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This is a thesis about classification and disease, our expectations as lay-people and 
patients as to where the borders of  illness lie, and the consequences of  such expec-
tations. In Chapter I the discussion is framed with a critical analysis of  common 
terms and concepts employed in the social, historical and philosophical study of  
disease. Chapter II revolves around a critique of  sections of  the philosophy of  
medicine literature, based upon the notion that any attempt at a ‘universal’ defini-
tion of  disease is likely to fail. Chapter III introduces and appraises the work of  
three thinkers - Edward Shorter, Elaine Showalter and Ian Hacking - in order to 
give more historical weight to the case study which follows. 
In Chapter IV, the final chapter, the main body of  evidence is presented. The con-
dition under examination is fibromyalgia and the bones of  the chapter come from 
twenty-two semi-structured interviews with patients about their experiences. It is 
argued that disease definition is not a procedure conducted in the abstract but 
rather a fleshy, intuitive process that all of  us, specialist or not, partake in. It is 
demonstrated that certain expectations of  disease exists among the population - 
what it should look like, what it should act like - and that these expectations have a 
greater role in constructing a patient’s identity than is often assumed. It is suggest-
ed that a patient might find themselves in harmony with their institutional catego-
ry, have a pleasant and working relationship with their doctor, but still exist in total 
discord with those around them on the basis of  their condition, a state of  affairs 
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This is a piece of  work which aims to look in detail at the philosophical context 
that frames the ways contested, chronic illnesses are experienced and understood 
by patients in the early 21st century. Nestled inside this subject sit many concepts 
which require further discussion and critique, and I shall go through them in turn. 
The key focus of  this research is to trace with greater accuracy and, more impor-
tantly, greater reference to lived experience, the contours of  belief  and assumption 
which provide us with our collective map of  disease.  
There is not an easy category in which to place this work. It is part historical, in 
that I utilise the writings of  historians to provide insight into our contemporary 
concerns. It is impossible, I suppose, to understand the current state of  disease be-
liefs prevalent across society without paying attention to the historical processes 
which have deposited a way of  viewing and feeling disease into our collective sub-
conscious. This work is also in part sociological, in that I borrow from sociology 
ways of  listening and observing illness.  Furthermore, sociology has given us the 1
most substantial attempt to reject or at least reform the biomedical view of  the 
body by highlighting the cases in which is is inappropriate and ill-fitted, and to this 
research I shall refer at several points. And though this work is clearly in-
terdisciplinary, it is perhaps most of  all philosophical. Throughout my discussions I 
return time and time again to fundamental questions of  conceptualisation: what 
do we expect a disease to look like?- what prevailing notions dictate the way we are 
allowed to, expect ourselves to be, and in some way are ill?- to whom does epis-
temic authority over these ideas belong to and originate from?  
I mean these questions to be read in a philosophical sense as attempts to probe be-
neath the surface of  our reaction to disease. In other words, how does a sick person 
 The semi-structured interviews I conducted were guided in part by previous sociological 1
approaches to medical narratives.
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understand their illness metaphysically, how do people around them approach it 
and what are the consequences of  these beliefs?  
My argument, to be expounded greatly in the following pages, can be summarised 
as follows. Many, if  not all, of  the different concepts that philosophers associate 
with illness suffer a great loss of  clarity under stringent investigation, and it is 
doubtful whether they are theoretically resilient enough to be relied on when con-
structing a coherent theory of  disease. What does emerge from their examination, 
however, is a more general impression, a broad framework through which it is pos-
sible to view the way disease is mediated and understood. From this we are able to 
envisage what shape illness takes on unconsciously, implicitly, in the imagination, 
the ways in which it is expected to show itself  and the ways in which people and 
institutions are expected to relate to it. In short, the way disease operates in our soci-
ety.  
With this idea in mind, I then introduce ‘chronic, contested illnesses’, those which 
do not conform to our vision, those which lie outside of  our expectations. These 
have a long and troubled history, intermingled most often with psychiatry. They 
present themselves in many forms, and a fuller description will be given below. The 
aim is not to show that people with these conditions ‘really are’ ill, or are deserving 
of  sympathy, though this is in my view certainly true. Rather, I want to put it that 
we intuitively categorise disease according to certain predispositions, and when we 
encounter a phenomenon which contradicts these prejudices, a gap opens up be-
tween our expectations of  disease and the condition itself, the thing before us. This 
gap creates a tension, a painful distance, but it is not purely theoretical. On the 
contrary, it is precisely in this space that harm occurs. This is found institutionally, 
in the form of  welfare disputes or dismissals from employment; interpersonally in 
the breakdown of  trust and respect in a marriage; psychologically in the self-doubt 
and depression of  an ill person who lacks an approved way of  deciphering the way 
they feel in their body.  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My thesis is that whilst much attention has been given to both analysing concepts 
related to disease and to investigating the relationship between institutions and in-
dividuals of  authority and patients, little focus has been granted philosophically to 
the ways in which we all - as friends, family members, colleagues, patients - con-
tribute to and constitute the experience and meaning of  disease. In other words, I 
think that the quest to define disease, to map the landscape of  the doctor/patient 
relationship, to understand how patients interact with their condition as described 
to them institutionally has eschewed broader questions about the underlying meta-
physical assumptions that exist in the minds of  clinicians and non-specialists alike. 
Essentially, I say that we cannot define disease, but we can look at the ways it is de-
fined, who is doing the defining, on what basis they make that distinction, and 
what the effects of  such a demarcation are.   2
The structure of  this work should hopefully impart a sense of  cumulation. In the 
first chapter I will discuss the various ways in which disease, illness and sickness 
have been employed conceptually, and account for my partial rejection of  such dis-
tinctions. Other concepts which orbit this topic will also be explored: biomedicine, 
malingering, issues of  legitimacy, validation and the role of  the patient community. 
The aim of  this discussion is to establish a conceptual context for talking about 
disease, to compile a language that engages with and enhances my case-study. I will 
then look at terms such as chronic and contested illness, recognising the slippery 
edges of  such things but arguing that our understanding of  them is adequate 
enough to justify using them as categories.  
My second chapter will consider how philosophy of  medicine has responded to the 
problem of  disease, specifically its definition. Though nearly half  a century of  
largely analytic literature exists on the topic, very little is of  applicable utility to the 
 These sound like very sociological questions. But what I am trying to get close to is out2 -
lining the unconscious, seemingly intuitive set of  beliefs and expectations that cause a per-
son to look at another and say ‘you are sick’ or ‘you are not ill’, a process that I think too 
obscure and too internal to be classified as an object of  sociological inquiry.
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problems of  chronic, contested illnesses. I consider a case crying out for definition, 
morgellons, and use this example to demonstrate the penury of  the disease defini-
tion literature in terms of  problem selection and applicability.  I then offer a short 3
historical analysis of  the definition of  disease literature which provides an original 
and critical thesis as to the discipline’s shortcomings, contending that the search for 
an all-encompassing definition of  disease is futile. I provide two main arguments 
for this perspective: my vast magnitude argument and my justification gap argu-
ment. The first of  these posits that there are simply too many entities that might  
qualify as disease to be accurately captured by a singular definition without entail-
ing the conceptual entrapment of  those things which we would not consider dis-
ease. The second makes the point that philosophers of  medicine provide little in 
the way of  justification as to why their stipulations should be taken up by medical 
decision makers.  
This is not the only philosophy that has relevance, however, and my third chapter 
will review work from other perspectives which come to bear on this topic. I will 
examine Ian Hacking’s ideas about the looping effect of  human kinds, alongside 
Edward Shorter and Elaine Showalter’s work about psychosomatic illnesses. The 
outlooks they provide give a historical view, and ask interesting questions as to the 
extent that contested illnesses are constructed (that is, produced and sustained by 
social trends), raise issues of  intertextuality and provide insight into the complicat-
ed reasons why these conditions struggle for legitimacy.  
The fourth chapter of  this work deals with my main case study, fibromyalgia. I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with patients from the UK and the US, try-
 Morgellons is a disease state which is heavily contested by doctors and patients who sub3 -
scribe to wholly different aetiological models. Patients (and a small group of  research-ac-
tivists) believe that they have an organic dysfunction which causes painful filaments or fi-
bres to grow from their skin, creating lesions that do not heal. Doctors believe that pa-
tients have delusions of  parasitosis, a long recognised psychological condition where indi-
viduals believe that something is crawling or growing beneath their skin, which they then 
lacerate in search of  relief. 
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ing to tease from their experiences a feeling of  the philosophical assumptions 
which underpin the troubles they face. It is here that I utilise the concepts discussed 
in Chapter I, mapping them on to real life struggles, told in the words of  those 
who experience them, and here which I hope to expose the myopia of  the philo-
sophical work referenced in Chapter II. The works discussed in Chapter III are 
also analysed, in that it becomes clear that individuals with these conditions are far 
more self-aware and reflexive than is sometimes assumed. This may not in fact be 
a negative reflection on those theorists’ work, but rather a demonstration of  in-
creased individualism in a new era of  truly mass communication and fluid identi-
ties. The ambition in this chapter is not to construct a new philosophy of  disease, 
or to say that one can be, but to lay as bare as possible the ways in which our phi-
losophy – the beliefs of  doctors, patients and the people around them – is unable 
to incorporate all of  our distress.  
In this final chapter I will conclude with a reassertion of  the importance of  disease 
as a topic of  philosophical enquiry. It is one which can tell us much about our rela-
tionship with our bodies and the environment. What is more, it offers us an appre-
ciation of  the profoundly moral way in which we discuss supposedly natural pro-
cesses, the importance to each individual of  being validated by a larger belief  sys-
tem and the consequences of  a medical superstructure based on reduction and de-
tection for entities which can neither be reduced or detected. Though it is hard to 
remain optimistic, given some of  the circumstances of  patients, it is also empha-
sised that only through further conversation, closer analysis and greater empathy 
can this topic be better understood. 
Caveats, of  course, abound. This is not a medical thesis, and does not aim to an-
swer any questions of  medical science. What this work tries to achieve instead is an 
illumination of  the way in which the medical aspects of  a disease: diagnosis, la-
belling, treatment etc. intersect with social beliefs about sickness and contribute to 
the manifestation of  illness in an individual, both in terms of  their symptoms and 
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how they understand them, but also in terms of  how those symptoms are greeted 
by others. Medicine is therefore just one of  many components which have an effect 
on our idea of  a disease, on our acceptance or rejection of  a certain set of  phe-
nomena as a disease concept. It is afforded no special status in this analysis.  
However, it should be highlighted that contested illnesses would benefit from more 
clarity in this (medical) and other areas, and I hope that my work on this topic 
might inspire others in different fields to approach these difficult questions. Doc-
tors, psychiatrists, health researchers, sociologists and other philosophers will find 
some interesting topics discussed in this thesis and may wish to pursue them fur-
ther within the scope of  their own specialities.  
Also to be noted is that the overriding emphasis of  this work is not to generate uni-
versals or to speak in grand terms, but rather to examine the specific and draw 
from it certain insights which may tentatively be said to represent something if  not 
nearly everything that can be said about the topic. As such, it is difficult to see how 
the conclusions of  the work presented below could be extended confidently beyond 
a UK context. Though of  course there will be similarities with the experience of  
people in other countries, the expectation that (in some cases subtle, in some cases 
vast) differences in outlook concretely exist prevents me from offering any detailed 
analysis beyond the borders of  this country.  
Furthermore, consistent with my stated commitment to specificity, this is a thesis 
that is ground in a precise time and place, and makes no claims to represent any-
thing more than a snapshot of  that particular moment. I take a lead from Floridi, 
who writes that any ‘timeless’ philosophy is a stagnant one.  This is a piece about 4
disease as it is lived and understood here and now and nowhere else. 
 
 Floridi, L. The Philosophy of  Information, 2011, Oxford University Press, UK, p.12.4
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Chapter I – Key Concepts  
What do we talk about when we talk about disease? It is something both grand and 
personal, with a metaphoric and psychological power hard to adequately contain 
within a single definition. Parts of  society can be diseased, an action can be sick, 
drinking culture can be a cancer, racism can be a tumour. And just as easily as we 
reach for these words do we proffer singular descriptions of  ourselves and others as 
unwell, from the banalities of  a cold to the life-threatening urgency of  a cardiac 
arrest. To begin at the beginning, disease is clearly also something biological, or at 
least connected to biology, and intuitively we seek to retain this connection in our 
discussion. It is where disease would appear to start. Arguing that this is the case is 
not, I think, as interesting as asking the inverse question, namely: where does it 
end?- what does it encompass? Alongside disease we must surely place illness and 
sickness. Is it useful to distinguish between them? What gains are made by treating 
them as equivalent terms?  
And then the central focus of  this work: chronic, contested illnesses. Is a chronic 
illness simply a condition that has persisted for a certain amount of  time, or is 
there a more inventive and instructive conceptualisation that can be reached? – 
what makes a disease contested? – are all diseases contested?  
Examining these conditions present a host of  related concepts: legitimacy, valida-
tion, responsibility, stigma. Are we able to make sense of  these on their own or do 
they have to be viewed in relation to a larger understanding of  disease? Then there 
exist certain outliers, such as malingering. Is it possible to tie down this idea in any 
useful way, or does it operate purely as a pejorative insinuation? Beneath it all, 
what is the ‘medical’ view, and how does it interact with the other concepts. Are we 
simply considering ‘biomedicine’ - whatever that may encompass - or is there a 
more convoluted and complex infrastructure at work here? 
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These may at first seem themselves to be slightly convoluted and complex ques-
tions themselves, but without attempting to answer them we leave ourselves bereft 
of  an adequate language with which to talk about disease. In the following chapter 
I will attempt to develop or dismiss these ideas in a way which lays the groundwork 
for later discussion of  real life examples, where I can hopefully begin to tie together 
the theoretical and the actual.  
Disease, illness, sickness 
Talcott Parsons famously wrote in 1951 about the rights and privileges that any ill 
person could expect to be afforded, providing they conformed with humble enthu-
siasm to certain anticipated behaviour, namely the ‘sick role’.  Under his function5 -
alist analysis, once one becomes ill it is possible to waive everyday obligations – 
work, school, being pleasant to others, dressing in a certain way – but only in ex-
change for a demonstrable change in attitude. Isolation is encouraged or in some 
cases demanded, doctor’s orders must be followed and above all a strong will to get 
better must be ostentatiously displayed. Infantile dependency may be allowed, but 
purely on the condition that it brings with it an equivalent childlike loss of  inde-
pendence.  
This analysis has been debated for over sixty years, and despite many shortcomings 
it remains important to this work because of  Parson’s original conception of  sick-
ness as a culturally understandable process, not something which acted upon an 
individual unknowingly.  The crucial insight that is of  relevance here is that illness 6
can be so much more than simply feeling unwell; it can be an escape from the frus-
 Parsons, T. The Social System, 1951, Routledge, UK; it might be worth noting that, 5
though highly original, Parsons was writing in the tradition of  Sigerist: see Sigerist, H. 




trations of  a complicated social world (Parsons describes this as ‘a tantalisingly at-
tractive “solution”’), it can have moral implications and it cannot exist in isolation.  7
Understanding sickness as something other than biological entity is of  course not 
something startlingly original itself, considering the relatively contemporary nature 
of  viewing disease biologically at all. Placing it within a wider scheme of  roles and 
responsibilities, however, allows us to consider illness as something both personal 
and intimately connected to broader social infrastructure. Whether you agree that 
being ill is a form of  deviance or not, it is difficult now to argue that we should 
think of  sickness in terms which ignore society.  
Defining exactly what ‘sickness’ means, however, has occupied medical sociology 
since Parsons. Literature in other fields such as medical anthropology and philoso-
phy of  medicine have reasserted by repetition the primacy of  refining a distinct 
and useable definition. As a result, significant gaps have opened between the con-
cept of  sickness and its sisters disease and illness as they are understood and 
utilised.  
To my mind the best, most lucid articulation of  disease, sickness and illness as so-
ciological concepts was written over 40 years ago by Marshall Marinka. His de-
scription to a remarkably full extent captured the way in which these ideas would 
be used in the years following. He starts with diseases: these are the ‘central facts’ 
that inform the medical view, they can be measured, quantified, somehow touched 
by apparatus and observation.  There is an statistical objectivity to them, they 8
present themselves as a ‘deviation from a biological norm’.   Diseases, then, are 9
discoverable, universal, comparable and consistent.  
 Parsons, T. and Fox, R. ‘Illness, therapy and the modern urban American family’ in 7
Jaco, E. (ed.) Patients Physicians and Illness, 1952, The Free Press, New York, p.237.




Illness skirts such neat definition. It is ‘a feeling’, something inward, only accessible 
by the patient, an ‘underworld of  experience’.  Illness is a subjective, personal 10
process and entry to it for outsiders is entirely reliant on the ways in which the in-
dividual chooses or is able to communicate their experience. Importantly, it is in-
consistent and variable. Illness here is fully demarcated from disease, in that there 
is no obligation that one should follow the other, despite them so often being bed-
fellows. To be ill but not diseased in the sense outlined here will occupy much 
space in this work. Not only is illness subjective, but it is also sometimes implied 
that unlike the other concepts it is something of  a personal decision, as Boyd writes 
‘whether or not someone is ill, is something the person concerned must ultimately 
decide for him- or her-self. But whether that person has a disease or is sick is some-
thing doctors and others dispute’.  11
Marinka adopts an essentially Parsonian view of  sickness, in that being sick is re-
garded as a negotiation between a person and society over which liberties can be 
taken and how favourably or unfavourably their actions will be received.  It is a 12
public manifestation, and does not require the presence of  either disease or illness 
as antecedents. Boyd states that ‘the security of  this role depends on a number of  
factors, not least the possession of  that much treasured gift, the disease’.  Still, a 13
person could be regarded as sick by society and adopt the sick role without in fact 
having any discoverable, biomedical irregularities or indeed feeling unwell subjec-
tively.  
Consider the strange case of  Joshua Norton, for example. A 19th century British-
American businessman who lost his entire fortune due to an inopportune change 
 Ibid.10
 Boyd, K. M. ‘Disease, Illness, sickness, health, healing and wholeness: exploring some 11
elusive concepts’ in The Journal of  Medical Ethics: Medical Humanities, 2000, Vol. 26, p. 11.
 Marinka, M. 1975, p. 83.12
 Boyd, K. M. 2000, p. 10.13
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in the rice markets, he emerged several years after this calamity to proclaim to the 
people of  San Francisco that he was the ‘Emperor of  the United States and Pro-
tector of  Mexico’. Encouraged by the local press and a good-humoured public, he 
was permitted to dress in regal attire and indulged by greetings of  mock reverence 
and ‘taxes’ wherever he went, despite continuing to live in poverty. Though retro-
spective diagnosis is a dangerous game, it is not such a stretch of  the imagination 
to believe that had Norton been ‘suffering’ from that which is most likely - 
grandiose delusions, a psychiatric disorder with no identifiable organic base – he 
would have been sick but not ill or diseased.    14
After Marinka, Arthur Kleinman added his voice to the discussion and strove for a 
more detailed though similar description of  disease and illness, alongside an ex-
panded vision of  what sickness might mean. In his view, sickness incorporates all 
the macro-social elements of  disorders, be it economic, class, gender, racial or in-
stitutional factors.  Poor housing, job pressures, family life, all of  these for Klein15 -
man became elements of  sickness that were previously ignored. His explicit desire 
in separating the three was to highlight the ways in which illness and sickness were 
ignored by a medical community overly focused on curing disease, and the lack of  
compassion, bad practice and poor public policy that resulted.  
Since the work of  these authors many subtle variations have emerged but most re-
tain the basic distinction that disease is something biomedical, illness is something 
personal and sickness is something societal. An indicator of  this continuity is Aho 
and Aho’s 2008 work Body Matters: A Phenomenology of  Sickness, Disease, and Illness, 
where they write that disease is ‘an organic pathology as discerned by one or more 
recognised clinical or laboratory procedures’ and illness is ‘a non-quantifiable lived 
 For more about this fascinating character, see Lis, E. ‘His Majesty’s Psychosis: the Case 14
of  Emperor Joshua Norton’ in Academic Psychiatry, 2015, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 181-185.
 Kleinman, A. The Illness Narratives, 1988, Basic Books, USA, pp. 6-7.15
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experience, not feeling well’.  Later in the same text they sum up by stating ‘physi16 -
cal and mental troubles show up in society as sickness-deviations to be corrected. 
To patients, they disclose themselves as illnesses. To doctors, ailments present 
themselves as diseases to be cured’.  This view is virtually indistinguishable from 17
that presented three and a half  decades previously. Further evidence of  the en-
trenchment of  these conceptual boundaries can be found in other places. Wilkman 
et al’s 2005 study, for example, attempted to operationalise disease, sickness and ill-
ness along these now-familiar lines. Professionally diagnosed conditions stood in for 
‘disease’, self-reported bad health was used for ‘illness’ and ‘sickness’ was repre-
sented by absence from work on sick-leave.  18
Although some theorists departed from Marinka and Kleinman’s basic view, the 
essential features of  their schema have remained unusually stable as sociological 
concepts. Such is the influence of  their work that the idea of  disease as ‘objective’, 
illness as ‘subjective’ and sickness is ‘macro’ or ‘societal’ is now in fairly common 
usage across not just sociology but also medical anthropology and the philosophy 
of  medicine. Some disputes have occurred, but generally these have taken place 
within the predetermined boundaries described above rather than about the actual 
ontological validity of  such distinctions.   19
Given its longevity, this approach evidently has an enduring appeal to theorists. In-
deed, it seems to fairly intuitively capture what are closely related and overlapping 
 Aho, J. A. and Aho, K. Body Matters: A Phenomenology of  Sickness, Disease, and Illness, 2008, 16
Lexington Books, USA, p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 77.17
 Wikman, A., Marklind, S. and Alexanderson, K. ‘Illness, disease and sickness absence 18
an empirical test of  differences between concepts of  ill health’ in The Journal of  Epidemio-
logical Community Health, 2005, Vol. 59, pp. 450-454.
 For example see Twaddle, A. and Nordenfelt, L. (eds.) Disease, Illness and Sickness: Three 19
Central Concepts in the Theory of  Health, 1993, Linköping University Press, Sweden; Hof-
mann, B ‘On the triad disease, illness and sickness’ in The Journal of  Medical Philosophy, 
2002, Vol. 27, No.6, pp. 651-673.
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but distinct concepts. There is a sense of  validity about the idea that a disease is an 
individual, measurable, pathological entity which causes you to feel ill, which then 
leads to a phone call with the boss and chicken noodle soup from your partner (i.e. 
the social benefits of  sickness), but that theses three concepts follow on from, inter-
act with and are closely related to each other without being exactly the same thing. 
No doubt, too, for a theorist working to challenge a biomedical system that has ob-
vious downsides for patients suffering from some conditions, the creation and as-
sertion of  these distinctions allows a shift in focus away from primarily reductionist 
medical concerns and a proclamation that the subjective and the societal matter. 
As such, Cecil Helman wrote in the 1980s that splitting disease and illness ‘has 
been one of  the most useful contributions of  medical anthropology’ and as recent-
ly as 2016 Havi Carel has asserted the desirability of  separating them.   20
However, in this work, I intend to disregard these distinctions and talk of  all three 
as if  they refer to the same thing - a broader, more encompassing category in 
which all three terms do not relate to delineated processes but rather deal with the 
whole hog. To summarise my argument briefly, I would say that the problem with 
disease, illness and sickness lies primarily in the order in which they are found in 
this sentence. Though of  course titles, approaches and motivations vary, what is 
almost invariable in the way that these concepts are employed in the literature is 
that disease comes first.  It is the smallest, the most quantifiable, the easiest to define. 21
 Helman, C.G. ‘Disease and Pseudo-Disease: A Case History of  Pseudo-Angina’ in 20
Hann, R. A. and Gaines, A. D. (eds.) Physicians of  Western Medicine: Anthropological Approaches 
to Theory and Practice, Springer, Netherlands, 1985, Vol. 6, p. 293; Carel, H. ‘Living in the 
present: Illness, phenomenology and well-being’ in Jackson, M. (ed.) The Routledge History 
of  Disease, 2016, Routledge, UK, p. 587.
 I mean this both literally in terms of  word order and also in the sense that disease is 21
implicitly epistemically privileged in the triad due to the reasons explained above. See, for 
example: Susser, M. ‘Disease, illness, sickness; impairment, disability and handicap’ in 
Psychological Medicine, 1990, Vol. 20, pp. 471-473; Boyd, K. M. 2000, pp. 9-17; Hofmann, 
B. ‘On the Triad Disease, Illness and Sickness’ in The Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy, 
2002, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp. 651-673.
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And although examples of  disease are virtually inexhaustible - the International 
Classification of  Diseases 10 contains 141,000 codes - these pale into insignificance 
when considered alongside the near-infinite possible permutations of  subjective 
experience present in illness and sickness. This lends the impression that vitally, 
disease is also the most real of  the three concepts, given our collective metaphysical 
prejudices.  The weight placed on ‘reality’ will become clearer when questions of  22
legitimacy and validation are raised later in this chapter.    
Illness comes after disease, and does not live in the objective world but rather the 
land of  subject feeling, impressionistic, inward and unreliable. We are inclined to 
trust that something objective (measurable, reliably quantifiable) is better, more re-
spectable, than the vagaries of  personal experience. Sickness completes the trio by 
encompassing the wider aspects of  morbidity that are difficult to ignore. Once 
again though this seems less concrete than disease, tied as it is to the whims of  so-
cial values. I am writing in this manner not because I believe it to be a true repre-
sentation of  these concepts but rather because it is the impression that one gets 
from reading about disease, illness and sickness.  
Medical sociology changed tack in the 1970s and 80s, abandoning its Parsonian 
roots for a model which was not so singularly suited to acute conditions and did 
not view illness as deviance.  Part of  this new direction was placing emphasis on 23
the split between disease, illness and sickness. Rightly, the separation of  these ideas 
was pursued with the aim of  provoking the realisation that clinical care in the last 
century also required patient and epidemiological perspectives in order to be truly 
humane and successful.  
However, at this stage, the continued segregation of  these terms serves in a subtle 
but persuasive way to reinforce implicitly the authority of  medicine to decide what 
 See ‘Biomedicine’, this chapter.22
 Pierret, J. ‘Constructing discourses about health and their social determinants’ in 23
Radley, A. (ed.) Worlds of  Illness: Biographical and Cultural Perspectives on Health and Disease, 
2002, Routledge, UK, p. 9.
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is ‘disease’ and what is not. It is clear that although the three concepts are often 
said to be overlapping and interrelated, what they actually are is hierarchical. Dis-
ease sits atop illness and sickness in validity and importance. Granting this primacy 
to disease too easily and too neatly accedes epistemic authority to medical science.  
Some philosophers recognise this danger but, to my mind, avoid confronting it 
head on or with a prolonged rebuke. For example, Carel writes:  
 
‘[The disease/illness dichotomy] does not imply that illness that is not accompa-
nied by disease is less real or less significant than an illness that is. Indeed, our abili-
ty to identify disease is contingent and changes over time. Hence I am not suggest-
ing that an illness that is not accompanied by disease is less real but merely that we 
have not (yet) identified the disease. The epistemic restriction, namely our current 
inability to identify the disease, should not drive any ontological assumptions about 
the reality or severity of  the illness’.  24
 
It seems to me, however, that statements like this reveal a reverence towards disease 
as biomedically defined, seeing as the validity of  illness hinges here on an hypo-
thetical and underdetermined future in which all illnesses are explicated by disease 
processes discovered according to biomedical parameters. When reading passages 
such as this one it also strikes me that though our current inability to align disease 
and illness should not indeed ‘drive any ontological assumptions about the reality or 
severity of  the illness’, our good intentions do not prevent it from doing so in actu-
ality, whether in the clinic or the street. The question then becomes, I think, 
whether or not this approach of  splitting disease and illness helps or hinders the 
problems which arise from having illness but not disease. I do not believe that it has 
 Carel, H. in Jackson, M. (ed.) 2016, p.  587; Carel perhaps has one further reason to 24
favour this distinction: it maps neatly onto the phenomenological concepts of  the objec-
tive body and the body-as-lived, canonical conceptualisations within her discipline.
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a positive effect in this regard, largely because this dichotomy cements the epis-
temic authority of  medical science in constituting the meaning of  disease and rele-
gates illness to a subsidiary role, perhaps bolstered by the presence of  disease but 
never granted the same authority.  
This arrangement of  concepts also seems to ignore wider trends in philosophy and 
sociology of  science, which have from the late 20th century sought the challenge 
the unquestioned acceptance of  science’s epistemic authority.  I do not want to go 25
down this route and rehash what are by now well-worn disputes, but I think it is 
important to highlight the incongruity here. As sociologists, philosophers, anthro-
pologists or whatever, we challenge and have challenged science everywhere and 
yet in this instance we continue to work within the disease/illness/sickness di-
chotomy. This implicitly removes our analytic hands from ‘disease’, assuming that 
it is the preserve of  medical science.  
The danger here is that the use of  such conceptual cleavers has an effect on the 
way we treat the resulting categories: in order to highlight and criticise the defi-
ciencies of  reductionist medicine, we have created separate groupings which allow 
medical science a designated space in which to be reductionist without analytic 
confrontation. This, and to be clear I am talking about present discussions (I fully 
acknowledge the previous usefulness of  such distinctions), is counterproductive. 
Not only does it suggest that all disease definition is an impartial, medical process - 
something not borne out by empirical evidence of  politicisation, borderline cases, 
pharmaceutical influence etc. - it also seems to accede all of  the fundamental mean-
 I am thinking not only of  the Strong Programme and the work of  Latour (who, despite 25
their differences, both believe the scientific production of  knowledge is ripe for critical 
analysis), but also of  more recent work such as Douglas, H. E. Science, Policy, and the Value-
Free Ideal, 2009, University of  Pittsburgh Press, USA.
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ing of  disease to abstract, impartial, scientific forces.  As will become evident 26
throughout this thesis if  it is not already, disease is messy. Advancing in our analysis 
as if  it is possible to isolate that which is medically determined and, furthermore, 
placing that atop the conceptual heap in terms of  validity, seems to me a foolish 
way to move proceed.  27
But perhaps I am coming at this from the wrong direction. We should consider for 
a moment the idea that it may not be disease which is easily bracketed from the 
other two (and therefore should be separate) but illness. By virtue of  its inwardness, 
its subjectivity, we might say that some important part of  illness is incommunica-
ble. It is in other words fundamentally personal in a way that disease and sickness 
are not. A disease, at least abstractly, exists with some consistency across popula-
tions of  people, whereas illness as constructed here can only be accurately dis-
cussed in terms of  individuals. Illness is different in each person it occurs in, 
whereas plenty of  people can be said to have the same disease.  
There are a number of  ways you could respond to this. Firstly, you could simply 
accept this argument and use it as a further buttress for the necessary separation of  
the concepts. Or, you could say that, actually, illness does have universal, consistent 
features and is comparable to disease in that sense (this is a line of  thinking taken 
up by Toombs and discussed briefly below, p. 90). These essential features, howev-
er, suffer from not being as essential as those found in disease processes, and from 
 That is to say that under this schema, any meaning not associated with the disease as 26
constructed by medical science is placed in some other category - ‘illness’, ‘sickness’, ‘pa-
tient experience’ etc. and regarded as something related but separate. The fundamentals 
of  disease thus become decided on an entirely scientific basis. 
 There are of  course permutations in the viewpoint I have outlined. You could, descrip27 -
tively, argue that disease is that which is captured by medicine without being compelled to 
accept the validity of  that discernment, as Aho and Aho do: Aho, J. A. and Aho, K. 2008, 
p. 3.
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being constituted in what I would consider a significantly different manner.   28
My response would be to say that there is nothing about the supposed incommuni-
cability or isolated nature of  illness that generates an unbridgeable gap between it 
and similar or related concepts. For me it simply sits at the same juncture- the 
crunch point where biological disharmony, social responses and individually expe-
rienced symptoms collide. Subjective reaction does not need to be be bracketed as 
it is a sufficient if  not necessary component of  disease, or illness, or sickness. 
Once you remove the barrier between disease, illness and sickness, have you simply 
adjusted the power balance in the doctor patient relationship? Is this the same 
thing as saying that anyone has the right to produce explanations of  disease, re-
gardless of  their qualifications? The answer to these questions is that simply re-
moving the conceptual distinction between disease, illness and sickness will not di-
rectly influence epistemic power relations. Medical science and its institutions re-
main the most influential arbiter of  meaning related to illness that exists in society, 
but that does not mean that we should allow it special analytic privileges. By treat-
ing disease, illness and sickness as one, larger phenomenon, we achieve several 
things. 
Firstly, the inbuilt, implicit hierarchy that assumes ‘disease’ is the most important 
aspect of  a condition is reconfigured, and we are encouraged to consider other fac-
tors, or at least to contemplate the way the puzzle pieces fit together. This reflects 
the fairly widespread constructivist critique of  objectivity in scientific knowledge, 
and reminds us that scientism should not go unchallenged or unquestioned. Or-
ganised biomedicine is not somehow ineffective or bad, it is just that giving it such 
an elevated role can be counter productive. As Mansbridge writes:  
 That is to say, the inconsistencies in illness experience are far greater than those in dis28 -
ease detection and it is arguable that something like the loss of  freedom (i.e. illness) is fun-
damentally different from the presence of  helicobacter pylori in your stomach (i.e. 
disease).
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‘Inequalities in power have their most insidious effect when the dominant group 
has so much control over the idea available to other members of  the society that 
the conceptual categories required to challenge the status quo hardly exist. Ideo-
logical hegemony of  this sort pervades every human society in ways that are, by 




‘The discourse generated by medical science is so dominant, and supported by 
such power and prestige, that its anomalies, self-contradictions and nonsequiturs 
are obscured from view’.  30
 
And this is precisely what happens when we fully accede to medicine the concept 
of  disease: we rob ourselves of  the tools to shine a light on these obscurities and 
properly resist outcomes which may seem misguided, warped or harmful. In this 
way I feel that combining the terms in fact carries on the previous work done in 
sociology to encourage a broader understanding of  illness and confront the appar-
ent omnipotence of  medicine to decide upon disease.  
Furthermore, setting down disease, illness and sickness together rather than apart 
represents a more sensible use of  language. Connotations do oscillate with context, 
and there are differences between the words, but there is really no substantive dis-
 Mansbridge, J. J. ‘The making of  oppositional consciousness’ in Mansbridge, J. J. and 29
Morris, A. Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of  Social Protest, University of  
Chicago Press, 2001, USA, p. 4.
 Kitwood, T. ‘Towards the reconstruction of  an organic mental disorder’ in Radley, A. 30
(ed.) Worlds of  Illness: Biographical and Cultural Perspectives on Health and Disease, 2002, Rout-
ledge, UK, p. 142.
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tance between the ill, the sick, and the diseased. To label someone sick but not ill has 
little relevance beyond the philosophy and sociology of  medicine, and does not 
represent how people relate to these concepts in their everyday lives. Many other 
languages do not draw any distinction between them. French generally uses some 
variation on malade. The German krankheit leans more towards disease whilst 
erkrankung is closer to illness, but largely they are used synonymously. Lithuanian, as 
a further example, does not distinguish between the three (liga is used for all).  
Clouser, Culver and Gert examined the different ways that disease and illness were 
used (alongside other terms like injury) and in response proposed that ‘malady’ be 
used in all cases to describe ‘roughly, any condition in which there is something 
wrong with a person’.  Their argument was that though there are ways to distin31 -
guish between disease, illness, disorder, wound, trauma etc., these concepts suffer 
from an ‘arbitrary element’ in their labelling, and as such should be abandoned in 
favour of  an umbrella description.  The strength of  their analysis lies not in their 32
conclusion, and indeed their proposed new descriptive category seemed to created 
new problems and did not garner support, but rather in the way they highlight the 
ambiguous and idiosyncratic use of  terms across clinical practice and by different 
groups.  For Clouser, Culver and Gert, disease, illness and sickness had been de33 -
fined too clumsily, in a manner which morphed and overlapped at great variance 
depending on who was doing the defining and for what purpose. This is close to 
my position. 
Replacing disease, illness and sickness with disease, illness and sickness enables us 
 Clouser, K. D., Culver, C. M. and Gert, B. ‘Malady: A New Treatment of  Disease’ in 31
Hastings Center Report, 1981, Vol. 11, Is. 3, p. 29.
 Ibid., p. 29.32
 Their definition of  ‘malady’ was as follows: ‘a person has a malady if  and only if  he or 33
she has a condition, other than a rational belief  or desire, such that he or she is suffering, 
or at increased risk of  suffering, an evil (death, pain, loss of  freedom or opportunity, or 
loss of  pleasure) in the absence of  a distinct sustaining cause’. Ibid., p. 36
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to examine the various features of  a condition as if  they belong to the same thing, 
rather than individual parts whose relationship is unclear. Thus we can speak of  a 
condition, largely regarded by doctors to be X (with associated clinical features, 
prognosis etc.), which can manifest in a patient as Y, whose causation or exacerba-
tion can be traced to environmental stress factors, which is generally treated 
through Z and consider the whole picture to be the disease. The focus here then be-
comes precisely how these different factors interact to produce a certain experience 
of  illness, which parts exert the most power (ontologically, epistemically, psycholog-
ically) and whether or not this is a benevolent and positive system. As Annemarie 
Mol states:  
 
‘The disease/illness distinction is no longer helpful. When doctor and patient act 
together in the consultation room, they jointly give shape to the reality of  the pa-
tients’ hurting legs. How to call what they thus shape? If  I use the word disease here, 
this is not to locate my text on the disease side of  the disease/illness distinction, but 
to breach it’. (Emphasis in the original).  34
 
In other words, no illness is purely a microscopic abstraction, and nor is it entirely 
an emotional or symptomatic response, but rather a complex set of  circumstances, 
and employing holistic language to describe and explain this more accurately rep-
resents its multifaceted reality. The pathogen is part of  the disease and the illness 
and the sickness, as is the pain in a person’s gut, the living conditions that allow it 
to spread and the way that the reporter talks about it on the news. We do ourselves 
no favours by separating and differentiating the three concepts and approaching 
them individually as if  they can only be analysed on their own. 
 Mol, A. The Body Multiple, 2003, Duke University Press, USA, p. 27.34
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Chronic, contested illnesses 
 
To better be able to examine disease, it is good to focus on one aspect of  the con-
cept. Honing in on a specific area is important for detail and accuracy but also at 
some point for explanation. Making grand statements about disease as a whole as-
sumes that such statements can be made at all, and it is better to shine a light on a 
small corner and speculate from that than stare into space and try to describe it all. 
That is not to say that I have decided to address an area of  this topic at random.  
On the contrary, by choosing to look at chronic, contested illnesses I have quite de-
liberately picked a group of  diseases that live within the crux of  many philosophi-
cal problems. These are the conditions unaccounted for by biomedical models, the 
ailments that debilitate and destroy without explanation or acceptance. They often 
straddle physical and mental, but share a sense of  dislocation; doctors are not 
trained to help their non-specific pain, partners are not naturally inclined to sym-
pathise and institutions are not willing to accept them as genuine. They are pre-
cisely those illnesses which disconnect from our expectations of  disease, and in the 
gap created lay bare our previous assumptions about what a disease is or what is 
necessary for someone to be sick. But is this a useful category, or indeed a category 
at all? Is it possible to adequately define a chronic disease, or a contested illness? 
Let us start with the former.  
Chronic diseases attract attention from all sorts of  groups in part because they 
present huge costs to healthcare systems around the planet, though most notably in 
the developed world.  Essentially, the better doctors become at treating short-35
term, self-limiting conditions, the more the burden of  healthcare transfers to 
 This is not to say that parts of  the developing world will not find themselves in a similar 35
situation as their acute medical care improves and life expectancies rise, see Choi, B. C. et 
al ‘Enhancing global capacity in the surveillance, prevention, and control of  chronic dis-
eases: seven themes to consider and build upon’ in Journal of  Epidemiology and Community 
Health, 2008, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 391-397.
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longer-lasting, less curable diseases and the medical emphasis switches from re-
sponse to management. Already, chronic conditions are estimated to account for 
up to 70% of  deaths in the USA and it has been noted that demographic trends, 
especially in the UK and US, point towards an unbalanced population with dis-
proportionately more older people than ever before.  Thrall notes that ‘the magni36 -
tude of  the population burden of  chronic disease is eye-opening’.   37
However, despite these concerns and the worrying prognosis above, an established 
definition of  ‘chronic disease’ - whether clinical, policy-focused, philosophical or 
sociological - is a hard to find. Many researchers note that it is not a static concept, 
displaying 'genuine ambiguity' or that different models and conceptualisations are 
used to suit the context.  Even then, explicit definitions are rare, and there is little 38
agreement across disciplines as to what constitutes a chronic disease or which dis-
eases could be classified as such. This lack of  specificity, or failure to operationalise 
chronic illnesses, may be a function of  the medical apparatus we expect to be able 
to analyse them with. As Martin writes, chronic diseases do not fit readily ‘into a 
biomedical or administrative classification’.   39
It is clear, however, that some essential features of  chronic conditions can be dis-
cerned, and indeed there are certain intuitive elements which reoccur across most 
conditions. As much of  a banal truism as it may seem, the fact that to be a chronic 
 Thrall, J. H. ‘Prevalence and costs of  chronic disease in a healthcare system structured 36
for treatment of  acute illness’ in Radiology, 2005 Vol. 235, No. 1, p. 9.
 Ibid, p. 10.37
 Carel, H. Illness: the cry of  the flesh, Acumen Publishing, UK, 2008, p. 80; For a good 38
guide to the various ways that chronic disease can be defined see: Walker, C. ‘Recognising 
the changing boundaries of  illness in defining terms of  chronic illness: a prelude to under-
standing the changing needs of  people with chronic illness’ in Australian Health Review, 
2001, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 209.
 Martin, C. M. ‘Chronic disease and illness care: adding principles of  family medicine 39
to address ongoing health system redesign’ in Canadian Family Physician, 2007, Vol. 53, No. 
12, p. 2086.
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illness one must have it for a long time is still a claim that needs examining. This is 
because what may be chronic now may not be so in the future, or may overlap with 
something regarded as acute. Consider, for example, that you are unfortunately 
involved in a car crash, which does severe damage not only to your insurance pre-
miums but also to your back, breaking your spine in several places. This leads to a 
week in hospital, followed by many return visits, orthopaedic and physiotherapy 
sessions and at first a total change to your home environment. Gradually you stop 
feeling so much pain when you walk, are able to lift things again and bit by bit 
reestablish a normal life. Within 18 months you are able to play sport again and 
are looking to lose the weight you gained whilst sitting idle in convalescence. The 
whole process has taken longer it takes some people to endure breast cancer treat-
ment, and yet breaking bones is very much considered an acute medical emer-
gency whereas cancer is normally defined as chronic.  40
Perhaps that example was unfair. After all, is a spinal injury the same thing as a 
long-term disease? Its properties are certainly similar to many acute conditions: an 
external shock which destabilises the body; either self-limiting or fatal; there are 
medical interventions which aid the recovery of  previous or near-previous func-
tioning. The point is possibly not whether breaking your back is comparable some-
thing like myocardial infarction, but rather to demonstrate that simply lasting a 
long time is not a strong enough demarcation to completely separate 'chronic' con-
ditions from the rest. 
It is also important to recognise that what might appear to be a chronic disease to-
day may well be an illness which at some point in the future comes to be consid-
ered otherwise. For example, syphilis is now easily treated by antibiotics. However, 
it once was a condition which could progressively degenerate a patient over 
decades, leading to mental and physical decay and ultimately death. For most in 
 This last point is debatable: some cancers are aggressive enough that they only last a 40
short period of  time, and it is true that historically cancer was not considered a chronic 
illness.
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the developed world it has become little more than an embarrassment and an in-
convenience, certainly not a morbid threat. It seems fairly straightforward to argue 
that syphilis, and many other diseases, were once chronic but are now acute, and 
that these categories are as dependent on our ability to treat diseases as the proper-
ties of  the disease itself. Or at least it does if  we are only taking into account time-
span.   
Are there other factors then which we should contemplate when deciding what 
constitutes a chronic disease? Should the classification in actual fact be indepen-
dent of  medical responses, and instead essentialist? If  so, then an acute disease 
would arguably become one which either kills or gets killed, lasts a short period of  
time and comes on quickly; it is unable to coexist with a body that functions, even 
in a limited capacity. Under this reading acute diseases then possess something of  
an odd duality, being either that which is fairly deadly or that which is almost 
harmless.  Syphilis here returns to its life as a chronic illness, but one whose true 41
calling is snubbed out by pharmaceutical intervention. Chronic diseases in this 
view become those which are nonself-limiting, those whose reoccur frequently, 
those that the body cannot expel. Those that do indeed last a long time.   
This view suffers from an implicit assumption that within diseases there are natural 
kinds which can help us distinguish between the chronic and the acute.  The sim42 -
plicity of  this approach ignores the many complicated ways in which disease inter-
acts with individuals, and interacts with them differently, as well as for the most 
part disregarding the effects of  medical intervention. Because of  this, I believe that 
if  we are to construct a definition of  chronic diseases which is useful and accurate, 
here and now, then we must disregard or at least downplay essentialist elements. We 
 That is to say, an entity that kills you or is killed by you in short order.41
 Alongside the charge that there are plenty of  ambiguous counterexamples which seem 42
to provide a compelling argument for grey areas: brain damage for instance, or infectious 
short term diseases which leave you chronically affected like, say, the scaring from severe 
scabies or polio which leaves you paraplegic.
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must also ask how much strain we intend to put on our concepts, and whether our 
descriptions can take such a load.  
In this case, I do not believe it to be unreasonable to expect that a pragmatic de-
marcation of  'chronic'  from 'acute' is possible, especially if  it is tied to a specific set 
of  conditions which are to be examined. It may at first seem as though I am skirt-
ing around the point to ask the following questions, but taken together I think they 
give a fairly good account of  what a chronic disease might look like and entail: 
does the disease necessitate repeated medical visits, continual medication or other 
treatment? - is it talked about in months and years or days and weeks? - is 'normal 
life' for the patient altered on a permanent or semi-permanent basis? - is major 
adaptation required, does the condition alter the sufferer's sense of  self  and body? 
- is the disease something that is being managed rather than fought, delayed in-
stead of  cured? These questions are not intended to create a watertight definition 
of  chronic diseases, but they do provide us with a starting point for discussing the 
topic which does not rely entirely on time-span or essentialism and draws a picture 
of  chronic illness which many patients would recognise.  
I now return to what I wrote at the beginning of  this section, namely that chronic 
conditions 'live within the crux of  many philosophical problems'. Overriding philo-
sophical ideas - how we view the body and the nature of  disease - clash with 
chronic illnesses which contradict our prior beliefs about disease. Arthur Frank, in 
his excellent book The Wounded Storyteller, confronts this dissonance narratively.  43
Frank explains that people tend to talk about their diseases in ways which either 
conform or confront our expectations of  what an ill person should be like. The 
most common attitude and method of  communicating as a sick individual is 
termed the ‘restitution narrative’, that is, the story of  a person who has recently 
become ill but is trying to, and will, recover soon. Think, for example, of  com-
monplace ‘battle’ narratives as they relate to cancer: people win their war with the 
 Frank, A. The Wounded Storyteller, 2013, University of  Chicago Press, USA.43
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disease or they lose their brave fight, or else they hang in there whilst medicine at-
tacks the condition, hoping to become survivors. Frank writes that ‘contemporary 
culture treats health as the normal condition that people ought to have restored. 
Thus the ill person’s own desire for restitution is compounded by the expectation 
that other people want to hear restitution stories’.   44
For Frank the central assumption of  the sick role is that people take it up in the be-
lief  (both of  themselves and others) that they will get better - or at least continue to 
have faith that they will - and it is this understanding of  disease which gives restitu-
tion stories their narrative power. However, in case of  many chronic illness, these 
narratives no longer fit, and in the place of  restitution we are left with ‘chaos’: an 
unending, spasmodic and unordered view of  what is happening. This creates its 
own problems as it rubs uneasily against the form that doctors and others expect a 
patient to take: ‘clinicians cannot entertain chaos because chaos is an implicit cri-
tique of  the modernist assumptions of  clinical work’.  In the end, the sick are left 45
in uncomfortable state where storytelling - the way that they understand what is 
happening to them and express it to those around them - breaks down entirely, and 
this collapse is ‘compounded by other people’s resistances to non-restitution stories 
of  illness’.  46
The problems often faced by chronically sick people highlight philosophical points 
about existing models of  disease. These conditions often fail to fit into conventional 
understandings of  illness and illustrate the futility of  both our common narrative 
responses and of  medical intervention (though only if  medical intervention's pri-
mary aim is to cure, to end).   
Clinically, research indicates that large numbers of  chronically ill patients are not 
happy with the care they receive, and that they do not receive enough or the right 
 Ibid., p. 77.44
 Ibid., p. 111.45
 Ibid., p. 191.46
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kind of  assistance.  There is some evidence to suggest that when the condition is 47
limiting (i.e. the individual’s social, personal and economic activity is restricted by 
their illness), then this dissatisfaction is greater.  My own research (to be discussed 48
in Chapter IV) would also seem to support these claims.  
Literature on this topic is regrettably sparse in some areas. Whilst an excellent so-
ciological tradition exists, from Kleinman to Charmaz, characterised by a devotion 
to compassionate, humane writing, there is a lack of  philosophical work on the 
subject, something both striking and worrying.  Many writings attempt to formu49 -
late or critique theories of  disease in general, and as such touch on chronic illness 
incidentally, but few regard it as something that might pose unique problems. One 
exception exists in von Engelhardt, whose work attempts to situate the experience 
of  chronically ill patients in a broader philosophical context. His argument is that 
chronic disease generates unique stress and puts demands on interpersonal rela-
tionships which mean that 'concepts of  health and disease require new 
definitions'.  He goes on to say that philosophers are capable of  ‘producing valu50 -
able interpretations of  health and disease that [take] the spiritual or cultural nature 
of  human experience into account, [and question] the established positivistic per-
spective’ . It is time, he is saying, to broaden our writings about chronic disease 51
 Wagner, E. H. ‘Chronic Disease Management: what will it take to improve care for 47
chronic illness?’ in Effective Clinical Practice, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 2-4; Darker, C., Casey, 
E., Seraukina, T., Whiston, L. and O’Shea, B. The Patients’ Perspective: A Survey of  Chronic 
Disease Management in Ireland, Report, Department of  Public Health and Primary Care, 
Trinity College Dublin, 2014.
 Hewitson, P. et al ‘People with limiting long-term conditions report poorer experiences 48
and more problems with hospital care’ in BMC Health Services Research, 2014, Vol. 14, No. 
33, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/33.
 Charmaz, K. Good Days, Bad Days: The Self  in Chronic Illness and Time, 1993, Rutgers 49
University Press, USA.
 von Engelhardt, D. ‘How to support the patient with chronic disease. A philosophical 50
point of  view’ in Journal of  Nephrology, 2008, Vol. 21, No. 13, pp. 27-28.
 Ibid., p. 28.51
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and recognise that though biomedicine is astonishingly successful at keeping peo-
ple alive, what we often fail to reflect on is ‘the quality, or lived experience, of  these 
many lives that have been saved’.  52
I think that this (von Engelhardt’s) point is key: illness is a topic ripe for philosophi-
cal reflection, but chronic disease in particular leads us to question our assumptions 
around sickness and well-being, precisely because it is not accommodated as well 
(or in some cases, at all) by the metaphysical guide ropes we use to understand 
medical conditions.  When he says that the concepts of  health and disease need 53
new definitions, he is recognising the inadequacy of  our current frameworks when 
it comes to providing insight into certain types of  diseases, and it is this inadequacy 
I will be highlighting and challenging throughout this thesis.  
Returning to chronic illnesses, it should be noted that they can also be viewed as an 
issue of  social justice. The way that patients are treated raises serious questions 
about the distribution of  resources within health infrastructure. Those with long-
term conditions who suffer the most, outside of  their symptoms, are those who are 
least able to materially support themselves, whether that involves paying for regular 
medication, hiring carers, modifying their living space or other costs associated 
with illness. Many are forced to continue working under great bodily distress be-
cause the alternative is homelessness and destitution. This is especially apparent in 
a health care system such as the US’s, where providing assistance for the chronical-
ly ill is not incentivised and therefore underprovided.  Often the need for more 54
material capital is accompanied by an increased reliance on a social network that 
 Brennan, J. ‘Transitions in health and illness: realist and phenomenological accounts of  52
adjustment to cancer’ in Carel, H. and Cooper, R. (eds.) Health, Illness and Disease, Acumen 
Publishing, UK, 2013, p. 129.
 Havi Carel has written extensively on the value of  illness to philosophy (and vice versa). 53
See, for example: Carel, H. ‘The Philosophical Role of  Illness’ in Metaphilosophy, 2014, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 20-40.
 Walker, C. 2001, p. 211.54
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can offer help if  not always understanding. Thus the weaker a person is connected 
to others or integrated into such a network at the time of  their illness, the more 
likely they are to struggle with the resulting financial, physical and psychological 
effects. Havi Carel has written about how the social world of  patients, 'so crucial to 
happiness' can shift and morph as chronic illness wears on. She writes that 'rela-
tionships come under new kinds of  pressure when the autonomy and indepen-
dence of  the ill person are modified. Old friendships must change to accommodate 
the illness or eventually wane. New friendships are now formed in the shadow of  
illness’.   55
What Carel does not mention in the extract above (though does discuss elsewhere) 
is how much of  this disheartening recalibration of  social networks is dependent 
upon having a strong web of  friends and colleagues in the first place, no matter 
how distressing it is to watch your grip on such relationships loosen or disintegrate. 
Later on in this work we will be introduced to individuals whose life was hard and 
isolated before illness, after which they unfortunately in some cases were left almost 
totally alone. In short, it is those on the fringes of  society, those already perhaps 
marginalised socially and economically from the benefits of  living in a developed 
countries, who find themselves worse off  should they develop a chronic disease.   56
I hope that by now it is clear that despite the inherent vagueness of  the concept, 
there is enough that is substantive about chronic disease to make it relevant as a 
topic of  philosophical inquiry. I wish to use chronic illness in this thesis as a way of  
demonstrating that there are a multitude of  ways that people experience sickness 
which are not adequately predicted or encapsulated by our expectations of  disease. 
 Carel, H. 2008, p. 74.55
 It should also be noted that those individuals who are marginalised economically and 56
socially tend to live both shorter lives and lives in which more time is spent in poor health 
or with a disability: Marmot, M., Allen, J., Goldblatt, P. et al ‘Healthy Lives, brighter fu-
tures - the strategy for children and young people’s health’, Marmot Review Team, UK, 
2010.
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Within chronic illness, there are a set of  conditions, held loosely together, that 
more than any others exemplify this problem. These are termed 'contested illness-
es' and it is to them that I turn now.  57
At first glance, it might seem that there are so many ways that a disease could be 
considered 'contested' that describing one as such becomes virtually meaningless. 
Although this is true to an extent, I would like to demonstrate in this section that it 
is possible to demarcate contested illness in a meaningful way. The conditions I am 
after are figures of  doubt in their entirety - the type of  contestation that occurs is 
fundamental not specific. They are illnesses that appear to us not as controversial 
because we don’t know their exact mechanism or which drugs are most effective at 
treating them but because in some sense we suspect them to not exist. They are, in 
my terminology, ontologically contested. But first, in what ways might a disease be 
considered contested and why are these criteria often inadequate in the making of  
a bona fide contested disease?  
Illnesses can be disputed clinically, pharmaceutically and legally, with arguments 
often springing up regarding aetiology and risk factors as well. Politically too, they 
can be contested and there have been well known and large-scale campaigns 
around individual illnesses. These focus on changing perceptions of  a certain dis-
ease, altering the tone of  education, improving access to resources, information 
and infrastructure. A side-effect of  these initiatives is that often disenfranchised pa-
tients feel like they have been able to recover some dignity and achieve a form of  
moral reconciliation with a society that has stigmatised and marginalised them. 
The patient response to the AIDS crisis in the 1980s is almost the epitome of  this 
kind of  political contestation, though equally the work of  disabled activists, the 
 Some examples of  contested illness include fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, 57
chronic lyme disease, toxic mould syndrome, sick building syndrome, multiple chemical 
sensitivity and silicone breast implant disease.
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blind and the deaf  movements as well as women's health campaigns could be in-
cluded here.  58
The way that doctors think we should respond to diseases is another source of  con-
flict. For any given condition there exists a spectrum of  medical options. Different 
treatment programmes are often favoured and promoted across different localities, 
between individual hospital departments and by doctors themselves, a process 
which reflects the fragmented, specialised nature of  modern medicine. If  alterna-
tive remedies are taken into account then it becomes clear that for any condition 
there exists a plurality of  possible medical reactions, not all of  which could be con-
sidered complementary. Yet this is considered fairly ordinary and offering patients 
choice is not framed as contestation.  
Pharmaceutically, diseases are contested in the sense that a complex relationship 
has emerged in some countries, most notably the US, between the drug companies, 
doctors and patients. I separate this from the clinically arguments discussed above 
because often this conflict comes to be about more than simply the 'best' way to 
treat a specific condition. The growth of  behavioural disorders and fears of  over-
diagnosis and medicalisation are good examples of  where illnesses become phar-
maceutically contested, the arguments being centred around the administration of  
 Much has been written about the politicisation of  AIDS, a good place to start being 58
Epstein, S. Impure Science: AIDS, activism, and the politics of  knowledge, 1996, University of  Cal-
ifornia Press, USA; for an examination of  how the deaf  community interacts politically 
with social changes see Lane, H. The Mask of  Benevolence: disabling the Deaf  community, 1999, 
DawnSignPress, USA; for many of  these examples it may seem as though the key battles 
are over responses to illness - in other words what to do about them. This is certainly a 
part of  what goes on, but it is important to remember the conflict over meaning that oc-
curs, whether it is the fashioning of  AIDS as a disease caught only by ‘deserving’, ‘de-
praved’ individuals or deafness as an exclusionary disability.
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drugs and explaining both the supply of  and demand for such treatments.   59
Related to the sometimes murky clinical and pharmaceutical picture, many dis-
eases could be considered to be aetiologically contested. This terminology is loose, 
but its basic essence is easy to discern: how exact and numerous are our explanato-
ry models? Do different descriptions of  potential causality compete in the academ-
ic space for legitimacy? It is clear that having a full aetiological picture is no pre-
requisite for diagnosis, prognosis or treatment. Autoimmune diseases are a case in 
point of  this kind of  conflict, as discussions around aetiology remains speculative 
and varied.  Even when considering diseases whose mechanism or causes we have 60
known for some time, it should be noted that research is constantly being under-
taken to expand our understanding. Many common conditions, whose clinical fea-
tures have been recognised for some time, have only relatively recently begun to be 
understood more fully from an aetiological standpoint and often their histories are 
ones of  treatment before understanding, or indeed treatment on the basis of  false 
understanding.  61
Legally, diseases have become in central to fights over dismissal from work, welfare 
access and compensation. Employment rights were rapidly expanded during the 
 David Healy has written extensively about this topic (see, for example: Healy, D. Let 59
Them Eat Prozac, 2004, New York University Press, USA and Healy, D. Pharmageddon, 
2012, University of  California Press, USA); Christopher Lane also covers this problem 
well in Lane, C. Shyness: How Normal Behaviour Became a Sickness, 2008, Yale University 
Oress, USA; it has been conceptualised in various critical ways by other authors, such as 
Goldacre, B. Bad Pharma: How drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients, 2012, Fourth 
Estate, UK; Elliott, C. White Coat Black Hat: Adventures on the Dark Side of  Medicine, 2011, 
Beacon Press, USA; González-Moreno, M., Saborido, C. and Teira, D. ‘Disease-monger-
ing through Clinical Trials’ in Studies in History and Philosophy of  Biological and Biomedical Sci-
ences, 2015, Vol. 51, pp. 11-18; for a short overview of  this process, see Cooper, R. ‘Dis-
ease Mongering’ in The International Encyclopaedia of  Ethics, 2013, published online.
 Alzabin, S. and Venables, P. J. ‘Etiology of  autoimmune disease: past, present and fu60 -
ture’ in Expert Review of  Clinical Immunology, 2012, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 111-113.
 For example, see Clarke’s discussion of  the history and aetiology of  cervical cancer: 61
Clarke, B. ‘Causation in Medicine’ in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.) Conceptual Revolutions: from Cog-
nitive Science to Medicine, 2012, Netbiblo, Spain.
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20th century, and part of  this process was the acknowledgment that work envi-
ronments can make people sick, that sometimes people are too sick to work and 
that this ‘right to be sick’ needs to be protected and legislated for.  However, given 62
the clear conflict of  interest here between the state, employers and the individual, 
it is inevitable that vigorous and lengthy legal battles can and do ensue. Often what 
is under scrutiny is the legitimacy of  symptoms, the extent to which they disable 
and the degree to which prognosis of  the condition suggests functional limitation.    
The reason for this brief  exposition of  the various ways in which aspects of  disease 
can be contested is to illustrate the simple point that a condition may be disputed 
in some or even most of  the ways above and still not be considered a 'contested illness'. 
There is a further jump that must be taken in order for a disease to become con-
tested, which is hard to precisely quantify, but involves a composite of  the above 
which lead the medical community and society at large to fundamentally doubt the 
condition in an ontological sense. It is this questioning of  being which I have taken 




A good place to start is to look at the work of  Swoboda, who provides the following 
five points as key features of  contested illnesses:   63
1) Their aetiologies are ambiguous;  
2) their existences are linked to other diagnoses and co-morbid conditions;  
 Not to say that there are no examples from earlier centuries, see Schivelbusch, W. The 62
Railway Journey: The Industrialization of  Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century, With a New 
Preface, 2014, University of  California Press, USA, pp. 134-149.
 Swoboda, D. A. 'Embodiment and the Search for Illness Legitimacy Among Women 63
with Contested Illnesses' in Michigan Feminist Studies, 2005, Vol. 19, Issue Title: 'Bodies: 
Physical and Abstract', p. 73; I have changed the order for clarity, in the original, number 
5 was placed first.
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3) their treatment regimens are unclear;  
4) their legal, medical, and cultural classifications are disputed; 
5) their statuses as legitimate illnesses are highly controversial. 
 
Taken together, this schema is useful for understanding how a condition comes to 
be considered a disputed illness. What is perhaps unclear is how some diseases can 
be said to fulfil numbers 1-4 without necessarily entailing that the fifth condition 
becomes a feature of  the illness. How is it that an illness becomes or is contested in 
all four of  the ways mentioned above but does not lose its status as a legitimate ill-
ness? And if  we establish that the first four criteria are not necessary for describing 
a contested illness, then surely what we are left with is simply a tautology?  In this 64
section I will approach these questions with a mind to revising Swoboda’s list to 
more accurately capture the key components of  disputed, or as I have phrased it, 
ontologically contested diseases. 
To explore this, let us take two examples - asthma and chronic fatigue syndrome 
(CFS) - and discuss why one is ontologically contested and the other is not with ref-
erence to the above formulation. Asthma is chosen here as superficially it fulfils 
much of  the criteria above, and yet remains emphatically not a contested disease. 
CFS is, however, very much considered to be a contested illness, and the following 
discussion should hopefully clarify why it is rendered such whilst asthma is not.  
CFS presents significant diagnostic and professional challenges for healthcare 
providers. Patients complain of  tiredness, lethargy and dangerously low levels of  
energy. Cognitive difficulties appear simultaneously; forgetfulness and difficulty fo-
cusing through to severe migraines and depression. Exercise is painful and can of-
ten lead to lengthy recovery periods of  forced inactivity and musculoskeletal pain. 
These symptoms ebb and flow and change day to day, but rarely disappear entirely. 
 i.e. a contested disease is defined by its status as a legitimate disease being highly con64 -
tested.
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There appears to be no abnormality in standard clinical indicators of  illness: blood 
pressure, blood sugar and heart rate don’t appear to correlate, clinical examina-
tions proffer no results, CAT scans likewise. Overall, it is extremely difficult to di-
agnose CFS in any orthodox manner, and it is normally classified as a diagnosis of  
exclusion, that is, arrived at after other possibilities have been eliminated. The cri-
teria generally used require persisting fatigue for at least 6 months which is not ex-
plained by other medical or psychiatric conditions and is not alleviated by rest.  65
To return to Swoboda’s criteria, we can note immediately that the aetiology of  
CFS is unclear. However, the same could be said for asthma. Causal models that 
deal with asthma tend to focus on highlighting prenatal, childhood, environmental 
and genetic risk factors which relate to a higher incidence of  the condition devel-
oping. These include firm links such as maternal smoking, family history and envi-
ronmental pollution and weak links such as exposure to allergens, diet and nutri-
tion, stress levels and breastfeeding.  This being said, all factors are sufficient and 66
not necessary. Overall, the aetiological picture is stubbornly multifarious and de-
spite a large amount of  research it is difficult to discern clearly what causes asthma.  
CFS also has no universally accepted aetiology, but rather numerous conceptual 
models based around physiological, psychosomatic and psychological 
 Fukuda, K. ‘The chronic fatigue syndrome: a comprehensive approach to its definition 65
and study. International Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Study Group’ in Annals of  Internal 
Medicine, 1994, Vol. 121, No. 12, pp. 953-959; for a list of  tests that should be completed 
before a CFS diagnosis is arrived at see NICE: Chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic en-
cephalomyelitis (or encephalopathy). Diagnosis and management of  CFS in adults and children, 2007, 
National Institute of  Clinical Excellence, London.
 Subbarao, P., Mandhane, P. J. and Sears, M. R. 'Asthma: epidemiology, etiology and 66
risk factors' in Canadian Medical Association Journal, 2009, Vol. 181, No. 9, pp. 181-190.
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frameworks.  It differs from asthma however, in the sense more moral onus is put 67
on the various causal explanations. The conflicts that exist tend not to be scientific 
discussions about the importance of  this or that influence on the condition, but 
represent a more dogmatic, factional process.  Many patients strongly reject all 68
models which identify psychosomatic or psychological factors as primary agents, 
arguing that what they are suffering from must be organic. The implication here is 
that if  their condition is not organic then the twin spectres of  control and respon-
sibility come into focus: the supposed control of  symptoms and the subsequent re-
sponsibility for them. 
What is different then, is that to CFS patients, the contested aetiology of  their 
condition has ontological consequences in a way which the causal relationships be-
hind asthma do not. This is because in the case of  CFS, the aetiology exists in an 
explanatory void - it is a conflict about the existence of  evidence, rather than what 
the evidence means. Doctors cannot say with confidence what causes either condi-
tion, but with asthma this ignorance is buttressed by various smaller pieces of  
knowledge: it is like we have most of  the puzzle pieces but can't put them together 
to form the complete image. Determining the aetiology of  CFS is a far less certain 
exercise, and the lack of  substantive evidence one way or the other contributes to 
suspicions that without casual links of  some kind we should question whether we 
are looking at a disease at all. From this short comparison it seems that the Swobo-
 The NHS list 6 possible causes for Chronic fatigue, see http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/67
chronic-fatigue-syndrome/pages/causes.aspx archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.we-
bcitation.org/6s5DPrQET; for a more holistic overview see Tveito, K. ‘So many things 
we do not know’ in Tidsskr Nor Legeforen (Journal of  the Norwegian Medical Association), 2014, 
Vol. 11, No. 134, pp. 1117-1118.
 That is to say, groupings of  researchers, activists and patients congeal around different 68
causal explanations, not always on the basis of  the best available evidence. Certainly it 
seems in some cases at least models are preferred because of  their acceptability to the so-
cial or psychological prejudices of  the person preferring them rather than anything that 
could be considered scientifically compelling. The reasons for this are complex, and since 
a very similar process occurs in the case of  fibromyalgia, I refer you to Chapter IV for a 
more thorough discussion.
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da's first condition needs to be modified or expanded to take into account varia-
tions in the types of  aetiological ambiguities that are present. 
Her second condition - that contested illnesses are linked to other diagnoses and 
co-morbid conditions - again appears to apply to both asthma and CFS. The for-
mer has long been known to be strongly associated with and in some cases exacer-
bated by many other conditions. In two separate, recent reviews, a high number of  
comorbid conditions were identified, including rhinitis, gastroesophageal reflux 
disease, bronchitis, atherosclerotic cardiac disease, psychopathologies and numer-
ous others.  The precise relationship between these conditions is important to 69
clarify as they can often obscure diagnosis and make treatment more difficult. Es-
tablishing links between other diseases and asthma has consequences for patients 
but also for public health policy.  
CFS is also known to have a high comorbidity with other diseases. Fibromyaglia, 
irritable bowel syndrome, multiple chemical sensitivity, interstitial cystitis and psy-
chiatric conditions such as depression and anxiety disorders have all been found in 
high prevalence amongst CFS patients.  The way that these conditions interact 70
and influence each other is unknown, and again highly disputed by patients in a 
way that is unique to contested illnesses. For example, many CFS sufferers would 
argue that depression is a result of  their debilitating fatigue, whereas researchers 
often posit that this connection is actually the inverse, or that both stem from the 
same source. Asthma patients do not have such a hostile relationship to their co-
morbidities.  
 Boulet, L. and Boulay, M. 'Asthma-related comorbidities' in Expert Review of  Respiratory 69
Medicine, 2011, Vol. 5, Is. 3, pp. 377-393; Ledford, D. K. and Lockey, R. F. 'Asthma and 
comorbidities' in Current Opinion in Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 2013, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 
80.
 Aaron, L. A. et al 'Comorbid Conditions in Chronic Fatigue: A Co-Twin Control Study' 70
in The Journal of  General Internal Medicine, 2001, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 24-31; Denise, E. J. et al 
‘Conditions comorbid with Chronic Fatigue in a Population-Based Sample' in Psychosomat-
ics, 2012, Vol. 53, No.1, pp. 44-50.
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The crucial point here is that whilst asthma is associated with mostly 'organic' con-
ditions, CFS finds itself  entangled in a web of  other contested illnesses or psychi-
atric diseases. In fact, the one comorbid feature of  asthma that is resisted more 
than any other by patients is the suggestion that there are psychosomatic elements 
to the disease, hence literature which urges a careful and sensitive approach to the 
topic.  Also notable is that the Global Initiative for Asthma (GINA) lists numerous 71
factors which contribute to the development of  asthma but only notes that emo-
tional stress and psychiatric conditions can exacerbate the disease.  This is in con72 -
trast to the ICD-10, which places psychological and behavioural causes alongside 
organic and environmental ones, indicating that there is a slight discrepancy be-
tween the medical view and patient outlooks.   
So to look again at the criteria, it seems in this case that expansion of  the second 
point is also necessary. What is important is not so much that comorbidities exist, 
but the types of  connections that the condition has with other diagnoses and the 
perceived validity of  those diseases. Especially relevant here is the question of  psy-
chiatric and psychosomatic disorders: if  it appears that an illnesses is mostly associ-
ated with these types of  diseases then I suggest that it will in turn be more likely to 
be considered contested. 
The third feature under discussion here is that in general the treatment regimes of  
disputed illnesses are unclear. In this case it seems that there is more of  a dichoto-
my between my two examples. Whilst the treatment of  asthma has certainly 
changed historically, and different approaches have their benefits, it is generally ac-
cepted that in most cases we can now manage the symptoms effectively in wealthy 
 Muramatsu, Y. et al 'Bronchial Asthma: Psychosomatic aspect' in The Journal of  the Japan 71
Medical Association, 2001, Vol. 126, No. 3, pp. 375-377.
 Moes-Wójtowicz, A. et al 'Asthma as a psychosomatic disorder: the causes, scale of  the 72
problem, and the association with alexithymia and disease control' in Pneumonologia i Aler-
gologia Polska, 2012, Vol. 80, No. 1, p. 14.
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nations both in acute emergencies and in the long term.  There would appear to 73
be very little that is 'contested' about this.  
CFS presents far more significant challenges for doctors and patients, as very few 
treatments have been found to have any consistent effect on those with the illness. 
A plethora of  different ideas and potential cures have been suggested, and many 
patients attempt various regimes, largely without success. Responses to treatment 
are extremely idiosyncratic - what works for one rarely works for another - and 
those with CFS can grow pessimistic over time as to the effectiveness of  any new 
programme that is suggested to them. Attempts to relieve symptoms such as chron-
ic pain likewise suffer from inconsistent patient response which makes it difficult to 
draw conclusions across the whole condition. 
Two controversial treatments have been fairly widely touted as having therapeutic 
benefits for CFS patients: cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and graded exercise 
therapy (GET). Part of  the justification for using these strategies is that over time 
patients’ cardiovascular and muscular strength deteriorates due to inactivity, which 
contributes to maintaining fatigue symptoms. Both methods attempt to restore 
physical strength gradually and combat unhelpful views about the disease and the 
dangers of  exercise. These treatments have not been shown to help all patients, but 
 Asthma UK describes the medication available for patients as ‘incredibly 73
effective’ (https://www.asthma.org.uk/advice/inhalers-medicines-treatments/ archived 
on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/6s5DyzZ1p). Severe problems persist in 
countries where patients cannot access treatment, and the number of  patients has in-
creased rapidly over the last few decades due to population growth, urbanisation, in-
creased pollution levels and other factors: Asher, I. and Pearce, N. ‘Global burden of  
asthma among children’ in The International Journal of  Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 2014, 
Vol. 18, No. 11, pp. 1269-1278.
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it has been argued that in a significant number of  cases they can be effective.  74
However, among some patients and a select band of  researchers, these approaches 
are often rejected because they rely on a psychosocial model of  illness that they 
disagree with. GET has also been argued to cause damage to patients through 
over-exertion. The flagship study which promoted its benefits as a treatment 
regime - known as the PACE trial - has been criticised heavily in what became an 
ongoing and acrimonious dispute.     75
In this case, simply stating that 'treatment regimes are unclear' misses the most im-
portant aspect of  this. It is not just that they are unclear, it is that they are inconsis-
tent and largely impotent. If  we think of  a disease like multiple sclerosis (MS), per-
 For example see: Wallman K. E., Morton A. R., Goodman C., Grove R., Guilfoyle A. 74
M. ‘Randomised controlled trial of  graded exercise in chronic fatigue syndrome’ in Med-
ical Journal of  Australia, 2004, Vol. 180. pp. 444–448; Whiting P, Bagnall A. M., Sowden A. 
J., Cornell J. E., Mulrow C. D., Ramirez G. ‘Interventions for the treatment and man-
agement of  chronic fatigue syndrome: a systematic review’. The Journal of  the American 
Medical Association, 2001, Vol. 286, pp.1360–1368; Price, J. R., Mitchell, E., Tidy, E. and 
Hunot, V. ‘Cognitive behavioural therapy for chronic fatigue syndrome in adults’ in 
Cochrane Database of  Systematic Reviews, 2008, No. 3, Art. No.: CD001027. DOI: 
10.1002/14651858.CD001027.pub2.; White, P. D. et al ‘Comparison of  adaptive pacing 
therapy, cognitive behaviour therapy, graded exercise therapy, and specialist medical care 
for chronic fatigue syndrome (PACE): a randomised trial’ in The Lancet, 2011, Vol. 377, 
No. 9768, pp. 823-836.
 Ibid.; for an example of  the critical response to this type of  treatment plan see, from a 75
patient organisation: http://www.mecfswa.org.au/Treatment/CBT_and_GET archived 
on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/6s5E7UY32 or this literature review (note 
however that the credibility of  both journal and researchers is questioned in this case): 
Twist, F. N. M. and Maes, M. ‘A review on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and 
graded exercise therapy (GET’) in myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME)/chronic fatigue syn-
drome (CFS): CBT/GET is not only ineffective and not evidence-based, but also poten-
tially harmful for many patients with ME/CFS’ in Neuroendocrinology Letters, 2009, Vol. 30, 
No. 3, pp. 284-299; for a critique of  the PACE study specifically, see Wilshire, C., Kind-
lon, T., Matthees, A. and McGrath, S. ‘Can patients with chronic fatigue syndrome really 
recover after graded exercise or cognitive behavioural therapy? A critical commentary 
and preliminary re-analysis of  the PACE trial’ in Fatigue: Biomedicine, Health and Behaviour, 
2017, Vol. 5, pp. 43-56; for a further selection of  the critical dialogue surrounding the 
PACE trial, see http://www.virology.ws/mecfs/ archived on 19/07/17 at http://
www.webcitation.org/6s5EN5qnR.
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haps more suitable for comparison here than asthma, then what we see is a condi-
tion that debilitates, destroys, and is ultimately unmanageable in a way that asthma 
isn't. However, vast therapeutic interventions exist for MS which can manage 
symptoms, slow progression and aid recovery from attacks. The aetiology of  MS 
remains unknown, but its symptoms can be effectively treated, if  you allow that 
treatment doesn't always have to involve total alleviation of  distress or some kind 
of  restoration to pre-disease health. Within the parameters of  the disease, we can 
do more to help those diagnosed with MS than we can for their CFS counterparts 
and this is I think where treatment contributes to the ontological doubt surround-
ing the disease. 
Swoboda's fourth point is that contested illnesses' 'legal, medical, and cultural clas-
sifications are disputed'. It is not immediately clear what is meant by this but I 
think that what she is arguing is that the way the disease is represented, talked 
about and assumed by many to be, is in constant flux between interested groups. 
Whether or not this can be said with confidence to be the case with asthma is un-
certain.  
Asthma no doubt intersects the legal system at certain points, though less than 
many other conditions. It is rare, but not unheard of, for individuals to be discrim-
inated against for their condition, and there is a smattering of  unfair dismissal cas-
es reported in the press.  Since asthma is largely a childhood disease, an important 76
way that its legal 'classification' is contested is in relation to healthcare and welfare 
access, especially under insurance-based healthcare system such as the USA. Mak-
ing sure that your child can get the care they need is often a legal issue, and links 
have been established between barriers to access, socio-economic status and men-
 For example: http://www.clarkslegal.com/Legal_Updates/Read/Employ76 -
ee_who_had_1_in_4_days_off_sick_wins_unfair_dismissal_claim archived on 19/07/17 
at http://www.webcitation.org/6s5ETeUwC or http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/
asthma-suffering-bar-worker-wins-6000-for-disability-discrimination-and-unfair-dis-
missal/ archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/6s5EZnvv6.
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tal health of  the families involved.  Also in the US, the vast majority of  states have 77
passed 'inhaler carry' laws, which entitle students to take prescription medicine on 
school premises and provide information for educational authorities.  The legal 78
classification here is again based around access to resources.  
Asthma has also featured in public health campaigns and attempts to improve 
workplace and public air safety. This has had success in reducing occupational 
asthma through the identification and eradication of  harmful agents, contributed 
towards reducing pollution and had an effect on the second-hand smoke debate.  79
Overall however, it would be a stretch to say that asthma is understood legalistical-
ly beyond a minority of  contexts, and as such its legal classification does not par-
ticularly figure as a ground for conflict. The legal work that surrounds asthma is 
certainly less acrimonious than that for CFS.  
As discussed earlier, some medical aspects of  asthma are shrouded in ambiguity, 
and to researchers it is a real aetiological puzzle. But whether or not this actually 
represents something that can be classified as a dispute is unclear. Asthma is re-
garded as fairly stable medically in a way that CFS is not, and I think this is the key 
factor here. Most diseases possess some kind of  medical uncertainty, but that un-
certainty does not always translate into conflict. 
Culturally, it is easier to see how asthma might fit into the schema we are using. 
The cultural meaning of  asthma has been for many years a case of  crude stereo-
typing: asthmatics are routinely typified as the weak, sickly coward, unable to par-
take in physically or emotionally strenuous exercise without their trusty inhaler. 
Clark carried out a content analysis on 66 Hollywood films and discovered that by 
 Wood, P. R. et al 'Relationships Between Welfare Status, Health Insurance Status and 77
Health and Medical Care Among Children With Asthma' in The American Journal of  Public 
Health, 2002, Vol. 92, No. 9, pp. 1446-1452.
 American Lung Association A National Asthma Public Policy Agenda, 2009.78
 Ibid.; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Best Practices for Tobacco Control 79
Programs, 2007.
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far the two biggest standard representations of  children with asthma were negative. 
Asthmatics were portrayed as a) socially different in a negative sense, i.e. a misfit of  
some kind, a nerd or a wimp, and b) that asthma is most often a stress response to 
a situation.  It should also be noted that there was a time when others were impli80 -
cated in the production of  asthmatic symptoms, namely over-protective, ‘smother-
ing’ mothers whose concern for their child’s health was argued to have become 
pathological.  81
This strikes me as the only area in which the 'classification' of  asthma could be said 
to be disputed, especially given the distance between the representations of  the 
disease and its medical reality.  
Looking at CFS, it is clear that it does indeed find its legal, medical and cultural 
classifications in a state of  bitter negotiation. A large portion of  the frustration and 
disappointment felt by CFS and other patients with contested illnesses is related to 
their perceived lack of  legal rights. In areas of  employment and welfare, sufferers 
consistently report finding themselves in the midst of  a seemingly contradictory 
struggle: the struggle to prove themselves fit enough to work in order to stay em-
ployed and then the subsequent struggle to prove themselves ill enough to be enti-
tled to state support should the first strategy fail.  
Medically, it is difficult to analyse the current view of  CFS without making refer-
ence to both the fairly wide-spread consensus of  the profession that this condition 
 Clark, C. D. 'Asthma episodes: stigma, children, and Hollywood films' in Medical Anthro80 -
pology Quarterly, 2012, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp. 92-115; a lesser-known archetype for asthma 
sufferers also exists: that of  the individual determined to exert themselves because of  their 
asthma rather than in spite of  it. Che Guevara is one such example of  an individual whose 
condition in part drove him to become more rather than less energetic, as part of  a ‘stub-
born personal battle to beat asthma’ (see ‘Cuba: Castro’s Brain’ in Time Magazine, August, 
1960). As a severely asthmatic child myself, my parents greatly encouraged me to swim 
and play other sports rather than trying to protect me through enforced abstention, so I 
recognise and appreciate this alternative model of  the asthmatic.
 Appignanesi, L. Mad, Bad and Sad: A History of  Women and the Mind Doctors from 1800 to the 81
Present, Viarago, UK, 2009, p. 351.
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has psychosomatic elements and the equally wide-spread rejection of  that consen-
sus by patients. What is different about this kind of  conflict is that far greater dis-
agreements exist between patients and doctors than between different researchers 
discussing the aetiology, best treatment, etc., something which is made even more 
extraordinary when you consider the vague and underdetermined clinical picture.  
Cultural wrangling over the meaning of  CFS has been explored by Hossenbaccus 
and White, who carried out a content analysis of  medical publications, patient or-
ganisation websites and newspaper articles about the condition. They discovered, 
not to their surprise, a large discrepancy between patient organisations, of  whom 
89% represented CFS as an organic disease, and medical authorities, who tended 
to regard it as having both physical and psychological elements (63%). Media out-
lets were fairly split, 58% portraying it as a wholly physical condition. The imbal-
ance present here gives us clear indicators as to the nature of  the cultural dispute. 
Again it comes back to patients (or patient organisations) being strongly resistant to 
a psychological label (no matter what form it comes in) and medical researchers 
reaching for one out of  a lack of  alternative explanations.     
There is another side to this cultural representation too, which is the prevalence of  
negative perceptions of  CFS patients amongst doctors and wider society. In a re-
cent study examining medical students’ views of  the disease, common prejudices 
such as sufferers being ‘lazy’ or sharing negative personality types, as well as being 
difficult patients, surfaced regularly amongst the participants.  Largely, it appeared 82
these views had been absorbed from superiors and media reports. Shorter suggests 
that this has always been the case, historically. He writes that ‘knowing they were 
not facing organic disease, organically oriented physicians tensed up whenever they 
encountered chronic somatisers [patients whose bodies subconsciously converted 
 Stenhoff, A. L., Sadreddini, S., Peters, S. and Wearden, A. ‘Understanding medical 82
students’ views of  chronic fatigue syndrome: A qualitative study’ in Journal of  Health Psy-
chology, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 198-209.
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emotional distress into physical symptoms]’.  Individuals with contested illnesses 83
also regularly report that these views are present amongst family members, friends 
and work colleagues. Unsurprisingly, patients try to fight these perceptions and 
wrestle the cultural meaning of  their disease towards their advantage. 
What I think needs to be made explicit in this discussion is that in large part the 
legal, medical and cultural classification of  CFS emerges from medical uncertainty 
rather than from other sources. The identity of  patients is not stretched and dis-
torted because they belong to a persecuted minority, or because some powerful 
group has an interest in marginalising how they feel about their disease, it is altered 
because there is genuine scientific doubt about how to classify, explain and treat it, 
which in turn interacts with existing social beliefs about illness. This is not the case 
for asthma, and hence when we look at legal, medical and cultural classifications it 
is not enough to simply assert that they are in some way conflicted - we need to ask 
why they are considered in that way and what sustains the dispute. 
By way of  a short detour, it might be worth considering this discussion in light of  
research on uncertainty, stemming from the work of  Donald MacKenzie and oth-
ers in the 1990s.  The assumed relationship between expertise and confidence in a 84
knowledge base - that those with the greatest access to information and experience 
in the field would be the most confident in both the facts of  that discipline and the 
technology it produced -  was convincingly shown to be oversimplified and in 
many cases wrong. Instead of  a linear relationship, where uncertainty increased 
the further from the site of  knowledge production, a different model was proposed 
whereby those closest to the beating heart of  the field were more unsure and reluc-
 Shorter, E. From the Mind into the Body: The Cultural Origins of  Psychosomatic Symptoms, 1994, 83
The Free Press, USA, p. 24.
 MacKenzie, D. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of  Nuclear Missile Guidance, 1990, 84
MIT Press, USA; MacKenzie, D. ‘The Certainty Trough’ in Williams, R., Faulkner, W. 
and Fleck, J. (eds.) Exploring Expertise, 1998, Palgrave Macmillan, UK; Wynne, B. ‘Uncer-
tainty and environmental learning: Reconceiving science and policy in the preventive 
paradigm’ in Global Environmental Change, 1992, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 111-127.
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tant to make strong claims than those from other, neighbouring disciplines. Those 
who were far away from the production of  knowledge but for whom something 
was at stake could be expected to express the greatest degree of  uncertainty.  
That is to say that uncertainty exists in the first group, those actually conducting 
the studies and designing the technology, is minimised or ‘black boxed’ by the sec-
ond, those who still work with it but not directly, and emphasised, focused on and 
potentially exaggerated by those furthest away who have a vested interest in magni-
fying the appearance of  doubt.  Thus it is that those working directly on climate 85
change or the relationship between lung cancer and smoking have a higher degree 
of  suspicion in their causal models than the scientific community as a whole, but 
less than that which is relentlessly promoted by organisations and individuals who 
profit from a view of  science that is socially constructed and fundamentally uncer-
tain.  This final point, of  something being at stake for some groups, is key to under86 -
standing this argument. In uncontentious areas of  science, such ambiguity in 
knowledge production is less obvious because there is no-one who benefits from 
doubt. The line goes that climate change modelling on a planet other than Earth 
would look very different from what we are seeing today, because it would not exist 
in a social matrix containing organisations strongly invested in maintaining and 
expanding the infrastructures which contribute to man-made temperature increas-
es. 
It gets slightly complicated when we try to apply this to CFS, because we need to 
be careful not to conflate this certainty/uncertainty axis with the ambiguous/un-
 Bruno Latour developed the concept of  a ‘black box’ over several books - see: Latour, 85
B. Science in Action, 1987, Harvard University Press, USA; Latour, B. Pandora’s Hope: essays 
on the reality of  science studies, 1999, Harvard University Press, USA.
 Oreskes, N. and Conway, E. M. Merchants of  Doubt: How a Handful of  Scientists Obscured the 86
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, 2011, Bloomsbury Press, UK; Following 
his groundbreaking work on exposing the uncertainty present in scientific knowledge pro-
duction, Latour would lament his role in creating the situation described above: Latour, B. 
‘Why Has Critique Run Out of  Steam? From Matters of  Fact to Matters of  Concern’ in 
Critical Inquiry, 2004, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 225-248.
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ambiguous scale I have been discussing.  That is to say, given that the ‘facts’ of  87
CFS are themselves so tenebrous, speaking of  certainty loses its bite somewhat: it 
may be that those related to the disease in some way are perfectly certain of  its 
ambiguity across different measures (just as they may be perfectly uncertain of  its 
unambiguity). However, what is useful is the both the idea that there is a three step 
variance in certainty as you move away from the position of  greatest knowledge, 
and the idea that having something at stake is vital in understanding the motivations 
of  those who seek to undermine the level of  certainty attributed to a set of  beliefs 
about a concept.  
The first of  these, the line of  uncertainty, does not act in the same way as it ap-
pears to in other areas of  contentious science. Insofar as you can chart uncertainty 
stretching from researchers in the field to GPs to patients (the three groups I feel 
most isomorphic with the general model), certainty levels vary between groups in 
relation to the supposed fact being discussed, with some drawing divergent re-
sponses and some producing a flat line of  agreement.  This is predictable and ex88 -
plainable. What is of  more interest is discussing what effect a vested interest - there 
being something at stake - might have on the levels of  uncertainty.  
It would seem, or it seems very much to me, as though the vested interests of  all 
parties involved are in the direction of  certainty about the unambiguity of  CFS. 
Medical scientists want to understand what is going on, to be able to model the 
condition accurately and produce efficacious therapies; doctors want to be able to 
treat patients, to feel as though they have succeeded in their roles as healers; pa-
tients want to comprehend what is going on in their bodies, to be able to commu-
nicate that to those around them and, most of  all, to get well. All of  these groups 
would therefore benefit from a reduction in the ambiguity of  CFS (whether that is 
 Special thanks to Havi Carel for bringing this to my attention.87
 Is CFS psychosomatic? Is CFS best explained partly or largely by reference to depres88 -
sion? Do symptoms get worse or better after short periods of  exercise? Do anti-psychotics 
help patients?
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framed as uncertainty about unambiguity or certainty about ambiguity) and none 
of  those involved has any interest in promulgating the current view of  CFS. But 
still we remain in a position of  fairly widespread doubt as to the solidity of  CFS - 
as a distinct condition, as a condition whose causality we understand, as an illness 
we can treat effectively.  It therefore seems fairly convincing to me to posit that the 
ambiguity here is genuine and does not come about because of  any vested interest 
one way or the other - that is to say the evidence that exists genuinely does not pro-
vide us with an adequate and reliable explanation for CFS, even to the standard of  
other (ambiguous but less so) aetiological frameworks. 
I hope that this example has not been too exhaustive, but I also hope that it has 
gone some way to clarifying what makes a disease ontologically disputed. To sum-
marise, below is a revised version of  Swoboda’s original criteria of  contested dis-
eases: 
1) Their aetiologies are ambiguous: a solid empirical basis on which to determine 
between different speculative models is lacking; firm causal processes - mechanistic 
or probabilistic - are notable by their absence; diagnosis is likely from exclusion; 
2) their existences are linked to other diagnoses and co-morbid conditions: mostly 
these themselves will struggle with ‘legitimacy’, they will be psychiatric or psycho-
somatic in nature, rarely will a clear relationship with an established organic dis-
ease exist;  
3) their treatment regimens are unclear; effective treatments are difficult to find: 
highly inconsistent results are reported amongst patients;  
4) their legal, medical, and cultural classifications are disputed: there exist  discrep-
ancies along these lines between patients and the medical community/society at 




 5) their statuses as legitimate illnesses are highly controversial and they should be 
considered ontologically contested diseases. 
 
Whilst I am confident that my attempt at definition above is successful to a greater 
degree than previous efforts, it is definitely open to the charge of  being an overly 
descriptive, socially-determined account, one that fails to provide what could be 
termed a statistical essence - biomedical markers, tests, ‘objective’ pathology.  This 89
critique would somewhat miss the point, in that it is precisely the absence of  such 
things that leads to a disease being categorised in this way in the first place. I would 
therefore dismiss that argument as an overly naturalistic view of  disease, something 
that will be elucidated in greater detail in Chapter II.  
But what about the following scenario: a virus is discovered tomorrow that ac-
counts fully and consistently for the symptoms of  CFS, and as a result much of  
what has been discussed becomes instantly irrelevant, and the disease shifts into 
one of  the many preexisting categories of  illness that we are familiar with. This, 
though highly unlikely, could happen, but if  it did I do not think it would prove too 
problematic for my categorisation. Firstly, our understanding of  disease constantly 
changes in light of  new information and it is not difficult to find examples of  this 
in recent history. A disease shifting from one group to another, or groups funda-
mentally changing, is not a strong criticism of  holding belief  in the utility of  those 
groupings given available information.  
Secondly this example presupposes that the only adequate categories are those 
which are unchanging and stable through time. Not only would it actually be diffi-
cult to find completely stable biomedical categories, but there is also nothing wrong 
with a description that applies in a completely satisfactory manner now but may 
 And of  course, sociologists might contend the opposite, that it is too essentialist.89
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not at some point in the future.  
Overall, it seems that despite problems, we can demarcate chronic, contested ill-
nesses with some success. In doing so, we are able to establish a category of  dis-
eases which in many ways highlight our assumptions and open our eyes to medical 
and social challenges.  
Malingering, validity and legitimacy 
Patients with chronic, contested illnesses often face accusations of  insincerity, of  
faking or exaggerating symptoms for gain and sufferers report being labelled ma-
lingerers. As we shall see, it can be unclear exactly what this entails conceptually. 
What is not unclear is that as a result they feel like their experience is invalidated 
and their disease is considered illegitimate. In this section we will look at what these 
concepts mean and how they intersect with those ideas previously discussed.  
Let us start with malingering. This is a well-known and historically resilient con-
cept but actual legal examples or clinical applications are scarce. There is, it seems, 
no one, clear definition of  malingering, and though it frequents legal, medical and 
psychiatric spheres it fails to make a home in any of  them.  In all, it is unstable 90
and untested as a theoretical concept, either subsumed into other categories like 
fraud or else partially medicalised. However, malingering does carry with it a large 
amount of  social weight, and examples are easily found in films, books and real-
life. This has generated a pejorative set of  meanings around the idea, which in 
turn negatively affect those tarred with its brush.       
The basic concept is common knowledge: malingering is the act of  pretending to 
be sick, or of  injuring yourself, in order to gain in some way. Although associated 
 Raine, A. ‘Malingering and Criminal Behaviour as Psychopathology’ in Halligan, P. W. 90
and Bass, C. (eds.) Malingering and Illness Deception, 2003, Oxford University Press, UK, p. 
103.
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firmly with military service, it morphed during the 20th century and expanded, 
becoming more than just self-inflicted injuries and faked symptoms as ways of  
avoiding war.  Now, it applies to anyone who declares themselves sick, or artificial91 -
ly induces illness in order to gain materially or by being able to give up responsibil-
ities.  
Central to the idea of  malingering is ‘secondary gain’, which is that an individual 
must aim to benefit in some way from their deception. In a 21st century context, 
this will ordinarily come in the form of  social security benefits, litigation payment 
or time off  work. Emotional rewards are not normally included here, but the sym-
pathy and good-will of  others could be added to the overall package of  benefits 
one hopes to achieve through their actions. Malingering stretches from phoning in 
sick when you are in fact planning to spend the day at the zoo to a calculated de-
ception intended to bring you large rewards, for example pretending to be grossly 
injured following a workplace accident. Key to this idea is conscious intent: the 
person involved must be aware of  the reasons behind their actions (even if  this 
turns out to be rationalised in an overly-simplistic manner or is reliant on false 
premises). However, secondary gain is a ‘highly speculative and empirically untest-
ed’ concept, and finding medical or legal applications for malingering proves trou-
blesome.   92
Clinically, it can be difficult to recognise individuals who are faking symptoms, and 
 Palmer, I. P. ‘Malingering, shirking and self-inflicted injuries in the military’ in Halli91 -
gan, P. W. and Bass, C. (eds.) Malingering and Illness Deception, 2003, Oxford University 
Press, UK, pp. 42-53.
 Rogers, R. and Neumann, C. S. ‘Conceptual issues and explanatory models of  malin92 -
gering’ in Halligan, P. W. and Bass, C. (eds.) Malingering and Illness Deception, 2003, Oxford 
University Press, UK, p. 74.
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malingering is ‘a description of  behaviour’, not a medical diagnosis.  Doctors are 93
not trained or especially expected to identify them, and it has been suggested that 
some ‘maintain an undiscerning naïveté’ about the potential for patients to lie or 
deceive.  Malingerers pose a unique problem for doctors in that they invert com94 -
pletely what is expected of  a patient. By ‘their very nature’ these individuals at-
tempt to ‘evade any normal doctor-patient relationship’ and enter the surgery or 
hospital with very different priorities to most.  In any case, demarcating this phe95 -
nomenon from actual disease is a process fraught with difficulty, and clinical skills 
are not always sufficient for this task. Even equipped with tools such as Symptom 
Validity Testing, attributing specific, motivated intent is speculative and malinger-
ing remains a ‘weak diagnosis of  exclusion’.  Doctors are also not best placed eth96 -
ically to identify malingerers, and if  the levels of  fraud reported by the health in-
surance industry are correct, they are not very successful at it either. This has been 
partially confirmed by studies which show doctors have difficulty detecting decep-
tion in a clinical setting.  97
Ultimately, the case has been put that in most instances it is more important to ac-
cept complaints and symptomatic patterns that you are uncertain of  as a doctor 
 That is to say, unlike factitious disorders (discussed below), malingering is not consid93 -
ered to be pathological and though doctors undoubtedly encounter it, they do not ap-
proach it as a medical issue; Boon, N. A., Colledge, N. R., Walker, B. R. and Hunter, J. A. 
A. Davidson’s Principles and Practice of  Medicine, 20th edition, 2006, Churchill Livingstone, 
UK, p. 251.
 Cunnien, A. J. ‘Psychiatric and Medical Syndromes Associated with Deception’ in 94
Rogers, R. (ed.) Clinical Assessment of  Malingering and Deception: Second Edition, 1997, The 
Guildford Press, USA, p. 23.
 Bayliss, R. I. S. ‘The deceivers’ in The British Medical Journal, 1984, Vol. 288, No. 6417, 95
p. 583.
 Pankratz, L. and Erickson, R. C. ‘Two views of  malingering’ in Clinical Neuropsychologist, 96
1990, Vol. 4, Issue 4, p. 383.
 Jung, B. and Reidenberg, M. M. ‘Physicians being deceived’ in Pain Medicine, 2007, Vol. 97
8, No. 5, pp. 433-437.
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than go down the opposite route.  This alternative road might lead to rejecting 98
genuine distress because a cynical and suspicious environment has been allowed to 
develop.  
Two distinct though related concepts complicate the clinical picture of  malingering 
in psychiatry. The first of  these are known as factitious disorders, a family of  psy-
chiatric conditions in which a patient fabricates illness, either through inducing 
symptoms or self-reporting problems they don’t have in order to receive medical 
care in the shape of  concern from their doctor, blood tests from the hospital and in 
extreme cases invasive surgery.  The aim here is not material gain, and this is what 99
separates it from malingering. Instead, individuals hope to satisfy a psychological 
need, to allay some deep personal unease through becoming a patient. The lengths 
to which people will go to get their sick role legitimised are frequently ex-
traordinary, and it is this lack of  rational ‘cost-benefit’ analysis which further sepa-
rates them from malingerers. The pertinent questions in these cases often becomes: 
at what point do we consider lying and deceit pathological and does it matter that 
the gains achieved are not material? In recent times the amount of  clinical infor-
mation available online has widened the opportunities for those with this condi-
tion.  100
The second set of  illnesses often confused and conflated with malingering are 
known as somatic symptom disorders. Though comprising many parts, these large-
ly arise when psychological distress and anxiety in a patient subconsciously trans-
fers or ‘converts’ into physical symptoms. These manifestations can look and feel 
 Robinson, W. P. ‘The contemporary cultural context for deception and malingering in 98
Britain’ in Halligan, P. W. and Bass, C. (eds.) Malingering and Illness Deception, 2003, Oxford 
University Press, UK, p. 135.
 This condition or group of  conditions is more famously and historically known as 99
Munchausen’s syndrome. For an overview, see: Folks, D. G. ‘Munchausen’s syndrome and 
other factitious disorders’ in Neurologic Clinics, 1995, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 267-81.
 Cunningham, J.M. and Feldman, M. D. ‘Munchausen by Internet: current perspec100 -
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no different to the individual than if  they were experiencing them in an orthodox 
manner. Unsurprisingly, somatic symptom disorders have a long and troubled his-
tory of  confusing and upsetting both patients and doctors.  What separates them 101
from malingering is intent: these symptoms are not produced or reported with any 
desire to deceive, and often doctors have a better grasp of  their production than 
the patient does. There is some common ground between malingering, factitious 
disorders and somatic symptom disorders, for example the responsibility placed on 
certain arbiters (normally medical staff) to ascertain both the level of  conscious 
awareness that a patient has and their potential motivations.  Teasing apart these 102
separate but overlapping concepts is not an easy task.  
Legally, malingering is a murky and ill-defined entity, and many doubt its existence 
as a distinct legal concept. Thus Jones argues that ‘malingering is occasionally cen-
tral but often marginal, if  not irrelevant, to the court’s decision making process’ 
and Sprince writes: ‘the law’s position on malingering is characterised by the ab-
sence of  substantive and definitive features and by an indifference to any impera-
tive to acquire them’.  This is largely because it is either subsumed under existing 103
illegal activity like fraud and perjury or lives a life of  its own within military and 
prison structures (where it has a long history).  
In specific contexts it does appear to gain a little clarity and distinction: most no-
tably in matters of  compensation and welfare. There is evidence of  patients faking 
 Hurwitz, T. A. ‘Somatization and Conversion Disorder’ in The Canadian Journal of  Psy101 -
chiatry, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 172-178.
 For a thorough overview of  the three topics discussed - malingering, factitious disor102 -
ders and somatic symptom disorders - see: Bass, C. and Halligan, P. ‘Factitious disorders 
and malingering: challenges for clinical assessment and management’ in The Lancet, 2014, 
Vol. 383, No. 9926, pp. 1422-1432.
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or exaggerating symptoms in cases of  post-traumatic stress disorder, brain injuries, 
whiplash and chronic pain amongst others.  However, here the definition of  ma104 -
lingering becomes extremely context-dependent, and ambiguities remain, especial-
ly surrounding methods of  detection. Exaggeration of  non-specific symptoms for 
example can be extremely difficult to prove, and whether it warrants the use of  
problematic and intrusive methods such as surveillance and character assessment is 
undecided. Too much weight is put on conjecture to allow malingering to be con-
sidered a solid theoretical entity in this situation.  
Compounding these problems is the dearth of  data that has been collected on ma-
lingerers. We have only very rough figures for how many there might be under any 
given diagnosis, and what this translates into in terms of  cost to the health care 
and insurance industries is equally unknown. First-person accounts are lacking for 
obvious reasons. Malingering is best characterised as a slippery concept that is not 
fit for purpose in the majority of  circumstances that it might reasonably be applied 
in. Sharpe succinctly describes the difficulties faced by researchers as the following: 
‘theoretically, malingering is distinguished from psychiatric illness by the absence 
of  psychopathology, the identification of  ‘secondary gain’, and a conscious intent 
to deceive in order to obtain the gain. However, psychopathology is hypothetical, 
secondary gain is non-specific, and the determination of  the extent that intent is 
 Rosen, G. M. and Taylor, S. ‘Pseudo-PTSD’ in Journal of  Anxiety Disorders, 2007, Vol. 104
21, pp. 201-210; Greiffenstein, M. and Baker, J. ‘Miller was (mostly) right: head injury 
severity inversely related to simulation’ in Legal and Criminological Psychology, 2005,  Vol. 11, 
pp. 131-145; Greve, K. W., Ord, J. S., Bianchini, K. J. and Curtis, K. L. ‘Prevalence of  
malingering in patients with chronic pain referred for psychologic evaluation in a medico-
legal context’ in Archives of  Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 2009, Vol. 90, Issue 7, pp. 
1117-1126; a recent example of  this kind of  behaviour is the spate of  food-poisoning cas-
es brought by British tourists against continental resorts, vastly out of  proportion to the 
other nationalities that holiday there.
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conscious probably impossible’.  That is to say, each constituent conceptual part 105
of  malingering begins to look suspect under further examination. 
This being true, malingering does cast a shadow over our cultural life, and it is 
here that perhaps it exists most vividly. Malingering is imbued with moral signifi-
cance, and the osmosis of  common tropes by both medical and non-medical fig-
ures contributes greatly to patients’ understanding and experience of  the term.  
There are no shortage of  cultural examples to choose from. Norman Mailer’s de-
but novel The Naked and the Dead included a character who attempted to fake the 
symptoms of  nervous shock to get removed from the front-line. Seinfeld’s George 
Constanza pretended to be disabled so that he could access the executive bath-
room. The traditional reading of  Hamlet has the woebegone prince feign (rather 
than suffer from) madness in order to extract his revenge on Claudius. And some-
times real life provides examples that are stranger than fiction.  
Consider the extraordinary case of  Steven Jay Russell. Among the duplicity and 
many daring escapes that littered his criminal career, one particular scheme stands 
out as a masterclass in malingering. Through a combination of  laxatives, starvation 
and convincing acting he was able to fake the symptoms of  late stage AIDS and 
get himself  removed from prison and placed in a hospice (where he subsequently 
engaged in further ingenious deception and faked his own death in order to es-
cape).    106
Kuperman’s content analysis on representations of  malingering in works of  fiction 
identified ‘madness’ and ‘folly’ as the two behavioural patterns most commonly 
used.  Whilst these are often employed as plot devices and as a basis for humor107 -
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 McVicker, S. I Love You Phillip Morris, 2003, Miramax Books, USA.106
 Kuperman, V. ‘Narratives of  psychiatric malingering in works of  fiction’ in The Journal 107
of  Medical Ethics; Medical Humanities, 2006, Vol. 32, pp. 67-72.
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ous passages, one consistency should be noted, that ‘in fiction, as in the clinic, ma-
lingerers often prefer mental disorders to somatic diseases’.  Because the majority 108
of  mental illnesses are symptomatic - that is, defined only by the symptoms as sub-
jectively reported and recorded - it is a truism that faking such a condition is far 
easier than altering your body so that it falls in line with biological indicators of  
specific conditions. The same is true for contested illnesses, which are also largely 
symptomatic.  
So, despite the ambiguity that dominates the theoretical debate around malinger-
ing, it would be foolish to dismiss this idea off  hand. However defined, this is an 
issue which has been growing in importance over the last century and may contin-
ue to do so. There are some troubling trends which pay testament to this and defy 
simplistic explanations. Since the 1970s, more generous sickness benefits have gen-
erally become available across the majority of  Western nations. Over the same pe-
riod, the uptake of  such benefits has increased dramatically and without signs of  
slowing, despite widespread improvements in general levels of  public health, occu-
pational safety, dietary information and interventionist medical care.  Partially 109
this paradox can be explained by the explosion of  ‘medically unexplained symp-
toms’ or ‘subjective health complaints’, which cover the majority of  chronic, con-
tested illnesses and whose patient populations often attempt to access sickness ben-
efits of  one kind or another.  How are these patients affected by the medical, le110 -
gal and cultural meanings of  malingering?  
For many individuals, especially sick people, the word ‘malingerer’ is heavily 
 Ibid., p. 68.108
 Haligan, P. W., Bass, C. and Oakley, D. A. 2003, p. 3.109
 Ford, C. V. ‘Somatization and fashionable diagnoses: illness as a way of  life’ in The 110
Scandinavian Journal of  Work and Environmental Health, 1997, Vol. 23, Supp. 3, pp. 7-16; 
Binder, L. M. and Campbell, K. A. ‘Medically Unexplained Symptoms and Neuropsy-
chological Assessment’ in The Journal of  Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 2004, Vol 
26, No. 3, pp. 369-392.
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loaded. It comes with a host of  accusatory connotations which grate against the 
dominant positive narratives of  selfhood present in modern society. In the wider 
scheme of  things, to be a malingerer goes against the idea that everyone must con-
tribute in some way, most often economically, to society, as best they can. Those 
who can but do not do this, or who find ways of  circumventing this responsibility, 
are placed with scorn into a unsavoury category of  people: ‘scroungers’ and 
‘cheats’. Malingering fits nicely into many people’s view of  society as constructed 
of  those who work and deserve the rewards they receive and those who refuse to, 
riding instead on the coat-tails of  better people, free-loading on an overgenerous 
state. On a personal level, being a malingerer makes you by definition a liar and a 
devious manipulator. People do not accommodate such views of  themselves easily, 
and so it is no wonder that being regarded in this way often provokes a violent de-
fensiveness.  
For patients with chronic, contested illnesses, this is a particular concern because 
of  the ‘subjective’ nature of  their complaints. Having a purely symptomatic illness 
can generate the uncomfortable feeling that those around you and those profes-
sionally responsible for your well-being have ceased to trust the way that you repre-
sent yourself. There is definitely truth in this: focusing on fibromyalgia for instance, 
different research has shown that a significant percentage of  doctors and a lower 
but still relevant number of  specialists doubt the credibility of  the disease, and 
many believe outright that those who claim to suffer from it are malingering.  111
What has also been highlighted, as suggested above, is the fairly straightforward 
way in which the clinical features of  the illness could be feigned, and some re-
 Hayes, S. M. et al ‘Fibromyalgia and the therapeutic relationship: Where uncertainty 111
meets attitude’ in Pain Research and Management, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 385-391; Album, 
D. and Westin, S. ‘Do diseases have a prestige hierarchy? A survey among physicians and 
medical students’ in Social Sciences and Medicine, 2008, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 182-188.
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search points towards inconsistent reporting of  symptoms.  More strongly sug112 -
gested is that on some level an exaggeration occurs, facilitated perhaps by ‘an uncon-
scious need to seek legitimisation of  symptoms in the context of  ‘disbelief ’ by oth-
ers’.  As a result of  this, sufferers of  these illnesses often develop strategies for op113 -
erating within this climate: a morgellons disease (a condition described further in 
Chapter II) organisation, for example, provides a cover letter to show to your 
physician whilst other groups emphasise different tactics that will make navigating 
the benefits system easier.  The idea here is not to somehow cheat or deceive, but 114
rather to recognise the often prejudicial circumstances that ill people find them-
selves in and to make the most of  the tools available.  
A concept that is sometimes brought into play when discussing these conditions is 
known as ‘compensation neurosis’. This is a term which is often used pejoratively 
to describe the apparent increase in symptom severity noted in those pursuing 
compensation which can abide or dissipate following a successful outcome. Some 
speculate on this basis that the rise of  welfare opportunities for the ill has caused 
the growth in symptomatic conditions, arguing that ‘financial reward or compensa-
tion for self  reported pain or suffering would seem to be more harmful than help-
ful’.  Compensation neurosis is a more complex phenomenon than it first ap115 -
pears however: it is not simply a case of  individuals overplaying their hand in or-
 Johnson-Greene, D., Brooks, L. and Ference, T. ‘Relationship between performance 112
validity testing, disability status and somatic complaints in patients with fibromyalgia’ in 
Clinical Neuropsychology, 2013, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 148-158.
 Harth, M. and Nielson, W. R. ‘Fibromyalgia and disability adjudication: No simple 113
solutions to a complex problem’ in Pain Research and Management, 2014, Vol. 19, No. 6, p. 
296.
 For example see http://fibroaction.org/Pages/Benefits-and-Fibro.aspx archived on 114
19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/6s5Ef6f3i for fibromyalgia; http://www.action-
forme.org.uk/get-informed/welfare-benefits archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webci-
tation.org/6s5ElJxZ6 for chronic fatigue.
 Bellamy, R. ‘Compensation Neurosis: Financial Reward for Illness as Nocebo’ in Clini115 -
cal Orthopaedics and Related Research, 1997, No. 336, pp. 94-106.
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der to squeeze money out of  the system. As Hall and Hall have argued, finding 
yourself  in a compensatory struggle presents a unique set of  stressors, only one of  
which is potential financial reward.  What may well be more pertinent is the 116
pressure exerted by lawyers, family and friends to experience your condition in a 
certain way, or the effect of  continually retelling and reasserting your subjective 
symptoms in a climate of  doubt. It is these processes which can in some people 
(different groups of  individuals have been shown to be more or less susceptible) 
generate the unconscious expansion of  symptoms. 
As we shall see in Chapter IV, there is some truth to this idea, though it is a murky 
and complex process to unpick. What I observed through my conversations with 
fibromyalgia patients did not appear to be a straightforward exaggeration of  symp-
toms in order to gain some kind of  reward. Rather, it was two processes occurring 
simultaneously. The first is the tailoring of  their disease, or how they reported their 
disease, to the rigid requirements of  different contexts. Even when it was not the 
case, they tried to present their condition as much as possible in ways which ac-
corded with institutional and societal expectations, most having learnt the hard 
way that telling the truth (as they saw and felt it) about their symptoms was not al-
ways fruitful. The second process is the hard to grasp subconscious effects of  living 
with a symptomatic profile not understood or valued by the social matrix of  your 
life, i.e. the struggle to live well and trust your body whilst lacking empathy and val-
idation from others around you. Though the effects of  this are difficult to deter-
mine, I would say it clearly has the potential to play a big role in the way that 
symptoms are conceptualised by patients, and perhaps in some cases does lead to a 
defensive ‘hardening’ of  the way they interpret their distress. 
Subjective health complaint patients do come under legal scrutiny for compensa-
tion neurosis, but it is worth noting that in many instances the hope of  financial 
 Hall, R. C. W. and Hall, R. C. W. ‘Compensation Neurosis: A Too Quickly Forgotten 116
Concept?’ in The Journal of  the American Academy of  Psychiatry and the Law, 2012, Vol. 40, pp. 
390-398.
!69
compensation from the very beginning is understood to be slight, and some do not 
engage in the process at all. There also seems to be little evidence of  patients re-
covering or part recovering after receiving welfare approval, though it is argued 
that in the case of  chronic conditions these payments incentivise patients to remain 
ill rather than get better and lose entitlement. In many cases, people remain ill, 
housebound and unable to work regardless of  the level of  assistance they receive. 
What is interesting though is the idea that constant narrative reinforcement of  
symptoms can solidify and worsen them. For many patients however, as I will talk 
about in Chapter IV, this persistent retelling and negotiation of  their sickness iden-
tity appears to generate self-doubt and foster concealment strategies rather than 
any hardening of  symptom narratives. Potentially shorter-term, more one-off  
compensatory situations, such as those regarding whiplash following an accident 
for example, seem more likely candidates for examining this concept thoroughly.  
To bring this conversation full-circle, it seems like we have covered a lot of  ground 
without saying much which is conclusive. And yet the way that patients feel about 
their conditions is intimately related to these concepts. There seems to be one extra 
component which is missing: the incredibly strong and emotive link that people 
draw between a condition being ‘psychological’ or ‘psychosomatic’ and it being 
controllable. Indeed, patients themselves have been shown to view psychosomatic 
illness and malingering as synonymous, regardless of  attitudes within medicine and 
psychiatry.  It is clear that the most important aspect of  malingering for those 117
with contested illnesses is agency. Agency brings with it that which is dreaded: re-
sponsibility. As Hacking states: 
 Wessely, S. and Showalter, E. ‘Chronic fatigue syndrome: a true illness or a social and 117
political issue?’ in Williams, G. (ed.) Horizons in Medicine, 1999, Vol 10, Royal College of  
Physicians, UK, pp. 501-516.
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‘Responsibility is the crux. We have a profoundly moral attitude to disease. If  
something is a real disease, you are not responsible for it’.  118
And thus, for some people with contested illnesses, the mere suggestion that any 
part of  what they suffer from might be psychological in origin can entail the subse-
quent conclusion that the person making that diagnosis is accusing them of  being 
in control of  their symptoms. That is, since psychosomatic conditions are not ‘real’ 
in the eyes of  suffers - organic, biomedical conditions being the only ones which 
‘count’ - they are therefore the fault of  the individual who contracts them or dis-
plays their symptoms. Kirmayer describes the diagnosis of  a psychosomatic condi-
tion as transforming the ‘real into the imaginary, the innocent into the culpable’.  119
As we shall see in Chapter IV, not all patients reject this label as strongly as is often 
suggested, some fully incorporating a psychological element to their problems, but 
what does remain constant is the desire to be absolved of  blame. Showalter writes 
about CFS patient ‘culture’ which contributes to prioritising biological explana-
tions: 
‘Patients with chronic fatigue live in a culture that still looks down on psychogenic 
illness, that does not recognise or respect its reality. The self-esteem of  the patient 
depends on having the physiological nature of  the disease accepted: the culture 
forces people to deny the psychological, circumstantial, or emotional sources of  
their symptoms and to insist that they must be biological and beyond their control 
in order for them to view themselves as legitimately ill’  120
 Hacking, I. Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of  Transient Mental Illnesses, 2002, Har118 -
vard University Press, USA, p. 11.
 Kirmayer, L. J. ‘Mind and Body as Metaphors: Hidden Values in Biomedicine’ in 119
Gordon, D. and Lock, M. (eds.) Biomedicine Examined, 1988, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
The Netherlands, p. 65.
 Showalter, E. Hystories: Hysteria, Gender and Culture, 1997, Pan Books Limited, UK.120
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The last two words used above are those that patients most often repeat: their con-
dition is not regarded as legitimate and therefore they are not believed to be legiti-
mately ill. Legitimacy here also means that an ill person has the right to feel the way 
they do, to be excused from working, to receive welfare payments, to expect sympa-
thy, etc. because their condition is ‘real’. As a reaction to this, what has been ob-
served across many contested illnesses is the formation of  alternative models of  le-
gitimation, which posit versions of  aetiology, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment 
that are removed from the mainstream medical view.  These explanations extend 121
to covering the difficulties that their conditions present and ‘helps sufferers deal 
with conflicting medical and cultural representations of  their illnesses by explain-
ing why contested illnesses are so hard to diagnose and treat’.  122
Closely related to this is the idea of  validity: that if  a disease is not legitimate then 
therefore the symptoms and associated distress of  the ill person becomes invalid. 
This is viewed by many patients as a deeply painful denial of  their personal expe-
rience, especially as it can come not only from medical professionals but from those 
closest to them - friends, children, partners. A recurring theme among patients 
with fibromyalgia (expanded in Chapter IV) is that although others ‘try to under-
stand’, nobody except fellow patients really has access to their symptomatic world. 
A lot of  people within the community point to explanatory strategies such as 
 Swoboda, D. A. ‘The social construction of  contested illness legitimacy: a grounded 121
theory analysis’ in Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2006, Vol. 3, pp. 233-251.
 Ibid., p. 245.122
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‘spoon theory’ as a way of  conveying to those without the condition what it is like 
to suffer from it.   123
This does not, however, alter the fact that for many patients, the way that their 
body makes them feel is sufficiently removed from how others perceive that experi-
ence as to create severe psychological tension. Despite the attempts of  the patient 
community to pursue alternative legitimatising models and even in possession of  
fortitude and self-belief, patients still remain engaged in a struggle to validate their 
own embodied existence.  
This issue is, I believe, best explained as a form of  conceptual distance, whereby 
the phenomenology of  disease for those with contested illnesses (and others) is 
mismatched with prevailing notions of  what disease should be, creating a gap be-
tween people’s expectations and a patient’s experience. To begin to look more in-
depth at this problem, we must first examine the pervasive but fuzzy historical and 
philosophical idea, ‘biomedicine’.  
It is this loose system of  thought or, rather, way of  seeing and encountering dis-
ease, which more than any other set of  ideas guides us, both as specialists and non-
specialists, when it comes to sickness. Though it has brought us many benefits, 
there are plenty of  instances where the biomedical worldview is simply unable to 
adequately account for phenomena it is expected to assimilate. Contested illnesses 
being one such group, in which disease experiences are rendered almost entirely 
incomprehensible by biomedical attempts to classify and explain. Such is the ubiq-
uity of  its basic tenets that they have come to represent the common-sense under-
 ‘Spoon theory’ is an analogy that describes the way conducting seemingly mundane 123
and everyday tasks can drain the energy of  someone with a chronic illness. People with 
chronic illnesses start each morning with a predetermined number of  ‘spoons’, and use 
them up throughout the day on whatever activities they attempt, to the point where if  all 
spoons are depleted then they have no option but to rest. This is contrasted to able-bod-
ied, healthy people who have a ‘never-ending’ supply of  spoons and do not have to adjust 
their actions on the basis of  how many they have left. This explanatory tool is not used 
exclusively by people with contested illnesses, but also by individuals with disabilities and 
other chronic diseases.
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pinnings of  categories like ‘disease’, and those conditions which does not appear to 
fit have become strange category errors, unable to ascend to full disease status.  124
The damage done by this incompatibility will be explained at length in Chapter IV. 
But first, what exactly do we mean when we talk of  ‘biomedicine’? 
Biomedicine 
In 1936, Henry Sigerist wrote that ‘medicine is not a branch of  science and it nev-
er will be’.  He was engaged in a dispute with George Sarton about the nature of  125
their disciplines’ relationship (history of  medicine and history of  science respec-
tively) at the time, but what is relevant is the way in which he regarded medicine as 
an intrinsically social enterprise. In the years that have passed since, this assertion 
has not lost relevance. If  anything, the need to emphasise those aspects of  medi-
cine which are not scientific, especially in relation to the topic at hand here, is 
greater than in Sigerist’s era. This is because of  the dominance of  the ‘scientific’ 
branch of  medical practice, which has expanded vastly in scope and power follow-
ing the Second World War. In this section, I will outline what are regarded as the 
core features of  biomedicine and discuss some common objections and critiques, 
mostly drawn from sociology. I will then look at the implications of  the biomedical 
model for chronic, contested illnesses and bring greater clarity to the notion that 
this can be framed as a philosophical problem as well as a sociological one.  
Though it is possible to trace the beginnings of  biomedicine, philosophically, far 
back into the nineteenth century, through the work of  Koch, Pasteur and Bichat 
 Though it must be said that contested illnesses, for a variety of  reasons, have rarely 124
been fully accepted as completely legitimate disease entities, at least from the 20th century 
onwards.
 Sigerist, H. ‘History of  Medicine and the History of  Science: An Open Letter to 125
George Sarton, Editor of  Isis’ in The Bulletin of  the History of  Medicine 1936, Vol. 4, pp. 
1-13.
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(and perhaps even further to Descartes), it is not an unreasonable assertion to make 
that the modern features of  this phenomenon only began to solidify and permeate 
in the post-war period, where biological science and clinical practice converged at 
the start of  the antibiotic age.  This is because, with the new focus on identifying 126
and eliminating foreign agents as a primary method of  fighting disease came a new 
set of  assumptions about what medicine is and does. It is here that a closer, more 
intimate relationship developed between the laboratory and the hospital, training 
began to contain an explicit, scientific core and a series of  seemingly incredible 
victories over long-standing scourges (tuberculosis and syphilis for example) shaped 
the narrative of  interventionist, miraculous medicine.   127
Thus it was that a way of  seeing the medical world which had long been intellec-
tualised - the development of  the dichotomised body as object and subject, the 
preference for measurement over speech - spread gradually across the medical and 
then social worlds of  the west, normalised and perpetuated through schools and 
universities.  In time biomedicine has become more and more demarcated from 128
other models of  understanding health, disease and medical treatment, and is the 
dominant viewpoint from which to understand disease, both by medical personnel 
(sometimes to an incredible level of  specificity) and by lay populations, albeit in a 
much more intangible, fluid manner. But what are its constituent parts?  
 
The core tenets of  Biomedicine 
 
 Keating, P. and Cambrosio, A. Biomedical Platforms: Realigning the Normal and the Pathologi126 -
cal in Late-Twentieth-Centure Medicine, The MIT Press, USA, 2003.
 Quirke, V. and Gaudilliére, J. ‘The Era of  Biomedicine: Science, Medicine, and Public 127
Health in Britain and France after the Second World War’ in Medical History, 2008, Vol. 
52, pp. 442-443.
 Mol, A. and Law, J. ‘Embodied action, enacted bodies’ in Burri, R. V. and Dumit, J. 128
(eds.) Biomedicine as Culture: Instrumental Practices, Technoscientific Knowledge and New Modes of  
Life, 2007, Routledge, UK, pp. 88-89. 
!75
Sarah Nettleton identifies five core tenets, and these serve as a good starting point 
as they encompass the major trends without necessitating too much deviation or 
lengthy exposition.  They are as follows: 129
1) Mind-body dualism: the mind and the body are treated separately; disease 
relates to the body; 
2) Mechanical metaphor: the body is best understood as a complicated ma-
chine with independent parts and systems that can be repaired individually; 
3) Technological imperative: technological interventions are prioritised; there 
is a bias towards curing rather than caring; 
4) Reductionism: health and illness are explained in strictly biological terms; 
sociological, environmental or psychological factors are downplayed or dis-
regarded unless no organic cause can be identified; 
5) Doctrine of  specific aetiology: disease entities are solely responsible for dis-
ease. 
Mind-body dualism in this context refers to the dichotomisation between what are 
regarded as ‘subjective’, mental complaints and ‘objective’, physical ailments, with 
the latter prioritised as more legitimate. The physical and mental domains of  
health as schematised here are separated to a large extent in training, research and 
clinical practice in western medicine. Distinct institutional and professional divi-
sions exist, and generally speaking ‘physical’ medicine is held in higher esteem. 
This split no doubt contributes to the lack of  parity that exists between mental and 
physical disorders, and the result is often that conditions that do not produce con-
sistent or convincing biomedical markers are regarded as suspicious, irrelevant or 
overly time-consuming by practitioners.    130
 Nettleton, S. The Sociology of  Health and Illness, 2006, Polity Press, UK, p. 2.129
 Crowley-Matoka, M. et al ‘Problems of  Quality and Equity in Pain Management: Ex130 -
ploring the role of  Biomedical Culture’ in Pain Medicine, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 7 p. 1314.
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The second factor that Nettleton identifies is the employment of  a mechanical 
metaphor to explain how the human body works and by extension how to fix it 
when things go wrong. Abstract representations of  anatomy and physiology in-
clude numerous references to the body-as-machine, and medical textbooks regular-
ly and explicitly make this connection. This is related to the third and fourth fac-
tors: the body is essentially reduced to a collection of  parts and systems that can be 
repaired through interventions aimed at specific problems. Viewed this way, the 
patient is a complex construction, with various interdependent parts, most of  
which can to some extent be isolated and worked on individually. The aim of  med-
icine here is always to cure, to restore the body as close as possible to the state it 
was in before the problem arose. The outcome of  this mechanistic, reductionist 
approach is that the clinical focus turns to biological rather than psychological or 
social factors to explain and encounter disease. Health becomes a largely physio-
chemical concept.  Biomedicine ‘exemplifies materialism…‘real’ illness corre131 -
sponds to the degree to which physical traces show up in the body…health and ill-
ness are defined in terms of  materialist indicators’.   132
The doctrine of  specific aetiology, identified by Nettleton as the final core feature 
of  biomedicine, states that all diseases are caused by identifiable factors, preferably 
singular ones that can be observed by technical means. This concept has a long 
history, and though it is widely accepted that most diseases are multifactorial and 
that the presence of  certain bacteria may be benign in some and pathological in 
others, this idea still exerts influence in both medical and lay contexts.  In many 133
 Helman, C. G. ‘Psyche, soma, and society: the social construction of  psychosomatic 131
disorders’ in Gordon, D. and Lock, M. (eds.) Biomedicine Examined, 1988, Kluwer Academ-
ic Publishers, The Netherlands, p. 95.
 Gordon, D. ‘Tenacious assumptions in modern medicine’ in Gordon, D. and Lock, M. 132
(eds.) Biomedicine Examined, 1988, Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, p. 24.
 Deep, P. ‘Biological and Biopsychosocial Models of  Health and Disease in Dentistry’ 133
in The Journal of  the Canadian Dental Association, 1999, Vol. 65, pp. 496-497. 
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cases, where diseases are located around one body part or system, or else result 
from one virus or bacteria, and other contributing elements are deemed to be of  
minimal importance or disregarded altogether. As Lawler writes: ‘such a viewpoint 
leaves little space for other aspects of  lived experience, such as feelings and emo-
tions, except to the extent that these things can be understood as biologically de-
termined processes’.   134
This approach to healthcare has certainly had its benefits. It is indisputable that 
advances in microbiology (and related fields) and their widespread application has 
saved a magnitude of  lives and vastly increased the power of  medicine to react and 
to heal. A large number of  illnesses fit neatly into this understanding of  health and 
sickness, and acute care is more effective than it has been in the history of  
mankind.  Rising life expectancy and steadily increasing clinical outcomes over 135
the latter half  of  the 20th century are due, in some part at least, to the strengths of  
the biomedical model in combating disease.  
However, it is arguable that other factors – improvements in personal and profes-
sional hygiene, public health campaigns, sanitation, education, housing, employ-
ment, air quality, diet – have all had a greater effect on the health of  western popu-
lations than interventionist medicine.  Biomedicine, in failing to recognise or ap136 -
propriately regard the socio-environmental context in which disease forms, is inad-
equate and unable to achieve its aims.  There is also the problem that a bio137 -
medical viewpoint assumes that its methods produce epistemic authority - that all 
 Lawler, J. Behind the Screens: Nursing, Somology and the Problem of  the Body, 1991, Churchill 134
Livingstone, Australia, p. 2.
 Wade, D. T. and Halligan, P. W. ‘Do Biomedical Models of  Illness Make For Good 135
Healthcare Systems?’ in The British Medical Journal, 2004, Vol. 329, No. 7479, p. 1398.
 Nettleton, S. 2006.136
 Broadly speaking, these aims are: restoring to health all those who are ill through spe137 -
cific, targeted treatment and identifying singular causes or physiochemical aetiologies for 
all conditions.
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validity surrounding a disease must be drawn from microbiology or histology or 
physiology or parasitology (or whatever). This not only ignores non-biological fac-
tors as discussed above but also assumes that medical knowledge production is ‘ob-
jective’ and without roots in a specific social context, despite much work which has 
demonstrated otherwise.  138
It is notable that the most strident criticisms of  biomedicine have come from soci-
ologists. Their work, as discussed in this chapter, has enabled us to give meaning to 
health and sickness beyond that which is provided by medical science, and 
equipped us with tools to challenge the assumptions on which we base our health 
care system. This has provided some support for movements within medicine to 
establish a broader base for understanding illness, such as the biopsychosocial 
model, first proposed in the 1970s and often referred to if  apparently little 
applied.    139
What is lacking however is any concerted effort to respond to biomedicine philo-
sophically. Looking at how the body is understood by practitioners is vital because 
it determines the way in which health and illness come to be defined within disci-
plines and as a consequence points towards what is perceived as the best medical 
response to a situation.  It is also important to recognise how individuals and 140
communities outside of  medical practice perceive and experience health and ill-
 For two landmark case studies in the social production of  knowledge, see: Fleck, L. 138
Genesis and Development of  a Scientific Fact, 1981 (originally published 1935), University of  
Chicago Press, USA and Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. Laboratory Life: The Construction of  Sci-
entific Facts, 1986, Princeton University Press, USA.
 Engel, G. L. ‘The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine’ in Sci139 -
ence, 1977, Vol. 196, No. 4286, pp. 129-136; Johnson, S. B. ‘Medicine’s paradigm shift: An 
opportunity for psychology’ in The American Psychological Association, 2012, Vol. 43, No. 8, p. 
5.
 Brown, C. and Seddon, J. ‘The social body and the biomechanical body: can they co140 -
exist in nurse education?’ in The Journal of  Advanced Medicine, 1996, Vol. 23, pp. 651-656.
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ness as well, and the effect that this has on the sick. I have no doubts that this is as 
much a philosophical problem as it is a sociological one. 
This is because biomedicine is a way of  seeing disease, of  seeing the body and of  
seeing bodies. The biomedical body is universal, consistent and constant; its ways 
of  signally distress can be quantified in numerical form; it can be fixed, it can be 
cured. Corporal regionalism reigns in the clinic. Diseases are malfunctions, exter-
nal not always (though often) in the necessary sense of  having come from outside, 
but rather in the sense that they are always external to the norm. A biomedical body 
should hold no surprises.  
This model seeps into the popular imagination and informs the way that non-med-
ically trained individual encounter illness. To them, disease is visible, ill people look 
ill – they limp, they’re pale, their hair falls out, they bleed. Diseases have scientific 
names because diseases are scientific entities. Disease is always located: you’re ill 
because of  this organ or that virus or because of  some imbalance in your blood; 
you are never simply ill. Disease is something to be fought against and triumphed 
over or it is something to be defeated by; patients get better or they get worse; they 
do not fluctuate day by day.    
This is not to say that this view is malevolent, but rather to state that there are 
many experiences of  sickness which fall outside of  these parameters. The patients 
involved, unsure of  their own ideas about their body, conflicted as they are be-
tween what they have absorbed and what only they know, cannot find a home for 
their sensory life in the meanings, explanations and narratives offered by the bio-
medical model. They are lost, and turn to each other to share the burden of  being 
misunderstood. In Chapter IV, through the words of  patients we shall see the reach 
of  the biomedical mindset, extending as it does far beyond the doctors’ surgery 
and into family homes and offices, newspaper articles and online forums.  
Concluding remarks 
!80
In the preceding pages we have covered in some detail the different concepts that 
seem most salient when it comes to discussing the philosophical context that in-
forms the experience of  those with chronic, contested illnesses. What we are left 
with now, as I try to bring these different conversations into some sort of  coher-
ence, is a vocabulary with which to understand real life experiences, and a set of  
questions that philosophical work in this area might try and answer. ‘Chronic’ dis-
eases seem an unstable category but one which is useable enough so as not to be 
disregarded. ‘Contested’ illnesses, as I understand them, can be demarcated fairly 
successfully, though this is where the interesting analysis begins rather than ends. 
Both of  these combined - as they almost always are - leaves us a sticky, viscous con-
ceptual group, but one which promises to be extremely demonstrative of  the prob-
lems surrounding philosophy of  disease. ‘Malingering’ is brought in and partially 
dismissed for its conceptual viscosity, but retained as an item of  utility due to its 
metaphorical power. It is important because of  what it means to those affected and 
how it fits into larger societal narratives of  justice and fairness. ‘Validity’ and ‘legit-
imacy’ are exposed as painful but essential components of  the contested illness ex-
perience, and their own make-up is examined. The subterranean system which 
underpins all this, ‘biomedicine’, has been shown to have several key features and a 
distinguishable core which informs the way not only large areas of  medicine oper-
ate but also how people in general view health and illness. In the next chapter we 
will look at how philosophers have written about disease, and what may appear the 






Chapter II - Definitions of  Disease  
In 1992, Arthur Caplan published a famous paper in Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics entitled ‘Does the philosophy of  medicine exist?’.  Within it he detailed 141
various necessary features of  a ‘field’ and concluded, broadly to his own disap-
pointment, that philosophy of  medicine did not satisfy those conditions. Therefore, 
it should not be yet considered a discipline in its own right and did not as such ‘ex-
ist’. His demarcation criteria were that a field must be integrated into cognate ar-
eas of  study; it should have a distinct and wrangled-over canon of  literature; and 
that there ought to be present some key puzzles or vital questions which form the 
centrepieces of  the main debates. Philosophy of  medicine, in his view, failed to 
make the grade in any of  these three categories.   142
It is the first and last of  Caplan’s criteria with which I am most interested here. He 
argued that philosophy of  medicine is too removed from practice, and that 
philosophers do not do enough to place themselves as loud, useful voices in rela-
tion to medicine. It is this baton I would like to raise here. I broadly agree with his 
suggestion that philosophy of  medicine is too insular and inward-looking, and that 
its proponents have not done enough to make themselves relevant. 
Then there is the question of  central problems. Caplan conceded that the debate 
surrounding ‘health’ and ‘disease’ comes closest to passing his test, but argues that 
these do not constitute enough to ‘transform a mixed set of  ruminations into an 
 Caplan, A. ‘Does the philosophy of  medicine exist?’ in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 141
1992, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 67-77.
 His overall thrust is fairly irrelevant to this work. I agree broadly with Stempsey’s ret142 -
rospective and roughly inclusive view: Stempsey, W. E. ‘Philosophy of  Medicine is What 
Philosophers of  Medicine Do’ in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2008, Vol. 51, No. 3, 
pp. 379-391. As such, the strength or weakness of  Caplan’s position is not under discus-
sion here, and I do not wish my use of  his paper to be taken as a tacit endorsement of  his 
views. I am using his work here as a springboard for discussion, not as an item for analysis 
itself.
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actual field’.  In the years since his paper these concepts have been hashed out to 143
a greater extent, perhaps even enough to contribute decisively to bonafide field-
hood, but that is not what I am concerned with. What I would like to focus on in 
this chapter is philosophical attempts to define disease, the underlying motivations 
for such efforts and the extent to which these could be considered a success. 
This is because I agree with Caplan, insofar as the definition of  disease is a prob-
lem which is and has been central to the philosophy of  medicine.  Its importance 144
would seem to be based in part on the benefits of  clear demarcation criteria. For a 
start, distinguishing between health and disease appears a prerequisite for the just 
distribution of  limited resources within any healthcare infrastructure. The alloca-
tion of  benefits, material, medical or social, seems to rely on being able to tell dis-
ease from non-disease. There are as well a large range of  specific dividing lines 
which come to mind, such as the distinction between treatment and enhancement 
- whether we should then treat body dysmorphic disorder with cosmetic surgery 
for example - or indeed demarcating between treatment and amputation, which is 
often sought by those with body identity integrity disorder. Both of  these could, in 
theory, benefit from greater clarity surrounding ‘disease’ and its hypothetical oppo-
site ‘non-disease’ . The special interest here of  course, contested illnesses, would 145
seem to gain greatly from proper categorisation, as the uncertainty that exists at 
present bleeds credibility from patient’s experience.  In any case, the examples 146
 Caplan, A., 1992, p. 73.143
 As do Nordenfelt, L. 2013, p. 23 and Lemoine, M. ‘Defining disease beyond concep144 -
tual analysis: an analysis of  conceptual analysis in philosophy of  medicine’ in Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 309-25.
 I make a distinction here between ‘disease’ and ‘non-disease’ not only because defining 145
‘health’, which most would take instinctively to be the opposite, has its own troubled defi-
nition history, but also because all that is not disease is ‘non-disease’, whereas plenty which 
is not disease is also not health.
 Though it remains to be seen what exactly would happen should their situations be 146
judged or assigned to not be ‘disease’.
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touched upon here just a few of  the topics which could be plausibly profit from a 
thorough and sophisticated elucidation of  the term ‘disease’.   
So yes, it would appear that answering, or attempting to answer, the question ‘what 
is disease?’ serves a useful purpose. However, in this chapter I will argue the oppo-
site. Attempting to define disease in a universal, closed sense, is a futile exercise. 
What’s more, it is one which gestates further futile exercises, in the form of  a pro-
longed theoretical tussle from which no winner is ever likely to emerge. My argu-
ment is that philosophers who attempt a universal definition of  disease, one which 
is able to sharply demarcate disease, are caught in an impossible bind. Maël 
Lemoine blames the procedural restraints of  conceptual analysis for this, and I will 
explore his position. But I will also posit that there is another factor which makes 
their attempts unlikely to be fruitful.  
I will show that given their aims, they either intend their theories to be descriptive 
or normative. In the case of  the former, it is highly improbable, given the desire to 
generate a set of  stipulations which includes all which is disease and excludes all 
which is not, that they will be successful. This is due to the sheer diversity of  enti-
ties that might be considered ‘disease’ and some pressing but unconsidered epis-
temic issues. The creation of  such a schema rests upon a necessary essentialism 
about disease which does not come close to enjoying adequate empirical support. I 
call this the vast magnitude argument, and I believe it applies even if  you try and 
restrict disease entities to something that appears fairly self-contained (say, ‘med-
ical’ usage) as well as to broader normativist theories of  disease. For the latter, the 
normative angle, it is simply that their conceptualisations carry little weight and 
make no strong claims as to why we should respect their authority.  I call this the 
justification gap argument. This argument has two strands: a theoretical deficiency 
which I will compare with bio-ethics and a practical element, which is that the 
words spoken in philosophy of  medicine fail to echo anywhere else. 
Furthermore, I will argue that theorists following this approach have a nefarious 
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influence on the discipline as a whole. Most notably, the focus on all-encompassing 
theories of  disease steers problem selection away from practice and into the arms 
of  pedantry.  To quote Caplan again, recent work on disease definition has done 
little to challenge the idea that ‘the philosophy of  medicine looks from afar like an 
intellectual island’ with no ‘connections to other parts of  the intellectual map’.  147
Using Illari and Russo’s taxonomy of  counterexamples, I will discuss how this 
problem might be approached and how plausible new directions in philosophy of  
disease would seem, utilising one promising section of  the literature, phenomenol-
ogy.  
Before I do this, though, it would be worth outlining the field, questioning the key 
assumptions and aims of  the philosophers, detailing some of  the more influential 
positions that have been taken, and focusing on a few of  the ways that people have 
approached the big questions surrounding disease: what is it and how should it be 
defined? I will make this section brief  as there already exists voluminous literature 
on the topic and what is more pertinent here is how we move past the current stric-
tures of  debate.   
 
Why define disease? 
What is the purpose of  achieving a succinct and self-contained definition of  dis-
ease? As with any ‘defining of  terms’ discourse, the possible outcomes are varied. 
Practical concerns, for example. Surely there is a straightforward, almost bureau-
cratic function to defining disease? After all, with the large amounts of  public and 
private money spent on health-care, there must be an incentive to be able to ade-
quately draw a line between who or what deserves resources. A strong, formulaic 
definition that could be referred to or imbued in practice would seem to serve a 
useful role. Certainly there are no shortage of  controversial cases that would ap-
 Caplan, A. 1992, p. 72.147
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parently benefit from some appeal to a higher adjudicator, especially in state-fund-
ed and distributed healthcare.  
Armed with such a definition, perhaps we could make progress on, for example, 
deciding whether people who eat fatty foods and exercise little become sufferers of  
obesity and therefore deserve access to relatively expensive surgical procedures. Or, 
to give another example, whether body dysmorphia qualifies as a disease and 
therefore should be treated (with cosmetic surgery for instance).  Indeed, politi148 -
cally, a strong and reductive disease definition could be wielded against medicalisa-
tion, over-diagnosis and fears of  boundary creep. 
Along with distributing concrete resources, a complete definition of  disease would 
allow us to resolve some of  the more fluid issues surrounding distribution, such as 
the allocation of  sick roles, sympathy and the validation of  an individual’s embod-
ied experience. These contentious and often painful battles to grab and hold on to 
legitimacy again could profit from reference to a higher, codified arbiter. Some-
thing like a gold standard in demarcation might play this role and be held up by 
those on the blurry edge of  disease like a certificate, a qualification that entitles 
them to be sick.  
Diagnostically, one of  the merits of  possessing a clean, useable definition is that it 
would enable health care professionals to make better decisions in the clinic. This 
is tied into concerns about medicalisation and over-diagnosis, in that a less vague 
disease concept is one which will simultaneously reduce false positives (especially 
with mental and behavioural conditions) and diminish the power of  special inter-
ests to bend definitions to their advantage (pharmaceutical companies seem the 
obvious target but equally patient groups and insurance companies might fit this 
description).  
 For an extended and fascination discussion of  these sorts of  questions, see Elliott, C. 148
Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets The American Dream, 2004, W. W. Norton and 
Company, USA.
!86
It might even be conceived that a slight codification of  demarcation criteria could 
be achieved whilst retaining some of  the plurality of  the current, organic, case-by-
case, institution-by-institution system. That is to say, we could move towards having 
a regular set of  demarcation criteria to be used economically in terms of  resource 
allocation, whilst generating a different set for clinical situations and so on, which 
would still reduce greatly the number of  stipulations for disease status in use. Es-
sentially, this would represent a scaling down and centralising of  the current situa-
tion, though some form of  arbiter would still be required.  
Finally, to return to the aims of  philosophers, there is a conceptual mapping aspect 
to all of  this. Put simply, disease exists in variant forms throughout institutions, cul-
tures, individuals and time. It is real in the sense that people believe in its reality. 
Indeed, despite the high variance with which it is found over a great multitude of  
different contexts, its core ‘reality’ is for the most part undiminished. And so there 
is a solid and understandable drive to describe and explain this phenomenon con-
ceptually, and integrate it into a nexus of  related concepts, as is the case in other 
parts of  philosophy for other entities. Whether this pursuit is a directly fruitful en-
deavour is not always the point; sometimes it is enough that the ideas were wrestled 
with and that the picture became slightly more in focus. Often the true yield of  
such work is initially obscure, and sometimes conceptual debates have surprising 
and pleasant outcomes far from the theoretical realm.  
I am not convinced by the above arguments, at least in the sense that I think they 
rely on things that will not come to pass or that they have unintended and deleteri-
ous consequences, and my objections will be clarified and expanded at the end of  
this chapter. I have included these potential motivations for attempting the task 
here so that we can better analyse the success of  various responses on their own 
terms.  
Is this, then, what philosophers are trying to achieve? Are they hoping to define 
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disease in order to solve or advance some of  the problems that I have outlined 
above?   
Maël Lemoine looked in detail at three important writers on this topic - Christo-
pher Boorse, Lennart Nordenfelt and Jerome Wakefield - and discussed the moti-
vations that drive philosophers of  medicine to attack this problem.  Though he 149
found that each had a closely related but distinct ‘major goal’, which tended to-
ward the broad and vague, he concluded that alongside this came common con-
cerns similar to those I have raised.  These relate directly to the sort of  advanta150 -
geous consequences they perceive their definitions to have, for example eliminating 
false positives in diagnosis and resolving disputed or borderline cases. They also 
retain a strong link to the things generally considered to be ‘disease’, at least insofar 
as they represent a considerably large set of  cases that must be satisfactorily assimi-
lated for a definition to be considered successful. Finally, it would appear to be the 
case that some level of  conceptual coherence is a worthwhile goal in its own right 
for these thinkers, and that work which is able to reconcile the different notions of  
‘disease’, ‘health’, ‘mental illness’, ‘injury’ etc. which are currently present in the 
literature is deserving of  attention.   
It seems evident, therefore, that philosophers see themselves as having clear moti-
vations for doing this kind of  work, and that they anticipate benefits emerging from 
their attempts. Before I go into detail as to why I take a contrary view, it will be 
useful to describe the main positions that individuals take in this field. 
Outline of  the field 
 Lemoine, M. 2013.149
 Boorse aimed to define health and disease within somatic medicine, Nordenfelt want150 -
ed a definition of  health in general and Wakefield limited himself  to mental disorders. 
Lemoine notes that despite these apparently diverse goals, these three thinkers are able 
and willing to argue with each other as if  their work was directly comparable. Certainly, 
by them and others, it has been treated as such.
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Within the definition of  disease debate (and discussion of  health more widely), 
there have over the last thirty years emerged two loose groupings of  theorists, shoe-
horned into what philosophers love to call a ‘false dichotomy’.  It is known as 151
such due largely to the coherence and consistency of  one thinker, Christopher 
Boorse, in the light of  whom disparate opponents begin to seem united.  
His ideas have formed the basis of  the naturalist tradition, which positions disease 
as a series of  entities which can be uncovered in a ‘value-free’ manner.  In es152 -
sence, naturalists argue that disease (along with health) is a concept which exists in 
the real world and can be described without evaluative elements needing to get in-
volved. Specifically, the usual arguments employed are that disease is revealed in a 
body by a statistical abnormality, measured scientifically, which indicates that nat-
ural function (usually framed in evolutionary terms) has been impaired. Bodies 
consist of  systems which have specific life-maintaining goals, and a departure from 
the normal functioning of  these systems (which is not harmless or beneficial) 
amounts to a disease state. Conscious of  some of  the basic problems of  normality, 
these statistical deviations are only considered significant if  they are anomalous for 
the type (age, sex, ethnicity etc.) of  person that experiences them. So, a young, 
ethnically Chinese woman who is lactose intolerant and gets drunk quickly has lit-
 Carel, H. and Cooper, R. ‘Introduction’ in Carel, H. and Cooper, R. (eds.) Health, Ill151 -
ness and Disease, Acumen Publishing, UK, 2013, p. 4; though many have commented on 
the convoluted nature of  this divide: for example see Kingma, E. ‘Naturalism about 
Health and Disease: Adding Nuance for Progress’ in The Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy, 
2014, Vol. 39, pp. 590-608; in this section I have deliberately attempted to narrow the lit-
erature analysed to those working on the ‘disease definition problem’. I did this because it 
is probably the largest glut of  literature in the field around a single topic and therefore 
worthy of  attention and because incorporating the work done at its edges would involve 
significant detours which, enlightening as they may be, I do not have space for here. 
 For a good discussion of  this ‘value-free’ definition of  disease, as well as the ‘value-152
laden’ normativist position, see Kingma, E. ‘Disease as Scientific and as Value-Laden 
Concept’ in Schramme, T. and Edwards, S. (eds.) Handbook of  the Philosophy of  Medicine, 
Springer, Germany, pp. 45-63.
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tle wrong with her (presuming that a biological aversion to dairy is the only thing 
‘abnormal’ about her body). These categories or sub-groups are generally referred 
to as reference classes.  
These disease classifications are regarded as ‘value-free’ because they supposedly 
require no subjective decision making. Naturalist theories are argued to exist inde-
pendently of  normative judgement: they simply tell us whether something is a dis-
ease, not whether it is good or bad to have it. Most naturalists expand this to a two-
stage process, whereby we first identify biological malfunctions (facts) and then in-
dulge in normative discussions about what this means (whether the person is suffer-
ing, whether we should medically intervene etc.) This approach is still a naturalist 
position because conceptual priority is given to the objective, organic descriptions 
and because those descriptions are assumed to be concretely real and value free.  
Across from these naturalists sit the normativists. They take a different tack regard-
ing the objectivity of  biological facts; in the case of  disease they believe all classifi-
cations to be ‘value-laden’. These philosophers are placed together because their 
ideas promote a fundamentally subjective element to disease definition, in that they 
believe calling something a disease necessarily involves making a normative 
judgement. That is, when deciding whether or not something is a disease, we are 
forced to make a statement about phenomena which does not and can not speak 
for itself. To call upon the words of  Tempkin who, as so often, said it best, disease 
can only exist within ‘man’s moral universe, when its occurrence within a scheme 
of  creation and right and wrong are accounted for’.  However, beyond these fair153 -
ly vague appeals to the subjectivity and judgement involved in defining disease, it is 
problematic to place all normativists in the same category as the positions they 
promote can be quite divergent. There is enough variety and disagreement on this 
side of  the discussion that it is questionable whether maintaining normativism as a 
 Temkin, O. ‘Health and Disease’ in The Double Face of  Janus and Other Essays in the Histo153 -
ry of  Medicine, 1977, John Hopkins University Press, UK, p. 421. 
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distinct position is still worthwhile. It can mean many things to many people.  
It is important at this point to highlight that the general, fundamental level at 
which most of  the disputes between naturalists and normativists take place is a 
conceptual one. This field is largely concerned with the theoretical nature of  dis-
ease, and not with how disease is applied in a social or lay context, nor even neces-
sarily by medical practitioners (although, confusingly, this is often presented as evi-
dence for the desirability of  choosing one theory over another). So, for naturalists, 
the core features of  a disease relate to function and dysfunction, and for norma-
tivists these vital components are defined by some form of  evaluative process.  
Beyond this discussion, there are numerous other positions which have been posit-
ed, a few of  which are relevant here. In a 2009 paper, Marc Ereshefsky described 
philosophers who attempt to straddle both naturalist and normative approaches, 
balancing themselves gently between the two, as hybrid theorists.  Some others, 154
such as Peter Schwartz, have tried different methods of  reframing and advancing 
the discussion.  155
However, regardless of  how successful they or others are in this endeavour, I will 
argue that they suffer from the same problems as straightforward naturalists or 
normativists: their project is doomed from the start to be a frustrating and difficult 
exercise.  
Finally, a few interesting and dissenting voices have been raised which question, as 
I do, the value in pursuing this problem at all, or at least in the way that it has been 
done thus far. Lemoine has highlighted the ways in which this debate is positioned 
 Ereshefsky, M. ‘Defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’’ in Studies in History and Philosophy of  Bio154 -
logical and Biomedical Sciences, 2009, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 221-227.
 Schwartz favours shifting from characterising concepts as they are currently being 155
used by medical science or wider society to making proposals for new definitions, a 
process he calls ‘philosophical explication’. See Schwartz, P. H. ‘Reframing the Disease 
Debate and Defending the Biostatistical Theory’ in The Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy, 
2014, Vol. 39, pp. 572-589. 
!91
as one of  straightforward conceptual analysis, which in turn dictates the sort of  
theories, evidence and arguments that are permissible and constrains the possible 
outcomes.  His examination of  the ‘rules of  the game’ are a welcome excavation 156
and I shall examine his thoughts. Hesslow famously took a stronger position, argu-
ing that the crucial role given to possessing a disease concept is illusionary and dis-
tracting, and that the importance of  such a definition to clinical practice is vastly 
overstated. I will restate his arguments later on in this chapter.   
Elsewhere, Carel, Kidd and others have tried to break with the tradition by 
proposing and debating the utility of  phenomenology of  illness and how to align 
this method with long-standing philosophical traditions.  I will examine the phe157 -
nomenological position at greater length below, but it is important to note that 
these thinkers argue from the same sense of  frustration that I do. Of  the conceptu-
al inadequacy of  both the medical and philosophical worlds, Carel writes: 
 
‘Because of  my training as a philosopher, my experiences pushed me to reflect ab-
stractly on health and illness: what these concepts mean and how best to under-
stand them. But when I started my research I found that the language and con-
cepts routinely used to describe illness are inappropriate, incomplete and often 
misleading. I became increasingly aware of  the impoverished language used in the 
medical world I encountered, which, in turn, led me to suspect that an impover-
ished concept of  illness was in the background’.  158
 Schwartz also makes this point.156
 See, for example: Kidd, I. J. ‘Can Illness Be Edifying?’ in Inquiry, 2012, Vol. 55, No. 5, 157
pp. 496-520; Carel, H. ‘Illness, Phenomenology and Philosophical Method’ in Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics, 2013, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 345-357; Carel, H. 2014; also discussed 
further below. 
 Carel, H. 2008, pp. 8-9158
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I will now give a brief  description of  a variety of  different positions within this 
field, in order to give a sense of  the sorts of  arguments that are employed and the 
types of  responses that could be considered representative. 
Different ways to define disease 
In this section I will look at some of  the main ways that theorists have tried to an-
swer the questions posed above. I treat this topic with deliberate brevity as it has 
been discussed extensively elsewhere and a lengthy and in-depth exploration is not 
necessary to make the arguments I wish to.   
It is customary in this debate to start your discussion by outlining and then criticis-
ing some aspect of  Boorse’s naturalist position, as his is the longest standing and 
most disputed theory of  disease. In fact, I would go as far as to say that critical in-
teractions between definitions of  disease where one theorist does not position 
themselves in contrast to Boorse are rare.  So central is he that Thomas 159
Schramme adapts Nozick’s comment about Rawls to say ‘it can be demanded that 
philosophers of  medicine must now either work within Boorse’s theory or explain 
why not’.  160
As discussed above, his naturalism is based around dysfunction and uncovering bi-
ological facts about disease. Known commonly as the bio-statistical theory (the 
BST), Boorse’s ideas rest on the physiology of  the human body as the key to un-
derstanding disease. There are three concepts which, placed together, form the 
BST. The first is physiological function, which is defined as the causal contribution 
a system (nervous, respiratory, circulatory etc.) makes towards biological goals (sur-
 One exception being Thomas Schramme, see  Schramme, T. ’A qualified defence of  a 159
naturalist theory of  health’ in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2007, Vol. 10, pp. 11-17.
 Schramme, T. ‘Christopher Boorse and the Philosophy of  Medicine’ in The Journal of  160
Medicine and Philosophy, 2014, Vol. 39, p. 565.
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vival and reproduction for example). The second is the idea of  a reference class, 
described above. These reference classes define what is considered typical for the 
individual under investigation. The third is a statistical concept, the idea of  organic 
statistical abnormality, which helps to delimit pathological from normal activity.  
Arranged in tandem with each other, these three ideas give us a fairly clear, if  not 
specific, notion of  Boorse’s theory. A disease is therefore present if  there is a statis-
tical abnormality, the result of  which impairs some aspect of  a person’s physiologi-
cal functioning and is untypical for that individual’s reference class. Or, as he puts 
it: ‘a disease is a type of  internal state which is…an impairment of  normal func-
tional ability, i.e., a reduction of  one or more functional abilities below typical effi-
ciency’.  161
These fundamental ideas and the places that they lead have been attacked for the 
best part of  half  a century. Almost every aspect of  his theory has been critiqued, 
the most effective arguments being those which focus on the impossibility of  un-
covering his basic criteria in a value-free manner.  Reference classes are not 162
strong enough to be natural kinds and neither is physiological functioning, even 
dressed in evolutionary clothing, objectively easy to determine. Classic statistical 
issues of  normality and line-drawing problems also stalk Boorse. Of  further diffi-
culty to him are several examples of  diseases that seem straightforward under his 
classification but are not considered to be diseases in general medical contexts. 
Homosexuality is a case in point here, as it would appear to be unequivocally a 
disease state under his schema, a state of  affairs very much of  out step with (con-
 This summary is compiled from Boorse, C. ‘On the distinction between disease and 161
illness’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1975, Vol. 5, pp. 49-68, Boorse, C. ‘Health as a theo-
retical concept’, in Philosophy of  Science, 1977, Vol. 44, pp. 542-573 and Boorse, C. ‘A re-
buttal on health’, in Humber, J. M. and Almeder, R. F. (eds.) What is disease?, 1997, Hu-
mana Press, USA; Quote is from Boorse, C., 1997. For an up-to-date summary of  his po-
sition, see Boorse, C. ‘A second rebuttal on health’ in The Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy, 
2014, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 683-724.
 For a good overview of  common criticisms and Boorse’s response, see: Smart, B. Con162 -
cepts and Causes in the Philosophy of  Disease, 2016, Palsgrave Macmillan, UK.
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temporary) thinking. These criticisms hold especial weight considering that Boorse 
purports the symmetry of  his theory with medical usage to be one of  its great 
strengths.  
These complaints are strong, and it is not clear that Boorse has been able to ade-
quately account for some or any of  them, though he has responded to critics peri-
odically.  All that sometimes seems to hold his ideas afloat is the intuition that 163
disease is related intrinsically to biology. His is, after all, the theory which ties itself  
most firmly to the organic and the natural. But beyond this indefatigable connec-
tion, which the majority of  thinkers would like to retain, all or almost all of  his ar-
guments are contentious and have been convincingly challenged. 
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, he is still at the forefront of  the field. Why he 
remains so important, so vital, so referenced, is difficult to tell. This is particularly 
interesting given the imbalance of  support and criticism in the literature. His ideas 
have been rebuked and dismissed on many occasions, in a manner that in many 
other areas of  philosophy or general academic discourse would seem adequate. 
George Khushf  has also noted this apparent enigma, writing:  
 
‘The scholarly response to Boorse has been vigorous and, at the same time, puz-
zling. Few accept his disease concept. When Boorse published a rebuttal to his 
many critics [in 1997], his bibliography lists well over a hundred such critics, and a 
literature search on the current philosophical debate indicates his work is among 
the most cited. Despite the broad consensus against his view, nearly everyone feels 
the need to return to Boorse and criticize him again. Why? This is the puzzling 
part’.  164
 Most notably in 1997 and 2014 - see footnote 156.163
 Khushf, G. ‘An agenda for future debate on concepts of  health and disease’ in Medi164 -
cine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2007, Vol. 10, p. 19.
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I can offer two explanations for this.  
The first is that Boorse represents a convenient foil. His work is continually dis-
credited because it is easy to criticise from a constructivist or loosely constructivist 
position which questions his basic assumptions surrounding normality and refer-
ence class objectivity and it is always nice to begin a paper with a refutation that 
strengthens your own position.  165
My second speculation is that Boorse is relevant not because of  the philosophical 
rigour of  his theories, but because these theories are the closest thing we have to a 
medical viewpoint. Therefore, the importance of  his thought could be derived 
from its isomorphic relationship with practice. He himself  has claimed this to be 
true, and it certainly should make us pause and consider the value of  the BST in a 
different way. If  this is indeed, nearer to how medical practitioners view disease, 
then what can we do with this knowledge? What effect might that mindset have on 
patients, on procedure, on insurance? Medical epistemologists know well the short-
falls of  applying general theories to individuals, and it is fair to say that debates like 
this (i.e. what do practitioners consider disease, how do they arrive at this etc.) are 
common across lots of  different arenas of  medical decision making and knowledge 
production.  This, if  anything, adds value and relevance to the BST: if  it is not 166
only a way of  conceptualising disease but a way that disease is actually conceptu-
 Kingma argues that there is a distinction to be drawn between normativism and social 165
constructivism, but I feel they are similar enough positions to be treated in this context as 
synonymous. See Kingma, E. ‘Health and disease: social constructivism as a combination 
of  naturalism and normativism’ in Carel, H. and Cooper, R. (eds.) Health, Illness and Dis-
ease, 2013 Acumen Publishing, UK.
 Miriam Solomon discusses four possible ways in which medical knowledge is produced 166
in Solomon, M. Making Medical Knowledge, 2015, Oxford University Press, UK.
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alised in practice, then all sorts of  interesting work can proceed.  Unfortunately, 167
not much has been done on the BST outside of  philosophy. As it is, the work re-
mains strangely important and an obligatory introductory sentence for pretty 
much everyone working on the philosophy of  disease who isn’t Christopher 
Boorse. 
Normativism does not have such a figurehead, but rather a multitude of  theorists 
orbiting its own central postulate: disease is about norms. A proper analysis of  
health and disease suggests, to them, that what we label with these terms tells us 
more about our own values than it does about some biological reality. Thus, desir-
able states become something to which to aspire, and which we associate with 
health, and likewise undesirable circumstances become called diseases.  
There are many general criticisms which are offered to this simplistic representa-
tion of  normativism. It is too inclusive, and rather than resolving controversies, 
seems to encourage them (alcoholism, obesity, ageing etc. all become straightfor-
ward seeming disease states). It is too relativistic, and allows for historical (and con-
temporary) instances of  persecution-by-medicine to be unproblematically justified. 
Stock examples from this criticism include homosexuals, political dissidents in the 
Soviet Union and slaves who ran away from plantations, all of  whom were at one 
point considered diseased because of  overt ideological biases present in their med-
ical communities. Finally, normativism of  the strongest sort breaks the intuitive 
bond with nature, the idea that there is some intangible or rather unquantifiable 
but supremely real connection between disease states and biology.  
The above sketch is superficial, so to get a better idea of  the sorts of  arguments 
normativists put forward, let us look at Rachel Cooper’s ideas. She sets out her 
 It may be the case, in fact, that many of  those who criticise Boorse do so because of  the 167
similarities between his view and that of  the dominant biomedical model, and in criticis-
ing his position they are raising broader issues with the way that medical science classifies 
disease. This is not made explicit anywhere that I can see, but I nonetheless think it might 
be an interesting avenue of  inquiry.
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aims in a way that is fairly typical of  normativist accounts:  
 
‘I suggest that a neat account of  disease cannot be achieved. By ‘disease’ we aim to 
pick out a variety of  conditions that through being painful, disfiguring or disabling 
are of  interest to us as people. No biological account of  disease can be provided 
because this class of  conditions is by its nature anthropocentric and corresponds to 
no natural class of  conditions in the world. 
I shall argue that by disease we mean a condition that it is a bad thing to have, that 
is such that we consider the afflicted person to have been unlucky, and that can po-
tentially be medically treated. All three criteria must be fulfilled for a condition to 
be a disease’.  168
 
From here she goes on to explain each category in detail, describing how she sees 
her account to be more a synthesis of  previous normativist writing than a novel 
theory of  disease.  A person is sick if  they have something which is considered 169
bad to have, which allows her to negate some of  the criticisms thrown at natural-
ists, such as the classification of  homosexuality in contemporary society. Her sec-
ond postulate, that a diseased person must be considered unlucky, is basically a 
normative version of  a reference class. As she says of  her definition of  an unlucky 
individual, she is talking about someone ‘that is, roughly, worse off  than the major-
ity of  humans of  the same sex and age’. This allows her to skirt around the nor-
mality question and account for people with disabilities. Her final criteria is that 
the condition must be potentially medically treated. That is to say, either now or hy-
pothetically at some point in the future, we might be able to medically intervene in 
order to alleviate the disease. This acts as a blade which cuts disease away from 
 Cooper, R. ‘Disease’ in Studies in History and Philosophy of  Science Part C: Studies in History 168
and Philosophy of  Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2002, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 271.
 Which is precisely why I feel it is a good example to discuss.169
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economic and social problems a person might have which would fulfil her first two 
categories.  
Overall, her account is much more nebulous than a naturalist view would allow, 
and this is a problem faced by many normativist attempts. Under her ‘bad to have’ 
category she admits the subjective and individual nature of  this description may 
lead to some cases where a seemingly diseased person does not think themselves to 
‘have something bad’ (such as in examples of  schizophrenia where individuals have 
vivid and enjoyable hallucinations that form a part of  their identity). She tries to 
pull herself  out of  this quandary by arguing that in the great majority of  cases 
there will be no disagreement (a statement itself  open to question), but it remains a 
firm counterargument.  
On her second point, even she admits that ‘being unlucky’ is ‘medically unsophisti-
cated’, and I think the conceptual messiness of  this argument detracts from the 
overall credibility of  her view. Her final criteria, about potential medical treatment, 
seems rather indeterminate, and it’s not clear that a theory with so many overly 
variable components could be considered a strong conceptual challenger to a natu-
ralist account. It is also the case, as Cooper recognises, that her schema tends to-
wards inclusiveness, to the point where things such as unwanted pregnancy are cast 
as diseases. If  it demonstrates one thing, this account shows us that it is easier to 
criticise Boorse than to suggest a viable alternative.  
I hope that the above discussion has given a flavour of  the sort of  arguments put 
forward by naturalists and normativists, as well as a few of  the stock critiques of  
such views. Clearly, I feel that both schools of  thought are unsuccessful in their at-
tempts. This is not, however, through lack of  trying or theoretical sophistication, 
but rather because from the outset they are trying to answer an impossible ques-




The reasons why definitions of  disease fail 
 
One thing that most attempts to define disease have in common is their all-encom-
passing nature. The very act of  delimitation in this instance is necessarily one that 
requires completeness; the purpose of  creating such a definition in the first place is 
to arrange phenomena neatly, or as neatly as possible, into a box labelled ‘disease’ 
and to make sure nothing else gets put in by mistake. Beyond the other motiva-
tions, this aim is, I believe, central to the conceptual exercise that is being engaged 
with here. Quite simply, there would be little point in producing a list of  stipula-
tions that was only able to demarcate certain phenomena as disease but not others. 
The two key assumptions made by anyone using this approach is that disease can 
be captured by a single definition and, by extension, that all diseases have some 
fundamental similarity.  
It is true that some philosophers try to be more ‘universal’ than others: Boorse re-
stricts himself  to what he regards as medical uses of  the term whereas someone 
like Nordernfelt tries to explain not just human conditions but also animal and 
plant diseases with his ideas.  Even at their most restricted however, the theories 170
of  disease that are found in the literature are still extensive and dynamic. They are 
intended as a set of  postulates which can be tested against our current pool of  ex-
amples but which will also prove to be accurate into the future as new cases are as-
similated. In theory, there is no limit at all to the number of  entities they could be 
expected to describe. There is, then, more than a hint of  universalism about them.  
Once formulated, these definitions have to be either descriptive or normative.  171
 Nordenfelt, L. ‘The opposition between naturalistic and holistic theories of  health and 170
disease’ in Carel, H. and Cooper, R. (eds.) Health, Illness and Disease, 2013, Acumen Pub-
lishing, UK.
 Lemoine draws this distinction as one between ‘description’ and ‘stipulation’ but our 171
uses are similar.
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That is, they have to either be an attempt to describe what disease means within 
socially existing parameters - be it medical uses of  the term, intuitive interpreta-
tions of  ‘undeniable’ disease or some other broad categorisation - or they are a 
suggestion of  way in which we might define disease for whatever purpose. On the 
whole, it would seem that most of  the theories thrown around in this debate are 
trying to be descriptive. They are attempts to articulate succinctly a pre-existing 
category of  things, which is commonly recognised and frequently encountered but 
currently ill-defined. However, a purely descriptive approach clashes with some of  
the aims described above (resource allocation, diagnostic clarity etc.), which sug-
gests that there must be a normative element involved if  any theory is to fulfil these 
objectives. In any case, both of  these possibilities (descriptive and normative) are, I 
believe, doomed to fail. I will deal with these two options in turn and examine why 
they might not be successful.  
Starting with the descriptive option, it is clear that the majority of  disease defini-
tion literature purports to be at least partially descriptive. Certainly, many theorists 
draw extensively on examples of  disease to support their ideas and use the same 
reservoir to attack their opponents. A counterexample, drawn from either the real-
world or a similar but hypothetical world, that does not accord with a theory is the 
most common form of  criticism offered. At the very least, the best indicator that 
we seem to have of  the strength of  a theory of  disease in this context is the extent 
to which it accurately accords with some external map of  disease which preexists 
in the world. 
In response to this I put it that there are simply too many things that count as dis-
ease for this to ever be a successful project. Even within a strictly confined theoreti-
cal space, the vast magnitude of  different types of  entities that could make a claim 
to disease status is staggering. It is not so much that there are so many diseases as it 
is that there are so many ways of  thinking about disease and so many ways that 
disease is thought about. If  we were to try and, as some do, strip away from the 
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fatty edges of  disease all common usage of  the term and cut from the centre some 
form of  solid terminology only used by medical professionals, I still believe we 
would be left with this problem. Different areas of  medicine deal with disease defi-
nition in a variety of  ways. Disease can exist on a spectrum between normal and 
pathological or as the presence of  a particular bacteria or because of  the discovery 
of  certain cells. It may be purely symptomatic. It can be acute or chronic, universal 
or extremely rare. Sometimes what may be disease in one individual is not a dis-
ease in another. Sometimes what may be disease in one culture is not a disease in 
another. Most diseases appear to be harmful, but not all are. Having a disease may 
prevent another disease. Some diseases can be fully subsumed into a biomedical 
causal matrix, but many can not. This indeterminacy goes on. What is important 
here is that both the conventional, common-language usage of  the term and more 
specialist application produce a hopelessly manifold array of  entities. Indeed, this 
is precisely the reason why counterexamples are so often employed in the disease 
definition debate: because there is an incredibly diverse set from which to draw 
from, and there is simply no way of  accounting for all of  them without falling into 
the trap of  including that which appears clearly to not be disease. We can define 
diseases, and do so regularly, using a number of  different methods depending on 
the purpose of  our criteria, but we cannot define disease.   172
To my mind there is no better evidence for this position than the inability of  
philosophers to make progress on this problem over a fairly long amount of  time. 
As Kingma states, ‘thirty years of  literature has failed to deliver an answer’ to the 
disease question.  I would state this in even firmer terms: the debate has di173 -
 The retort to this might be that the ICD-10 appears to do a good job of  defining dis172 -
ease. I would say that this is indeed true, but it is constructed on a case-by-case basis 
rather than an essentialist one. There are no necessary criteria for being included but 
there is a staggering amount of  diversity.
 Kingma, E. 2013, p. 37; depending on how you frame it, this is also of  course a far 173
older debate.
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gressed in a few different directions but the fundamental issues remain the same, 
remain fundamentally unresolved and there is little to suggest that this will change 
through the continued use of  current methods. It may be that the reason so little 
ground has been made is because ‘the concepts of  health and disease have become 
problematic in ways that are unprecedented’.   174
This is owing to, amongst other things, the rise of  economic and social protection 
for those with diseases, the challenging of  normality and perceptions of  pathologi-
cal states by disability campaigners, the growth of  patient groups, the discussion 
around enhancement, sex change operations and the increasing medicalisation of  
previously non-medical conditions. But even if  this is the case, a rapidly changing 
medico-social environment underlines further the futility of  attempting a statement 
of  complete conceptual containment, especially as philosophers are not on the 
whole trying to provide a snapshot but rather something more dynamic. If  histori-
cal and hypothetical examples are to be employed as counterexamples, then it is 
reasonable to expect that a condition of  a theory is that it not only apply to the 
present but also to the past and the future.  
Schwartz has made a similar point to those described above, contrasting scientific 
reality with the essentialist aspirations of  philosophers:  
 
‘As scientists have acquired better and better understanding of  diseases and their 
causes, they find not a unifying microstructure, as for gold or water, but variation. 
While many have sought an essence that all and only diseases share, this quest has 
been blocked at every step by variability and heterogeneity. Any definition that 
would draw a sharp line through all conditions, determining for each whether it is 
a disease or not, looks like the imposition of  a decision, rather than the application 
 Cavel, H. and Cooper, R. 2013, p. 2.174
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of  a discovery’.  175
 
What Schwartz is hinting at here is that the philosophy of  disease has proceeded 
on the basis that diseases are natural kinds of  some form or other.  Whilst this is 176
an angle that has been used to attack naturalist conceptions of  disease, most no-
tably by Reznek, I would like to employ it here to criticise the heart of  descriptive 
theories of  disease: their reliance on a regularity and uniqueness to diseases that 
does not seem empirically sound.  This regularity is admittedly twofold. Natural177 -
ists appear to presume a physical, biostatistical reality to disease which is easy to 
criticise as a natural kind argument, and has been so, as I have described above. 
Normativists do not believe in this form of  measurable unity, and indeed it is this 
which in many ways separates them most from naturalists. They do however, also 
lean upon a different sort of  universalism: that there is enough consistency in our 
agreed set of  disease examples (and indeed that enough of  us agree on said exam-
ples) that it is possible to design a framework capable of  capturing them without 
capturing anything else.  
Now, this consistency might have little to do with microbiology, pathophysiology, 
evolutionary function, variations from a norm etc. but it nonetheless requires the 
presence of  some underlying and particular quality or qualities, which are found in 
diseases as mediated by us and not in non-diseases. Thus is it that in the standard 
normativist approaches, their routine stipulations (causes harm, unlucky for the 
 Schwartz, P. H. ‘Decision and discovery in defining “disease”’ in Kincaid, H. and 175
McKitrick, J. (eds.) Establishing medical reality: Essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of  bio-
medical science, 2007, Springer, UK, pp. 47-63; it might be stated that this underlying diver-
sity is a key feature of  biology as a whole, not just disease.
 There are gradations on this position. Rachel Cooper for instance argues that individ176 -
ual diseases are natural kinds, but that disease as a whole is not: Cooper, R. ‘Natural 
Kinds’ in Fulford, K. W. M. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of  philosophy and psychiatry, 2013, Ox-
ford University Press, UK. 
 Reznek, L. The Nature of  Disease, 1987, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, USA.177
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individual etc.) become the universal features of  disease. It is just that these concrete 
features are framed as instrumental rather than statistical or structural, and the 
level of  discovery is moved from the actual world, or ‘the facts’, to the tools we use 
to uncover them. Both naturalist and normativist theories of  disease are then to 
some degree universalist schemas.  
So, what if  we change the intention, then, and say that these theories are not 
meant to be descriptive, but rather normative? They might still reasonably gain 
some credibility from descriptive accuracy, but largely their success would be found 
in their ability to achieve some predetermined goals, such as reducing diagnostic 
creep or resolving controversial cases. An example of  this is the work of  Thomas 
Schramme, who argues that naturalism can provide us with a fairly stable and use-
ful concept of  disease which is a necessary guard against medicalisation. In fact, 
Boorse’s original intention was to kick back against what he called the ‘psychiatric 
turn’ under whose influence medicine was, in his view, dangerously encroaching on 
the territory until then occupied by social morality. Another advantage of  reformu-
lating disease definitions as normative exercises is that they are freed from the vast 
magnitude argument discussed above: if  you are stating what should be rather than 
what is, then you are apparently no longer tied down by the tyranny of  examples. 
However, you still have to provide a justification for your theory - as to why it is a 
good way of  classifying phenomena, what we gain by organising things in this way 
and how exactly this would work in practice. It is here that this normative framing 
fails to convince.  
It is rare to see explicit justification given to the usefulness of  choosing one model  
or theory of  disease over another. The benefits of  possessing a clear concept of  
disease in general are often highlighted, but very little space is afforded to justifying 
the adoption of  one particular view in light of  its non-descriptive advantages. The 
one salient factor that splits theories is their relative ability to accurately reflect in-
tuitive feelings about what disease is and what a disease looks like, not any values 
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relating to applicability or outcomes. So in fact, defining disease is often more like 
a clever parlour game than a debate with implications for real life. When Caplan 
spoke about the philosophy of  medicine being removed from practice, this is what 
he had in mind.  
Yet there are times when philosophers have stated, or at least hinted at, normative 
aims. Whilst Boorse maintains for the most part that his account is a descriptive 
one, and uses the Standard Nomenclature of  Diseases and Operations as a guide 
by which to judge his success, he also stipulates that some universal conditions such 
as periodontal disease should not be considered disease states, which belies a nor-
mative aspect to his work.  Cooper too highlights a notable discrepancy between 178
her theory and existing convention by arguing that ‘we still think of  unwanted 
pregnancy as not being a disorder because our intuitions lag behind changes in the 
disorder-status of  a condition’, suggesting that there is at least some element of  her 
thinking which is out of  step with common assumptions but simultaneously not a 
problem for her theory.  179
What is more important than this however, is that even if  philosophers of  medicine 
were solely concerned with the practical application of  their ideas, and presented 
theories as explicitly designed to capture disease in a socially useful way, it is highly 
doubtful that they would be very successful in challenging and changing medical 
practice. Medicine, for all intents and purposes, defines disease. Individuals are 
tested and diagnosed and treated in their hordes daily. A longstanding, sophisticat-
ed and, though fragmented, effective infrastructure exists across the world to do 
precisely that. There is nothing to suggest that a universal theory of  disease would 
have any great effect on clinical medicine and so if  no-one is listening, should we 
talk?  
 The Standard Nomenclature of  Diseases and Operations is published by the Ameri178 -
can Medical Association.
 Cooper, R., 2003, p. 278179
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A hypothetical example might make this point clearer. Say, for whatever reason, a 
‘new’ disease emerged. Social infrastructure begins to coalesce around it: patient 
advocacy groups are formed, conferences are held, medical responses are re-
searched. In countries with largely private healthcare systems, insurance compa-
nies sit up and take notice - is this something they should be covering? Now, this 
condition is controversial and potentially expensive. People who believe they suffer 
from it clash with individuals who deny them. Who would we look to in order to 
solve this controversy and to resolve the conflict? Which bodies carry epistemic 
and ontological authority in these situations? Certainly not, under current condi-
tions, philosophers. It is difficult to conceive of  a situation where a new illness 
would be cross-referenced with some list of  philosophical stipulations in order to 
decide whether or not it was adequately disease-like.  
This is not to say that philosophy cannot speak to and help us understand medi-
cine, or that it cannot gently nudge and cajole the dominant modes of  thinking. It 
is just that in this specific circumstance - formulating a self-contained theory of  
disease - any claim to practical consequences are likely overstated. Diseases, on the 
whole, are already defined adequately, and those that aren’t are unlikely to be 
helped by a universal theory of  disease. This is because an essentialist proposition 
that emerges from a theoretical, philosophical base has no credibility in competi-
tion with definitions that grow out of  biomedical structures. It will not carry more 
weight in controversial cases than medical opinion or patient views.  
A contrast can be drawn here between the philosophy of  medicine and bioethics 
(which is a distinction that Caplan also makes). The history of  the latter in the sec-
ond half  of  the 20th century and the fledgling decades of  this one serves to remind 
us how influential and important reflective, philosophical thought can be. 
Bioethics, in all its complicated permutations, reframes classic ethical questions 
and brings arguments to bear on cases as they develop. Sitting as it does at the in-
tersection between medical practice, theory and law, this is a discipline fully inte-
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grated to other cognate areas of  study and administration.  
In the International Bioethics Committee, it possess a forum whose authority is 
recognised worldwide and all of  the UNESCO member states have adopted the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which was unveiled 
against a backdrop of  a ‘great number of  existing international guidelines, state-
ments and declarations relating to bioethics’.  Since membership of  UNESCO 180
stretches to 195 countries, this is a sizeable achievement in terms of  global influ-
ence. There are also many declarations which deal with more specific areas of  the 
discipline, such as the UN Declaration on Human Cloning or the UNESCO Uni-
versal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.  
The movement has been criticised - (though what movement is without critics) - 
but these criticisms are levelled at its intrusiveness into scientific autonomy, the cor-
rect level at which to administrate conventions, whether a certain body or other 
possesses a mandate to grant it authority, the effectiveness of  non-binding declara-
tions etc., and not aimed at its core relevance. The fact remains that bioethics sits 
in sharp contrast with the philosophy of  medicine as an academic subject that has 
an impact on behaviour and alters policy whilst remaining in large part a theoreti-
cal, normative discipline driven by a long history of  deep thinking. 
The road to influence and to relevance may well be harder for philosophers of  
medicine. It is not immediately obvious in which ways they can and should assert 
themselves, as recent historical precedence is lacking. Some things are clear 
though. The temptation to remain insular in our work, to offer critique without 
broader vision, is one which must be consciously avoided and different questions 
must be asked in order to return to the realm of  relevance. As I cover this in more 
detail at the end of  this chapter, for now we will return to the topic at hand.  
 Andorno, R. ‘Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of  the Universal Declaration 180
on Bioethics and Human Rights’ in The Journal of  Medical Ethics, 2007, Vol. 33, No.3, p. 
150. 
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In this section I have argued that any universal theory of  disease is necessarily ei-
ther descriptive or normative, and that both approaches, whether actual or hypo-
thetical, fail. This is because there exists too much diversity in what people consid-
er to be disease entities and because there is no suitable justification given that 
would likely influence medicine to accept and adapt to normative suggestions 
made by philosophy. You either say what is and you’re wrong or you say what ought 
to be and nobody listens to you. However, I am not the first to critique this field, 
and other theorists’ views strengthen my argument. 
A longstanding criticism that covers some of  the same ground as I have came from 
Germund Hesslow, who in 1993 asked the question ‘do we need a concept of  dis-
ease?’.  His central argument is that the importance of  possessing a clear disease 181
concept is illusionary and that philosophy’s obsession with this ‘conceptual straight-
jacket’ obscures the fact that it makes very little difference to clinical decision-mak-
ing. What he contends is that since we treat things that aren’t diseases and don’t 
treat things that are, as well as provide medical provision to some degree based on 
economic grounds, then the best way of  formulating medical decision-making is as 
a cost-benefit analysis, rather than anything crucially reliant on a universal view of  
disease. His central point is well made: having a clear definition of  disease as a 
whole is not essential to medical care, where other factors take precedence.  
Some thinkers have suggested problems within this field are largely caused by the 
constraints of  the conceptual analysis used to try and answer the original question. 
As Leen De Vreese has argued, due to the extreme difficulties present in conceiv-
ing an univocal meaning of  disease, deciding to privilege one theory over others 
automatically leads to a revision of  at least some of  our use of  the concept whether 
we want it to or not (because no theories can fully account for ‘disease’ as it is 
 Hesslow, G. ‘Do we need a concept of  disease?’ in Theoretical Medicine, 1993, Vol. 14, 181
No. 1, pp. 1-14.
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now).  She goes on to say that the ‘only possible justification’ for preferring one 182
theory to another has to be one based on pre-existing intuitions about disease 
rather than normative projections. The tension between these two demands ren-
ders the type of  definition that is being aimed at impossible. As she explains:  
 
‘Presuppositions with respect to what diseases are will always form the basis for 
building and/or accepting a specific definition. Indeed, one cannot deny that all 
proposed definitions are based on presuppositions on what is a disease and what 
not, and hence that an a priori definition on the basis of  which one can subse-
quently decide what is a disease and what not, cannot be given’.  183
 
De Vreese concludes that this impasse will not be overcome through the methods 
currently employed. Her main aim in highlighting the deficiencies of  the current 
approach was to encourage others to try new methods and embrace new ways of  
thinking, somewhat of  a theme in this chapter.  
Lemoine has also attacked conceptual analysis as an appropriate set of  tools for 
addressing disease. I will examine his ideas in more detail below when I discuss the 
negative consequences that have been experienced by the field as a whole from 
pursuing such an approach. But first I will add a further two, broad criticisms.  
 
Epistemic homogeneity and the mental/physical distinction  
 
The first of  my two criticisms is that disease definitions make assumptions about 
epistemic homogeneity which are not accurate and downplay important aspects of  
 De Vreese, L. ‘Rethinking the concept of  disease debate: a pragmatist alternative’, 182
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of  Science, draft copy accessed online 2/04/16 http://
logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/Rethinking_the_concept.pdf.
 Ibid., pp. 6-7.183
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medical conflict, especially in areas where a clear-cut disease concept is supposed 
to be useful. Because the thinkers in this field are so fixated on the ‘what’ of  dis-
ease, there is little space given to the ‘how’ and the ‘who’. This is an especially wor-
rying oversight given the fact that who gets to define to disease and how they do it 
are often the more pressing questions in the more controversial cases. 
The second is that they rely too heavily on being able to easily distinguish between 
physical and mental illness and do not reflect enough on the difficulty of  this dis-
tinction. Naturalist positions seem to assume that this division is uncomplicated 
and that they can focus purely on physiological conditions without having to justify 
or explain this categorisation. Normativist positions often emphasise the value-
laden nature of  many psychological diseases, whilst giving precedence to the role 
of  medical science to identify and legitimise illness. My issue with this is that a 
biomedical view underlies both positions and as a consequence the theories are 
unable to adequately explain the many conditions which do not fit neatly into these 
categories. Contrary to the sharp dichotomy that is often drawn between natural-
ists and normativists, this is an area where they share many of  the same assump-
tions. 
Khushf  has argued strongly for this view. He compared Nordenfelt and Boorse, 
positioning them as archetype naturalist/normativists, stating that:   
 
‘…both are actually working toward similar ends. Both advance health concepts 
that seek to tease out fact from value, and reinforce theoretical and social structures 
that insulate medical science from outside intrusion and distortion. In different 
ways, both reflect the thought style of  modern medicine itself, and both work to 
preserve its core features’.   184
 
 Khushf, G. 2007, p. 20; he borrows the concept of  ‘thought style’ from Ludwig Fleck.184
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He goes on to argue that maintaining a fact/value distinction in our analysis of  
medicine and disease concepts is likely to become impossible in future, given the 
material changes to medical infrastructure.  But what is important here is his 185
highlighting of  assumptions about medical authority, about scientific descriptive 
ability and about the desire to protect or isolate medicine from the messy value 
structures of  a dynamic and diverse society.   
Within this, one of  the assumptions that philosophers make when trying to define 
disease is that there is a workable level of  agreement within either medical science 
(if  you are a strict naturalist) or societies as a whole (if  you are a normativist) relat-
ing to disease states. Without this homogeneity, we would be unable to say that 
having something deemed undesirable is potentially a disease, because only certain 
people might think it to be the case. It is true that in many instances, our ‘intu-
itions’ about disease are relatively consistent across medical and lay populations, 
and so comparing some theory of  disease against a list of  examples like cancer, tu-
berculosis, typhoid etc. is straightforward. In these instances, it makes sense to pro-
ceed on the basis that there is an uncontroversial set of  cases with which to test our 
ideas. However, there are enough examples where this is not true to make us think 
twice about this approach.  
In these situations, disagreements and discord ring out between doctors, patients 
and lay individuals. Philosophers of  medicine who propose theories of  disease be-
stow upon us with few tools to understand these conflicts. 
Let us examine a case on the fringes of  medical legitimacy to demonstrate what I 
 Khushf  views the clinical/administrative divide as the embodiment of  this distinction, 185
and cites recent structural changes to health care provision as evidence that the philoso-
phy will likewise evolve.
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mean.  ‘Morgellons’ is a condition that has ‘no general medical acceptance as a 186
disease entity’.  However, it does have symptoms. Primarily, the location of  dis187 -
comfort reported by patients is on, in, or under the skin. Individuals complain of  
painful and frustrating sensations of  a stinging, crawling, itching nature. These irri-
tations are accompanied by raw cutaneous lesions which fail over time to heal 
properly. Alongside these dermatological problems, a host of  other issues may be 
present. Fatigue, joint pain, difficulty remembering words and speaking, headaches 
and other non-specific symptoms are recorded by patients. Unsurprisingly, per-
haps, there is also a high incidence of  related conditions that morgellons patients 
also suffer from including chronic fatigue, depression, OCD, ADHD, fibromyalgia, 
joint pain, sleep problems, hair loss and neurological disorders as well as anxiety 
and substance abuse/dependence.  The number of  patients who suffer from co188 -
morbid psychological conditions has been reported as high as 75%.  The rela189 -
tionship between these comorbid features is disputed. Whereas patients argue that 
these conditions are symptomatic of  morgellons, doctors are more likely to believe 
that the link between them is correlative. 
The most contentious aspect of  morgellons is the wrangling between doctors and 
 This section is based on a previous work: Quinn Schone, H. ‘Learning from Morgel186 -
lons’, pp. 4-6, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/prospective/msc/Quinn_Schone_2014_Learn-
ing_from_Morgellons.pdf  archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/6s6JW-
B0Bt.
 Mayne, P., English, J. S., Kilbane, E. J, Burke, J. M., Middelveen, M. J. and Stricker, R. 187
‘Morgellons: a novel dermatological perspective as the multisystem infective disease bor-
reliosis’ in F1000Research, 2013, Vol. 2, No. 118, doi:10.12688/f1000research.2-118.v1.
 Savely, V. R., Leitao, M. M. and Stricker, R. B. ‘The Mystery of  Morgellons Disease: 188
Infection or Delusion?’ in American Journal of  Clinical Dermatology, 2006, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 2; 
Ahmad, K. and Ramsay, B. ‘Delusional Parasitosis: Lessons Learnt’ in Acta Dermato-Venere-
ologica, 2009, Vol. 89, p. 167; Hylwa, S. A., Foster, A. A., Bury, J. E., Davis, M. D., Pit-
telkow, M. R. and Bostwick, J. M. ‘Delusional infestation is typically comorbid with other 
psychiatric diagnoses: review of  54 patients receiving psychiatric evaluation’ at Mayo 
Clinic in Psychosomatics, 2012, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 258-65.
 Ibid., p. 264.189
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patients over aetiology and one symptom in particular. Patients consistently report 
the existence of  protruding material from the skin and blame this for the painful 
sensations they experience and the sores that develop. Often described as ‘fibres’ or 
‘filaments’, these ‘protruding’ items can normally only be viewed through a micro-
scope.  Patients have reported these fibres as being of  varying length, colour and 190
transparency.  This belief  is regarded as the ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of  the 191
condition by patients and a small number of  researcher advocates.  192
However, in clinical settings, morgellons sufferers have consistently been diagnosed 
as possessing delusions of  parasitosis, an age-old condition that has been recog-
nised for over a century. Delusions of  parasitosis, delusional infestation or Ekbom 
syndrome is a psychological condition where individuals falsely believe that there 
are insects, parasites or other unidentified objects about their person and most fre-
quently under their skin which cause them discomfort.  Under this interpretation 193
of  morgellons, which is now favoured by the majority of  doctors, the open wounds 
that patients present with are self-inflicted in the process of  trying to relieve their 
symptoms, the fibres in most cases come from clothes and the environment and the 
 For images of  these occurrences, see: http://morgellonsdiseaseawareness.com/190
morgellons_photo_galleries/morgellons_fibers_in_skin archived on 19/07/17 at http://
www.webcitation.org/6s5FGiP2x.
 Savely, V. R., Leitao, M. M. and Stricker, R. B. 2006 p. 2.191
 http://www.thecehf.org/about.html archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcita192 -
tion.org/6s5FZtNQx.
 Bak, R. et al ‘A review of  delusions of  parasitosis, part 1: presentation and diagnosis’ in 193
Cutis, 2008, Vol. 82, No. 2, pp. 123-130;  Edlich, R. F., Cross, C. L., Wack, C. A. and 
Long, W. B. 3rd ‘Delusions of  parasitosis’ in The American Journal of  Emergency Medicine, 
2009, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp. 997-999; Levin, E. C. and Gieler, U. ‘Delusions of  parasitosis’ in 
Seminars in Cutaneous Medicine and Surgery, 2013, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 73-77.
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comorbid features a function of  someone predisposed towards mental illness.  In 194
essence, then, according to mainstream medical opinion, morgellons is an old dis-
ease dressed up in new clothing. It has been suggested that the alternative disease 
model which strays from the medical account was galvanised by advances in com-
munications technology, most notably the internet, which allowed patients to con-
verse with each other and form concrete, non-medical aetiological narratives. But 
also in play here are a group of  patients desperate not to be labelled as psychologi-
cally ill and extremely adverse to any suggestion that they might be. To them, a 
psychological diagnosis does nothing but tug the validity of  their pain from under 
their feet.  
So, in an instance like this, what are reasonable expectations for a definition of  dis-
ease? Well, one of  the claims made by philosophers is that their ideas may be able 
to resolve controversial cases by distinguishing disease from nondisease, so perhaps 
a theory might be able to tell us whether morgellons is a disease. If  we take some 
of  the philosophers we have already examined and apply their ideas to this case, I 
think it becomes apparent that they possess severe shortcomings. Beginning with 
Boorse, it is simply unclear as to whether this would be classified as a condition or 
not. There would seem to be a distinct dysfunction with reference classes, but there 
is a lack of  the kind of  biological statistical deviation to which he is so fond. 
Though at several points during his work he states that his theory is only applicable 
to physical illness, he never provides firm demarcation criteria by which to divide 
the two. He also states that criticisms of  his work are only relevant if  they refer to 
‘medically clear cases’, which indicates he has little time for the vagaries of  some-
 The hardening of  medical opinion on the side of  a delusional disorder was especially 194
evident following the publication of  a CDC report that found no organic signs of  pathol-
ogy: Hylwa, S. A., Foster, A. A., Bury, J. E., Davis, M. D., Pittelkow, M. R. and Bostwick, 
J. M. 2012,  pp. 258-65; Pearson, M. L., Selby, J. V., Cantrell, V., Braden, C.R. et al ‘Clini-
cal, Epidemiologic, Histopathologic and Molecular Features of  an Unexplained Der-
mopathy’, 2012, in PLoS ONE 7(1): e29908. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029908; 
Freudenmann, R. W. and Lepping, P. ‘Delusional Infestation’ in Clinical Microbiology Re-
views, 2009, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 690-732.
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thing like morgellons. As such, in this instance, it is fairly uncertain as to what his 
ideas tell us at all.  
Normativist ideas seem more straightforward in this circumstance. Under Cooper’s 
schema, as discussed above, we can see that for a patient, having morgellons would 
be a bad thing, we would consider the person to be unlucky and their condition 
would be potentially treatable by medicine. Morgellons, then seems largely un-
problematic: it is a disease. Clearly, this fails to explain or resolve the enormous 
controversy surrounding the condition.  
If  we use some other definitions, we see similar patterns emerge. So, Scadding’s 
idea of  ‘biological disadvantage’ renders morgellons a disease because it is true 
that patients struggle in relationships, their employment prospects are damaged by 
their condition and their reproductive chances are impaired (his criteria).  Wake195 -
field’s influential account defines disorders as ‘harmful dysfunctions’, and tries to 
incorporate both a value-laden and factual component into our understanding of  
the concept.  Viewed through the lens of  this theory, morgellons would certainly 196
fulfil the ‘harmful’ portion of  the criteria, seeing as it is ‘judged negative by socio-
cultural standards’ and ‘harmful according to social values’.  It is less clear 197
whether it would qualify as a dysfunction, which in this instance is close to Boorse’s 
use of  the term. Wakefield describes a dysfunction as a ‘scientific and factual term 
based in evolutionary biology that refers to the failure of  an internal mechanism to 
perform the natural function for which it was designed’.  There is not the space 198
here to examine in all its nuances the implications of  this definition, but I think it is 
 Scadding, J. G. ‘The semantic problems of  psychiatry’ in Psychological Medicine, 1990, 195
Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 243-248.
 Bolton, D. ‘The usefulness of  Wakefield’s definition for the diagnostic manuals’ in 196
World Psychiatry, 2007, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 164-165.
 Wakefield, J. C. ‘The Concept of  Mental Disorder’ in American Psychologist, 1992, Vol. 197
47, No. 3, pp. 373-388.
 Ibid., p. 374.198
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certainly arguable that morgellons, whether a little understood neurological condi-
tion, a dermatological concern, a psychological maladjustment or something even 
more ambiguous, goes some way to fulfilling his criteria.  
What these (and other) theories of  disease have in common is that they add very 
little to our understanding of  cases like this. There is no explanation for the com-
peting interests, the various complicated ways that people feel delegitimised, the 
alternative aetiologies and why they are believed. Nothing can be extrapolated 
which might unpick the value disputes present or the power structures which en-
able them, the way that patients and doctors view disease entities or the heteroge-
neous responses of  individuals and professionals to confusing symptomatic presen-
tation. In short these theories say nothing interesting, new or useful about morgel-
lons, or indeed many other conditions that find themselves in the same category. It 
is not whether morgellons or fibromyalgia or whatever are diseases that is really at 
stake here, but rather how they are diseases and on whose terms. 
In this section I have criticised at length the efforts of  various philosophers to de-
fine disease in a self-contained manner. I have presented arguments against any 
general theory of  disease being successful, by positing that the number of  entities 
hoped to be sufficiently delimited is too great and by putting it that normative the-
ories lack adequate justification. Further to this, I looked at similar critiques from 
others and raised some questions about that which is left unasked by theories - 
namely questions about epistemic authority and the true roots of  controversy in 
disease definition. There are, however, more things to say on this topic. Not only 
do I believe that the literature suffers from major flaws, but that the approach tak-
en by many theorists has unintended consequences of  a negative nature. It is at 





Consequences of  such an approach  
 
It is generally accepted that philosophers working on the disease definition ‘prob-
lem’ are engaging in a form of  conceptual analysis.  That is, they are trying to 199
agree upon a cogent definition for a well known terms, as well as uncovering the 
exact relation between them. In this case, the terms are ‘health’ and ‘disease’ as 
well as, on occasion, ‘illness’, ‘injury’, ‘disorder’, ‘dysfunction’ etc., though in this 
section I have focused on ‘disease’ as a central concern. The method of  honing our 
definitions generally proceeds as follows: a set of  uncontroversial examples are 
treated as foundational, and a list of  criteria is drawn up in the form of  necessary 
and sufficient conditions which capture to a great degree these examples. A propo-
nent then argues why their stipulations are the most accurate, anticipates coun-
terexamples and controversial cases and adds any further justifications that they 
deem relevant. Any opponent wishing to join the conversation must then either at-
tack their definition, propose a new one or do both. I believe that setting up the 
‘rules of  the game’ in this manner has a nefarious effect on the sort of  philosophy 
that is produced subsequently. 
In this section I will argue that decisions to pursue such an approach limit problem 
selection and centre the discourse around narrow questions of  internal consistency 
and accurate isomorphism to an agreed set of  examples, at the cost of  moving the 
philosophy any closer to practice, patient experience or some other practical mea-
sure. The way in which the leading figures in a field conduct their debates colour 
and direct the rest: it gives a shape and a flavour to the philosophy that others must 
either replicate or give firm justification as to why they are taking a different path. 
Most often, they slip into the conversation and follow the established norms, ‘hav-
ing a go’ as it were at producing their own definitions to add to the pot.  
 I have adapted this short section from Lemoine’s description in Lemoine, M. 2013, p. 199
311.
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Lemoine has argued along these lines, stating that the most influential figures in 
this field follow the same rough rules, engaging with each other on the basis of  
fundamental understandings about the kind of  theories that would be considered 
successful. However, this leads to a situation where more than one theory could be 
regarded as reasonably successful and arguments ‘about conceptual analyses of  
“health” and “disease” consist mainly in providing uncontroversial counter-exam-
ples to a definition of  a term that should successfully account for them’.  This is a 200
problem because it highlights the shortcomings of  using conceptual analysis, 
demonstrating that it is not sufficient in its current form to actually decide between 
theories. Therefore, he argues that the naturalism/normativism debate will not be 
resolved in this manner because both sides may feel justified in thinking that they 
have produced relatively successful definitions of  disease and there is nothing we 
can reach for that would privilege one account above the other. Worryingly, be-
cause of  the potential to just keep producing and tweaking theories, this is a situa-
tion which left unchecked could continue ad infinitum, albeit in various permuta-
tions. His rather devastating pronouncement is that the only definitions that con-
ceptual analysis can completely rule out are ‘those that nobody would hold, be-
cause of  some counterintuitive consequence nobody would support’.  201
Lemoine goes on to argue for a potential way of  deciding between naturalism and 
normativism that goes beyond conceptual analysis, namely calling for the naturali-
sation of  the concept of  disease, a process he has detailed elsewhere.  However, 202
for our purposes here, his vital contribution is the way in which he so plainly lays 
out the various internal mechanisms of  conceptual analysis in relation to disease 
definition and demonstrates the ultimately limited usefulness of  such an approach. 
 Ibid., p. 316.200
 Ibid., p. 320.201
 Lemoine, M. ‘The Naturalization of  the Concept of  Disease’ in Huneman, P. et al 202
(eds.) Classification, Disease and Evidence, History, Philosophy and Theory of  the Life Sci-
ences 7, 2014, Springer, USA pp. 19-41.
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What he picks up on which I would like to expand is the use of  counterexamples as 
a major form of  rebuke. I believe that too often the energy expounded by philoso-
phers on the search for a perfect case with which to deliver the knockout blow is a 
wasted effort. Because though other types of  arguments are employed by thinkers, 
counterexamples are king. However, for the most part, they distract and divert at-
tention from more important matters.  
If  you are aiming to refute a theory of  disease then there is no better way of  doing 
it than to produce an example which quite clearly does not accord with both our 
intuitive notion of  disease and the stipulations provided by your opponent. In some 
circumstances, it is the criteria themselves which are attacked rather than their 
consequences, but since the matter in which they are disputed is similar I also in-
clude them here. Luckily for philosophers indulging in this kind of  attack, there are 
so many applicable entities to choose from, both real and potential, that often this 
is a case of  just picking the right one off  the shelf  to fit your argument (see exam-
ple below). However, this can lead to some bizarre lines of  inquiry which, rather 
than necessarily engaging with the literature in a critically useful way, make the 
debate entirely about internal logical cogency. Though this doesn't sound like a 
negative charge, its effect is to drag the discussion further from practice and into 
ever smaller, ever more irrelevant avenues of  discourse. Philosophers consciously 
operate within a paradigm and their acceptance - sometimes an explicit agree-
ment, sometimes an acquiescence - to the rules of  this arrangement is dictating the 
type of  philosophy that gets done.  
A good example of  this is Rachel Cooper’s discussion of  Boorse.  She attacks his 203
theory on two fronts, namely that his ideas rely on the existence of  both natural 
kinds and clear-cut evolutionary rules of  functionality, which, according to her, do 
not exist in this instance. To support this statement she employs a number of  ex-
amples. The first of  these is actually an extension of  an argument used previously 
 Cooper, R. 2002, pp. 263-282.203
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by Wright, which is that a Boorsean account of  function cannot distinguish acci-
dental from non-accidental contributions to the goal of  a system. So, while sweat-
ing has the function of  cooling down the body and contributing to the goal of  reg-
ulating body heat, general survival etc., should you trip and knock a bucket of  cold 
water over yourself  that would perform the same role.  As we cannot tell the dif204 -
ference between the two, something in Boorse’s analysis must be lacking.  
To continue with Cooper’s critique, her second line of  contention is with the no-
tion that it is possible to draw up reference classes in any practical way, which is 
necessary if  we are to define dysfunction in the way Boorse wants us to. Cooper 
argues that due to human variation these would have to be excessively small, in 
some cases consisting of  just one individual, such as ‘elderly female Masai moun-
tain-bikers [or] half-Chinese, half-Eskimo boy toddlers’.  As to not single out 205
Rachel Cooper, I will look at some others, for there are many who engage in simi-
lar, lengthy discussions of  potential shortcomings which can be exposed through 
clever counterexamples. Lilienfeld and Marino discuss Wakefield in much the same 
way. Looking in detail at his theory and focusing on the role that evolution plays in 
culture, they argue that Wakefield’s ideas fail to adequately account for exadap-
tions. They therefore put forward criticisms like the following: ‘atheists who are 
persecuted and ostracised as a result of  their beliefs (and thus experience harm) 
would in many cases be considered disordered according to Wakefield’s criteria be-
cause, as noted earlier, religious beliefs are probably adaptively neutral exadaptions 
rather than adaptions’.  206
What these arguments have in common is their logical accuracy and their practical 
 Ibid., p. 5; Wright, L. ‘Functions’ in Philosophical Review, 1973, Vol. 82, pp. 139-168.204
 Cooper, R. 2002, pp. 6-7.205
 Lilienfeld, S. O. and Marino, L. ‘Mental disorder as a Roschian Concept: a critique of  206
Wakefield’s “harmful dysfunction analysis”’ in The Journal of  Abnormal Psychology, 1995, 
Vol. 104, No. 3, p. 413.
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uselessness. They are both philosophically sound and not fit for purpose. This is 
because they do not shift the debate in any meaningful way, and continue to point 
the search-light at component parts of  theories rather than the whole beast: the 
types of  theories we produce and the way that we produce them. These criticisms 
act, in my view, like playful distractions from more important matters - no-one out-
side philosophy considers the function of  a bucket of  water accidentally spilled to 
be comparable with sweating, just as nobody believes that atheists who are discrim-
inated against are ill.  
A good way of  analysing this is to use Illari and Russo’s taxonomy of  counterex-
amples. They compiled a set of  counterexamples commonly used by philosophers 
in debates and ordered them in a hierarchy from the broad to the precise. These 
range in scope from ‘all possible worlds’ downwards through ‘worlds close to the 
actual world’, ‘this world’, ‘some region of  this world’ to ‘some region of  this world 
at some time’.  At the broader end of  these possible counterexamples, critics can 207
draw upon hypothetical situations from any conceivable environment, as long as 
they are consistent with the original argument (on the same ‘plane’ so to speak). 
Closer to the bottom, counterexamples must be found from the world as it is, some 
more specific area of  the world, or a specific area of  the world at a specific time. 
As may already be clear, the discussions around disease definition currently take 
place on a ‘worlds close to this world’ basis, hence the inclusion of  elderly female 
Masai mountain-bikers and sufferers of  persecuted atheist disease.  
I believe that a shift towards something more local would be beneficial, as this 
would more readily recognise the temporal and contextual nature of  all of  our 
philosophical understandings of  disease. The way illness is mediated is, I would 
argue, entirely context dependent, and our philosophical discourse should reflect 
 Illari, P. and Russo, F. Causality: Philosophical Theory meets Scientific Practice, 2014, Oxford 207
University Press, UK, p. 224.
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that.  As Floridi has argued in relation to the philosophy of  information, trying 208
to generate timeless philosophy does not advance the field because it is ‘unable to 
contribute, keep track of, and interact with, the cultural evolution that philosophi-
cal reflection has itself  helped to bring about’, a statement which could have easily 
been written about the philosophy of  medicine.  He argues that philosophy’s 209
‘pulling force of  innovation has become necessarily external’ and again these 
words ring true, with developments in medical technology, surgical techniques, ge-
netics and the emergence and mutation of  previously unknown or unrecognised 
diseases and the challenges of  an ageing population all serving to inject the philos-
ophy of  medicine with intellectual impetus. None of  the changes outside of  phi-
losophy, as far as I can see, indicate that we should continue down the road of  uni-
versal theories of  disease. If  anything, they reassert the diversity, the confusion, the 
bluster of  a world which cannot be simplified and bent into the confines of  stipula-
tion. Without true acknowledgement of  the criticisms I have laid out here, philos-
ophy of  medicine, Caplan’s ‘intellectual island’ will edge ever closer to disappear-
ing off  the horizon, unable to speak for, to, or about pressing issues in modern 
medicine.   210
There is, however, one aspect of  contemporary philosophy of  medicine that is, to 
my mind, engaging more actively with practice and patients as opposed to concep-
tual tussles. This is the phenomenology of  illness, a topic that I feel deserves a few 
words now. 
 
 This is not the same as saying I think that disease itself  - however you wish to bracket it 208
- is somehow context dependent, or that diseases are constructions of  society. Rather it is 
the way that we understand disease, and indeed what we understand to be disease, which is 
grounded in a here and now or there and then. 
 Floridi, L. 2011, p. 12.209
 Caplan, A. 1992, p. 73.210
!123
The phenomenology of  illness 
The branch of  philosophy known as phenomenology is instructive here for several 
reasons.  Firstly, it refashions the ‘problem of  disease’ away from a concern of  211
demarcation and changes it into a broader question of  how philosophy can and 
ought to respond to illness, and in what ways philosophy might be useful to the sick 
themselves and those around them. Secondly, it weaves ancient and contemporary 
thought together in the same framework, using illness to inform longstanding and 
central philosophical questions. Thirdly, and most importantly here, phenomenol-
ogists working on disease do what I have criticised others for not doing: they en-
gage with medicine, with patients and with sickness in a manner that is not only 
illuminative but also has potentially practical consequences.   
Havi Carel, a prominent phenomenologists, makes the claim that illness is a ‘violent 
invitation to philosophise’ (emphasis in original) because of  the way it compromises 
the normal subject-object operation of  embodied selfhood and makes us confront 
our bodily existence, whether we would like to do so or not.  Illness, in this sense 212
an interruption, an uninvited disjuncture, forces us to approach our embodied 
selves in a new way. This focus on embodiment and being-in-the-world has many 
benefits. It not only gives us tools and insights to challenge the Cartesian spirit so 
present in both medical and lay understandings of  the body but it also exposes the 
extensive reach and fault-lines of  such a worldview. Furthermore, this work focuses 
 I do not have the space here for a discussion of  what the phenomenological method is, 211
or to describe the various intellectual currents within the field. For canonical texts, see: 
Husserl, E. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 2012, Routledge, UK; Merleau-
Ponty, M. Phenomenology of  Perception, 2013, Routledge, UK; Satre, J. Being and Nothingness: 
The Complete Text, 1969, Washington Square Press, USA; Heidegger, M. Being and Time, 
1978, Wiley-Blackwell, USA. For an overview, see Moran, D. Introduction to Phenomenology, 
1999, Routledge, UK.
 Carel, H. ‘The philosophical role of  illness - and how it can teach us to live reflective212 -
ly’, Article, The Conversation, 2016a, http://theconversation.com/the-philosophical-role-of-
illness-and-how-it-can-teach-us-to-live-reflectively-57310 (accessed 22/04/17).  
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on the experience of  disease in a way that other philosophy avoids: it is messy, sub-
jective, narrative, qualitative. But is it also, I believe, edifying. Unlike the high-
minded conceptual tussles described in this chapter, phenomenology offers patients 
a way of  approaching their condition that may allow them to achieve ‘well-being 
within illness’, as well as reminding doctors that the biomedical world they describe 
to a patient may not be isomorphic with the sufferer’s experience.   213
Whilst the 20th century thinkers who loom large over phenomenology - Heideg-
ger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl - had little specific to say about illness, they bestowed 
upon later writers a sophisticated method for approaching the problem. It is these 
thinkers I will briefly examine here, from the work of  S. Kay Toombs and Drew 
Leder through to more recent studies by Havi Carel.  Taken together, their body 214
of  work represents a serious challenge to reductionist models of  medicine and 
draws attention to both the transformative and informative nature of  disease as an 
subject of  inquiry.  
S. Kay Toombs, a philosopher with multiple sclerosis, has written extensively and 
originally on the phenomenology of  illness. Ironically, given the critique provided 
above, her starting point is that there are essential (Toombs terms them ‘eidetic’) 
features to the illness experience, not specific to one condition.  These character215 -
istics, which ‘transcend the peculiarities and particularities of  different disease 
states and constitute the meaning of  illness-as-lived’, revolve around loss: the loss 
of  certainty, of  control, of  freedom to act, of  the familiar world and of  a sense of  
 Carel, H. ‘Can I be ill and happy?’ in Philosophia, 2007, Vol. 35, No.2, pp. 95-110.213
 These are not the only influential thinkers in this field, but I have chosen to examine 214
them because they have either written the most extensively or present a thesis uniquely 
salient to this work. For an overview of  the literature on this topic, see Carel, H. Phenome-
nology of  Illness, 2016b,  Oxford University Press, UK, pp. 35-39.
 It should be noted that she later weakened this from ‘essential’ to ‘typical’: Toombs, S. 215
K. ‘The Meaning of  Illness: A Phenomenological Account of  the Different Perspectives of  Physician and 
Patient, 1993, Springer, USA.
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wholeness.   216
These aspects of  illness are common and universal, she argues, but her intention is 
not to bracket ‘illness’ as a category to be delineated or denied in the manner of  
disease. Rather, she hopes to show how the ‘world’ of  illness and the patient - 
whose spatial and temporal structure fluctuates - is separate from that of  the physi-
cian, who deals in the body-as-object and the disease-as-entity, and suggests that a 
greater understanding of  these disparities would pave the way for better care.  217
Patients and doctors need to work together to find a shared language, recognising 
that the manner in which one party (those who are ill) experience illness not as a 
biological dysfunction but as a rupture of  their lived body dictates what are and 
are not appropriate forms of  communication.  
Bringing prolonged attention to the ways in which disease alters our experience of  
the world, and to the consequences of  these changes, was Toombs’ key contribu-
tion in my view.  She outlined the ways in which disease is capable of  rendering 218
the world a changed place, in which objects with previously unambiguous and be-
nign roles now appear to be obstacles or challenges. Furthermore, she described 
the alienation that can arise when a patient and a physician talk past each other, 
one about normal ranges and white blood cell counts, the other about not being 
able to walk up the hill to their house. Ultimately, it is this that Toombs was trying 
to make us understand: that serious disease is almost always transformative, and by 
interpreting that transformation in narrow biomedical terms, we run the risk of  
witnessing successful communication between doctor and patient break down. Pa-
 Toombs, S. K. ‘The meaning of  illness: a phenomenological approach to the patient-216
physician relationship’ in The Journal of  Medicine and Philosophy, 1987, Vol. 12, pp. 228-235.
 I have simplified this account in the interests of  brevity - following on from Satre, 217
Toombs actually identifies four layers of  illness experience: Toombs, S. K. ‘The Tempo-
rality of  Illness: Four Levels of  Experience’ in Theoretical Medicine, 1990, Vol. 11, pp. 
227-241; Toombs, S. K. 1993.
 This insight was not limited to disease, but also applied to disability: Toombs, S. K. 218
‘The lived experience of  disability’ in Human Studies, 1995, Vol. 18, pp. 9-23.
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tients and physicians must not let their different experiences of  the same body (the 
body-as-lived and the body-as-analysed) mean that total delineation occurs, and 
neither finds themselves speaking to the other about the same thing. 
Other writers have used phenomenology and personal experience to make broader 
points about the metaphysical scaffolds that support our world views (or ‘habits of  
mind’, as some phenomenologists would have it). For example, in his masterful 
study of  embodiment The Absent Body, Drew Leder utilises an intense examination 
of  our bodies as experienced (or not) in order to highlight not just what is taken for 
granted about our every day bodily lives but also to undermine the tendency to-
wards disembodiment which he takes to lie beneath our entire intellectual tradi-
tion. He does this by first explicating in detail the way in which our bodies are of-
ten removed from consciousness, whether obscured, forgotten, automated or oth-
erwise concealed from our attention. It is difficult, he says, to become aware of  a 
body so often relegated in this manner. ‘Feelings of  general neutrality’, he writes, 
‘or well-being are typically amorphous, marked neither by definable beginnings 
and ends nor abrupt transformations’.  A large part of  his study focuses on the 219
ways in which this ‘invisibility’ occurs, and the interruption that disease causes to 
such an arrangement, but the most important contribution he makes, as far as this 
discussion goes, is his unrelenting assault on the clean division of  mind and body, a 
process of  disembodiment he views as ‘an abiding stream in Western intellectual 
history’.  220
The problem he identifies and criticises is the way in which our medical notions of  
embodiment are based upon abstractions or, when they are tied to the flesh, upon 
a mechanistic thematisation of  corpses. As he says:  
 Leder, D. The Absent Body, University of  Chicago Press, USA, 1990, p. 72.219
 Ibid., p. 3220
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‘We can inspect a dead body in a way we cannot the living. Modern medicine, pro-
foundly Cartesian in spirit, has contrived to use the corpse as a methodological tool 
and a regulative ideal. Medical education begins with the cadaver, just as the clini-
cal case ends with the pathoanatomical dissection. Death unveils the truths of  the 
inner body and its diseases… Notions of  embodiment based upon the corpse can 
lead to an objectivist, depersonalised medicine. The physician need not attend to 
the patient’s intentionality when he or she is conceived of  as a physiological ma-
chine’.  221
    
Though I have covered similar ground myself  (see Biomedicine, Chapter I), Leder 
makes an interesting point which I would like to touch upon. He argues that that a 
positive feedback loop exists between dualist metaphysics and western society, as 
experienced on a bodily level.  In other words, what began as a theoretical ab222 -
straction has become codified into ways of  seeing and organising the world, which 
in turn feeds back into and strengthens our dualistic schematisations of  our bodies 
and disease. ‘We are all to some extent Cartesians’, he writes, ‘either willingly or 
struggling to get free’.  I think there is something profoundly correct about this, 223
though it can express itself  in oblique ways. Patients find, as will be discussed in 
Chapter IV, that they simply do not have the language to adequately describe what 
is happening to them. This is because of  a failure of  categorisation - a prevailing 
notion that the phenomenological world can be neatly assimilated into the bio-
medical one. That this assimilation does not happen, or happens in a clumsy, inel-
egant way, is no surprise, but that does not lessen the negative effects of  such a 
failed integration. What Leder points to - what I am pointing to - is the sense that 
 Ibid., pp. 146-147.221
 Ibid., p. 152.222
 Ibid., p. 108; The extent to which this dualism is internalised and the problems that 223
can arise from it will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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our entire system of  categorisation is flawed, and that it cannot encompass that 
which we think it can or should.  
Havi Carel, a contemporary philosophy who I reference at several points during 
this thesis, has written extensively on the phenomenology of  illness, covering too 
broad a range of  topics to be effectively summarised here.  In place of  an over224 -
view I would like instead to mention two particular components of  her work: her 
repeated assertion that illness is a fantastically apt subject for philosophers to work 
on and her attempts to use philosophical tools in a wide variety of  circumstances. 
The questions she asks as a result of  this approach are more direct, more personal, 
more relevant. Can we, for example, be happy within illness? What can philosophy 
teach us about being sick and can it change our experience of  sickness for the bet-
ter? A person with chronic illness herself, she writes:  
‘I have the most pressing and personal interest in understanding the illness experi-
ence and in thinking about how to make that experience less lonely, alienated and 
socially scripted. In the years since I was diagnosed I have navigated my rickety 
boat of  selfhood between the Scylla of  medicalisation and objectification of  my 
illness and Charybdis of  social pressures to conform to the ideal of  ‘the good pa-
tient’ or ‘sick role’. When subjected to philosophical analysis, this navigation, both 
philosophically salient and pragmatically important, can help us understand illness 
as part of  self-hood: it is thus of  prime philosophical value’.  225
 
 For example, she extends Toombs’ thoughts about the losses that illness can bring, fo224 -
cusing in particular on the loss of  freedom, discusses the ways in which illness can have a 
benign effect on a person’s wellbeing or at least provoke a surprisingly positive reaction 
(see also: Kidd, I. 2012, pp. 496-520), expands Fricker’s notion of  epistemic injustice (see 
p. 151) and also provides several in-depth, phenomenological accounts of  breathlessness 
as part of  a large, collaborative project called Life of  Breath.  
 Carel, H. ‘Living in the Present: Illness, phenomenology, and well-being’ in Jackson, 225
M. (Ed.) The Routledge History of  Disease, 2016, Routledge, UK, 2016c, p. 582.
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What she touches on here is something I wish to echo, albeit less eloquently, 
throughout this thesis: severe illness is a philosophically fascinating and serious ob-
ject of  inquiry, the grip of  which only the luckiest of  us are likely to completely es-
cape. It makes us think about ourselves, about our limitations and our strengths, it 
puts enough strain on our relationships to show them for what they are; it brings us 
closer to death, whether that entails reflection, contentment, fear or something 
else; it removes us from the sanitised world we have created and reminds us of  our 
biology, whilst pushing us into the hands of  expensive, gleaming pieces of  technol-
ogy. It is transformative, in other words, though the nature of  the transformation is 
unpredictable and idiosyncratic. Disease affects everyone in different ways: 
 
‘The values and desires of  ill people can alter. They may slow down or speed up, 
reconsider their career, or want to spend more time with their family; they might 
find new meaning in work or as a volunteer, and they may value time and simply 
living in the present more highly. Goals and ambitions are often updated, taking 
into account the limitations and opportunities brought about by illness, perhaps 
becoming more focused on what is still possible. Their world-view may change 
deeply. They may become depressed, or more religious, or happier. And, of  course, 
they may not change at all’.   226
 
This transformation, in all its nebulousness, is a worthy topics of  philosophical ex-
amination, and it is to the credit of  phenomenologists that they approach the prob-
lem of  disease in such a way.  
Carel in particular has produced thoughtful work in response to this idea of  illness-
as-change which tries to ally philosophy with pragmatism, utilising not only the 
 Carel, H., Kidd, I. J. and Pettigrew, R. ‘Illness as transformative experience’ in The 226
Lancet, 2016, Vol. 338, Iss. 10050, p. 1153; it is important to remember that ‘transforma-
tion’ in this context is meant literally, without implying particularly positive (or negative) 
outcomes - as the changes may well be a mix of  both, or just push in one direction.  
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knowledge and insight that philosophy can bring to an individual but the method 
of  philosophising itself. She helped to develop a ‘phenomenological toolkit’ for pa-
tients, that might be delivered through one-day workshops, with the aim of  im-
proving both patient’s understanding of  their own condition (in a philosophical 
rather than medical sense) and giving them tools with which to develop a ‘thick’ 
conception of  illness.  This is a conception in which all aspects of  the disease are 227
considered as interconnecting points of  impact on a person’s life, where views ill-
ness as a gateway to a new way of  ‘being in the world’ for the patient, rather than 
as a disembodied biological dysfunction that is separate to the sufferer (in that it is 
abstract, depersonalised and talked about in statistical, universal terms). 
I stated at the beginning of  this brief  section that the work of  phenomenologists 
has practical consequences, and I do believe this to be true. I think it could be of  
great comfort to an individual to come to see their condition not simply as an un-
wanted, external intrusion into their lives but as something transformative of  their 
way of  being and not necessarily in a negative sense. Likewise, I think it could be 
of  great help to a physician to more deeply understand that the world they trans-
pose from textbooks onto their patients is not the same world that the individual in 
their clinic lives in. But, having stated these positions as I have, does it not seem 
fairly self-evident that illness is transformative and that doctors should think about 
things from the perspective of  the patient? And, undoubtedly useful as philosophy 
might be to some individuals in coming to terms with their new position in life, so 
might self-help books, or running, or listening to Radio 3.  
This is where the specificity of  phenomenology comes into play, in that philoso-
phers in this discipline have articulated and fleshed out the notion of  transforma-
tion within illness, tied it to other’s works and generally speaking given the concept 
 Carel ran some small-scale, pilot versions of  these workshops in conjunction with GPs 227
and patients, but never took them further (personal correspondence).
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a depth and clarity where it once may have seemed glib.  Having accounts of  ill228 -
ness like Carel’s and Toombs’, which peg themselves closely to the patient experi-
ence in all its permutations allows us to consider illness in a fuller, more complete 
manner - it gives us more to chew on, so to speak.  
It is also complimentary to much work that has been completed in the sociology of  
health and illness, and works in tandem with it by providing a philosophical expli-
cation of  the personal level of  meaning and interaction to supplement the social. A 
good example of  this is how Toombs’ concepts of  the patient’s and doctor’s sepa-
rate ‘worlds’ compliments Mishler’s idea of  the lifeworld: Toombs provides an ex-
periential account of  the broken interactional model that Mishler famously de-
scribed by analysing doctor-patient transcripts.   229
Phenomenology thus reinforces what sociologists have been arguing for decades: 
patients’ views matter, disease is not best understood as a biological dysfunction, 
illness alters the functional boundaries of  an individual’s life. But it also utilises so-
phisticated philosophical tools to challenge biomedicine, highlight epistemic injus-
tice and to recognise all the ways in which disease is ‘world-changing’. Phenome-
nology sets itself  apart from other aspects of  philosophy of  medicine (and from so-
ciology) by being attentive to disease as it is lived, by being conceptually astute and 
by offering deep analysis of  the breakdowns that occur along common fault lines. 
Its usefulness is such that I will continue to draw on work done in this tradition at 
various points throughout this thesis. 
 
 
 Such as L. A. Paul’s work on decision making and transformative experiences in Paul, 228
L. A. Transformative Experience, 2014, Oxford University Press, UK; I mean by this that it is 
glib to say that illness transforms - how it does so, in what way and for what reason, now 
these are the real questions.





This chapter has been a critical analysis of  the way that, over a number of  years, a 
certain strand of  philosophy has approached the problem of  disease. I have noted 
the motivations, both potential and given, for this undertaking and found that the 
aims of  theorists are insufficiently fulfilled by their attempts. What’s more, it seems 
highly likely, as detailed here, that it is not the attempts themselves that fail but the 
method by which they are assembled in the first place and the rules they must ad-
here to. Of  particular relevance to this thesis is the lack of  contribution such theo-
ries make to our understanding of  contested illnesses. Many of  the issues I detailed 
in the first chapter are at most lightly brushed by the ideas discussed here. But if  
we are to insert philosophy into these problems (and I think we must), then where 
to begin? 
Focus, certainly: diseases not disease. A continued acknowledgement of  the com-
plicated and the inexplicable and the diverse; a tendency to shy away from at-
tempted containment, universalism and essentialism, instead falling more towards 
individuated experience. A desire too, whether in analysis or description, to imag-
ine other worlds, other ways of  being patients, of  being doctors, of  being bodies, 
this being in itself  the surest method to avoid acceding total epistemic stewardship 
to medical science, remembering always that we are not simply engaging with a 
scientific enterprise but with a process inseparably tied up with symbolic meaning. 
It is this - the production and dissemination of  meaning - that philosophy of  medi-
cine should be most concerned with, and yet it is a subject on which many remain 
largely tight-lipped. What do we think, why do we think it, how does it affect our 
health and can we shift our perceptions to make us feel better? These are more 
useful questions. 
Fundamentally, I think the philosophy of  medicine literature around disease frus-
trates me because of  the lack of  insight it offers into people's lives. This may be too 
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lofty an aim to bestow upon what is, really, an intellectual exercise much like many 
others, but disease appears to me to be a particular topic of  inquiry that, more 
than invites, demands serious reflection. It is the imposition of  an altered state on a 
person, for sure, but it is also the meeting place of  biology, culture, science, tech-
nology and economics. Contested illnesses, to as much of  if  not greater degree so 
than other diseases, sit at such junctions, and their study tells us so much more 
than simply a reductive narrative of  personal impairment.  
In the next chapter I will look at three writers outside of  the philosophy of  medi-
cine, (a cultural critic, a historian and a philosopher of  science), all of  whom in dif-
ferent ways have discussed disease in the broader sense hinted at above. Their work 
is directly relevant to the topic at hand, as it focuses upon conditions that dwell in 
the shadowy netherworld between valid and illegitimate illness, but it also serves as 
a partial rebuke to the subject matter of  this chapter. That is because it strives to 
unpick people's lives and their experiences, and because it thinks that these are the 





Chapter III - Shorter, Showalter, Hacking  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed at length the relevance (or lack thereof) that 
contemporary philosophy of  medicine has to contested illness in relation to the 
central question of  this thesis. That question, or rather cluster of  questions, being 
in some strong sense to do with the way we experience illness, both as patients and 
as healthy bystanders; those question essentially being what qualifies instinctively as 
disease and how does it do so? - what do we expect to look at when we look at a sick person? – 
how do we grade information given to us by our bodies, by professionals and by the people around 
us?- what are the social and institutional contexts in which our diseases live?  
We may not, indeed, be much closer to answering these concerns, but I have be-
gun to sketch out the foundations of  the discussion. Legitimacy, validation, respon-
sibility, biomedicine, embodiment – all these find a place in our language of  dis-
ease, and in particular of  contested disease. By the end of  this chapter I will have 
added a handful more. And although I believe there is little to be usefully gleaned 
from the disease definition debate in terms of  helping us to understand the philo-
sophical underpinnings of  contested illnesses, this does not mean that no interest-
ing or relevant scholarly work has been completed recently which can further our 
comprehension of  what is, at its most clear, a muddied subject.  
In this chapter, then, I will turn my attention to two historians and a philosopher 
who in many ways could also be classified as a historian. The former pair, Edward 
Shorter and Elaine Showalter, have both courted controversy in patient communi-
ties with their historical analysis of  psychosomatic illnesses, psychiatry and, in the 
case of  Showalter, hysteria specifically. The reasons for this are, I surmise, a com-
bination of  form and content. Their theses, though distinct, overlap in many sig-
nificant ways; they believe that chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia and many 
other similar conditions exist on a historical continuum with previous psychoso-
matic conditions, and that they are for all intents and purposes the current incar-
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nation of  hysteria. That is to say, of  emotional distress finding an outlet subcon-
sciously through physical symptoms, the exact manifestation of  which is dependent 
on prevailing notions of  acceptability. This does not sit well with those who believe 
their illness to be primarily organic and whose identity has come to a certain ex-
tent to be formed in opposition to those who say or act as though it isn’t. Both 
writers present this idea in a somewhat forthright manner, which does not endear 
them to patient communities who feel belittled and patronised. It is, however, no-
table that whilst they remain controversial figures for many individuals with con-
tested illnesses, they have received minimal criticism from fellow academics.  230
It is my intention to give the ideas presented by Shorter and Showalter a fair read-
ing and to analyse the claims they make, especially relating to subconscious symp-
tom selection (drawn from the so-called ‘symptom pool’), cultural transmission of  
disease and how the changing nature of  the doctor-patient relationship and the 
family have affected patients. The inferences they draw from historical examples 
are not inconsistent with adequate contemporary patient care and to deny their 
relevance (as some do) is simply ignorance. Though I do take issue with the tone 
used on occasion, what I will be most attentive to is their ideas.   
The last individual of  the three, Ian Hacking, is a philosopher who has written ex-
tensively about dynamic nominalism and the relationship between individuals and 
the categories they are placed (or place themselves) into. His exemplary studies of  
multiple personality disorder and dissociative fugue are the brightest stars in a con-
stellation of  writings around this topic, his contribution to which he has phrased 
his ‘Making Up People’ project. His work follows in the long tradition of  natural 
kinds but the ways in which he has adapted nominalist debates into a modern 
framework of  interaction - positioning himself  between a Foucauldian structural 
 For an example of  the backlash against Shorter and a description of  the reaction to 230
Showalter, see (for Shorter) Scott, D. W. and Scott, L. C. The Extremely Unfortunate Skull Val-
ley Incident, 2003, Trafford Publishing, USA and (for Showalter) Larkin, M. ‘Elain Showal-
ter: hysteria’s historian’ in The Lancet, 1998, Vol. 351, No. 9116, p. 1638.
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analysis and Goffman’s closely observed sociology of  mental illness – give it reso-
nance for the discussion here. It concerns identity and the structure of  thought and 
memory, and has provoked a fairly vigorous response from other philosophers.  
What I believe Hacking has gifted us with is a loose but ingenious framework of  
looping between individuals and institutions, one which despite his protestations of  
simplicity and simple-mindedness has grown into a fairly sophisticated tool with 
which to approach certain topics, especially when used in conjunction with his less 
appreciated ecological niche concept. To what extent his ideas can be adapted and 
hold true to specific cases of  contested illnesses will be left for the final chapter, 
though arguably his existing work has already dealt with, to a certain extent, con-
tested illnesses of  a sort.  
What all three of  these writers have in common is the importance they place on 
viewing the patient in context. A sick person is never just a sick person. They are 
part of  a group of  individuals experiencing similar sensations, part of  a society 
that gently and not-so-gently nudges them towards certain patterns of  behaviour 
and explanation and away from others; they become both willing and non-willing, 
conscious and unconscious agents of  their own distress. That this happens is, to 
some extent, less contentious or problematic than how it happens. How do shady 
interactions with the vagaries of  ‘culture’ produce specific illness behaviour and 
beliefs? Is the restructuring of  experience that is posited to occur anything close to 
a consistent process?  
That questions like these lie at the heart of  the work discussed below is in large 
part why I have chosen to discuss it in the first place. There would be a great deal 
missing from our understanding of  disease and contested diseases if  we were to 
lean solely on the philosophy of  disease literature for analytic support, and so by 
bringing in these thinkers from other disciplines, I hope to cast more light and 
shadow on the topic at hand. That is to say, I hope that their words and thoughts 
will give depth and shape to the lives of  the patients I examine in the next chapter, 
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Edward Shorter has been described as a ‘highly critical’ historian of  psychosomat-
ic conditions.  There are four strands of  his work that are relevant here: the his231 -
torical continuity of  past psychosomatic conditions with modern illnesses, the sub-
conscious mind’s desire to be respected and to choose ways of  expressing its pain 
that reflect this, the decline in trust between doctor and patient and the increased 
atomisation and loneliness of  postmodern family life. Taken together, these provide 
a coherent if  conservative explanation and analysis of  contested illnesses, and one 
which makes us question the consequences of  sympathetic doctors, the role of  the 




Across his two most famous works on the subject, From Paralysis to Fatigue and From 
the Mind into the Body, Shorter strongly argues for a total historical continuity be-
tween hysteria, railway spine, shellshock, neurasthenia and any number of  other 
ancient appellations for unexplained medical symptoms with conditions we see 
around us today such as chronic fatigue, golf  war syndrome and fibromyalgia.  232
That is not to say that a fibromyalgia patient feels and presents in the same way as 
a hysteric, just that the root cause is the same. Shorter believes that undulations in 
 The epithet is Hacking’s: Hacking, I. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences 231
of  Memory, 1998, Second Printing, Princeton University Press, USA, p. 156.
 Shorter, E. From Paralysis to Fatigue: A History of  Psychosomatic Illness in the Modern Era, 232
1993, The Free Press, USA; Shorter, E. 1994.
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the professional structure of  medicine and psychiatry, as well as various ripples 
across the cultural life of  the societies in question, lead in some tangible but slip-
pery way to different symptoms being ‘popular’ at different times.  The condi233 -
tions have changed, then, in the sense that the way patients present in clinics 
changes as you look over the years. However, this metamorphosis of  symptomatic 
profile forms a large part of  Shorter’s evidence, for he contends that our body only 
expresses emotional disquiet in ways which are considered acceptable and explica-
ble in the social and intellectual milieu in which it exists.  
Paralysis, then, as an example, ‘was a culturally specific nineteenth century mode 
of  processing extreme emotion’ and is not seen today in as great numbers because 
it is not as deeply imbedded into our social consciousness as a way of  experiencing 
distress legitimately.  This can be observed in the way that, whilst once common 234
among a certain class of  young women, paralysis ceases to be seen frequently once 
the Babinski sign and test became well known: it is difficult to claim you are paral-
ysed when an ‘objective’ test of  your reflexes finds them to be working normally. 
The same could be said for claiming to have a strange object or animal inside you 
once the power of  x-rays became well disseminated or for professing issues with 
your heart, lungs or sensory organs once these became exceptionally easy to moni-
tor and investigate with the tools and feelers of  modern medicine. The argument 
goes that once paralysis (or whatever) becomes somehow discredited or illegitimate, 
the body will find another, more acceptable or, at least, less disprovable way of  so-
matising.  
 I put ‘popular’ inside quotation marks because although Shorter frequently employs 233
this kind of  adjective, along with ‘fashionable’, ‘trendy’ and the like, I find that the conno-
tations of  conscious decision-making and glibness associated with these words detract 
from their relevance as descriptors. I am not the only one to think Shorter’s loose relation-
ship with language can undermine his scholarship - Fitzhugh Mullan makes a similar 
point in Mullan, F. ‘Revolt of  the Postmodern Patient’ in The New York Times, 
02/02/1986.
 Shorter, E. 1993, p. 114.234
!139
Shorter is clearly very much of  the opinion that whilst there is something perma-
nent about ‘organic’ conditions, or diseases with an identifiable physical lesion, 
psychosomatic illnesses, both then and now, are permanent only in their cause and 
vary wildly in their manifestation. That this cause itself  is vague – a sort of  malad-
justment, a realised or unrealised discontent – only serves to make them more diffi-
cult to identify and analyse. The specific symbolism of  this unhappiness may mi-
grate from one vector to another; the nineteenth century woman unknowingly re-
acting against the stupefying passivity that defined her femininity is different from 
the man returning from the trenches was unable to reconcile his civilised existence 
with the horror he witnessed, but both are uniform in the sense that they are un-
happy in ways they do not comprehend. What Shorter says is that to these arche-
types we can add the career-driven yuppies of  the 80s who suddenly found them-
selves unimaginably tired and lonely divorcees wrestling with an unfulfilling and 
tedious existence who begin to ache all over.  Their cultural and personal situa235 -
tion is different and thus the symptoms they experience are not the same, but the 
heart of  the problem remains that their bodies are expressing sadness without in-
forming their minds. Or rather, that this is their method of  informing them. 
What is evident from the outset is that Shorter is keen to dispel concerns of  insen-
sitivity and is worried about being misunderstood. On the very first page of  From 
Paralysis to Fatigue he states: 
 
‘It should be emphasised…that from the patient’s viewpoint psychosomatic prob-
lems qualify as genuine diseases. There is nothing imaginary or simulated about 
the patient’s perception of  his or her illness. Although the symptom may be psy-
chogenic, the pain or grinding fatigue is very real’.  236
 Shorter notes that a diagnosis of  hysteria or similar is as likely to emerge from a life of  235
leisure as it is from extreme hardship: Shorter, E. 1994, p. 66.
 Shorter, E. 1993, p. ix.236
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His lip-service to the reality of  the pain is undermined however, by repeatedly im-
plying throughout his work that psychogenic mechanisms are ontologically less 
valid than biological ones. By arguing that, in one case, organic disease, both 
symptoms and internal distress are ‘real’, whilst maintaining that only half  of  this 
duality is present in a somatiser, he drives a wedge between them that preferences 
the organic illness. At no point does he adequately examine or explain why the 
metaphysical basis for one form of  reality, (pain caused by an anatomically observ-
able dysfunction), is placed above another, (pain caused by some other, harder to 
identify mechanism, as with psychogenesis).  
It may be possible to infer clinically useful reasons why symptoms and symp-
tomatic experience, that is, the difference between the fact that the muscles in my 
arm ache and the pain it causes me, should be separated, but on the whole Shorter 
does not go down this route. To him, physical diseases are the permanent or semi-
permanent bedfellows of  mankind. They are constant throughout history.  Psy237 -
chosomatic conditions, on the other hand, are products of  a time and place, 
morally charged in a way that other diseases aren’t, and heavily, heavily influenced 
by outside factors.  238
What are these outside factors? Shorter speaks often of  the ‘symptom pool’. By this 
he means that at any given time and place there are acceptable and unacceptable 
ways of  being ill.  
 To me this seems to be a contentious claim. It does not seem unreasonable to argue 237
that to a (perhaps lesser) degree what Shorter considers ‘organic’ disease is also greatly 
affected by its social surroundings. Plenty of  conditions require specific environments in 
order to flourish and come and go historically - for example waterborne diseases in heavi-
ly populated areas. Furthermore, some diseases simply are different: to take a common 
example, the diabetes patient of  today would be unrecognisable to doctors even in the 
mid-20th century (see Polonsky, K. S. ‘The Past 200 Years in Diabetes’ in The New England 
Journal of  Medicine, 2012, Vol. 367, pp. 1332-1340). 
 It should be noted he is talking about symptomatic presentation here, with a consistent 238
underlying mechanism. As he writes, ‘[the] tendency to convert unhappiness into physical 
symptoms is probably universal in the human species’, Shorter, E. 1994, p. 88.
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The symptom pool  
 
To display acceptable symptoms, as used by Shorter, is to feel sick in a way that ab-
solves moral responsibility for your symptoms, but also in a way that accords with 
the expectations and prevailing scientific notions of  biological illness behaviour:  
 
‘The unconscious mind, just like the conscious, is influenced by surrounding cul-
ture, which has models of  what it considers to be legitimate and illegitimate symp-
toms. Legitimate symptoms are ascribed to an underlying organic disease for 
which the patient could not possibly be blamed. Illegitimate ones, by contrast, may 
be thought due to playacting or silliness. By defining certain symptoms as illegiti-
mate, a culture strongly encourages patients not to develop them or risk being 
thought ‘undeserving’ individuals with no real medical problems. Accordingly 
there is a great pressure on the unconscious mind to produce only legitimate symp-
toms…the unconscious mind desires to be taken seriously and not be ridiculed’.  239
 
There are then three identifiable parts to what Shorter would consider a legitimate 
symptom. It must accord with overriding ideas of  validity, that is to say that for a 
symptom to be acceptable it should relate to some current theory or other of  the 
body that is widely acknowledged to be correct. This idea can then be used to ex-
plain how symptoms have changed over time in tandem with movements in gener-
al aetiological frameworks of  disease. The second part is intertwined with the first, 
that the symptoms displayed must work to absolve the patient of  moral responsibil-
ity for their illness. This is usually most successfully achieved by mimicking that 
which has the most credence and commands the most respect, and in this cultural 
 Ibid., 1993, p. x.239
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context that means established, observable, quantifiable, organic disease.  The 240
third part of  this idea, by implication, is that there exists some powerful mecha-
nism of  cultural transference which imbues in the popular mind a list of  accept-
able and non-acceptable means of  being ill, which in times of  crisis is used to 
communicate emotional dysfunction in a painful psychical language.  
Shorter suggests two further clarifications of  this point. Firstly, he puts emphasis on 
the doctor-patient relationship as a means by which sick individuals are able to 
gauge what is expected of  their bodies according to the ideas of  the day. He does 
not place this inside a simplistic framework of  suggestion, Charcot-style, but pro-
vides a more sophisticated account of  an important dynamic which changes over 
time from one of  idolatry and patriarchal hierarchy to a process based more on 
individualistic market models of  healthcare, growing mistrust of  authority and a 
preference for pharmaceuticals.  
Secondly, he argues that patients are aware or become aware of  the ‘trends’ in 
symptomatic presentation which are most in harmony with contemporary expla-
nations of  illness. How this occurs has likewise developed over time, from the pop-
ular culture of  the nineteenth century, be it novels, the theatre or forms of  spa 
tourism, to the sensationalist mass media and day-time talkshows of  the 1990s, all 
the while buffeted by the ever-present influences of  friends, family and word-of-
mouth. In his words, the ‘two actors in this psychodrama…are, and have always 
been, doctors and patients…Doctors’ notions of  what constitutes ‘genuine’ or-
ganicity may alter, perhaps as a result of  increased scientific knowledge or new cul-
tural preconceptions. Although patients’ notions of  disease tend to follow doctors’ 
ideas…patients may also change their notions of  the legitimacy of  symptoms that 
 It is not impossible to imagine, however, an alternate historical or contemporary sce240 -
nario in which the parameters of  respectability were different, and therefore a different 
mode of  illness was ‘aped’. Presumably, Shorter would contend that his theory would still 
hold true in this circumstance, if  he were to admit the usefulness of  conceiving such a 
universe.
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have little to do with medicine’.  To give this idea a little more flesh, let us see 241
how it operates through one of  Shorter’s examples, reflex theory, which was influ-
ential in the second half  of  the nineteenth century.  
In the most basic sense, this was the idea that any organ in the body could, by 
means of  a ‘reflex arc’ transmitted through the nervous system of  the spine, affect 
at a distance some other organ or bodily function. In particular, the uterus was 
seen as a troublesome piece of  anatomy (when is it not?), and was the site of  grow-
ing medical meddling with female reproductive organs. It was thought that, as 
every internal item was connected dynamically with every other, and as the uterus 
was believed to be among the most influential of  all parts of  the female body, it 
made sense that in some form or other it would be sending nefarious signals to all 
the things it could reach. 
Targeting the uterus as the source of  disparate symptoms was not the only method 
of  applying this theory to treatment. Connections between distant body parts were 
constantly being drawn and redrawn, and remedies included pulling on the tongue 
in order to galvanise the heart, ‘propping up’ organs through surgery that were 
said to have fallen out of  place and thus caused instability in the nervous system 
and reflexively generated hysteria, treating breasts to cure a painful womb and 
cauterising nasal mucosa to influence ‘everything imaginable’.  242
The immediate result of  this theoretical backdrop, according to Shorter, was that 
patients, mainly women, became fixated on certain areas of  the body which are in 
fact impossible to experience specifically, such as the uterus.  Thus, what was 243
vague pain, tiredness or otherwise dissipated and ambiguous distress became fun-
 Shorter, E. 1993, pp. x-xi.241
 Ibid., 1993, p. 47.242
 That is to say, you can certainly experience pain coming from the vicinity, but it is not 243
an organ which you can identify from others around it in the way you could, say, with the 
lungs or heart.
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nelled through this analysis into a coherent and centred dysfunction. Though re-
flex theory and the medical movement it played an integral part in is complicated 
and multifaceted, Shorter demonstrates quite succinctly how a combination of  fac-
tors and pressures collide under one banner to provide a complete and convenient 
explanation of  disease, which in turn affects treatment and presentation: 
 
‘For patients it provided a mooring of  certainty in the face of  the body’s bewilder-
ing signals: it was just those pesky pelvic reflexes again. For doctors reflexes provid-
ed a general explanation of  how disease in one part of  the body affected the other 
parts: nervous signals from any other irritated organ could travel up and down the 
spinal cord to any other target organ in the body. In women, the uterus and ovaries 
were thought the organs most susceptible to irritation, thus the organs that drove 
forward disease processes elsewhere. But reflexes could also spread to the brain, 
offering explanations of  nervous and psychiatric symptoms in men and women 
generally, but particularly in women because of  the permanent state of  irritability 
of  the female pelvis’.  244
 
The exact nature of  the mechanism whereby culture engenders symptoms, with its 
changeable weighting over time between doctors, science, other patients and popu-
lar media is sometimes difficult to pin down, in a manner that raises for me several 
problems with Shorter’s approach. I will return to this topic later.  
 
The doctor-patient relationship  
 
So, from historical continuity and the symptom pool, we move now to what I con-
sider the third important strand of  Shorter’s thinking, the doctor-patient relation-
ship and the loss of  medical authority. He has stated that ‘the history of  psychoso-
 Ibid., 1993, p. 45.244
!145
matic illness is one of  ever-changing steps in a pas de deux between doctor and pa-
tient’ and his analysis of  the evolving nature of  this dance provides some insight 
into the occasionally antagonistic and counter-productive dynamic that can be 
witnessed between modern-day sufferers of  contested diseases and their various 
physicians.   245
Historically, he identifies and delineates three loose but clear phases in the devel-
opment of  the doctor patient relationship.  The first, traditional, refers to the age 246
before the rise of  the doctor as a cultural symbol of  trust and healing. Roughly 
speaking, this means pre-1850, and can be defined by a distrustful and dismissive 
attitude amongst patients, who for the most part view medicine (accurately) as fail-
ing to provide much in the way of  diagnostic accuracy or therapeutic efficacy. Fol-
lowing this we entered a period termed by Shorter as modern, wherein the doctor 
became a powerful, respected figure, able to diagnose and explain but in many 
cases still without the ability to cure with consistency. After the Second World War 
and just as we entered the age of  miraculous medicine, he believes we transitioned 
to a post-modern doctor-patient relationship. This represents a return to a period of  
cynicism about mainstream medicine, characterised by doctor-shopping, an enor-
mous boom in alternative therapies, increased litigious agitation, the growth of  pa-
tient communication and networks, the proliferation of  new, non-medically sanc-
tioned explanations for illness and the expansion, entrenchment and reduced 
treatability of  psychosomatic conditions. To draw the distinction sharply, until the 
1960s, ‘near veneration of  the doctor was the rule, the demigod in white whose 
patients would willingly sacrifice their ovaries to suit his theories’, whereas follow-
ing this point ‘mistrust of  the doctor and refusal to accept his or her reassurance’ 
became the defining feature of  doctor-patient interactions in relation to somatisa-
 Ibid., 1993, p. xi.245
 This sketch is based largely on Shorter, E. Bedside Manners: The Troubled History of  Doctors 246
and Patients, 1986, Penguin Books, UK.
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tion.   247
What is of  relevance to our discussion here is the thesis that Shorter advances re-
garding the complex relationship between psychogenic conditions, trust in doctors, 
placebos and the general therapeutic environment of  the contemporary world. His 
basic idea is that over the time-span of  the modern period, a number of  psychogenic 
complaints, which are the central loci of  his historical focus, began in many cases 
to be treated quite effectively. This is due to a combination of  informal psy-
chotherapy within the consultation itself, which was conducted over a lengthy peri-
od of  time and incorporated many elements, and a wide range of  placebo thera-
pies. Mostly harmless, these suggested cures were often entered into wholehearted-
ly by patients not only hoping to get better but fully believing that they would 
do.  This is the key, according to Shorter, for understanding why in some cases 248
they did indeed improve: because they felt listened to and respected by a profes-
sional, who in turn possessed significant authority and standing, and who was able 
to explicate their symptoms in cogent, scientific terms (be it spinal irritation, reflex 
theory, neurasthenia or whatever) which in turn came hand in hand with a treat-
ment programme. By some intuitive though mysterious internal mechanism, this 
benevolent network of  suggestion was able to save a great deal of  people a great 
deal of  pain.  
Things change, however, when post-modern patients appear. A decline in the idea 
of  the doctor as a lionised figure is the result of  both push- and pull-factors. On 
one side, doctors became more and more the agents of  scientific fields; immunolo-
gy, biochemistry and pharmacology were placed above patient and family history 
and the amount of  time spent talking and listening to patient declined as the num-
ber of  diagnostic tests available increased exponentially. In fact, instances of  ‘bed-
 Shorter, E. 1993, p. 299.247
 The biggest exception to this is the large number of  unnecessary surgeries that were 248
performed. 
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side’ medicine became anachronisms, eventually disappearing altogether, as doc-
tors’ spaces became more and more centralised and their time with patients more 
and more limited. The image of  illness and methods of  treatment that were in-
creasingly offered to medical students at this time are those which were described 
at length in Chapter I. They were given ‘a picture of  disease that ignores the 
mind’.  249
On the other side of  these trends are developments among patients themselves in 
the 20th century. The archetype here is an individualist consumer, who has done 
their own research, has self-diagnosed, is sure of  what they want and is unwilling to 
accept anything different from their medical practitioner, who finds themselves 
transformed into a gateway to prescriptions and little else.  This is nothing if  not 250
a caricature, but it aptly demonstrates medicine’s prejudices and fears around this 
period. Lying under the surface is a sense that something had gone awry with both 
the way doctors talks to their patients and the way that patients have come to view 
their doctors. Shorter certainly takes this stance, and argues that it has had direct 
ramifications for the way in which psychosomatic conditions are treated (or, as the 
case may be, not treated).  
What these changes have meant is that big chunks of  the positive suggestive matrix 
established in the modern period were eroded, and replaced by systems of  care 
both less effective and more harmful. The biggest aspect of  this is pharmacology:  
 
‘The problem today is not that patient’s don’t believe in their doctors’ scientific 
qualities. They do: but that scientific status centers almost exclusively on drugs. 
 Shorter, E. 1986, p. 185.249
 This transition in the meaning of  the ‘patient’ from passive receiver of  planned, pa250 -
ternal care to active agent in possession choice happened in the UK and elsewhere from 
the mid to late 20th century: Mold, A. ‘Patient Groups and the Construction of  the Pa-
tient-Consumer in Britain: An Historical Overview’ in The Journal of  Social Policy, 2010, 
Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 505-521 and Mold, A. ‘Making British patients into consumers’ in The 
Lancet, 2015, Vol. 385, No. 9975, pp. 1286-1287.
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The torrent of  effective drugs since the 1940s has given medicine a gleaming, 
high-tech allure. Patients of  today go to the doctor because they must go through 
him to get the drugs that are truly powerful’.  251
 
There is a further element to this. Yes, in the place of  spa treatments, patients want 
specific, targeted drug treatments that mirror approaches to organic disease. But 
what is also different is the necessary uncertainty that accompanies such therapy. 
Trial and error tactics with different medications do little to instil the requisite faith 
in patients that what they are taking will be effective, perhaps summed up by that 
familiar and formulaic sentence ‘we will try you on X, and, if  that doesn’t work 
then we’ll give you a course of  Y’.  Without faith, however naïve, the placebo ef252 -
fect ceases to operate.  
Shorter adds to this the encroachment of  the media into terrain once the sole do-
minion of  medicine. Whereas, in the years of  the modern period, medical authori-
ty would be largely accepted in areas pertaining to medicine, now we witness a sit-
uation where alternate sources of  information, sensationalism and epistemic struc-
tures more favourable to patient prejudices jostle for space alongside scientific 
opinion. As Shorter puts it, ‘what is different…is that the authority of  the mass 
media has started to take precedence over what was once called medical authority. 
The dominant medical paradigms of  our own time fall unheeded in the babble of  
media interviews of  physician-enthusiasts and wrenching accounts of  patients’ suf-
fering’.  253
What we are left with then, is a fairly grim view of  the situation. Patients who 
would perhaps have been helped in the past are now at the mercy of  their condi-
tions thanks to changes in their expectations and an alienating, dehumanising 
 Ibid., p. 92.251
 Known by medics as ‘empiric therapy’.252
 Shorter, E. 1993, p. 314.253
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medical experience. Doctors, as willing to assist as ever, have less time and more of  
the wrong tools to help such individuals. There is a dark irony in Shorter’s thought 
here: it is just at the point when medicine comes true on its promises and begins to 
provide us with genuinely widespread, effective responses to disease that we turn 
back to cynicism and mistrust.  
But while he has provided a fairly credible account of  trends within the doctor-pa-
tient relationship, there is still much that is unexplained or underdetermined. 
He places too much emphasis on the effectiveness of  historical treatments of  psy-
chosomatic illness. Many, many ‘cures’ were just as unable to make people feel bet-
ter as modern treatments, and some, such as unneeded surgeries, institutionalisa-
tion and lengthy rest cures, had significantly worse side-effects than current drug 
courses. Though Shorter himself  details the worse therapeutic excesses listed 
above, he is unable to convincingly reconcile this with his idea of  a time when doc-
tors were far more trusted and therefore possessing both more power of  placebo 
and, to some degree, humanity.  
His excavation of  the 20th century patient is also incomplete. There is little space 
given to the monetisation of  medical systems from the 1950s onwards, the in-
creased education levels of  the populace, the growth of  ‘rights’ culture, scandals 
such as that of  the thalidomide babies or, indeed, any number of  other factors that 
could be brought into play to help further explain and analyse this breakdown in 
trust, which Shorter treats as an unambiguously negative development. The basic 
facts of  this breakdown also remain shakily justified: is it really true that modern 
doctor patient interactions are characterised by a business-like determination on 
the part of  patients and a cold indifference to pastoral medicine by doctors? I think  
the likelihood is that this is a highly exaggerated account of  what are real trends.  
The criticisms just listed notwithstanding, Shorter does provide one final frame-
work through which to understand contested illnesses, making explicit reference to 
chronic fatigue and bringing his work closer to the 21st century. It is on to this, the 
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fourth strand, that we now move.  
 
The postmodern patient  
 
After identifying and breaking down the other aspects of  his thesis, starting with 
the historical continuity of  psychosomatic disease - the sense that ‘people have al-
ways possessed some kind of  implicit model for analysing their internal sensations, 
and the quantity and nature of  sensation have probably been historically change-
less’, the notion of  a ‘symptom pool’ and the three-phase gestation of  the doctor-
patient relationship, Shorter provides us with one further tool with which to dissect 
the conditions that have made up most of  his life’s work.  He suggests that trends 254
at the end of  the last century acted to loosen up traditional social structures and 
cast individuals adrift on a sea of  uncertainty and bodily obsession:  
 
‘At the cultural level, these new patterns come from a distinctively ‘postmodern’ 
disaffiliation with from family life. If  the psychosomatic problems of  the nineteenth 
century resulted from an excess of  intimacy in the familial psychodrama, those of  
the late twentieth century have been the result of  the opposite phenomenon: a 
splintering of  close personal ties and a lack of  intimacy. These changes of  the late 
twentieth century have had the effect of  making people more sensitive to bodily 
signals than ever before and more willing to shift the attribution of  their plight 
from internal demons to external toxins’.  255
 
The argument he is making here is that in the second half  of  the 20th century we, 
in Western societies, transitioned from a view of  the family as a unit worthy of  ul-
timate commitment to a milieu in which the ‘desire for self-actualisation’ takes 
 Ibid., p. 51.254
 Ibid., p. 295.255
!151
precedence.  This is symbolically represented by the salience of  ‘the 256
relationship’ (and the willingness to ‘shop around’ for the best one), at the expense 
of  marriage. Consequences from this shift included a significant decrease in multi-
generational cohabitation to the point of  near-extinction and a marked increase in 
people either living alone or with just one partner.  257
Shorter intimately connects this ‘decline’ in the traditional family unit with two 
processes, each of  which contribute to an increase in psychosomatic behaviour and 
fixed illness belief. The first of  these is the removal of  the checks and balances that 
others in close proximity provide, something he terms ‘feedback loops’, an appella-
tion I will avoid as it might cause confusion with my later discussion of  Hacking’s 
feedback loops, which are different. What Shorter means by these checks and bal-
ances are the normal social dynamics that regulate and reassure us about our 
health, most often provided by others in our immediate environment. When you 
remove the partner and the grandparent who would ordinarily serve as a sounding 
board for health worries and complaints, an individual is left to come to a conclu-
sion by themselves or on the internet. Therein lies the danger, says Shorter, for in 
this individualised, unregulated space obsessive behaviour related to bodily signals 
develops, not helped by a reliance on mass media or patient groups for further in-
formation. Where once there would have been concern but rebuttal, there is now 
exaggeration and scaremongering.  
The second process that Shorter identifies is loneliness. People are now single for 
longer than before, spend more time living on their own and the elderly in particu-
lar are more likely to be socially isolated. This loneliness can breed a discontent 
that feeds directly into the worries presented above, that of  an individual left to 
gauge their own physical state without the appropriate tools to do so, compounded 
 Ibid., p. 320.256
 Though interestingly, this trend has reversed somewhat in the last decade largely due 257
to economic pressures on housing.
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His work is, of  course, already somewhat out of  date. The enormous influence that 
the internet has had over all of  our lives has equally had a large impact on pa-
tients. The way they communicate, the sources from which they gather and dis-
seminate information, the very language in which they structure their experiences - 
all have become both more universal (and thus homogenous) and more rapid. It is 
difficult to gage accurately the ways in which a truly connected world has changed 
the dynamics of  diseases such as those under consideration here.  258
However, Shorter provides us with much more than an antiquated theory. The his-
torical aspect of  his work and the ways in which he brings to bear many different 
factors do provide an answer to the question he sets out to respond to, namely why 
is it that psychosomatic conditions seem so fluid in their presentation over time and 
what is it about our current age that would appear so conducive to their prolifera-
tion as notoriously difficult, often untreatable entities?  In fact, with the exception 259
of  the internet, most of  his ideas can be applied to modern case studies with a little 
extension here and there but no real issue. He has provided us with a sophisticated 
template for understanding certain conditions, one which retains relevance as we 
move through the first quarter of  the 21st century. 
 That being said, the evidence does suggest that in some cases these changes have had 258
positive ramifications for doctor patient relations: Iverson, S. A., Howard, K. B. and Pen-
ney, B. K. ‘Impact of  internet use on health-related behaviours and the patient-physician 
relationship: a survey-based study and review’ in The Journal of  the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation, 2008, Vol. 108, No. 12, pp. 699-711 and Tan, S. S. and Gonnawardene, N. ‘Inter-
net Health Information Seeking and the Patient-Physician Relationship: A Systematic 
Review’ in The Journal of  Medical Internet Research, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 1, e9, DOI: 10.2196/
jmr.5729.
 Note: ‘an’ answer not ‘the’ answer.259
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At the beginning of  this section, I borrowed Hacking’s words and described Short-
er as a ‘highly critical’ theorist. He is precisely that. I am not in the least bit sur-
prised that his work has angered patients of  one stripe or another. Though his tone 
can be sneering and condescending and he oscillates between high scholarship and 
polemic, this is not the most pressing issue. What is of  more concern is his lack of  
interest in getting underneath the skin of  patients and asking why they behave in 
the ways that they do, especially in relation to rejecting psychological causes. He 
recognises the problem, and forensically tracks the various ways that this pattern 
plays out in the 20th century: the refusal of  psychiatric help, the demands for med-
ication, the way that a fixed belief  in organicity repeats itself  over and over in myr-
iad circumstances. What he fails to do is to provide an adequate framework for un-
derstanding this process, beyond basic notions of  personal responsibility and stig-
ma. The effect of  this theoretical sloppiness, especially in light of  the thorough ap-
proach he takes to other aspects of  this work, is to reinforce the notion that these 
patients are not worthy of  the same respect as other sick people, that they are sim-
ply being unreasonable, that they are overly pliable pawns of  their own imagina-
tions and a solicitous but misguided media.  
A better grasp on the metaphysical conceptions of  the patient - how do they see 
themselves and their condition? - what causes them to, apparently so consistently 
and without thought, latch on to biological explanations and reject holistic ap-
proaches? - would allow a more detailed and nuanced attempt at uncovering the 
exact mechanism of  cultural suggestion that Shorter hangs many of  his ideas on. 
Indeed, the experience of  contested disease teaches us that whilst patients’ rela-
tionships with medical authority have changed, their clamour for the legitimacy it 
brings has not lessened. In fact, it is not so much that patients’ have lost faith in 
doctors or in medical science, it is that their conditions fall outside of  the parame-
ters of  biomedicine. If  there was a true and absolute loss of  medical authority, 
then the alternate aetiological models proposed would not latch on so enthusiasti-
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cally to biochemical explanations. The breakdown in trust that is often seen be-
tween doctors and patients in this situation is of  a more convoluted manner than 
simply a case of  behavioural changes on the patient side and a growing indiffer-
ence to holistic care on the other; both groups still operate more or less within the 
same framework, and when conditions emerge that do not fit, the urge of  patients 
is not towards a rejection of  medical authority but towards whatever assimilation 
they can achieve. 
Another unresolved tension in this work is the relationship between the ‘symptom 
pool’ and patients’ subjective feelings. How exactly do trends in scientific under-
standing, popular culture and the doctor-patient relationship translate into people’s 
everyday experience of  their bodies? Put together, Shorter describes these factors 
as forming the ‘climate of  suggestion’. The exact importance of  one or the other at 
any given time will vary, and at certain points one aspect of  this triad will take 
precedence.  
For example, he states that the introduction of  the Babinski test and the use of  
ophthalmic diploscopes strongly discouraged the subconscious production of  
paralysis and achromatopsia; as these conditions became liable to being 
‘disproved’, the body sought new and more difficult to expose forms of  organic 
mimicry. For this to be true, in the strictest sense, a fairly extraordinary level of  
medical and scientific literacy would be required from the population at large. Evi-
dence that might suggest otherwise is lacking, and it unreasonable to believe that 
the proliferation of  relatively niche scientific ideas and technology occurs both 
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quickly and with regularity.  260
As well as this, his specific ideas about the role of  suggestion and symptomatic 
transference from doctors can at times be vague. Whilst he is well versed in the his-
tory of  this, suggesting for example that ‘the story of  Charcot demonstrates the 
enormous capacity of  doctors to frame and shape symptoms which their patients 
then experience’, he is less clear about how this operates under the modern climate 
of  distrust and rejection of  medical authority.  Perhaps we should understand, by 261
implication, that Shorter believes that in modern circumstances the role of  the 
doctor to mould and influence a patient’s symptoms is much reduced.  
Alongside the above is his claims about the media and popular culture. Sympathet-
ic or exaggerated coverage of  a disease, along with a vague description of  symp-
toms, gives individuals what they have been looking for: a box with a scientific 
name in which to place their body’s haywire attempts to communicate with them. 
They now have a research object with its own distinctive traits, something to bring 
with them when they visit their doctor, some loose form of  closure. And, if  they do 
not see the original article or TV show, perhaps a friend or family member did. 
The net for such concepts is cast wide in a media-saturated society. This sounds 
like a fairly neat explanation, but again the question is the same: what exactly is the 
mechanism and why is it so apparently effective? Are these individuals such un-
thinking and alike agents that their digestion of  and response to media reports is so 
simple-minded? As we shall see in the final chapter, the experience of  patients on 
 Although there are issues with using science literacy surveys, they consistently present 260
an image of  populations that either misunderstand or are ignorant of  fairly basic scientif-
ic concepts. A relatively recent survey in America, aiming to discover how much effect a 
college education had on science literacy, concluded ‘It appears that high school educa-
tion and students’ exposure to media and popular culture convey a basic knowledge of  
science, although it is piecemeal and barely adequate’, see Impey, C., Buxner, S., Antonel-
lis, J., Johnson, E. and King, C. ‘A Twenty-Year Survey of  Science Literacy Among Col-
lege Undergraduates’ in The Journal of  College Science Teaching, 2011, Vol. 40, No. 4, p. 37.
 Shorter, E. 1993, p. 166.261
!156




There is a significant amount of  overlap between Edward Shorter and Elaine 
Showalter’s work, so this section will be reasonably brief  as I only intend to discuss 
elements of  her research which challenge or expand his ideas. Like him, she be-
lieves that many contentious conditions that populate the modern medical exist on 
a historical continuity with the unhappy women of  the Salpêtrière.  And, like 262
him, she believes that medical authority has been eroded to the point of  dysfunc-
tion and that various public institutions contribute to the creation and perpetua-
tion of  illness. However, she is not just a medical historian but also a literary critic, 
and her analysis barely takes a step in any direction without recourse to language 
and narrative. A point she powerfully and repeatedly makes is that words and sto-
ries shepherd us through our experiences, making sense of  them whilst simultane-
ously making them make sense by smoothing rough edges and incongruities into well 
worn, recognised archetypes. As she says, ‘literature spreads hysteria, but it can 
also help us understand it’.  263
Her work in this area is more refined than Shorter’s, and presents us with a few an-
swers to the questions I posed immediately above. From her approach we can see 
more clearly how a symptom pool might come to be assembled and disseminated, 
and what cultural conditions might contribute to what she has, somewhat hyper-
bolically, termed ‘contemporary hysterical epidemics’. She also claims that specific 
aspects of  modern culture mean that ‘hysteria’ is more ‘contagious’ and spreads 
 ‘Hysteria has not died. It has simply been relabelled for a new era’ - Showalter, E. 262
1997, p. 4 – an opinion about which Hacking says ‘Showalter is…profoundly right in say-
ing hysteria is not dead’ in Hacking, I. 2002, p. 89.
 Shorter, E. 1997, p. 99.263
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There are, she claims, three ingredients necessary for a modern incarnation of  hys-
teria to take shape and proliferate.  These are: sympathetic and involved physi264 -
cians and enthusiasts, disaffected and isolated patients, and a surrounding cultural 
environment that is conductive to spreading and maintaining false illness beliefs. 
The first step is for a doctor, scientist or some other person in a position of  authori-
ty to define, name and publicise a new disorder. This acts as a catalyst for patients 
looking for a diagnostic label and for some explanation as to what they are feeling. 
‘The most influential doctors’, she writes, ‘are…theorists who offer a unified field 
theory of  a vague syndrome, providing a clear and coherent explanation for its 
many confusing symptoms’.  As doctors ‘recruit’ more patients to their diagnosis, 265
so it is that news of  the disease is spread through increased press attention. Even-
tually, through film and television, novels and plays, self-help books and BBQs with 
your neighbours, the modes of  expressing one particular condition or another be-
come familiar - symptoms and stories congeal and solidify, then appear to provide 
evidence by their very consistency. All of  this takes place against a social back-
ground which may be more or less disposed to a certain illness at any specific time. 
According to Showalter, the 1990s in America represented a particularly fertile soil 
in which for hysteria to grow: technological advances in telecommunications, the 
birth of  the internet, an increasingly pervasive, increasingly confessional mass me-
dia - all these intersect with the ‘more generalised paranoias, religious revivals, and 
 Sketch largely taken from Ibid., 1997, pp. 17-18.264
 Ibid., 1997, p. 17.265
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conspiracy theories that have always characterised American life’.  266
Although her appraisal is not without mistakes - most glaringly adopting a one-
size-fits-all approach to what are quite clearly different phenomena (she conflates 
the causal origins of  chronic fatigue syndrome, satanic ritual abuse, multiple per-
sonality syndrome and alien abduction almost unthinkingly, for example) - she does 
make some genuinely interesting points about how the process of  cultural transfer-
ence of  symptoms might occur.  What is most innovative about her characterisa267 -
tion of  this mechanism is the emphasis she places on literary devices being played 
out in real life. As she says:  
 
‘Above all, hysteria tells a story, and specialists in understanding and interpreting 
stories know ways to read it. As hysteria has moved from the clinic to the library, 
from the case study to the novel, from bodies to books, from page to stage and 
screen, it has developed its own prototypes, archetypes and plots. Many of  these 
motifs are adapted from myth, popular culture, folklore, media reports, and litera-
ture’.  268
 
What this leads to, she suggests, is a remarkable convergence of  both form and 
content. Individuals begin to experience their symptoms in the same way and talk 
about it using the same terminology. Interestingly, she also claims that this symme-
try extends to developments in the disease; if  the condition changes in some form, 
then the changes experienced are likely to be consistent among patients as they re-
act subconsciously to alterations in their socio-medical environment. As stories of  
 Ibid., 1997, p. 5.266
 A criticism Simon Wessely echoes: Larkin, M. 1998. I would agree with Perring when 267
he says, in response to Showalter’s sensationalism and generalisation, that we should in-
stead follow ‘the humdrum option of  taking the middle way, going case by case, and being 
cautious’ in Perring, C. ‘Review - Hystories’ in Metapsychology, 1997, Vol. 1, No. 27.
 Showalter, E. 1997, p. 6.268
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illness are told and retold, they become concurrently more well-known, more simi-
lar and more legitimate by their repetition. ‘Patients learn about diseases from the 
media’, she writes, ‘unconsciously develop the symptoms, and then attract media 
attention in an endless cycle. The human imagination is not infinite, and we are all 
bombarded by these plot lines every day. Inevitably, we live out the social stories of  
our time’.   269
But there is a further aspect to this. It is not simply the case that these templates 
always develop organically or in a linear fashion. On occasion they appear entirely 
deliberate, created and disseminated by professionals, self-help authors, horoscope 
writers and patient groups themselves. I do not mean that a group of  individuals 
set out to ‘create’ a disease, but rather that their actions are focused around the 
things which spread narrative information about a condition, rather than this be-
ing an unintended side effect of  some other process. And thus it is that disorders 
become personalised into prototypes, vague enough to apply to a wide number of  
cases, specific enough to contain heuristic qualities for readers, viewers and listen-
ers, which they use to solidify their conceptual understanding of  the disease.  
To show how these various ideas of  cultural support and prototype development 
interact in an actual disorder, I will borrow Showalter’s convincing example of  
anorexia from the mid-20th century onwards.  Firstly, the surrounding culture in 270
America at that time was broadly sympathetic to the development of  such a condi-
tion. Aesthetic demands were placed on the female body like never before, an ideal 
body type projected across magazine stalls, billboards and cinema screens. Adoles-
cent girls were the vulnerable group most likely to be affected by these new obses-
sions with thinness, weight-loss, beauty and exercise. They ate up the popular cul-
ture of  the 1960s onwards and internalised the messages about beauty and happi-
ness it conveyed. Then, an articulate and well-known authority figure, Hilde 
 Ibid., 1997, p. 6.269
 Ibid., 1997, pp. 20-21.270
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Bruch, provided a coherent theoretical framework for anorexia, and through two 
widely read books popularised her ideas and inserted the basic ‘facts’ about the ill-
ness into the public consciousness. Not only this, but these works outlined what was 
to become the prototypes of  the disease - the quiet, obedient sorts of  girls it affect-
ed most, the identification of  mother-daughter dynamic as especially important, 
the rejection of  natural sexual maturation as a symbolic cause. This information 
was then replicated in one form or another and circulated through news reports, 
teen magazines, TV, movies and best-selling novels. After this came celebrity con-
fessions and anorexia autobiographies, as well as a large amount of  young adult 
fiction which tended to vary little in basic plot. Alongside these developments ar-
rived the ‘social life’ of  anorexia, the group counselling sessions, peer-support 
groups and its assimilation into parts of  the feminist movement. It is certainly a 
compelling picture.   271
What I think we can take away from this, in conjunction with Shorter's work, is the 
multitude of  obvious and subtle ways that our cultural surroundings structure how 
we interpret reality. It seems convincing to me that over time an individual might 
take on board certain pieces of  narrative information about a disease and generate 
from that a series of  subconscious expectations and ways of  ordering experience 
that accords with what they have seen, heard or read. This is, I suspect, especially 
true if  the condition is widely known and well publicised. To reach for an obvious 
example, the narrative connotations of  cancer are so familiar and the semantics by 
now so well elucidated that it seems a cheap comparison to make. If  anything, the 
proliferation of  cancer prototypes is so high that we might reasonably make the 
case that there is space for more variety and less convergence, due simply to the 
vast quantity of  material.  
 Though quite clearly not the full picture - who were the anorexics that must have ex271 -
isted in order for Bruch to write about them? - how can hearing about other anorexics on 
the radio make you one yourself ? These are the sorts of  questions that Hacking addresses 
in detail, so I will leave them for later in the chapter.
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Another point which Showalter makes that should be considered is the role of  fear 
in gestating hysteria. It is an underlying symbolic theme which runs through her 
work: where there is an outside force that creates unrest, there are people being 
made ill by it or understanding their disquiet in opposition to it. As Hacking states, 
‘Showalter demonstrates how our recent hysterias have one thing in common, a 
tormented fear of  some evil other, from outer space, or from the depths of  the 
soul, or from federal agents, or from the vicious patriarch, or from poisonous gas 
cocktails in the desert’.  272
But the conditions that concern us are at the other end of  this scale from cancer 
and often conspiracy or outright paranoia for the most part represents a last resort 
and a fringe interest within the patient community. What we will see in the final 
chapter is that for many people, their first encounter with fibromyalgia or some 
other contested illness was not through a book or a TV show or some other media, 
but rather came through a reluctant doctor after months or years of  diagnostic un-
certainty. And even then, the information they were offered was hardly enough to 
construct an elaborate and consistent narrative identity. So the question here then 
is one of  degree: in less well-known, less publicised cases, is there less of  a proto-
typical tendency? Showalter would argue that the immense intertextuality of  expe-
rience in contemporary society means that, whether we realise it or not, there are 
always narratives to act out or react against. She would also make the point that 
with conditions like chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia knowledge is wide-
ly disseminated, regardless of  what patients’ claim. This is something I will return 
to in the final chapter. 
Showalter makes one further point which I will quickly address. Writing in 1996, 
she makes explicit links between the surrounding political culture and the rate at 
which new conditions appear, expand in patient numbers and plays out. She 
claims that at the end of  the 20th century a climate of  political paranoia, anti-es-
 Hacking, I. 2002, p. 89.272
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tablishment feeling, millennialism and developments within the feminist movement 
(pejoratively labeled ‘victim feminism’) contributed decisively to the growth in 
numbers of  people either being diagnosed or self-diagnosing themselves with new 
conditions. Though the western world has changed since then, we must ask about 
what ingredients we find in contemporary society that might likewise create an en-
vironment conducive to the sort of  processes Showalter and Shorter describe. 
Where does medical authority stand now? To what extent does an individual privi-
lege their own ability to generate knowledge about themselves over what others, 
professional and otherwise, tell them? What narratives are available, which are 
chosen and why? Are there patterns? The individual thinker who has done more 
than any other to bring these questions into focus and provide a theoretical frame-
work for understanding them is Ian Hacking. The final section of  this chapter will 




A minor motif  in Saul Bellow’s Humboldt’s Gift is the protagonist Charlie Citrine’s 
internal reflections on a beaver colony he visits whilst camping with his children. 
Next to the lake where the animals live, the Park Service put up a series of  bill-
boards which described and categorised the habits, activities and various natural 
cycles of  the beavers. What strikes Citrine as profound is that ‘the beavers didn’t 
know a damn thing about this. They just went on chewing and swimming and be-
ing beavers’. This, he supposes, is the exact opposite of  what happens when order 
is given to people: ‘we human beavers are all shook up by descriptions of  ourselves. 
It affects us to hear what we hear. From Kinsey or Masters or Eriksen. We read 
about identity crisis, alienation, etcetera, and it all affects us’.  
In other words, the study and theorising about a society alters those within it. 
When we are grouped or organised according to some principle or other, we react 
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to that grouping: we are happy or sad to see ourselves or be in seen in this or that 
way, we change. Citrine completes this observation by wishing that we could be 
more like the beavers, indifferent to whatever name or description is given to us.   273
In a less prosaic way, Ian Hacking concerned himself  with this ‘beaver problem’ 
for the best part of  thirty years. What he set about trying to understand is the way 
in which classifying individuals acts upon those individuals, changes them as ob-
jects of  knowledge and thus leads to a further change in classification as part of  an 
ongoing process. This topic, detailed in a series of  books and papers, has been 
termed his ‘Making Up People’ project. As he says, ‘it is about how a causal under-
standing, if  known by those who are understood, can change their character, can 
change the kind of  people they are that can lead to a change in the causal under-
standing itself ’.   274
This project has multiple aspects and asks more than the simple questions I have 
outlined above. Roughly speaking, Hacking does not just want to know how it is 
that categories affect those within them or future categories. He would also like to 
know how we can ourselves make use of  this mechanism, and how it might influ-
ence the appearance or disappearance of  what he has termed ‘Transient Mental 
Illnesses’ - those which seem to arise at a specific place and time and then for some 
reason fade away from public and medical consciousness. Furthermore, he wants 
to draw connections between questions of  memory, questions of  the self  and ques-
tions of  category; in other words, how is it that categorising objects of  knowledge 
fundamentally alters the way individuals not only structure their experiences but 
 Citrine’s position in the novel is actually slightly more complicated than this, especially 273
as it refers to residents of  Chicago and German systems of  classification. See Heidsieck, 
A. ‘Bellow, Styron, Roth: representation of  anti-Semitism and its relationship to German 
cultural history in Jewish and non-Jewish American novels’ in Bogdal, K. M., Holz, K. 
and Lorenz, M. Literarischer Antisemitismus nach Auschwitz, 2007, Metzler, Germany, 2007.
 Hacking, I. ‘The Looping Effects of  Human Kinds’ in Sperber, D., Premack, D. and 274
Premack, A. J. (eds.) Causal cognition: a multi-disciplinary debate, 1996, The Claridon Press, 
UK, p. 351.
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also the way they remember their lives and thus the very person that they believe 
themselves to be? - and, ultimately, can we use this information to change people’s 
lives, to make them happier?  
 
A multitude of  kinds  
 
One of  the philosophical traditions in which Hacking situates his work is nominal-
ism, or the naming of  things. He argues that alongside natural kinds - that is, 
names for groupings that occur in the real world - we can place human kinds, which 
are categories that emerge from the social sciences. In his later work, Hacking 
dropped the ‘human’ and replaced it with ‘interactive’ and likewise refrained from 
talking of  ‘natural’ kinds in favour of  ‘indifferent’ ones, so I will use this terminol-
ogy from here on in.  
Without wanting to dredge through centuries of  philosophy on the topic of  natural 
kinds, it is enough to briefly describe the sort of  object of  knowledge that Hacking 
has in mind when he talks of  ‘indifferent’ ones.  What he means when he dis275 -
cusses such things are sets that exist (or indeed, simply may exist) in nature and 
which we have sought organised, scientific knowledge about. Some examples might 
be canonical, like the chemical elements, some fashionable (in the 90s when Hack-
ing was writing), like quarks and some simply mundane, like a certain type of  corn 
or particular species of  tree. Hacking’s realism is fairly broad, but this is not what is 
interesting. What matters to us here is not whether these objects exist or corre-
spond to some actual reality, but that they are examined, grouped and studied yet 
remain unchanged by that process. 
 For a good discussion of  natural kinds, see Dupré, J. The Disorder of  Things: Metaphysical 275
Foundations of  the Disunity of  Science, 1995, Harvard University Press, USA; for Hacking on 
natural kinds, see Hacking, I. ‘A tradition of  natural kinds’ in Philosophical Studies, 1991, 
Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 109-126.
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Interactive kinds are, on the other hand, types of  people that are conceptualised 
and ordered according to some agenda or other.  Where indifferent kinds are the 276
preserve of  physics, chemistry, biology and all their innumerate subsidiaries, inter-
active kinds begin life in the ‘marginal, insecure, but immensely powerful’ social 
sciences.  Hacking outlines them as follows:  277
 
‘By [interactive] kinds I mean kinds about which we would like to have systematic, 
general, and accurate knowledge; classifications that could be used to formulate 
general truths about people; generalisations sufficiently strong that they seem like 
laws about people, their actions, or their sentiments. We want laws precise enough 
to predict what individuals will do, or how they will respond to attempts to help 
them or to modify their behaviour’.  278
 
Some examples of  this would include women refugees, children with autism, peo-
ple who commit suicide, alcoholics, multiple personality disorder sufferers and 
communists. Hacking sketches out four criteria in order to show what might quali-
fy as a human kind. Firstly, he is thinking of  kinds that are relevant to some people, 
that apply to some portion of  the population. Secondly, these kinds must in the 
first instance organise individuals, their actions, their habits and behaviour. Third-
ly, they should be kinds which are studied in the human and social science, group-
ings about which it has been deemed interesting or important to gain knowledge. 
Finally, Hacking adds clarity by saying that ‘kinds of  people are paramount’.  279
What he means by this is that only when the study of  people transforms into our 
 ‘Agenda’ in this context does not, so to speak, have an agenda. I mean it merely to in276 -
dicate that there must be some motivation present, nefarious or benevolent, in order to 
create a category of  people.
 Hacking, I. 1996, p. 352.277
 Ibid.278
 Ibid., p. 354.279
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idea of  that sort of  person does it become a human kind. If  I research a certain set 
of  individuals but that research does not produce any typological knowledge about 
their behaviour, their experiences, the casual links between their past and present 
surroundings and the way they ‘appear’ in the world, then I have not contributed 
to making a human kind.  
As is immediately obvious, the variety of  interactive kinds present in a particular 
society at any one time is immense.  Some are too mundane to waste much 280
thought over, such as perhaps (though maybe not historically) ‘left-handed people’, 
and, though qualifying as interactive kinds, the truths produced by our knowing 
about them will indeed be so general that there seems little point in pursuing them 
without qualification or some specificity. There does exist however, apart from 
these instances, an enormous number of  what we might term useful interactive 
kinds. These are groupings on which we might want and hope to have an effect 
upon through understanding the nature of  the effect of  categorisation and the 
many tributaries which contribute to its general flow. They tend to be narrow 
enough to produce semi-solid truths about which we can talk with a degree of  cer-
tainty not granted to those broader, more ambiguous groupings. It is these sets that 
Hacking is most interested in. They form the interactive kinds that he uses as ex-
amples and the groupings he thinks the most worthy of  analysis.  
The way in which he has separated these interactive kinds from indifferent kinds is 
contested. At its most fundamental, he distinguishes them by saying that the act of  
categorising an indifferent kind does not alter it, whereas placing an external theo-
retical structure upon an interactive kind does. As he states: 
 Though Hacking is at pains to note that his ideas apply only to his society - ‘My cul280 -
ture is my culture and none other’ - in Hacking, I. 1996, p. 351; and require an in-
frastructure of  study - ‘All classifications that stick exist only within practices and institu-
tions’ – in Hacking, I. ‘Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: between discourse 
in the abstract and face-to-face interaction’ in Economy and Society, 2004, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 
285.
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‘Inanimate things are, by definition, not aware of  themselves…Take the extremes, 
women refugees and quarks. A woman refugee may learn that she is a type of  per-
son and act accordingly. Quarks do not learn they are a certain type of  entity and 
act accordingly…The idea of  quarks does not interact with quarks. Quarks are not 
aware that they are quarks and are not altered simply by being classified as quarks. 
There are plenty of  questions about this distinction, but it is basic’.  281
 
I take this to mean that self-consciousness is one of  the key distinctions between 
the two sorts of  kinds that are being described. For my purposes this kind of  
rough-and-ready delineator is adequate, though critical responses have been forth-
coming and will be outlined later in this chapter. I would however largely agree 
that ‘naming’ something has a different effect on that thing depending on whether 
or not it is able to absorb, reject or otherwise react to its ‘naming’.  
A second way in which interactive kinds are said to be removed from indifferent 
ones is their dynamic nature. Not only does placing a person within a certain 
grouping, about which we suppose we have knowledge, change them, it also leads 
to an alteration of  the grouping itself, because its subject entities have now shifted 
and become something else. This means that when we create an interactive kind 
what we have produced is a moving target. Dynamic nominalism, as this is known, 
is ‘the belief  that systems for classifying people created by society may affect what 
people do, which may in turn affect our knowledge of  them’.  282
If  Hacking is hyper-aware of  anything, it is that none of  his rules will apply in all 
circumstances. This is especially evident when he says that no interactive kind will 
operate in precisely the same way, but even of  the above distinctions he is reluctant 
 Hacking, I. The Social Construction of  What?, 1999, Harvard University Press, USA, p. 281
32.
 Schmaus, W. ‘Sociology and Hacking’s Trousers’ in PSA: Proceedings of  the Biennial Meet282 -
ing of  the Philosophy of  Science Association, 1992, No. 1, p. 169.
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to be dogmatic. He splits up types of  interactive kinds and produces sub-theories 
for each, some of  which contradict his more general thoughts on how to tell one 
kind (interactive or indifferent) from another.  
For example, he recognises that in some cases the individual does not themselves 
need to be aware of  a classification which applies to them. It is enough in these in-
stances for the surrounding social environment of  the person to be influenced. An 
example he uses to illustrate this – a type of  interactive kind he terms inaccessible 
– is autistic children. These types of  people are ‘human beings who cannot under-
stand’ and for whom there ‘cannot be self-conscious feedback’.  However, what 283
does possess self-consciousness is the ‘larger human unit’ that the autistic child is 
situated in, and this can change depending on what knowledge is produced about 
the individual in the centre. Thus, as causal understandings change over time (from 
feeble-mindedness to childhood schizophrenia to refrigerator mothers to theories 
of  mind etc.), the immediate social and institutional environment of  the person so-
described is altered. Individuals may also fall in and out of  classification depending 
on such alterations. 
This type of  kind is important because it appears to challenge Hacking’s founda-
tional distinction of  self-consciousness, but he does not take it to be a critical flaw. 
Rather, by expanding the unit of  classification beyond the individual to their im-
mediate social surroundings, he thinks he is purporting a broader self-conscious-
ness and making the same point – organising a set of  qualities and attributing 
them to a group of  people changes both the people and the group – about autistic 
children as about any other interactive kind.  
Inaccessible kinds are not the only subdivisions of  interactive kinds that Hacking 
outlines. He also includes administrative, second-order, biologised and self-ascrip-
 Hacking, I. 1996, p. 374.283
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tive kinds in his analysis.  It is the last two of  these which I think are of  most rel284 -
evance here, and which I would like to discuss.  
‘Biologised’ kinds represent for Hacking one of  the most important and powerful 
trends in scientific and social thought at the end of  the 20th century: the move to-
wards finding genetic or neurological explanations for behaviour that was previous-
ly explained as social or environmental.  What we find with biologised kinds is 285
that they have a tendency to possess an amorality or absolve responsibility for cer-
tain actions. A kind of  people whose causal matrixes are formed at birth are differ-
ent from a kind who decide to do something, based on some other reason and influ-
enced by other factors.  
This can lead to an interesting tension between competing frameworks which both 
claim to explain the same phenomena. Hacking gives the example of  alcoholism, 
where one framework – Alcoholics Anonymous – produces knowledge about alco-
holics which is explicitly moralistic and thus creates a different kind of  person than 
that produced by a biologised explanation which ‘blames’ genetic inclination to-
wards addiction. Which kind becomes dominant depends on the social context in 
which the kind is expressed; which kind fits in most with people’s preconceived, ex-
isting ideas of  that sort of  behaviour?- who speaks from the position of  most au-
thority when defining the kind?- which kind aligns most with other trends present?- 
 Briefly, the first two kinds not discussed at length are as follows (bear in mind there is 284
significant overlap between them and the others). Administrative: kinds created by the 
categorisation of  people into administrative entities, i.e. the interaction between census 
criteria and those who fall within census criteria (‘Hispanic’ is given as a good example). 
Second-order: these are kinds derived from a primary concept, the most prominent being 
normality. Once you have an established ‘norm’ in relation to whatever it may be, devia-
tions from this produce ‘abnormal’ kinds, the interactive axis being between individuals 
perceptions of  themselves and their perception of  what it is to be ‘normal’, alongside an 
evaluative element that judges how much this matters, whether it is positive etc.
 Hacking does point out that this is in some sense a rerun of  previous research pro285 -
grammes from before WWII and in the 19th century, but what is different here is both the 
sophistication of  the tools and the lack of  an specific ideological driver beyond reduction-
ism and moral exculpation for all within the kind (rather than, say, a specific race).
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which kind of  kind do people most want to be? In many cases there is no ‘winner’ 
so to speak, and different kinds have precedence in different situations.  
When he talks about ‘self-ascriptive’ kinds, what he is referring to is an inversion of  
the traditional way in which interactive kinds operate and have operated. Roughly 
speaking, pre-1950 (according to Hacking), the two axes of  the social science – a 
positivist aping of  natural science methods and interpretations of  causation and 
the bureaucratic-statistical mass collection of  data – combined to loosely create be-
tween them the knowledge and the known. Speaking from the point of  view of  ex-
perts, be it census collectors, sociologists, psychiatrists or whomever, ‘‘we’ know 
about ‘them’’.  That is to say, there is a one-directional model of  knowledge pro286 -
duction. The known-about remain passive and do not contribute to the creation of  
knowledge about themselves, except in a subconscious manner. What we have seen 
since then, says Hacking, is the explosion of  a different sort of  process, whereby 
the ‘known may overpower the knowers’.  This inversion is even more marked 287
now than when Hacking was writing, with identity narratives prevalent across the 
western world which prioritise and valorise self-identification.  
This is where the objects of  knowledge themselves lay claim to the epistemic 
process, and begin opting in or out of  a category, generating and disseminating 
new information and generally challenging the moral scaffolding of  the grouping. 
What is different about these ‘self-ascriptive’ kinds is that the motivation behind 
‘reclaiming’ or ‘reframing’ the interactive kind is almost universally attempted in 
order to benefit those under description. Classifications can affect the way we eval-
uate our personal worth, and frequently they represent straightforwardly moral 
distinctions. Because of  this, it can be greatly in the interest of  an individual to try 
and deliberately shift the grouping they believe they are a part of  towards some-
thing that allows them and others like them more self-respect and emotional con-
 Ibid., p. 381.286
 Ibid., p. 359.287
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tentment, as well as better treatment by others and by institutions whose actions in 
relation to them are directly organised on the basis of  their category.  
The canonical example in this respect is homosexuality, which during the last hun-
dred years or so has gone in the west from a top-down, (pejorative) medical de-
scription of  behaviour to a contested psychiatric diagnosis to a ‘lifestyle choice’ to a 
relatively accepted, in some places, way of  biologically being, with many stops and 
reversals in between. What is key to this process is the way in which the ‘known’, 
homosexuals, fought with the ‘knowers’ over the category that came to a greater or 
less extent to define them, and to some degree gained control of  the agenda.  
These two types of  interactive kind often intersect. This is because, not-
withstanding famous exceptions such as Alcoholics Anonymous, self-ascribing 
kinds push towards biologising as a way of  creating a more positive, less stigma-
tised kind to belong to. This process occurs in virtually any kind in which those in-
volved both feel they are held responsible for their (negative) actions by some por-
tion of  society and that their moral condition could be alleviated by pursuing a bi-
ological explanation.  
To bring this discussion full circle, it is the presence of  a moral dimension which is 
the final substantive wedge between indifferent and interactive kinds. Interactive 
kinds are imbued with intrinsic normative qualities in a way that indifferent kinds 
are not. To put it starkly: ‘caked mud and polarized electrons may be good or bad 
depending on what you want to do with them, but child abuse is bad and multiple 
personality is a disorder to be healed’.  288
Hacking is aware that this approach does not accurately outline all of  the various 
links between institutions and the types of  people they describe, or indeed the form 
that those many variations might take. What I believe he is articulating is a belief  
in the plurality of  interactive kinds but also a conviction that this plurality is trivial. 
 Ibid., p. 366.288
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Every interactive kind will be different in some way, both from those around it and 
those that came before, but like Wittegenstein’s famous family resemblances, each 
will have similarities with some others and the overlapping mesh will grant us 
enough similarity to speak with relevance about them as a group. It is not just re-
garding interactive kinds that Hacking is a pluralist, but also about the looping effect 
of  interactive kinds, a conceptual innovation which we will now examine.  
The looping effect of  interactive kinds  
 
As outlined above, the most fundamental differences between indifferent and in-
teractive kinds are the self-consciousness, moral content and dynamism of  the lat-
ter.  The mechanism by which these special features affect the categorisation it289 -
self  and generate a ‘moving target’ has been termed ‘the looping effect’ and is key 
to understanding how producing new knowledge about people causes them to be-
come different and thus our understanding of  them to change in an ongoing 
process.   
Essentially, when a category of  people is delineated from society on the whole, and 
knowledge is created and disseminated, institutionally, instrumentally or in some 
other manner, the individuals in question react. This reaction appears under many 
guises and is never exactly the same across different kinds. However, in all cases it 
creates a type of  person who is different from that originally under study, with new 
causal truths and new typologies. Thus the original category is now no longer iso-
morphic with the object of  study, and so must itself  change to catch up, assimilat-
ing or rejecting the new knowledge in the same way that the individuals did in the 
first place. This unfolding and permanently unfinished relationship is what Hack-
 It is worth noting that at one point Hacking does argue that something can be both an 289
indifferent kind and an interactive one, which seemingly contradicts most of  what he 
writes elsewhere. See Hacking, I. 1999, pp. 108-124.
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ing calls the ‘looping effect’.  
His best and most extensive example of  this is multiple personality disorder, now 
called dissociative identity disorder, which he chronicled in Rewriting the Soul. In this 
work he outlined two main processes. Firstly, he showed how memory came to be 
medicalised as a surrogate, secular soul and how trends in the study of  hypnotism, 
fugue, sleepwalking, hysteria and epilepsy shaped this. Secondly, he demonstrated 
how similar issues of  memory and the self  played out in a completely different 
arena: multiple personality disorder (MPD) in 1980s America.  
His account, simplified, goes like this.  From the first (modern) diagnosis, a proto290 -
type ‘multiple’ is produced and some knowledge about them is distributed. Then, 
as more psychiatrists become aware of  the diagnostic category, more patients begin 
to appear and attract press attention. Furthermore, the category itself  begins to 
move, or ‘wander’. Where once it was a condition that typically presented in pa-
tients as a splitting of  personality into one or two ‘alters’ (that is, alternate person-
alities), soon patients were appearing with more and more, hundreds even. Being 
abused as a child is identified as a key causal link to adulthood MPD and this be-
comes a well-known ‘fact’ about the condition. Patients who do not recall being 
abused are encouraged to search their memory and in some cases false memories 
are recalled, with all the family-splitting acrimony that inevitably arises from incor-
rect accusations. Journals are started about the condition, conferences are organ-
ised and all the while patient numbers grow and grow. There is a backlash: the 
False Memory Syndrome Foundation is formed to combat misremembered or en-
tirely untrue allegations of  sexual abuse made by patients against family members 
whilst some psychiatrists begin to embark on treatment programmes contrary to 
orthodoxy.  
What we witness here, says Hacking, is the complicated interplay between individ-
uals, institutions and the knowledge that flows from one pole to the other. Narra-
 Hacking, I. 2002.290
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tive similarity in patients becomes regarded as evidence for this or that law-like 
regularity, which in turn suggests to patients that this is a way of  structuring their 
experience. Morality flickers in the background at all stages, steering decisions 
made by professionals and those caught up in it all, the families and friends of  pa-
tients. Those themselves who sit at the centre of  the whole thing, the individuals in 
the group, being told what it is they have by different sources, begin to see them-
selves as someone new, someone different from before. In doing so, says Hacking, 
they also become something different from before, an original type of  person:  
 
‘We think of  many kinds of  people as objects of  scientific enquiry [and] we think 
of  these kinds of  people as given, as definite classes defined by definite properties. 
As we get to know more about these properties, we will be able to control, to help, 
to change, or to emulate them better. But it is not quite like that. They are moving 
targets because our investigations interact with the targets themselves and change 
them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of  people as 
before. The target has moved. That is the looping effect. Sometimes our sciences 
create kinds of  people that in a certain sense did not exist before. That is making 
up people’.  291
 
It is this last point which is the most profound that Hacking makes, and which is 
vital to understanding the whole enterprise. When he speaks of  ‘making up 
people’, what he is referring to is not just a process whereby people evolve. He is 
articulating something different: categorising people creates not just a modified 
version of  that group but whole new people, people that didn’t and couldn’t have 
existed before.  The restructuring of  experience which comes with new cate292 -
 Hacking, I. ‘Kinds of  People: Moving Targets’, The Tenth British Academy Lecture, 2006.291
 I mean this in a metaphysical sense: the components of  selfhood necessary to view 292
yourself  in a certain manner, to understand and, more viscerally, process new experiences, 
did not exist previously, and therefore being this sort of  person was not an option.
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gories and creates new, distinct selfhoods is the final piece of  the puzzle required to 
understand Hacking’s interactive kinds.  
It is banal to state that as we gain knowledge about the world we begin to organise 
our experience of  it differently. Understandings of  the external world and who we 
are as people lead us to interpret situations and phenomena in ever unfolding 
ways. To use some archetypes, a writer may find that they can no longer enjoy the 
simple pleasures of  watching a sunset without the internal compulsion to translate 
it into prose, the art lover may become unable to hear of  an event without pictur-
ing the scene in the manner of  a corresponding masterpiece and the economist 
might find themselves frequently conceptualising events according to pieces of  fi-
nancial theory. These restructurings of  experience are constant and multifarious: 
the first time I drove on the motorway at night, for example, I was viscerally re-
minded of  racing games I used to play as a child on the PlayStation, that previous 
embedded experience informing how my mind processed sensory information in 
the present.  293
How Hacking makes use of  this idea is far more significant however. He says that 
new categories of  people, new interactive kinds, give individuals unanticipated and 
unpredictable tools with which to understand their pasts. So it is that with the rise 
of  ‘child abuse’ as an interactive kind, people began more and more to view them-
selves as abused and to slot into that kind. They restructured their past experiences 
in light of  current knowledge, and so what was viewed as one thing became anoth-
er. This is important because for Hacking memory is key in modern western soci-
eties to understanding the construction of  self.  Memory makes us who we are, 294
 A character in the Jean Thompson short story Applause, Applause puts it like this: ‘…this 293
heightened self-awareness was a sign of  strain. As if  he couldn’t really escape his work or 
the persona that went with it. The Artist’s impressions of  a walk in the woods. The 
Artist’s view on viewing. The Artist on Art…One ended, of  course, by losing all spontane-
ity. You saw people as characters, sunsets as an excuse for smilies…’
 I mean construction in the strict sense here, i.e. of  composite parts, rather than ‘social’ 294
construction.
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and if  our memory changes, then we become a new type of  person.  
This process is described as follows:  
 
‘New meanings change the past. It is reinterpreted, yes, but more than that, it is 
reorganised, repopulated. It becomes filled with new actions, new intentions, new 
events that caused us to be as we are. I have to discuss not only making up people 
but making up ourselves by reworking our memories’.  295
More specifically, regarding MPD, Hacking states that: 
‘A certain picture of  origins is imported to disturbed and unhappy people, who 
then use it to reorder or reorganise their conception of  their past. It becomes their 
past. I am not saying their past is directly created by doctors. I am saying that this 
picture becomes disseminated as a way of  thinking of  what it was like to be a child 
and to grow up. There is no canonical way to think of  our own past. In the endless 
quest for order and structure, we grasp at whatever picture is floating by and put 
our past into its frame’.  296
Though I would take issue with the ambiguity of  his final sentence, on the basis 
that some ‘pictures’ are more convenient for our mental and moral well-being than 
others and therefore more likely to be chosen, I think he makes an important point 
about categories, memory and self-conception. Only when we appreciate that 
knowledge production about a set of  people can deeply, fundamentally alter the 
way they are can we see the true power of  the looping effect.  
This restructuring does not of  course only extend backwards. New categories also 
 Hacking, I. 2002, p. 6.295
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create new possibilities for understanding experience extending into the future, and 
more dramatically, for new actions. To use a current example, the proliferation of  
a certain type of  pornography (misogynist, violent, demeaning to women) since the 
1990s and especially following its widespread and inexpensive distribution on the 
internet has probably had an effect on the way that many individuals conceptualise 
‘normal’ sexual relations, even if  that effect is not mimicry but more a subtle shift 
in expectation. Further to this internal reclassification, it has produced prototypical 
sexual experiences and normalised what were most likely to be in the past relative-
ly rare sexual events. In many cases, it is simply that individuals had fewer modes 
of  action from which to choose from previously, and the expansion of  the possibili-
ties given to them leads to a pattern of  behaviour which is self-reinforcing. Hacking 
makes this point regarding the dissemination of  information about child abuse: not 
only did it lead people to come to see themselves as abused, it also gave abusers ideas. 
One thing that I think is worth mentioning is Hacking’s desire, with MPD, to de-
scribe and analyse an interactive kind that was still in motion. A reason why he did 
this was to show how types of  people that may seem concrete categories are actual-
ly in an undulating and messy state of  constant redescription, and that this is hap-
pening all around, all the time. Though possible contemporary instances of  this 
abound, I think the transgender movement is an almost-too-perfect case of  this 
‘still in motion’ kind.  
Over the last decade or so, we have witnessed a significant growth in the number 
of  people who identify themselves as being transgender. This has come to be seen 
as a far wider grouping than its antecedent category, transsexual, with a diverse ar-
ray of  meanings, terminology, medical and commercial infrastructure. Though the 
past can be bent into all kinds of  shape by well-meaning activists looking for histor-
ical validation, I am confident that what we are seeing here is, in Hacking’s sense, a 
new type of  person rather than learning more about a constant human state. As 
Carl Elliott writes (of  transsexuals), ‘fifty years ago the suggestion that tens of  thou-
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sands of  people would someday want their genitals surgically altered so that they 
could change their sex would have been ludicrous. But it has happened’.  297
In transgender people we have all the outward features of  an interactive kind – the 
conferences, the journals, the patient organisations, the jargon, the expansion of  
people identifying themselves as being that way etc. But we also see this intriguing 
forwards/backwards realignment of  meanings; individuals who come to have pos-
session of  knowledge about themselves begin reinterpreting the past and the fu-
ture, and do so in a way which is novel, which has not happened before. The 
transgender person of  today, fighting back against an irreducible cocktail of  bio-
logically and culturally defined gender roles, living their life in a societal and politi-
cal context in which self-ascribed personal identity has reemerged as a pivotal 
force, seeing themselves as a manifestation of, alongside many other things, the 
right to choose your own way of  seeing gender, is a different kind of  person to the 
boy in the 1980s who liked wearing women’s clothes because they made him feel 
more at peace, was regarded as effeminate and grew up to be a gay man. They are 
probably even substantially different from the transsexuals seeking surgery that El-
liott was referring to in 2000. These things move fast.  
Placed together, Hacking’s ideas about interactive kinds, the looping effect and the 
reconstruction of  self  are an attractive and poetic explanatory framework. Before I 
deal with his critics, I will briefly describe one more set of  conceptual apparatus 
that he has bestowed upon us. 
Ecological niches 
 
Like Shorter and Showalter, Hacking is interested as to why it is that some condi-
tions ‘appear’ at certain times in certain places and then seem to fade from view. 
He terms this sort of  disease a ‘transient mental illness’ and wonders what it is 
 Elliott, C. ‘A New Way to Be Mad’ in The Atlantic, December 2000.297
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about the cultural backdrop at the time which causes it to spread or die out. He is 
not here overly concerned with the symptoms of  the patients or uncovering what 
they ‘really have’. Rather, he tries to build a framework, loosely similar to ideas dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, through which it is possible to understand why some 
diseases are so, or appear so, specifically bound to a culture or set of  similar cul-
tures, at one time.  
The metaphor he employs to illustrate this framework is that of  an ecological niche, a 
term borrowed from ecology that ‘invites us to think of  life in all its rich bio-com-
plexity’.  He uses it as a way of  demonstrating his commitment to the complicat298 -
ed nature of  these diseases, conditions for which simple modelling will never pro-
vide a complete picture. When he says ‘ecological niche’, he is referring to various 
aspects of  medical, social and institutional life which enable or restrict the manifes-
tation and proliferation of  a disease. These different features of  the societal land-
scape he terms vectors, each with the capacity to provide part of  a home for a 
condition at any one time. 
To use his example, fugue states in France and Europe generally (though not 
Britain or the United States) around the end of  the 19th century, found a place in 
each of  the four vectors he provides: medical taxonomy, cultural polarity, observ-
ability and release.  Fugue could be allocated a space in medical understanding, 299
either as hysteria, epilepsy, or both. This meant that did not represent a challenge 
to existing knowledge structures, but that it also posed a problem of  precise classifi-
cation to be solved. Culturally, fugue was positioned between the moral antipodes 
of  tourism and vagrancy, both of  which were of  great general interest at the time. 
It was also observable: due to conscription laws and fears of  absconding there ex-
isted in Europe a surveillance system designed to stop young men travelling from 
place to place without reason. Finally, it served as a release for lower middle-class 
 Hacking, I. 2002, p. 81.298
 Hacking hints that more vectors might be available but does not provide them.299
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men in stable but poorly paid employment. Not poverty-stricken enough to be va-
grants, not rich enough to be tourists, they moved around in a netherworld.  
The use of  this framework helps Hacking to answer one of  the questions he sets 
himself, namely ‘why France? Why not Britain or the United States?’ The answer 
being that two of  his four vectors are not present in those societies. Vagrancy was 
not a social problem of  any great importance and individuals were free to travel 
without papers or pressure to account for their appearance in any particular loca-
tion. In societies lacking all or some of  these vectors, a wandering man might be 
many things, but they were not, and did not come to see themselves, as suffering 
from a mental illness. As Hacking, talking about a place that Albert, his central 
fuguer, once wandered, puts it: 
‘There on a flowery slope or on a wind-blown outcrop you may still encounter a 
nervous man who was hoping not to be seen. Today he is more likely to be a con-
fused Moroccan making his way gingerly through to France than a dazed French 
infantryman heading for the safety of  Spain. Today he is just a mixed-up illegal 
immigrant. Ninety years ago he suffered from a distinct mental malady, ambulato-
ry automatism’.  300
 
How this metaphor might help us to understand current conditions is fairly clear. 
Like other work discussed above, it asserts the necessity of  a cultural environment 
which is conducive to certain types of  behaviour and certain ways of  understand-
ing that behaviour. The soil must be fertile, in other words, for some conditions to 
grow. What Hacking is not doing is downplaying other causal mechanisms, 
whether they are environmental, neurobiological, the result of  childhood trauma 
or some other agent. He is just asserting the multiplicity of  circumstances that 
must align in order for a disease like ambulatory automatism (fugue) or MPD to 
 Hacking, I. 2002, p.79.300
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appear and ‘thrive’.  
I think this schema has wide applicable potential. If  we use it to analyse fibromyal-
gia for example, we come up with a plausible explanatory framework, based on 
Hacking’s vectors.  We see that by placing this disease within Hacking’s schema, 301
we might begin to understand how it would appear to come about at a certain 
time in history but not others. The following is speculative but potentially useful:  
Medical taxonomy: fibromyalgia does fit into a medical taxonomy, or rather, several. 
It has a ICD code and is recognised by many as coming under rheumatology’s 
domain. Articles are written about it in various journals and though its classifica-
tion is problematic, it is problematic in a way that accords with expectations, and 
alternate explanations (mostly related to somatisation) simply slot it within some 
other taxonomy. In other words, it can be understood in a variety of  recognised 
ways, the important feature here being that it can be understood. 
Cultural polarity: Hacking states that conditions like fibromyalgia exist between two 
cultural poles, one of  vice and one of  virtue. This can be a slightly tricky vector to 
pin down, but in the case of  fibromyalgia it might be argued that patients are 
caught between narratives of  health, wellbeing and employment and the persistent 
rhetoric attacking those who claim welfare as ‘scroungers’, ‘malingerers’ etc. Indi-
viduals with fibromyalgia cannot fulfil their role as able-bodied, participatory eco-
nomic agents but equally recoil from being associated with the lazy, the feckless, 
the ‘undeserving’ or ‘conniving’ poor. In the gap between these two points they 
find themselves, both unable to work and unwilling to associate with what has been 
culturally presented as the alternative.  
Observability: since the American College of  Rheumatology released its diagnostic 
criteria in 1990, the ‘18 tender point’ test has been used in order to identify fi-
bromyalgia patients. Recently, following studies which showed this test to be incon-
 See Chapter IV for more details on fibromyalgia.301
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sistent, a broader diagnostic approach was adopted. The tender point test now 
forms one part of  the criteria, performing a less central role. The nature of  the 
condition means that developing more incisive, reliable instruments is difficult, but 
the presence of  such a tool, however problematic, does mean the fibromyalgia is 
more likely to be offered as a diagnosis. You can still see something through cloudy 
glasses.  
Release: for patients, fibromyalgia might provide a release in several ways. It could 
be a bodily expression for some unknown, suppressed pain. Or a way for the body 
to secure near-permanent relief  from an overly stressful lifestyle. Both have been 
postulated and might be considered. Personally, I find the overly symbolic nature 
of  this vector troubling. It is seems to me a recipe for selection bias and may be of  
little use in explaining conditions like fibromyalgia.  302
What we can see from this exposition is that there are certain aspects of  the mod-
ern medical and societal landscape that seem as though they might contribute to 
fibromyalgia and other similar condition’s ‘possibility’. That is to say, following 
Hacking’s vectors would allow you to formulate fairly extensive answers to the 
questions: why fibromyalgia? - why now and not in 1950?  
 
Criticism and discussion  
I have now outlined Hacking’s main ideas in relation to the topic at hand. I think 
his work on this area provides us with a feast of  food for thought, and criticisms of  
his project tend to respect his innovation and invention if  not all of  the details of  
his speculation. The critical angles of  attack have tended to come in two forms: 
either taking issue with his ontology regarding the clear cut, fundamental distinc-
tion between interactive and indifferent kinds or questioning the specifics of  his 
 I am of  the firm belief  that a great majority of  people are conceivably in need of  ‘re302 -
lease’. We only notice when we start looking for it.
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mechanisms. There is a third line of  criticism, which is that his demarcation of  in-
teractive and indifferent kinds does not form a cogent method of  separating the 
natural sciences from the social.  I will not pursue this line of  enquiry as these 303
questions do not concern us here. 
The first of  these critical approaches, favoured in different ways by Khalidi, Tsou 
and Cooper, focuses on perceived inconsistencies in the way in which Hacking de-
lineates interactive from indifferent kinds.  Essentially, say the critics, there is not 304
quite such a firm line to be drawn between the two. Khalidi demonstrates convinc-
ingly that classifying certain objects, such as making marijuana illegal or conceptu-
alising livestock as food does change the objects themselves and creates a moving 
target, in the same way it does for people.  If  the defining feature of  an interac305 -
tive kind is that it is influenced by our classifications and then loops back and 
changes the classification, he surmises that this phenomenon ‘is not confined to the 
human or social realm’.  Where Khalidi takes this argument is towards a discus306 -
sion of  the realism about kinds. Whether or not kinds are mind-dependent, or in 
what way they are mind-dependent, seems to matter little to my concern here, 
namely how they might affect individuals with contested diseases, so I will leave 
this criticism as is.  
Tsou highlights what would appear an outright contradiction in Hacking’s writing: 
he (Hacking) states that looping is the distinguishing feature between indifferent 
and interactive kinds, which are mutually exclusive on that basis, yet also makes the 
 For an example of  this sort of  critique, see Drabek, M. L. ‘Interactive classification 303
and Practice in the Social Sciences: Expanding Ian Hacking’s Treatment of  Interactive 
Kinds’ in Poroi: Issues in the Rhetoric of  Science and Technology, 2009, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 62-80.
 For similar criticism, also see Bogen, J. ‘Comments on “The Sociology of  Knowledge 304
about ‘Child Abuse’”’ in Nous, 1988, Vol. 22, pp. 65-66.
 Khalidi, M. A. ‘Interactive Kinds’ in The British Journal for the Philosophy of  Science, 2010, 305
Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 335-360.
 Ibid., p. 358.306
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claim that there are some human kinds which are both indifferent and 
interactive.  What Hacking is trying to account for is psychopathology, where it is 307
likely that in future some definitive underlying neurological process will be identi-
fied for say, childhood autism. Then we will find ourselves in a position where the 
category – ‘childhood autism’ – refers to an indifferent kind (in his example it is 
hypothesised as pathology P) and an interactive one (the children themselves, who 
are shaped by their category and in turn feed back into their classification). He 
partially explains how this would be possible with an appeal to Putnam’s semantic 
distinction between referents and stereotypes, with the pathology (and therefore 
indifferent kind) being the referent of  a given classification and the stereotype be-
ing the set of  meanings, actions under description, attitudes associated with the 
classification (the interactive portion).  
Tsou argues that Hacking is being inconsistent, and that he has conflated a lack of  
looping effects with the potential existence of  identifiable biological regularities. 
He concludes that this is just one of  several instances in which Hacking equivo-
cates on the separation of  interactive and indifferent kinds in relation to their defi-
nition. We should not therefore base our understanding of  what constitutes each 
type on their distinctions.  
Cooper also focuses on the way in which the two kinds are delineated. She ques-
tions the legitimacy of  cultural feedback loops as distinguishing features in a simi-
lar vein to Khalidi and says that conceptually Hacking has misunderstood 
 Tsou, J. Y. ‘Hacking on the Looping Effects of  Psychiatric Classifications: What is an 307
Interactive and Indifferent Kind?’ in International Studies in the Philosophy of  Science, 2007, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 334; This confusion is not helped by the fact that Hacking switches from 
talking about human kinds to referring to them as interactive, only to then seemingly 
adopt the former label as a sort of  umbrella term. It is perhaps inevitable that conceptual 
confusion begins to creep in when you write three books and a dozen articles about the 
same topic over a couple of  decades.
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Anscombe’s intentional actions under description argument.  What she aims to 308
show is that because description is not needed for novel action, or indeed for any in-
tentional action at all, there is no strong logical link between new descriptions and 
new actions or types of  people. She believes that this causes the conceptual level of  
his argument (related to the necessary self-consciousness of  human kinds) to deflate 
back into being solely one of  cultural feedback, which she has shown to be prob-
lematic.  This leads her to conclude that he is wrong to say that interactive kinds 309
cannot be indifferent kinds.  
Her argument is flawed though, in two senses. Firstly, when discussing the possibili-
ty of  action without description, she uses the example of  a cave man called ‘Ug’ 
who, she claims, would be unable to do anything in Hacking’s world because noth-
ing had been described yet, alongside the example of  a bird landing on a branch 
with both bird lime and seeds on it, an action we can interpret by considering the 
bird’s nature and without requiring the bird to be aware of  a description:  
 
‘…as there are other means of  inferring an actor’s intentions which do not depend 
on descriptions, it cannot be concluded that descriptions are essential for inten-
tional actions. Ug can intend to make a fire, and the bird can intend to land on the 
twig, without any descriptions being required. In such cases Hacking is simply 
wrong to claim that descriptions are required for intentional action’.  310
 
 Cooper’s paper was written first, so technically it is the other way round: Cooper, R. 308
‘Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds’ in The British Journal for the Philosophy of  Sci-
ence, 2004, Vol. 55, pp. 73-85.
 Cooper argues that cultural feedback poses problems for Hacking because plenty of  309
‘indifferent’ kinds appear to be changed over time by societal classifications - for example 
prize cattle or the marijuana plant, both significantly altered as a result of  their assign-
ment to this or that group.
 Cooper, R. 2004, p. 82.310
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This counterargument fails, however, because Hacking is explicit about the 
modernity of  his theory; it requires the existence of  vast social science in-
frastructure, mass communication and many other factors besides in order to be 
applied. It is very far away from cave men.  
Secondly, her idea of  Hacking’s conceptual vision is extremely oversimplified. He 
is not arguing that people did not or could not act in certain ways before a catego-
ry was created that allowed them to do so, he is saying that the production of  cate-
gory causes new meanings to congeal around action (and a lot more besides). So in 
a sense an action becomes ‘new’ not because it could not have been performed be-
fore but because if  it was it would have been performed under a different psycho-
logical understanding. I could have had sex with another man five hundred years 
ago, but I could not have done so as a ‘gay man’ in the modern sense. Cooper 
seems to have missed this distinction. 
She does, however, conclude by stating that she is ‘happy for Hacking to be right 
about a great many things’ and seems to accept that her work has not harmed the 
conceptual core of  his project.  Tsou says something similar, that he does not 311
think that the ‘conceptual flaws’ he identified in ‘Hacking’s presentation are neces-
sarily fatal to his overall theory’.  312
I think these final comments are key. Even if  the strict dichotomy between the two 
types of  kinds needs to collapsed, redefined or extended this does not alter the 
most important points Hacking makes. The looping effect, ecological niches, the 
restructuring of  experience/memory/selfhood…all remain valid conceptual inno-
vations regardless of  whether sometimes interactive and indifferent kinds appear to 
overlap. For my purposes, slight conceptual confusion, blurred ontology and minor 
inconsistency are acceptable so long as they do not interfere with the lessons Hack-
ing might teach us about the experience of  contested disease patients. And, on the 
 Ibid., p. 80.311
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whole, I do not think that they do. 
The second critical approach to Hacking, which focuses on mechanisms, poses 
more of  a problem. Put simply, his ideas are too messy for some critics. There is no 
concerted attempt to accurately model the looping effect, and at times his descrip-
tions impart a sense of  what he means, but not a definitive capsule of  thought. As 
Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen say, he only points ‘towards an interesting phenomenon 
without providing the resources for systematic modelling, analysis, and ultimately, 
explanation’.  Indeed, this is one of  the reasons why I quote him at such length 313
above. Hacking in small segments does not make sense.  
Tekin makes a similar point to Kuorikoski, stating that, in particular, ‘the causal 
trajectory in which looping effects are generated and the way in which the subject 
responds to being classified remain unclear’.  It seems that one strength of  Hack314 -
ing – his appreciation of  complexity and multiplicity, his simple, open-minded plu-
ralism about how the looping effect will apply – is also a weakness. That we are 
able to get a strong idea of  what he means is no consolation if  we are not able to 
map it in a constrained conceptual manner. There is a danger that this reduces its 
usefulness as a tool, which is a far more serious and potentially damning criticism 
then the first critical thrust outlined above.  
Hacking has stated that he has been accused of  being too ironic in his intellectual 
stance and that people complain he places too much space between himself  and 
 Kuorikoski, J. and Pöyhönen, S. ‘Looping Kinds and Social Mechanisms’ in Sociological 313
Theory, 2012, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 188.
 Tekin, S. ‘The Missing Self  in Hacking’s Looping Effects’ in Kincaid, H. and Sullivan, 314
J. A. (eds.) Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds, 2014, The MIT Press, 
USA, p. 227.
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his subject matter.  The basic claim is that his style negates taking a stand. I dis315 -
agree with this assessment. His writing does obscure his position, it is true. Partly 
this is down to his distaste from social constructivism, to him an overtly moral ex-
ercise and one which he wants to distance himself  from.  Partly too it is because 316
he writes about topics which are current and which inspire histrionics, another 
style of  expression he wants to avoid.  
However, beneath this, there is a quiet but distinct moral agenda. He is not inter-
ested in telling people how to live their lives, or in saying that there is a right way to 
remember your life or to structure your experiences. He is not arguing in favour of  
one kind of  identity over another. But what he is saying is that people are unhappy 
and that they may be being harmed by some of  the processes he has outlined. Pre-
viously stable or treatable people may come to understand themselves in a way 
which is not amiable to their recovery. The meanings that guide their lives may 
have been hijacked by one force or another. By mapping these mechanisms, by un-
derstanding the different ways in which these things can occur, I think Hacking is 
hopeful that in some small way we might be able to gain a measure of  purchase on 
their levers. Especially in light of  his work regarding memory, identity and the soul, 
it is fair to say that in some instances the stakes are very high indeed. 
This is why it is particularly worrying to consider that his causal understandings 
may be more incomprehensible than the ‘complex and shady’ description of  them 
 ‘There’s too much irony in my work, there really is…People often ask: so you’ve given 315
us all the options and you’ve given us good things and bad things about all of  them but 
what the heck do you think?...In general it is a defect in the way that I proceed that I am 
often very ironical’. In Hacking, I. Holberg Prize Lecture, The Holberg Prize Symposium, 
2009.
 Though reading The Social Construction of  What?, you get the distinct feeling that a large 316
part of  his problem with social construction is linguistic: he has a certain definition of  
‘construction’ in mind, that of  various materials being gathered together and employed to 
create something new, where a plan is followed according to an agenda etc., which makes 
the metaphor as it is used in the humanities look decidedly lazy. 
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he allows.  Without some degree of  applicability, this theory is unable to gain any 317
traction on individual units of  study, or be usefully engaged on subjects outside of  
his own examples.  
This is a problem not just of  conceptual messiness, but also of  specificity. By ad-
hering to a model of  looping which assumes each and every instance of  looping 
will be different in some way, there is a risk that we arrive at a situation where 
every phenomenon requires in-depth, rigorous and extensive historical research in 
order to be understood. By the time we are able to do this, to work out the particu-
lar manifestation of  interaction in any given case, that case is likely to have moved 
on, the ‘target’ advancing in new and unpredictable directions.  
The question, then, is twofold. Hacking is ‘explicitly sceptical about the possibility 
of  generating a substantial and generalizable theory of  the looping effect’ and ‘he 
appears to think that forms of  looping are too varied and always highly dependent 
on specific sociocultural contexts’.  So does this mean, firstly, that his theory is in 318
fact fairly blunt?- and could it be modified, clarified or extended in a way that 
sharpens it? 
Kuorikoski and Pöyhönen do not answer these questions but suggest a direction of  
travel towards answers. Their aim is to move the discussion and analysis of  looping 
effects away from a philosophical debate about the ontological status of  social real-
ity and towards empirical discussion, theorising and data collection. I second this 
intention: looping effects may well act as neat devices in the ongoing natural kind 
discussion, but they are first and foremost an empirical phenomenon which appear 
to casually dictate certain social relationships, for better or worse. Pinning this 
down is, to me, a more useful exercise.  
Their suggestion is to privilege mechanistic explanations, which steer clear of  con-
 Hacking, I. 1996, p. 351.317
 Kuorikoski, J. and Pöyhönen, S. 2012, p. 194.318
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structionism and essentialism. They believe that mechanistic accounts align most 
accurately with the practices of  classification in both the natural and the social sci-
ences, and they believe that further study should aim at providing middle-range, 
casual theories of  social phenomenon. Work like mine, which pays close attention 
to the patient experience whilst retaining theoretical frameworks such as Hacking’s 
is in this tradition. 
One final critique, to my mind the most sophisticated, has been provided by Tekin. 
Like others, she identifies the complexity and ambiguity in the casual trajectory of  
the looping effect as a shortcoming of  Hacking’s approach. She separates this issue 
into two problematic elements: the lack of  an empirically and philosophically co-
gent account of  the self, which sits at the centre of  Hacking’s theory but is never 
satisfactorily articulated, and the failure to properly engage with the manifold 
complexity of  psychopathology.  
In addressing the first of  these sub-problems, the ‘missing self ’, Tekin argues that 
by showing the looping effect through large examples, Hacking has negated pro-
viding us with a cogent explanation of  exactly how and why the looping effect influ-
ences subjects, causing them to respond in the way that they do. She points out 
that though Hacking talks of  the person/subject/self/soul interchangeably, his fo-
cus is their interactions, not them, and therefore he does not ‘delve into what it is 
about that self  that is prone to being made up’ (emphasis in original).  In other 319
words, how uniform is the pattern of  looping?- what factors make a person more 
or less likely to react in a certain way to their classification?- why are some people 
presented as pliable and suggestable but others seem more robust? In essence, 
‘what motivates changes in self-concepts and behaviour?’  I think these are all 320
serious questions that Hacking does not address.   
In her analysis of  the second unexplained aspect of  the looping effect, Tekin focus-
 Tekin, S. 2014, p. 232.319
 Ibid., p. 238.320
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es on psychopathology, and the varying weight we should give to its different axis – 
classification, subjective symptoms, knowledge about diagnosis etc. She is right to 
point out that the relationship between these different factors is not adequately ex-
amined by Hacking. Three questions, says Tekin, remain: 
- How much of  the changes in the subject’s self-awareness and behaviour are con-
nected to the knowledge she receives about the diagnosis?  
- How much of  such changes are connected to her particular mental disorder?  
- How much of  the changes in her self-concept and behaviour are connected to the 
clinical treatment she receives upon diagnosis?  
 
In short, she is arguing that in cases of  psychopathology, and I would posit other 
conditions as well, the looping effect is not just mediated by the knowledge re-
ceived by the patient about their classification, but also by their clinical encounters 
and the actual course of  their illness. That Hacking fails to elucidate and situate 
these other potential influences in detail is a weakness of  his approach. I would 
add one further question to Tekin’s three: 
 
- How much does the immediate social environment of  an individual alter their 
self-concept?  
 
Hacking has already discussed how the ‘larger human unit’ that surrounds an 
autistic child or other inaccessible kind can influence looping, but I think he un-
derestimates the impact that family, social and workplace environments can have 
on a person’s relationship to their category and themselves. Partly this is due to in-
tellectual positioning. Though he acknowledges his debt to both, to me Hacking is 
clearly further towards Foucault’s top-down, institutional study of  meanings than 
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Goffman’s bottom-up approach. He is, I think, instinctively more interested in how 
large, organising bodies of  epistemic production affect individuals under their gaze 
than how interpersonal relationships with others might produce similar effects. 
This could just be because he is a philosopher and not a sociologist, and because 
using Foucauldian methods have a tendency to produce Foucauldian results.  321
It may be in fact that it is a several step process, where the first arc of  looping is 
indeed directed by institutions and social scientists. But I would posit that after this 
stage the direction of  such loops becomes muddied. Other members of  society, not 
in the group themselves but aware of  its classification, may come to have a more 
important role in generating feedback relationships. Goffman wrote about this in 
The Insanity of  Place.  This work represented a shift in focus from the more institu322 -
tional, closed-system type analysis of  Asylums towards an intimate and probably 
highly autobiographical account of  illness in a family setting.  He recognised the 323
immense power of  feedback within an immediate social setting and how it might 
slot in with other factors such as diagnosis and institutionalisation. Hacking does, 
on the face of  it, acknowledge the potential relevance of  such an intersection:  
 
‘Goffman’s idea of  looping applies to one rather well-understood phenomenon of  
face-to-face interaction. Mine, much less well understood, applies to a quite differ-
ent phenomenon bearing on classification itself. Yet it is very probably that my 
kind of  looping, at the abstract level of  discourse, works only because of  Goffman’s 
 ‘As a research strategy, I have always been much taken by what Michel Foucault 321
named archaeology. I think that there are sometimes fairly sharp mutations in systems of  
thought and that these redistributions of  ideas establish what later seems inevitable, un-
questionable, necessary’, in Hacking, I. 2002, p. 4.
 Goffman, E. ‘The Insanity of  Place’  in Psychiatry: Journal of  Interpersonal Relations, 1969, 322
Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 357-387.
 Shalin, D. N. ‘Goffman on Mental Illness: Asylums and ‘‘The Insanity of  Place’’ Revis323 -
ited’ in Symbolic Interaction, 2014, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 128; Goffman, E. Asylums: Essays on the 
Social Situation of  Mental Patients and Other Inmates, 1961, Doubleday Anchor, USA.
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concrete looping effect, at the interpersonal level of  face-to-face interaction’  324
I would say that this is incorrect, or at least incomplete. What Hacking is arguing is 
that his looping effect is between the classification and the classified, that this is a 
dynamic relationship of  change, and that this is perhaps sustained by face-to-face 
interaction. What I would argue is that once the ball is rolling, so to speak, it is of-
ten the wider social context of  an individual, represented by constant interpersonal 
and now online encounters, which affects their relationship with their category.  325
This, in some cases, causes more change, more ‘movement’ of  the interactive kind, 
than anything else. Therefore, the broader social environment’s reaction to the 
classification (and indeed the broader social environment’s understanding of  the clas-
sification) of  the individual is what has caused the kind to shift and become some-
thing new, not their personal interactions with their category. Most crucially, sub-
sequent changes in the institutional categorisation of  an individual may well have 
little effect on the way they are classified socially, and thus may be of  limited im-
pact in relation to the dynamism of  the interactive kind.  
I do not think that it is controversial to emphasise the importance of  this level of  
looping. Individual’s identities are constituted and reconstituted continuously on 
the basis of  our interactions with others. We come to think of  our selves as being 
this way and not that way only within a social matrix, and it informs the way we in-
terpret present and past events and actions. Some times we are even self-aware 
enough to realise that this process is occurring as it does so. In Doris Lessing’s The 
Golden Notebook, for example, the narrator Anna Wolfe is also acutely aware of  the 
impact that being part of  one or other grouping can have on social relations. Anna 
 Hacking, I. 2004, p. 299.324
 Or, as Goffman writes ‘the third parties, the patient’s daily circles: his service commu325 -
nity, his work place, his friendships and particularly his family’ in Goffman, E. 1969, p. 
360.
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describes an encounter with an old friend after she had joined the Communist par-
ty: 
 
‘The fact I had become a party member, made me, for her, an embodiment of  
something she had to have certain attitudes towards. And I responded in kind. At 
which Michael said: ‘Well, what did you expect?’ He was speaking in his role of  
East European exile, to me in my role as ‘political innocent’. And I replied in that 
role, producing all sorts of  liberal inanities. Fascinating – the roles we play, the way 
we play parts’.  
 
It is fairly obvious what Anna (or perhaps Doris) is getting at here, that our cate-
gories change not just how we see ourselves but how the whole world sees us, 
which in turn alters how we view our identity and how we act. And I believe that 
this line of  thought – that the social environment can become paramount in loop-
ing – has gained particular salience given the events of  the decade or so since 
Hacking stopped writing substantially on this topic. In 1996 he wrote that ‘there 
has been a bizarre proliferation of  self-help groups of  late. Their core feature has 
been self-ascription: their rhetoric is that of  taking control of  themselves’.  326
I would argue that due to a number of  factors, most notably the internet’s gal-
vanising effect on communication and the influence of  individualist, identity-based 
movements, self-ascription is in many cases now the norm.  In the case of  con327 -
tested illnesses, disease identities have been continuously fought over and negotiat-
ed at the theoretical level, and though they are still a case-study in uncertainty and 
diagnostic ambiguity, a sufficiently acceptable conceptual framework for several 
 Hacking, I. 1996, p. 379.326
 A process which has by now been occurring for decades. See: Franck, T. M. The Em327 -
powered Self: Law and Society in an Age of  Individualism, 2000, Oxford University Press, UK.
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diseases has been established.  
Patients in many cases now have little conflict with their insitutional category (rela-
tively speaking) because of  the variety of  meanings that are available and because 
of  the hand they play in shaping those meanings themselves. The greatest source 
of  tension that has evolved is not between classifiers and classified, because to some 
extent these have become one and the same, but between the classified and every-
one else. These ‘others’, for whom the category means one thing or another (nor-
mally, in the eyes of  patients, a retrograde and pejorative set of  assumptions), are 
the boundary at which individuals react most to their grouping. It is these relation-












Chapter IV - Fibromyalgia in Context  
At the beginning of  this thesis, I explained that my aim was to examine chronic, 
contested disease in a philosophical context, or rather, in its philosophical context. 
To do this I have so far talked in general terms, stretching and teasing at the edge 
of  concepts to test their robustness, and have outlined a number of  overlapping 
frameworks that might aide our understanding of  the experiences patients have. It 
it these experiences around which this chapter is based, the idea being to focus on 
the specific problems faced and language used by patients to test not only the ideas 
engaged with in previous chapters but also to look for gaps and things unsaid, to 
search through the speech of  those with these conditions for the contours of  what 
might loosely be termed ‘our general understanding of  disease’ or the ‘prevailing 
notions of  legitimate illness’.  328
This is important as it links into all sorts of  other epistemic points I wish to make - 
that the reality of  disease for many people is greatly affected not just by ‘medical’ 
knowledge (in so far as it is possible to bracket this), but by the underlying meta-
physical beliefs of  the population at large and more specifically the population 
around the diseased person: their family, friends, work colleagues and indeed to a 
great degree themselves.  In the same way that phenomenological work on illness 329
has exposed the various physical aspects of  our environment that we take for 
 This is a departure from the illness narrative literature that has taught me much: I am 328
indeed, to use Riessman’s phrase, interested in ‘coding’ - that is, looking for particular 
items or topics - the patient speech I have recorded, but doing so in a way which takes 
into account the narrative context in which such remarks are made. My categories are 
porous not discrete, and I utilise narrative structure to illustrate points as well as short 
quotations from patients. (‘This approach does not fragment the text into discrete cate-
gories for coding purposes’ from Riessman, C. K. ‘Strategic uses of  narrative in the pre-
sentation of  self  and illness: a research note’ in Social Science and Medicine, 1990, Vol. 30, 
No.11, p. 1195); for a full description of  my methodology, see Appendix I.
 This is not to say that the medical angle is unimportant, unrelated or will be glossed 329
over in this chapter.
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granted, I would like to chip away at our understanding of  disease and uncover the 
presumptions, the intuitions, the expectations that shape our view of  an ill person 
in our vicinity or in the mirror.   330
In this chapter I will relate the content of  my qualitative interviews with patients 
suffering from fibromyalgia, a complex and confusing disease which presents a se-
rious challenge to health care providers and patients. I have split my findings into 
four broad categories: pain, relationships, work and care. These groupings are 
simply used to organise the disparate topics of  conversation that patients discussed 
with me into something more easy analysed. In this final section I will bring to 
bear the various concepts discussed in Chapter I, use patient experience to bolster 
arguments made in Chapter II, test the ideas put forward in Chapter III and relate 
their thoughts to my general argument. First, though, I will present a short outline 
of  the disease and use three examples from my research to illuminate some of  the 
typical and nontypical features of  the condition.  
 
Fibromyalgia  
Fibromyalgia is characterised by widespread musculoskeletal pain across the body, 
fatigue, cognitive issues and other symptoms. Patients are often co-morbid with a 
range of  psychological conditions like depression and anxiety as well as other con-
tested illnesses such as chronic fatigue syndrome and irritable bowel syndrome. Its 
aetiology is a site of  conflict and no one model exists which can adequately map 
the disease. Likewise, the diagnostic tools used to demarcate the condition are also 
called into question.  
As with many of  the ailments it is often placed alongside, fibromyalgia has a trou-
 Many years of  disabilities rights activism have also worked hard to highlight the ‘able-330
bodiedness’ of  our designed environments.
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bled and oblique genealogy.  For those prone to scour history, confirmation bias 331
in hand, examples of  chronic pain, muscular discomfort and fatigue stretch from 
the Bible to Shakespeare.  These are of  less interest to us, however, than the 332
modern, explicitly diagnostic attempts to classify what remains an uncertain symp-
tom constellation.  
Although discussion of  rheumatism, muscle sensitivity and tenderness can be 
found among physicians throughout the 19th century, the first reference to ‘fibrosi-
tis’ seems to appear in 1904, as used by Sir William Gowers. He hypothesised that 
an unknown process which inflamed the fibres of  the lumbar muscles was the 
cause of  backache.  A contemporary physician of  his named Ralph Stockman 333
used the term more broadly to describe patients with symptoms that align quite 
isomorphically with modern presentation (stiffness and aching, muscular fatigue, 
general pain), and throughout the 20th century these vague complaints were vari-
ously swallowed by a number of  diffuse classificatory frameworks, patients being 
assigned different labels and finding themselves under the care of  various spe-
 For a far more exhaustive history of  the concept than is presented here, see Inanici, F. 331
and Yunus, M. B. ‘History of  Fibromyalgia: Past to Present’ in Current Pain and Headache 
Reports, 2004, Vol. 8, pp. 369-378.
 The theatre would appear a particular rich source for such retrospective diagnosis, for 332
example: Huth, K. ‘Figures of  Pain in Early Modern English Tragedy’ in Renaissance Dra-
ma, 2014, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 169-190; I am thinking in particular of  some Old Testament 
suffering: ‘…the days of  affliction have taken hold upon me. My bones are pierced in me 
in the night season: and my sinews take no rest’. (Job 30: 16-17) or ‘Behold ye and see if  
there be any pain unto my pain, which is done unto me, wherewith the Lord hath afflict-
ed me in the day of  his fierce anger. From above hath sent fire into my bones…and I am 
weary and faint all the day’. (Jeremiah, in Lamentations 1: 12-13). This comparison is 
from Wallace, D. J. and Clauw, D. J. Fibromyalgia and Other Central Pain Syndromes, 2005, 
Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, USA, p. 1.




It was not until the 1970s that ‘fibrositis’ again caught the the sustained attention 
of  rheumatologists and began to stimulate clinical interest, leading directly to the 
dissemination of  the diagnostic criteria that brought ‘fibromyalgia’ into 
existence.  This began with Smythe, who sketched an outline of  the condition 335
which included much of  what we now take to be of  central importance: gener-
alised muscle pain, fatigue, disrupted and low-quality sleep, aggravation through 
exertion, potential underlying emotional distress and multiple tender points.  336
Further work was completed which emphasised the role that disturbed and unusu-
al sleep patterns played in the aggravation of  symptoms, and by 1983 key re-
searchers were calling upon the field of  rheumatology to produce reliable diagnos-
tic criteria which could be used to accurately classify the disease now known as 
‘fibromyalgia’.  This was provided in 1990 by the American College of  Rheuma337 -
tology (ACR), who placed the presence of  eleven (or more) out of  eighteen possible 
‘tender points’ at the centre of  distinguishing between fibromyalgia patients and 
those with other conditions, these providing the ‘most discriminating power’, 
 Myofascial syndrome, neurasthenia, post-infectious fatigue, myasthenic syndrome, 334
myalgic encephalomyelitis, myofasciitis and muscular rheumatism, for example.   
 Goldenberg, D. L. Clinical Management of  Fibromyalgia, 2009, Professional Communica335 -
tions, pp. 12-13.
 Smythe, H. ‘Nonarticular rheumatism and psychogenic musculoskeletal syndromes’ in 336
McCarty, D. J. (ed.) Arthritis and Allied Conditions, 1972, Lea and Febiger, USA, pp. 881-891.
 Moldofsky, H., Scarisbrick, P., England, R. and Smythe, H. ‘Musculoskeletal symp337 -
toms and non-REM sleep disturbance in patients with “fibrositis” syndrome’ in Bulletin on 
the Rheumatological Diseases, 1977-78, Vol. 28, pp. 928-931; Yunus, M. B., ‘Fibromyalgia: a 
need for uniform classification’ in The Journal of  Rheumatology, 1983, Vol. 10, pp. 841-844; 
Hench was the first to use the term ‘fibromyalgia’ in Hench, P. K. ‘Nonarticular rheuma-
tism, 22nd rheumatism review: review of  the American and English literature for the 
years 1973 and 1974’ in Arthritis and Rheumatism, 1976, Vol. 19, pp. 1081-1089.
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alongside widespread pain.  338
Subsequent to this, research interest increased alongside rising patient numbers. It 
was clear that fibromyalgia patients presented with far more than simply tender 
points, and that the routine diagnostic test proposed by the 1990 criteria was rarely 
being used or was being used incorrectly. As a result, fibromyalgia became regard-
ed as a ‘dustbin diagnosis’ or diagnosis of  exclusion, a label given to patients when 
all other diagnostic options had been exhausted.  
Though the ACR criteria stimulated plenty of  research, along genetic, epidemio-
logical, haematological and more general pathophysiological lines, this failed to 
translate into effective clinical practice, where diagnosis remained uncertain, 
treatment inconsistent and outcomes poor. In light of  these problems, the ACR 
revised their criteria in 2010, introducing the use of  widespread pain index (WPI) 
and symptom severity scale (SS) scores alongside a requirement that symptoms be 
present for at least three months or more and the presence of  no other disorders 
which might better explain the symptoms.  339
The current clinical picture is as follows.  Fibromyalgia, or fibromyalgia syn340 -
drome as it is often referred, is characterised by widely distributed, chronic muscu-
loskeletal pain, as well as elements of  fatigue, joint stiffness, cognitive difficulty, 
sleep disturbances, headaches, bowel problems and other symptoms. The pain is 
 Wolfe, F., Smythe H. A. and Yunus, M. B. ‘The American College of  Rheumatology 338
1990 Criteria for the Classification of  Fibromyalgia: report of  the Multicenter Criteria 
Committee’ in Arthritis and Rheumatism, 1990, Vol. 33, pp. 160-172.
 Wolfe, F. et al ‘The American College of  Rheumatology Preliminary Diagnostic Crite339 -
ria for Fibromyalgia and Measurement of  Symptom Severity in Arthritis Care and Research, 
2010, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 600-610.
 This section is drawn largely from the following papers: Chinn, S., Caldwell, W. and 340
Gritsenko, K. ‘Fibromyalgia Pathogenesis and Treatment Options Update’ in Current Pain 
and Headache Reports, 2016, Vol. 20 p. 25; Clauw, D. J. ‘Fibromyalgia: A Clinical Review’ in 
The Journal of  the American Medical Association, 2014, Vol. 311, No. 154, pp. 1547-1555 and 
Bellato, E. et al ‘Fibromyalgia Syndrome: Etiology, Pathogenesis, Diagnosis, and Treat-
ment’ in Pain Research and Treatment, Vol. 2012, Article ID 426130, pp. 1-17.
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often variable and patients report that the intensity of  their symptoms appears to 
be related to stress and physical exercise. Common patient conceptualisations of  
their symptoms include ‘fibrofog’, which is the inability to remember pieces of  in-
formation, the clouding of  an otherwise functional mind, and ‘flare ups’ which re-
fer to a particularly bad symptomatic reaction to something, such as stress, physical 
overexertion or changes in the weather.  341
As might be expected from these symptoms, fibromyalgia patients suffer from con-
siderable psychosocial impairment and a reduced - in some patients absolutely - 
ability to work. They also represent a considerable cost to their respective health 
services as repeat appointments, referrals, hospital admissions, multiple prescrip-
tions and various other therapies are required.  
Depending on the diagnostic method employed, prevalence varies from between 
1.3-8% and is most common among middle aged women.  Fibromyalgia is esti342 -
mated to be between twice and four times as prevalent in females as in males, 
though it had been reported that in some societies this ratio is even greater.  Sev343 -
 The link with weather appears to be widespread amongst patients but disputed by re341 -
searchers. See Bossema, E. R. et al ‘Influence of  Weather on Daily Symptoms of  Pain and 
Fatigue in Female Patients With Fibromyalgia: A Multilevel Regression Analysis’ in Arthri-
tis Care and Research, 2013, Vol. 65, No. 7, pp. 1019-1025.
 Smith, H. S., Harris, R. E., Clauw, D. J. ‘Fibromyalgia’ in Benzon, H. T., Raja S. N., 342
Molly, R. E., Liu, S. S., Fishman, S. M. (eds.) Essentials of  pain medicine, 2011, 3rd ed., Else-
vier, USA, pp. 345–350; Theoharides, T. C., Tsilioni, I., Arbetman, L. et al ‘Fibromyalgia 
syndrome in need of  effective treatments’ in The Journal of  Pharmacology and Experimental 
Therapeutics, 2015, Vol. 355, pp. 255–263; Diaz-Piedra, C., Di Stasi, L. L., Baldwin, C. 
M., Buela-Casal, G., Catena A. ‘Sleep disturbances of  adult women suffering from fi-
bromyalgia: a systematic review of  observational studies’ in Sleep Medicine Reviews, 2015, 
Vol. 21, pp. 86–99.
 Branco, J. C. et al ‘Prevalence of  fibromyalgia: a survey in five European countries’ in 343
Seminars in Arthritis and Rheumatism, 2010, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 448-53; Lindell, L., Bergman, 
S., Petersson, I. F., Jacobsson, L. T. H., and Herrstrom, P. ‘Prevalence of  fibromyalgia and 
chronic widespread pain’ in Scandinavian Journal of  Primary Health Care, 2000, Vol. 18, No. 
3, pp. 149–153; for example, a Danish source put the gender split at 1:9: see Bartels E. M. 
‘Fibromyalgia, diagnosis and prevalence. Are gender differences explainable?’ in Ugeskrift 
for Lœger, 2009, Vol. 171, No. 49, pp. 3588-92.
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eral epidemiological meta-analyses have demonstrated that fibromyalgia is present 
on every inhabited continent, with inter-country variations ascribed to different 
clinical attitudes, application of  diagnosis and patient behaviour.   344
Co-morbidity with other ‘functional’ (and ‘contested’) illnesses is high and it is 
common for a fibromyalgia patient to suffer from one or several of  the following: 
chronic fatigue syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, anxiety, migraine 
headaches, obsessive compulsive disorder and others, including many multiple 
non-specific symptoms.  In some study populations it has been found that more 345
than half  of  fibromyalgia patients have seven or more chronic co-morbidities.  346
The aetiology and pathogenesis of  fibromyalgia remains poorly understood, but it 
is posited that some combination of  genetics, central and automatic nervous sys-
tem dysfunction, neurotransmitters, hormones, immune system deficiencies, exter-
nal trauma, environmental factors and psychiatric problems are involved. No one, 
definitive aetiological narrative has been established and as yet no consistent 
enough biomarker has been discovered that can indicate and demarcate fi-
 Queiroz, L. P. ‘Worldwide Epidemiology of  Fibromyalgia’ in Current Pain and Headache 344
Reports, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 356; Neumann, L., and Buskila, D. ‘Epidemiology of  Fi-
bromyalgia’ in Current Pain and Headache Reports, 2003, Vol. 7, pp. 362-368.
 Goldenberg, D. L. et al  ‘Understanding Fibromyalgia and Its Related Disorders’ in 345
The Primary Care Companion To The Journal Of  Clinical Psychiatry’, 2008, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 
133-144; Arnold, L. M., Hudson, J. L., Keck, P. E., Auchenbach, M. B., Javaras, K. N. 
and Hess, E. V. ‘Comorbidity of  fibromyalgia and psychiatric disorders’ in The Journal of  
Clinical Psychiatry, 2006, Vol. 67, No. 8, pp. 1219-25.
 Vincent, A., Whipple, M. O. and McAllister, S. J. et al ‘A cross-sectional assessment of  346
the prevalence of  multiple chronic conditions and medication use in a sample of  commu-
nity-dwelling adults with fibromyalgia in Olmsted County, Minnesota’ in BMJ Open, 
2015, Vol. 5, e006681. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-006681; This should be qualified by 
noting that, increasing as you go up the age scale, multiple co-morbidities are common 
(see: Piccirillo, J. F. et al ‘The Changing Prevalence of  Comorbidity Across the Age Spec-
trum’ in Critical Reviews in Oncology/Hematology, 2008, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 124-132), so in 
this instance it might be sensible to consider the quality of  the co-morbidities rather than 
their quantity.
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bromyalgia with any reliability.  As such, the diagnosis of  fibromyalgia remains a 347
process of  elimination and subjective reporting, occasionally in tandem with the 
ACR criteria.  
A major problem with identifying fibromyalgia is its similarity to other conditions, 
and patients are often told they suffer from a multitude. A literature review by 
Aaron and Buchwald highlighted this problem, noting that despite different case 
definitions, overlap between conditions appeared to be high: 
 
‘The existing literature, although dispersed across many disciplines, suggests that 
many unexplained clinical conditions—for example, the chronic fatigue syndrome, 
fibromyalgia, and temporomandibular disorder—share demographic, clinical, and 
psychosocial features, as well as objective findings. In fact, it has been suggested 
that the diagnosis assigned to patients with one of  these illnesses depends more on 
chief  symptom and clinician specialty than on the actual illness’.  348
 
Wessely, Sharpe and Nimnuan had previously argued along similar lines, that each 
medical speciality appeared to have its own ‘unexplained’ syndrome which, when 
examined as patient populations, would seem to overlap greatly in terms of  both 
 Giacomelli, C., Sernissi, F., Rossi, A., Bombardieri, S. and Bazzichi, L. ‘Biomarkers in 347
fibromyalgia: a review’ in Current Biomarker Findings, 2014, Vol. 4, pp. 35-41.
 Aaron, L. A. and Buchwald, D. ‘A Review of  the Evidence for Overlap among Unex348 -
plained Clinical Conditions’ in The Annals of  Internal Medicine, 2001, Vol. 134, p. 868.
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symptoms and treatment strategies.  They concluded that the classificatory slic349 -
ing of  different functional somatic syndromes was of  questionable utility, given the 
apparent lack of  concrete delineating factors. In place of  this, they suggested that a 
dimensional approach might work better, on the understanding that all present 
subdivisions are attempts to demarcate something which to a great degree is singu-
lar: general functional somatic syndrome.  
Perhaps predictably, there was a strong reaction to this hypothesis among some 
members of  certain patient communities, rejecting Wessely et al’s ideas and in some 
cases resorting to personal attacks and threats. This backlash illuminated another 
layer of  complexity when regarding this issue: once given a diagnosis, sufferers can 
build up rationalities and explanatory frameworks with which to understand their 
condition and become in a sense loyal to these descriptions and unwilling to coun-
tenance an entirely new and less legitimate sounding disease that they now suppos-
edly have or indeed had all along.   350
There are, of  course, a number of  other ideas orbiting fibromyalgia. For example, 
Yunus and other rheumatologists are of  the view that fibromyalgia is best concep-
tualised and classified as a central sensitivity syndrome (CSS).  This is where the 351
 Wessely, S., Nimnuan, C. and Sharpe, M. ‘Functional somatic syndromes: one or 349
many?’ in Lancet, 1999, Vol. 354, pp. 936-939; Incidentally, this paper sparked a debate 
(ongoing) between ‘splitters’ who believed in the usefulness of  divergent diagnoses and 
‘lumpers’ who argued for a broader category which acknowledged the wide overlap. For a 
recent summary of  these arguments, see Lacourt, T., Houtveen, J. and van Doornen, L. 
‘“Functional somatic syndromes, one or many?”: An answer by cluster analysis’ in The 
Journal of  Psychosomatic Research, 2013, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 6-11; It is for this reason - symp-
tom similarity and overlap in populations - that in this section I draw on the chronic fa-
tigue syndrome literature as readily as that of  fibromyalgia. 
 Wessely, S. and White, P. D. ‘In Debate: There is only one functional somatic syn350 -
drome’ in The British Journal of  Psychiatry, 2004, Vol. 185, No. 2, pp. 95-96.
 Yunus, M. B. ‘The Prevalence of  Fibromyalgia in Other Chronic Pain Conditions’ in 351
Pain Research and Treatment, 2011, No. 584573; Fleming, K. C., Volcheck, M. M. ‘Central 
Sensitisation Syndrome and the Initial Evaluation of  a Patient with Fibromyalgia: A Re-
view’ in Rambam Maimonides Medical Journal, 2015, Vol. 6, No. 2, e0020.
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central nervous system exaggerates pain across different bodily systems and gener-
ates a number of  debilitating symptoms as the body becomes hypersensitive to ex-
ternal stimuli.   352
These researchers also take a hard line against the language that is used to describe 
fibromyalgia patients in other fields, and Yunus argues (as I do in Chapter I) 
against the firm division of  ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ along biomedical lines:  
 
‘…differentiation between illness and disease is artificial and contrary to patient 
interest and hampers proper management of  CSS conditions, since anything that 
is not currently viewed as a disease (i.e., does not have structural pathology, e.g., 
inflammation, degeneration, or neoplasm) is viewed as predominantly or exclusive-
ly psychological and benign and is not taken seriously by the health care providers, 
accentuating the suffering of  the patients. In an irresponsible way, this untruthful 
“dogma” is passed down from the professor or the attending to the students, and 
the victims are our patients’.   353
 
Elsewhere he has stated: 
 
‘Patient-blaming terms like somatization, somatizer and catastrophizing should be 
avoided’.   354
 
 Hypersensitive in both the allodynic (pain from things which are ordinarily non-352
painful) and hyperalgesic (when mildly painful things are experienced as excruciating) 
senses. 
 Yunus, M. B. 2011, p. 1-2.353
 Yunus, M. B. ‘Editorial Review: An Update on Central Sensitivity Syndromes and the 354
Issues of  Nosology and Psychobiology’ in Current Rheumatology Reviews, 2015, Vol. 11, No. 
2, pp. 70-85.
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Regardless of  the validity of  their physiological explanations, and I don’t think I 
am in a position to pass judgement on that, Yunus and others like him recognise a 
key truth: the way the medical cards are dealt, the cards are stacked against pa-
tients with contested illnesses. Style matters. The language employed does have 
strongly negative connotations and the prestige hierarchy of  physical and psycho-
logical ailments is reinforced (intentionally or not) by its use. These writers are cer-
tainly correct to point this out, as well as to note that bracketing ‘disease’ in the 
manner that it is, excludes a whole range of  conditions from ascending to bona 
fide disease status with deleterious consequences for the patients involved. 
As might be expected, these thoughts are not echoed by all practitioners. Hadler 
states firmly that he believes this to be the wrong approach, dismissing central sen-
sitisation specifically as a ‘contrived neologism’.  The problems faced by patients 355
are largely iatrogenic, he argues, caused by ‘treatment acts, dripping with empty 
promises of  elucidation and unproved promises of  palliation’.  Indeed, Hadler 356
believes that telling patients they suffer from a distinct and diagnosable condition 
called fibromyalgia amounts to the clinically irresponsible ‘medicalisation of  mis-
ery’ and he is not alone in that, or similar, views.   357
Wolfe, for instance, believes that the controversy surrounding fibromyalgia (what 
he terms the ‘fibromyalgia wars’) is ‘best understood in terms of  medicalisation 
and social construction’.  In a later paper, he outlines his position as follows:  358
 Hadler, N. M. ‘Editorial: “Fibromyalgia” and the Medicalisation of  Misery’ in The 355
Journal of  Rheumatology, 2003, Vol. 30, No. 8, p. 1669.
 Ibid. 356
 Ibid., p. 1668; Ehrlich, G. E. ‘Pain is real; fibromyalgia isn’t’ in The Journal of  Rheuma357 -
tology, 2003, Vol. 30, No. 8, pp. 1666-1667; for responses to these viewpoints, which fur-
ther illustrate the range of  opinions held see ‘Letters’ in The Journal of  Rheumatology, 2004, 
Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 827-829.
 Wolfe, F. ‘Fibromyalgia wars’ in The Journal of  Rheumatology, 2009, Vol. 36, pp. 358
671-678.
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‘There is as yet no compelling evidence that an underlying central nervous system 
disturbance contributes in a substantial or clinically meaningful way to the devel-
opment of  fibromyalgia. In addition, neurobiological associations depend on fi-
bromyalgia being a discrete disorder, for which no evidence exists. Even if  fi-
bromyalgia is considered to be largely a psychocultural disorder, a strong body of  
criticism suggests that the definition of  fibromyalgia is arbitrary, and the methods 
of  assessment illusory’.  359
 
In other words, Wolfe and many doctors across rheumatology and other disciplines 
believe that fibromyalgia is not a separate clinical entity nor a useful diagnostic tool 
and its continued existence as a disease concept is largely the result of  social factors 
and not any underlying medical reality. Furthermore, the insistence on labelling 
non-distinct, vague symptoms as if  they were part of  a cohesive whole has the ef-
fect of  solidifying false illness beliefs, making patients sicker than they were before 
and impeding potentially effective treatment.  
Malleson also takes this view, but frames his skepticism about fibromyalgia around 
‘compensation neurosis’, the rise in injury payments and what he views as an un-
scrupulous welfare state that incentivises invalidity.  He writes dryly that ‘rather 360
than curing diseases, medicine is manufacturing new ones’.  361
Whether or not we should collect patients with seemingly disparate symptoms un-
der one diagnostic label, or indeed under a series of  diagnostic labels, is a difficult 
question to answer. I certainly have sympathy with those who question its validity 
 Wolfe, F. and Walitt, B. ‘Culture, science and the changing nature of  fibromyalgia’ in 359
Nature Reviews Rheumatology, 2013, Vol. 9, p. 751.
 Malleson, A. 2002, pp. 165-196; for a description and analysis of  ‘compensation neu360 -
rosis’, see Hall, Ryan C. W. and Hall, Richard C. W. 2012, pp. 390-398.
 Malleson, A. 2002, p. 172.361
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as a medical approach. What I do take umbrage with, however, is the suggestion 
that the ‘solution’ to this patient population (however they may be composed) is to 
remove social security benefits and medical nomenclature. My disagreement stems 
from the fact that, as we shall see, many individuals receive neither welfare pay-
ments nor diagnosis for years, and yet their symptoms persist. These are patients 
for whom an eventual diagnosis comes as a surprise, and for whom the label ‘fi-
bromyalgia’ is of  limited utility; they are surprised because they were expecting 
something specific and physical - a viral infection, an autoimmune dysfunction - 
and underwhelmed because of  the dearth of  information available about fi-
bromyalgia and its lack of  cachet as a responsibility-absolving diagnosis.  
Returning to professional perceptions, on the part of  general practitioners and 
specialists who come into contact with fibromyalgia, survey data is scarce but it 
would appear to suggest that a majority support a psychosomatic view of  the con-
dition.  A small minority regard it as a ‘non-disease’ and some rheumatologists 362
refuse to receive referrals or provide ongoing care for patients with the diagnosis.  363
Evidence also shows that experienced doctors across a variety of  countries lack 
confidence in diagnosing and treating fibromyalgia, especially in relation to making 
a differential diagnosis, and that that find fibromyalgia patients frustrating to 
 A small study of  rheumatologists in Canada reported that 55% believed fibromyalgia 362
to be primarily psychosomatic rather than physiological: Ghazan-Shahi, S., Towheed, T. 
and Hopman, W. ‘Should rheumatologists retain ownership of  fibromyalgia? A survey of  
Ontario rheumatologists’ in Clinical Rheumatology, 2012, Vol. 31, No. 8, pp. 1177-1181; 
another Canadian survey of  different specialists reported the with regard to aetiology, 
28% thought fibromyalgia was primarily psychological, 23%, primarily physiological, 
15% psychological and physiological, and 34% were unsure: Busse, J. W., Kulkarni, A. V., 
Badwall, P. and Guyatt, G. H. ‘Attitudes towards fibromyalgia: A survey of  Canadian chi-
ropractic, naturopathic, physical therapy and occupational therapy students’ in BMC 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2008, Vol. 8, No. 24, doi: 10.1186/1472-6882-8-24.
 8% of  respondents to a BMJ survey regarded fibromyalgia as a ‘non-disease’: ‘What 363
do you think is a non-disease?’ in The British Medical Journal, 2002, Vol. 324, p. 7334; 
Kraag, G. ‘Fibromyalgia’ in Mosher, D., Stein, H. and Kraag, G. (eds.) Living well with 
arthritis, 2002, Viking Press, Canada, pp. 55-64.
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treat.  A study by Album and Westin also suggested that doctors regard fi364 -
bromyalgia as less ‘prestigious’ than other diseases, placing it bottom of  a hierarchy 
of  38 conditions.  365
I could go on, such is the multiplicity of  opinion and clinician perspectives that ex-
ists on this topic (and indeed related topics), but endlessly mapping the various 
lines in the sand that have been drawn over the last few decades will simply serve 
to make the same point over and over again: fibromyalgia is a terribly convoluted 
and tangled affair.  
It is inevitable, I surmise, that such an interwoven conflict of  diagnostic reliability, 
clinical pragmatism and aetiological ambiguity will continue unless wholesale epis-
temic change is enacted across the medical world and conditions of  this sort - sub-
jective, symptomatic - come to be regarded as valid disease entities despite their 
 Perrot, S., Choy, E., Petersel, D., Ginovker, A. and Kramer, E. ‘Survey of  physician 364
experiences and perceptions about the diagnosis and treatment of  fibromyalgia’ in British 
Medical Council Health Services Research, 2012, Vol. 12, No. 356, doi: 10.1186/1472-6963-12-
356; this frustration stems in part from what doctors view as a damaging preoccupation 
with multiple, vague symptoms, as well as the perception amongst patients about the great 
impact of  their condition upon their lives: Walker, E. A. et al ‘Predictors of  physician frus-
tration in the care of  patients with rheumatological complaints’ in General Hospital Psychia-
try, 1997, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 315-323; Homma, M., Ishikawa, H. and Kiuchi, T. ‘Associa-
tion of  physicians’ illness perception of  fibromyalgia with frustration and resistance to ac-
cepting patients: a cross-sectional study’ in Clinical Rheumatology, 2016, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 
1019-1027. 
 This ‘prestige hierarchy’ was arrived at as follows: ‘Respondents were asked to rank 365
these 38 diseases and 23 specialities individually on a scale of  1 (lowest prestige) to 9 
(highest prestige), based on how they believed most health personnel would rank them. 
The wording of  the question was for the prestige of  diseases (in translation): “Below you 
will find a list of  38 diseases or disease categories. Please give each disease a number 
based on the prestige you imagine it has among health personnel. A disease you feel is 
considered to have a low prestige should be given a low number, the lower the prestige, 
the lower the number. Oppositely, a disease you feel have a high prestige should be given 
a high number, the higher the prestige, the higher the number. Please circle the number 
you choose”’; Album, D., and Westin, S. 2008, pp. 182-188.
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clear incompatibility with biomedical methods of  ratification.  Should this 366
change not be forthcoming, and the evidence is that it is slow to do so, then un-
doubtedly such conflicts will continue.  
What is likely then, is that patients will continue to meet a range of  reactions in 
both the clinic and on the street. There being, as described above, no completely 
or even partially established ‘medical’ view, the response that patients receive can 
be incredibly diverse. The most damaging of  these from the patient’s perspective is 
that of  disbelief  or suspicion. As Harth has written: 
‘…patients with fibromyalgia have to shoulder a burden seldom borne by individ-
uals with other medical conditions. Fibromyalgia sufferers are frequently not per-
ceived as having a distressing condition…patients with fibromyalgia seeking help 
from their physicians may encounter hostility, skepticism, confusion and therapeu-
tic nihilism’.   367
Harth also notes that ‘their families, their friends and their coworkers are often 
sceptical of  their symptoms or their functional impairment’.  This atmosphere of  368
disbelief  and the discrediting of  an individual as a producer and communicator of  
knowledge has been analysed from an epistemic perspective by a number of  au-
 Or, it should be noted, unless the conditions in question can be more successfully as366 -
similated into biomedical structures through the discovery of  some pathogen or other 
physiological process.
 Harth, M. ‘Cursing the darkness: Reactions to fibromyalgia’ in Pain Research and Man367 -
agement, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 64.
 Ibid.368
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thors, most notably Fricker, under the banner of  ‘epistemic injustice’.  This, by 369
now a multifarious concept in possession of  various subdivisions, can for our pur-
poses here be simplified: it is a state in which a speaker’s credibility is diminished or 
erased due largely to prejudice on the part of  the listener. Lying at the juncture of  
epistemology and ethics, epistemic injustice can be used to understand how com-
munication can be stacked for and against certain parties, and the damage that can 
arise from such arrangements.  
Originally, this concept was used to bring attention to the ways in which the gen-
der and race of  the speaker, among other irreducible features of  a person’s identity, 
might lead to the systematic devaluing of  their perspective and the discounting of  
any epistemic contributions an individual thought or was required to make in a 
given situation. Recently, however, it has been expanded and applied to medical 
contexts.  
Carel, Blease, Kidd and others have argued that it is especially applicable in 
healthcare settings, both in regard to the doctor/patient dynamic (the ‘encounter’) 
and also to broader issues of  medical training and policymaking.  Epistemic in370 -
justice can result not only in bad interpersonal relations (no-one enjoys being pa-
tronised or ignored), but also in the missing or misinterpreting of  key information 
because the epistemically privileged individual has chosen to interpret the experi-
ences of  another entirely through a framework that undermines the credibility of  
the patient’s communication. What is of  relevance to our discussion here is the 
 Note that Fricker does not explore the medical aspect of  epistemic injustice: Fricker, 369
M. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the ethics of  knowing, 2007, Oxford University Press, UK; see 
also Hookway, C. ‘Some varieties of  epistemic injustice: response to Fricker’ in Episteme, 
2010, Vol. 7, pp. 151-163 and Coady, D. ‘Two concepts of  epistemic injustice’ in Episteme, 
2010, Vol. 7, pp. 101-113.
 Blease, C., Carel, H. and Geraghty, K. ‘Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: 370
evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome’ in The Journal of  Medical Ethics, 2016, Vol. 0, pp. 
1-9, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103691; Kidd, I. J. and Carel, H. ‘Epistemic Injustice 
and Illness’ in The Journal of  Applied Philosophy, 2017, Vol. 34, No. 2, doi: 10.1111/japp.
12172.
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ways in which patients with contested illnesses experience and deal with epistemic 
injustice and how this comes to pass.   
What should be evident by now, and certainly will be evident by the end of  this 
chapter, is that the fibromyalgia patient reporting debilitating pain is not afforded 
the same epistemic status as an individual with, say, gallstone problems would 
be.  That this occurs both in the clinical context and outside, and that it can fluc371 -
tuate over time in relation to external events (‘belief  turns to disbelief  as when tests 
come back normal’), is of  great interest to us here.  Routinely, as we shall see, 372
their self-reporting of  symptoms and pleas for sympathy are filtered by doctors and 
those around them in a manner which diminishes their severity and shifts the 
moral onus from external dysfunction to individual responsibility once it becomes 
apparent that their problems stem from fibromyalgia rather than some other, more 
acceptable source.  
It is this, the broad reaction to fibromyalgia and all its attendant consequences for 
individual patients, that will be the focus of  this chapter. In order to flesh out or 
bring to life some of  the conflicts and confusions discussed above, I will present the 
experiences of  three patients I interviewed. The variation present in their stories 
will hopefully elucidate some of  the more tricky aspects of  this subject: their symp-
toms, the meanings they are given by themselves and others, the bureaucratic and 
medical pillar-to-posting involved, the compromised and transformed sense of  self  
and surroundings…these can all be seen most starkly when shown through the 
lives of  real patients. In the following section I present three illuminative patient 
profiles, drawn from my semi-structured interviews with the patient community. 
 
 This particular form of  epistemic injustice is referred to as ‘testimonial’.371
 The quote is from the movie Voices from the shadows, directed by Josh Biggs and Natalie 372
Boulton, also used as an example by Carel in Carel, H. 2016b, p. 186.
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Three patients 
Lucy worked for twenty five years for what was the Department for Social Security 
and is now the Department for Work and Pensions in a job centre before she was 
forced to leave due to ill health.  Initially, she had been to see her doctor about 373
some lower back pain, but the scans they completed came back negative. Following 
this, her wrists and hands began to hurt and the doctors suspected that she might 
have RSI. Then: 
 
‘…other bits started aching and being problematic and I was going in quite a lot. 
The doctors thought it was in my head, that it was depression, that I was feeling 
low which I wasn’t. I was just getting fed up with not being able to do things’.  
 
Prior to these complaints, Lucy had led an active life, playing sports and exercising 
frequently. She felt frustrated by the increasing limitations that her mysterious 
symptoms were placing her under. Eventually she got a diagnosis:  
 
‘I was referred to a chronic pain consultant and he was the one who said it was fi-
bromyalgia, which I’d never heard of. All the key points were hurting and the 
symptoms fitted in with that. He pieced everything together’.  
 
Having a name to put to her symptoms allowed Lucy to conduct research, and 
past events began to congeal into a coherent illness narrative for her. Recounting 
her personal history, she placed salience on two traumatic events that occurred 
within quick succession of  each other: a bad car accident that required treatment 
and divorce from her husband. Lucy now believes that within nine months of  these 
 All names have been changed. See Methodology for details.373
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things happening she began to develop pain across her body. The pain itself  is bad 
but she has found ways to manage it. If  she has a flare up, it can take a while for 
the worsened symptoms to return to normal, and though the they never leave her 
entirely, she has developed coping mechanisms which she tries to employ as dili-
gently as possible. Still, it is often a case of  simply ‘muddling’ through.  
Since her diagnosis, Lucy’s experiences with doctors have not been overly positive. 
Largely she has found GPs to be unsympathetic, treating her as if  she is wasting 
their time and occasionally appearing to induce guilt on her behalf  because of  the 
expense of  long-term treatment:  
 
‘A GP called me in to up my medication but purely on the basis that it was around 
twenty pound a box cheaper than the medication I was on. He went through the 
cost of  it and how much I was costing the surgery. You feel like a drain on their re-
sources and blooming angry as well. I didn’t actually want to increase my medica-
tion but you’re just kind of  thrown into it’. 
 
Feeling pressured in this way was not the only poor communication Lucy had with 
her doctors. In other instances she struggled to get them to appreciate that she felt 
she knew her body well enough to act as a competent translator:  
 
‘You have to prove yourself  all the time and say well yes, this really does hurt. Es-
pecially when they say it’s depression. I’ve suffered from depression in the past, I 
know what it’s like and no, this is a pain, it’s really hurting me. I’ve had other pains 
that aren’t fibro and I told him it wasn’t the same but he said “we’ll add another 
tablet in, it must be the fibro”. Trying to distinguish and tell them that no, it’s 
something different, is met with the cop-out that it must all be fibro, off  you go, 
you’ll be fine. People just aren’t listening to what you’re saying and you’re just la-
!215
belled as someone with chronic pain symptoms’.  
 
The GP surgery is not the sole location that Lucy found it difficult to get the way 
that she was feeling across to a professional in a manner that she deemed accept-
able. After trying and failing to find further, more flexible employment, she found 
herself  back at the job centre she had left due to sickness, for a disability assess-
ment. She felt that throughout her appraisal she was made to feel as if  they re-
garded her condition as one which could be alleviated through willpower:  
 
‘The chap I saw there went on about people who have lost their limbs and how 
they use their mind to get rid of  the phantom limb pain and that. He was sort of  
implying that it was all in my head and that I should be able to use my mind to 
control all of  these pains. It wasn’t until I burst into tears and argued back about 
fibro that he changed his opinion. He still put fibro in inverted commas as if  it 
wasn’t a real illness though, which did rather annoy me’.  
 
In what will become a reoccurring motif  in this chapter, Lucy bristles at the sug-
gestion that her symptoms are in her head - that is to say controllable, somehow 
invented.  She recounts lying in bed, crying in pain and wishing that those people 374
who doubt her could see her, so that they can see the evident distress she is in. ‘You 
try living with this’, she says to these people, ‘I’m not making it up’.  
Despite this anger at her treatment and desire for greater recognition of  her dis-
comfort, Lucy tries to maintain a positive outlook, and believes that this assists her 
 There is perhaps some confusion on this point. When medical professions use the 374
terms ‘all in your head’ or similar, they may well mean to say that the pain is real and 
that, though the cause is psychological rather than physiological, the patient bears no re-
sponsibility for it. However, this is not the way such statements are interpreted by patients, 
who receive the message as if  they have been accused of  having agency in relation to 
their symptoms.
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in dealing with her symptoms:  
 
‘I could be miserable every day if  I wanted to be. It doesn’t do anyone any help. It 
doesn’t help me to be miserable and dwell on things so that’s why I don’t want to. 
It’s very easy to be depressed when you’re feeling that, really, half  of  your life has 
gone and that the person you were before has disappeared. I just want to get on 
with trying to cope with it’.  
 
It is this attitude that she takes with her into a local fibromyalgia support group, of  
which she is treasurer. Here, too, they try not to dwell and rather focus on sharing 
palliative solutions and organising events to raise money. Lucy is simultaneously 
resigned to her fate and taking regular steps to alleviate it, a common bind for 
chronically ill patients. She doesn’t fear that it is fatal, has her own understanding 
of  what the disease means and has altered her life as much as possible to cope with 
the disjunction it has caused. Samuel’s story is quite different. 
His symptoms have a distinct starting point. He was attacked from behind in the 
street in an unprovoked assault. Samuel told me he was ‘lucky enough’ to pass out 
quickly, but later was shown CCTV of  the attackers striking his head with bottles 
until they smashed. He was admitted to hospital that night, his ‘nose broke, bed 
covered in blood’. Despite this, when his wife came to see him he checked himself  
out, not realising the severity of  his condition. Within a week he noticed a dramat-
ic deterioration in his motor skills and found himself  unable to complete simple 
tasks like opening the door of  his car. Further tests revealed a massive blood clot, 
and doctors sought permission from Samuel to write up his case in a journal as 
they had never before seen such a large clot in that area of  the brain in someone 
still alive. It was successfully removed, but this was not the end of  Samuel’s prob-
lems. 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Initially it seemed as if  he was on track to make a full recovery. He was able to get 
a job as a support worker in social care, helping young people with behavioural 
problems, and he tried to put the attack behind him. In time, however, his symp-
toms did not disappear but rather began to multiply and worsen. He would get 
spasms down the left hand side of  his spine and at the top of  his neck, pains in his 
legs, was ‘fatigued all the time, constantly tired’ and ‘never seemed to get a proper 
sleep’. Often, he would ‘wake up half  an hour after going to sleep, in a cold sweat’. 
Seizures and memory problems became a reality of  daily life that Samuel had to 
adjust to.  
He found the response from the GP unhelpful. They prescribed painkillers, build-
ing and diversifying the dose until he felt that his house was ‘like a chemist’ but do-
ing little to alleviate his symptoms. ‘All they do is give you tablets’, he said, ‘med-
icate, medicate, medicate’. The problems he reported were also met with scepti-
cism:  
 
‘My GP told me that if  I ignored it it would go away. And that they didn’t believe 
in fibromyalgia. I said “well, the pain I’m in…I’m not imagining the pain”. I 
wasn’t getting anywhere with him and it was really depressing me. I’m in so much 
pain and the doctors were telling me to just ignore it’.  
 
It became hard at times for Samuel to distinguish between which symptoms were 
emanating from his body and which were being induced by the significant amount 
of  medication he was taking. Night tremors interrupted his sleep even more and he 
became increasingly light-sensitive and resorted to keeping the blinds down in his 
house so that he could get some relief. In response to the latter of  these problems, 
he now wears glasses with an anti-glare coating to afford him a little respite from 
bright light. Both of  these symptoms he initially put down to the drugs he had 
been prescribed, but finds it understandably difficult to untangle causality in a 
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body so racked by strange symptoms and ingesting so many painkillers.  
He also started having frequent seizures. The following situation might make clear 
the frightening and disorienting nature of  Samuel’s condition: 
 
‘I was in the house when I woke up and I was covered in sweat and I don’t know if  
I’d had a seizure or what happened but I’d run up the stairs to the toilet and the 
next thing I know I’d woke up on the floor and I’d banged my head and I had 
massive lumps on both sides. I had a temperature but I don’t know how it hap-
pened. I’d also urinated when I’d collapsed up the stairs’.  
 
Whilst at work he suffered another seizure and had to take a fortnight off, during 
which time he remained mostly on the sofa, only rising to use the bathroom. His 
symptoms during this time accord with what many fibromyalgia patients refer to as 
a ‘flare up’: his ‘muscles were agony all over…like [he’d] been beaten’. He was able 
to return to work but lost his driving licence as a result of  the seizure.  
This was to prove costly, as his employment then deemed him to have frustrated 
his contract as a result of  becoming unable to drive. Not able to work, at least in 
the short term, he decided to apply for a Personal Independence Payment, which 
involved an hour and a half  drive to the nearest centre:  
 
‘My wife was taking me. They were asking me questions like, “how did you get 
here?”, to which I said, “my wife drove me”. Then asking me if  I could count, ask-
ing me to spell things backwards. I actually got it wrong, and then I got confused 
and then eventually got it right. They were asking me, “if  you paid a pound…” 
and all these questions about the change. These were the kinds of  questions they 
were asking me. I told them about my symptoms. I had the doctor’s report, the 
neurologist’s report, my rheumatology report. When I got home I got a letter say-
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ing basically I got zero points altogether, that I had made my way there using map-
reading, that there was nothing wrong with me and that I was fit to work’. 
Samuel noted with dark irony that though he was declared fit to work by the au-
thorities, it was essentially on health grounds that he had become unemployed in 
the first place. His desire to work has not been diminished, but he feels the stigma 
of  the job centre: ‘they look on it like you don’t want to work. I do want to work, I 
want a normal life. I don’t want to be in the house the whole time, I want to go out 
and provide for my family’.  
Samuel’s experiences are a harrowing example of  the transformational nature of  
disease. His life has been, perhaps permanently, altered beyond recognition. Before 
he was attacked he worked two jobs and described himself  as ‘constantly active, 
very fit’ with a ‘positive outlook on life’. In short, he has gone from being ‘a really 
happy person’ to one in the grips of  despair, unsure of  where to look for help and 
what steps to take towards recovery. ‘It’s got to the stage now’, he says, ‘where I’m 
unemployed, not entitled to anything…I don’t know where to turn. With the in-
come coming into the household, I’m basically just above the breadline’.  
Clearly, multiple anxieties converge upon a case such as Samuel’s: the frustrated 
ambitions of  modestly providing for and raising a family and putting food on the 
table alongside a life now constricted and squeezed by medical realities, all the time 
in the shadow of  mysterious and humiliating symptoms.  
Samuel has found that singing in the choir his sister runs alleviates his problems, if  
only for a short time. When he sings, he feels the muscles in his back relax, and the 
pain leaves his body momentarily. Typical of  the explanatory void in which fi-
bromyalgia patients must lives their lives, he is unsure of  why or how this happens, 
but glad that it does.  
Lauren’s experience is more ordinary than Samuel’s, but her life no less reconsti-
tuted by illness. Her introduction to the condition was more gradual, as she found 
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herself  repeatedly getting ill without explanation or proper recovery. She contract-
ed a serious chest infection lasted for four months and from there the symptoms 
worsened and spread, despite the use of  steroids and antibiotics. Lauren began to 
hassle the doctors, telling them that she believed the pain was getting more severe: 
she was getting aches in her lower back and her right arm and shoulder seemed 
permanently sore. As she explains, it was hard work getting a referral:  
 
‘It was a constant badgering, going to the doctors every week and saying I feel real-
ly ill. Nothing seemed to fit the pain. He’d done the blood tests and everything. 
Nothing came back, it was all clear. It took two years to get him to let me see 
somebody’.  
 
In the end, she was sent to see a rheumatologist, who diagnosed her within ten 
minutes as having fibromyalgia, giving her a name if  not a complete explanation 
for what she was going through.  
Lauren’s experience here is fairly standard of  the patients I interviewed, and it of-
fers clues as to why some doctors dread dealing with fibromyalgia patients. She’s 
clearly in pain, but the pain is widespread, nonspecific and nonobservable. The GP 
thinks that they know what she is going to say before she comes in the door: that 
this hurts and that hurts and why can’t they do something about it? No doubt the 
medical professional feels somewhat helpless to aide such patients, who in turn feel 
frustrated that it seems as if  the doctors are ignoring or downplaying their symp-
toms. Lauren recognises the difficulties faced by doctors, and shares in their frus-
trating ignorance: ‘they just don’t know what to do. They have no knowledge of  
fibromyalgia, and that’s the hardest part’.  
Once she got a diagnosis and learnt a little more about the condition through per-
sonal research, Lauren thought back through her life and began to see a clear pat-
!221
tern of  tiredness, pain and infections. She now believes that these problems 
stemmed directly from sexual abuse she suffered as a child at the hands of  her 
brothers and brother-in-law. We can see here what Hacking means when he talks 
about ‘making up people’: before her diagnosis, Lauren had been the victim of  
abuse as a child and then subsequently yet separately lived a life frequently inter-
rupted by illness, which cumulated in her lengthy chest infection and the search for 
its explanation. Now, diagnosis in hand, she is able to make sense of  her personal 
history in a new way, and events in her life that previously were explained away or 
forgotten clot around a new, all-encompassing explanation. This is not to say that 
in some way that her beliefs are correct, it is just to say that before she became 
aware of  the category fibromyalgia, the inferences and connections she now draws 
between things that have happened to her had no soil in which to grow. 
However, there were still times she doubted her label. Mostly this was due to the 
many-faced nature of  what she was experiencing: how could all these symptoms 
belong to the same thing? ‘The pain was in my shoulders’, she said, ‘down my 
neck, down my back, everywhere. And I was incontinent. I thought, this can’t just 
be fibromyalgia. But that’s what I was told, that there are many elements to it. And 
that’s how it works’. 
The pain became so much of  an issue for Lauren that she had to give up work. 
She was always someone who worked, sometimes up to three jobs at the same 
time, and this change of  lifestyle has been hard to swallow. Lauren talks of  an utter 
transformation:  
 
‘It’s just changed me completely. I’m stuck in the house. I go out twice a week for 
shopping and that’s it. I’m not the person I used to be at all. It has forced me into 
something, somebody that I’m not. And it’s very difficult when you’ve always been 
an active person. I feel like I’m missing out on life. People see me and think she 
looks well but they really don’t know what’s going on inside. I come home and cry 
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for no reason. I sit and cry and there’s no reason whatsoever for it’. 
 
Lauren’s is not the only life left unrecognisable by her condition. Her husband, 
Gary, has become not just a partner but a full-time carer. He says ‘I basically don’t 
know who I’m going to get when I come home. There’s no social life. And basically 
she’s always…’, his voice trails off  before he says, ‘she tends to require me all the 
time’.  
Gary admits that he was sceptical for some time about his wife’s health issues. ‘It 
took me about twelve months’, he says, ‘to get over the idea that she was faking it. 
It was very difficult to understand the illness’. Now, though, he recognises in his 
wife a genuine dysfunction, and his concern is to care for her and to assist her in 
getting recognition and support from the state. He has been disappointed by what 
he views as the cynical attitude of  those who determine whether or not she is eligi-
ble for social security payments:  
 
‘It took a long time to get disability allowance and even now we’re getting home 
visits basically looking at ways of  taking money off  her. You only have to tell some-
one who comes to visit that you can walk so many feet and they’ll take the money 
off  you. Before this happened, I always thought it would be your worst case scenar-
ios that they would take into account’. 
 
I have drawn these three vignettes for the simple purpose of  adding flesh and 
sinew to the dry bones of  aetiology, diagnosis and pathogenesis, in order to show 
the ways in which theoretical conflicts and ambiguities play out in the lives of  those 
in pain. Even from the short overview presented here of  Lucy, Samuel and Lauren 
we can appreciate the complexity and frustration present in fibromyalgia, both on 
the part of  the patient and on that of  the doctor. We can also see clearly that the 
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arguments about diagnosis are not baseless, and that establishing a positive manner 
of  diagnosing is nearly impossible at present. This is evident from the stories I have 
presented above: Samuel and Lauren are quite different in symptomatic presenta-
tion and the series of  events that led to their problems are far removed, yet they 
still received the same diagnosis. It would seem fair to say that they have both re-
ceived diagnoses of  exclusion. Evident too is the swirling cloud of  validation, legit-
imacy, stigma and epistemic injustice that seems to surround fibromyalgia patients: 
each of  the three talked of  being disbelieved, being suspected, being talked down 
to.  
All of  the examples presented above could be classified under Frank’s scheme (dis-
cussed in Chapter I) as ‘chaos’ narratives, stories of  individuals who have lost faith 
in the direction or substance of  their condition, who begin to see no end to their 
symptoms. These individuals try to live day-by-day rather than indulge in thoughts 
of  recovery, not because they would not like to recover but because they see little 
evidence to suggest that they will.  
In the remainder of  this chapter I will look at these issues and others in more de-
tail, bringing into play the rest of  my conversations with patients. 
Pain and other symptoms 
If  there is one, central locus of  fibromyalgia, it is pain. Underlying the headaches, 
interrupted sleep and forgotten words on the tips of  tongues is the near-constant 
presence of  bodily discomfort - aching muscles and searing joints. In this section I 
would like to examine this amorphous problem from a philosophical viewpoint. 
Generally speaking, pain is regarded as perhaps the archetypical example in dis-
cussions of  solipsism, assessing the existence of  internal states, scepticism about 
private language and the like.  Indeed, the philosophical tradition of  pain goes 375
 Carel, H. 2016b, p. 123.375
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back millennia: what I would like to bring attention to in this section is the specific 
problems that pain in contested illnesses poses in contemporary settings.  376
It strikes me that the questions we should ask of  pain in relation to fibromyalgia 
are the following: how do patients describe and communicate their pain? - does 
this tell us what the pain is like or something else? - what is our reaction to the pain, 
as in, why the air of  scepticism and the apparent downplaying of  severity? - where 
do we think the pain comes from and why is this important? - and how do these 
questions relate to each other? The problem of  pain as it relates to fibromyalgia is 
about belief  and the conflict between medical and personal methods of  communi-
cating information about the body. 
I doubt greatly that many fibromyalgia patients would take issue with René 
Leriche’s description of  pain as an object which is ‘always purposeless’.  Certain377 -
ly, it is something they could do without.  Two factors converge in the descrip378 -
tions of  pain that I heard from patients: its excruciating severity and its om-
 I am not alone in thinking this is a pressing concern. Rita Charon said in 2016 that 376
‘unremitting pain is…our contemporary central dilemma’ as quoted in Padfield, D. and 
Zakrewska, J. M. ‘Encountering Pain’ in The Lancet, 2017, Vol. 389, pp. 1177-1178; on a 
side note, an interesting question for which we do not have the space to consider: in light 
of  what has been discussed thus far in relation to identity and the socially-influenced me-
diation of  experience, can we discuss pain as a historically consistent entity? In the same 
way in which I said on p. 134 that an identical act five hundred years apart (having sex 
with a man) is rendered fundamentally different by the social architecture which struc-
tures our interpretations, memory and indeed experiences of  events, could it not be said 
that the pain Montaigne or Epictetus endured was somehow a distinct object from that 
which I feel when I stub my toe? Or have we not changed?
 Leriche quoted in Buytendijk, F. J. J. Pain, 1971, Greenwood Press Inc., USA, p. 161.377
 Though perhaps not completely. Patients with a total inability to feel pain (congenital 378
insensitivity to pain with anhidrosis) very often live difficult, truncated lives, and even re-
gional insensitivity to pain can cause serious problems, as in peripheral diabetic neuropa-
thy, where amputation after the fact is often not enough to save patients lives. See: 
Daneshjou, K., Jafareih, H. and Raaeskarami, S. ‘Congenital Insensitivity to Pain and 
Anhydrosis (CIPA); A Report of  4 Cases’ in The Iran Journal of  Paediatrics, 2012, Vol. 22, 
No. 3, pp. 412-416 and Pendsey, S. P. ‘Understanding diabetic foot’ in The International 
Journal of  Diabetes in Developing Countries, 2010, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 75-79.
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nipresence. Painkillers, lifestyle changes and meticulous planning all appeared to 
help individuals moderate the symptom but none would eliminate it entirely. Many 
spoke of  the pain pulsing through their bodies twenty four hours a day, seven days 
a week, and the metaphors that some chose to use to illustrate their experiences 
speak of  a group of  people who firmly believe that what they are going through is 
without precedent in their pre-illness lives: 
 
‘What’s the pain like? Gnawing. It’s constant. It’s always there. It’s kinda part of…I 
say it’s part of  who I am now’.  
 
‘What I can only describe as, it feels like, if  someone put a candle under your skin. 
It feels like you’re almost on fire from inside. I know it’s weird describing it like that 
but that’s kind of  what it feels like, that you’re actually burning from the inside out. 
It’s everywhere, it never goes’. 
‘If  someone said to me there was a pain like it I would have possibly told them it’s 
not true. Well you know what, there is pain like it. It’s horrible’.  
In recounting their journeys from health to patienthood, it often seemed to me as 
if  the pain began at a specific location, like in their lower back or down the side of  
one arm. However, as the search for a diagnosis wore on, the stories I was hearing 
from patients started to use more general terms. The pain had ceased to have a lo-
cation and begun to spread, to the point where for many of  the individuals I spoke 
with it was everywhere, in every system of  the body. 
This symptomatic profile has a limiting effect on people’s lives. That is to say, it re-
shapes what they are able to do on a day to day basis, but also on how they plan 
for their future. Chronic pain and its treatment seeps into many different aspects of  
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a person’s life and changes the way they view possibilities. One patient, for exam-
ple, spoke frankly about the fear that her symptoms might restrict her ability to 
raise children:  
 
‘I don’t know if  I could have children. I’m sure I could physically, as far as I know 
I’m fertile and stuff, but could I come off  my medication for nine months? Because 
I can’t take the stuff  I’m taking while pregnant, it’s dangerous. I’d have to come off  
that. And then lifting the child…if  I do that it only makes it worse the next day 
and make the tiredness really bad. Because you need to physically look after a 
child…you can’t just lie in bed all day if  you’ve got kids’.  
 
As I listened to patients talk about their symptoms and their consequences, I began 
to think often of  the poverty of  language in relation to pain and fibromyalgia. It is 




The trouble of  conveying pain has, of  course, famously been explored before, but 
it did not lead me in this instance to think about beetles in boxes. Or, at least, not 
straight away. I was first drawn towards the question of  legitimacy in pain being a 
straightforward issue of  inadequate communication.  If  patients could not trans379 -
late their pain into accessible forms for others, would this go some way to explain-
ing the lack of  compassion they routinely received?  
Certainly, a lot of  the patients I spoke with suggested that unless you had the con-
dition yourself, you would never truly understand what it felt like. ‘Only people 
with the condition’, said one patient, ‘can understand how somebody feels’. ‘People 
 Rather than a grander problem of  language itself, à la Wittgenstein: see Wittgenstein, 379
L. Philosophical Investigations, 2009, 4th ed., Wiley-Blackwell, UK.
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don’t understand what it’s like’, said another, ‘they don’t understand the amount of  
pain’.  
There is a precedent here: fibromyalgia patients are not the only ones who have 
had issues communicating their symptoms. Many people with different conditions 
have likewise found the tools available to them inadequate for the task of  getting 
others to understand how it is they are feeling. 
Throughout the 1990s, Mark Collen suffered immense and chronic pain after her-
niating a disk in his lower back, causing long term nerve damage. He struggled to 
articulate how he was feeling to his practitioner and felt that the vision of  true pain 
which he held both in his head and, against his will, in his back was obscured be-
hind a clunky and inexpressive linguistic medium. In desperation, he turned to art 
as a method of  conveying his symptoms visually. This form of  representation actu-
ally improved the treatment he received as the doctors felt they better understood 
what was happening in Mark’s body and how it was making him feel. Buoyed by 
this success, he founded The Pain Exhibit at the turn of  the new millennium, an on-
line collection of  artworks produced by those in pain.  It aims to educate health380 -
care providers and the general public as to the unspoken and unspeakable nature 
of  some illnesses, and though a fair number of  them are harrowing, what is more 
striking is the directness with which they portray pain. These are not allusions to 
hidden disquiet, they are visceral demonstrations of  agony, and they illustrate more 
than anything the penury of  language when it comes to describing physical misery.  
Spurred on by this work and others, researchers since have tried to test the utility 
of  using non-verbal communication tools in clinical settings, mostly through the 
employment of  visual aides developed in conjunction with patients. The success of  
such approaches has been mixed, but what is of  interest here is that their motiva-
tions emerge from the same problem: we struggle to talk about pain in a way that 
 http://painexhibit.org/en/ archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/380
6s5GCCb2W.
!228
other people understand.  381
Virginia Woolf  decried this exact issue nearly a century ago. ‘English’, she stated, 
‘has all grown one way’: towards romance and psychology and schemes, greed and 
jealousy, power and attraction.  Little attention is given to the body, which ‘all 382
day, all night…intervenes’. Indeed, ‘the merest school girl, when she falls in love, 
has Shakespeare, Donne, Keats to speak her mind for her; but let a sufferer try to 
describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry’. It would 
appear that we have not expanded our means of  expression sufficiently in the years 
since.   383
For writers like Scarry, it is not illness in general but pain specifically where our 
language is unable to bear the load placed upon it.  There is a fissure between 384
the irrepressible veracity of  being in pain and the detached uncertainty of  viewing 
others in apparently similar situations. As she writes: ‘to have pain is to have cer-
tainty; to hear about pain is to have doubt’.   385
Part of  this doubt comes down to the bluntness or inappropriateness of  the tools 
 For example: Main, S. ‘Picturing pain: using creative methods to communicate the 381
experience of  chronic pain’ in Pain News, 2014, Vol 12, No. 1, pp. 32-35; Padfield, D., Za-
krzewska, J. M. and Williams, A. C. C. ‘Do photographic images of  pain improve com-
munication during pain consultations?’ in Pain Research and Management, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 
3, pp. 123-128.
 Woolf, V. On Being Ill, 2002, Paris Press, USA.382
 It is not just a problem of  the English language, either. Canguilhem writes (in French): 383
‘It is impossible for the physician, starting from the accounts of  sick men, to understand 
the experience lived by the sick man, for what sick men express in ordinary concepts is 
not directly their experience but their interpretation of  an experience for which they have 
been deprived of  adequate concepts’, in Canguilhem, G. The Normal and the Pathological, 
1991, Zone Books, USA, p. 115.
 Scarry, E. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of  the World, 1985, Oxford Univer384 -
sity Press, USA; see also Neilson, S. ‘Pain as metaphor: metaphor and medicine’ in Med-
ical Humanities, 2015, Vol. 1-8, doi: 10.1136/medhum-2015-010672.
 Scarry, E. 1985, p. 13.385
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we employ. Scarry takes particular issue with the metaphors commonly used by 
those in pain, and splits them into two types: patients, she says, talk of  either an 
‘external agent’ or of  ‘bodily damage’. The former frames pain in imagery of  at-
tack from or damage sustained as a result of  something coming from outside: a 
hammer, a drill, a knife, a flame. The latter discusses pain in terms of  broken 
bones, twisted muscles, aching organs. Neither of  these approaches, argues Scarry, 
provide the listener with an ‘identical’ description of  pain. They are rather refer-
ents or associative images that approximate a nonreferential process. That is to say, 
their use separates our vision and understanding of  the pain from the pain itself: 
we visualise the hammer or the broken bone rather than placing the pain in its ac-
tual context, no matter how nebulous it might appear to us. 
This being true, it is still possible to impart a portion of  our physical experience to 
others through imagery; we are not entirely impoverished linguistically, and I am 
in no doubt that the more articulate among us can paint vivid pictures of  their in-
terior landscapes. Certainly I can think of  many memorable descriptions of  pain 
in fiction, such as the following by Updike (who so often wrote beautifully on pain) 
in his novel The Centaur: 
‘By searching through his body he can uncover any colour and shape of  pain he 
wants: the saccharine needle of  the toothache, the dull comfortable pinch of  his 
truss, the restless poison shredding in his bowels, the remote irritation of  a turned 
toenail gnawing the toe squeezed beside it in the shoe, the little throb above his 
nose from having used his eyes too hard in the last hour, and the associated but dif-
ferent ache along the top of  his skull, like the soreness left by his old leather foot-
ball helmet after a battering scrimmage down in the Lake Stadium’.  
 
Or Lorrie Moore’s wonderfully succinct and evocative portrait of  a headache:  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‘…sometimes the zigzag of  a migraine made its way into her skull and sat like a 
cheap, crazy tie in her eye’.  
Even if  we admit that pain is ultimately incommunicable, it is not clear why using 
metaphors and imagery such as in the passages above that allow us at least an indi-
cation of  what another person is going through is worse than giving up on the idea 
of  communication at all. In a clinical setting, throwing your hands up and stating 
that pain speaks in an inaccessible language and therefore not worthy of  effort is a 
non-starter. 
In fact, most of  the patients I spoke with had little problem putting their problems 
into words, and many refrained from using metaphors at all: they talked about 
pain as something self-evident and were more interested in communicating its 
reach - both across their bodies and across their lives. What I am trying to say by 
all this, however circuitously, is that it is not the inherent deficiency of  language 
that leads to miscommunication or scepticism in relation to fibromyalgia patients’ 
pain. Their ability to describe what they are going through in words is just as ade-
quate as a non-specialist with cancer, and so the suspicion - and I think suspicion is 




An important and obvious point to raise at this stage is the fact that pain is com-
municated by more than just language. The state of  being in pain is expressed to 
and understood by others not just, or even most often, through words but by 
means of  ‘serialised bits of  pain behaviour – grimacing lips, wincing eyes, moans 
issuing from the larynx, writhing torsos, and so on’.  It is because of  this visual, 386
 Schrag, C. O. ‘Being in Pain’ in Kestenbaum, V. (ed.) The Humanity of  the Ill, University 386
of  Tennessee Press, USA, 1982, p. 117.
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physical performance of  pain that we nonetheless understand when children or 
animals who cannot tell us how they feel are hurt in some way. Fibromyalgia pa-
tients talked about crying with pain, about rolling into balls and about being un-
able to stand for a few minutes because of  the intensity of  feeling, but they also 
told me about covering up their symptoms, wearing a mask in front of  others and 
finding ways of  dealing with what their body was telling them without showing it.  
I wondered whether then the problem was not of  communication per se, but the 
precise method and manner in which these patients were trying to express them-
selves. For most people extreme pain has an immediacy to it - a broken leg cannot 
be ignored for too long, individuals stung by a box jellyfish cannot hold long dis-
cussions, etc. - but the patients I spoke to were able to hold cogent and involved 
conversations with me, some lasting upwards of  an hour, in spite of  what they de-
scribed as debilitating, extraordinary discomfort. I do not wish to be misunder-
stood on this point: I am not casting doubt on their testimony, but rather question-
ing to what extent our acceptance of  another’s pain lies in the way in which it is 
conveyed. For the worst pain, people around the patient seem to need more evi-
dence than to be simply told it is the worst. They need to see that it is the worst, and 
to understand how it came about. Our powers of  empathy do not exist in an ex-
planatory void. But I am getting ahead of  myself.  
This is a problem which has been identified before in relation to psychosomatic ill-
nesses. It was noted that despite being paralysed or bedridden or suffering some 
other unfortunate fate, patients often seemed unperturbed by their situation, al-
most cheerful to be wheelchair-bound or paralysed. This surprisingly care-free re-
action was regarded as a strong indicator that the symptoms had no identifiable 
biological base, and was known as ‘la belle indifference’, or, literally, ‘the beautiful 
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indifference’.  The patients I spoke with were not care-free, and neither did they 387
downplay their symptoms, but I cannot help but be reminded of  my experiences 
speaking with some young doctors in Australia.  
We were sitting in a pub garden under the Melbourne sun and talk had turned to 
my research. I was keen to hear what their experience with fibromyalgia had been, 
given that they worked in various parts of  a hospital rather than a surgery and so 
occasionally saw patients with fibromyalgia brought in from A&E. One of  them 
told me that the typical fibromyalgia patient they’d see would be a woman who 
appeared normal and might be playing on their phone or reading. Upon admis-
sion they would inform the medical staff  that they were in excruciating pain, that 
everything hurt and that they were ten on the pain scale. Throughout, the patient 
would seem fairly calm and unperturbed. Finally, they would ask for painkillers. 
Some of  the other doctors nodded in agreement at this portrayal.  
No doubt this is a caricature, perhaps exaggerated by the presence of  a crowd and 
a few Victoria Bitters, and a portrait which fibromyalgia patients themselves would 
wince at (doctors too perhaps), but it illustrates my point: it is not enough to say you 
are in pain in order for that pain to be recognised. This doctor’s scepticism, in 
large part, was founded upon the discrepancy between the pain being reported by 
the patient and the corresponding enactment of  that pain; he simply did not be-
lieve that someone who rated themselves that highly on the pain scale would be 
able to maintain a conversation, entertain themselves on a phone and generally 
continue to function. To put this in perspective, to report yourself  as suffering from 
that level of  pain is to put yourself  in a category of  distress ‘so intense you feel you 
 As a clinical sign it has been deemed too ambiguous to be of  use in contemporary 387
medicine: Stone, J., Smyth, R., Carson, A., Warlow, C. and Sharpe, M. ‘La belle indifférence 
in conversion symptoms and hysteria’ in British Journal of  Psychiatry, 2006, Vol. 188, pp. 
204-209.
!233
will go unconscious shortly’.  388
There may be a biological component to this. Much neurological research has 
been conducted over the last decade or so which demonstrates that the human 
brain reacts differently depending on whether it is empathising with another per-
son in an embodied sense, that is to say an individual vicariously shares the emo-
tional sensations of  another, or whether the interaction is based upon ‘cognitive 
perspective taking’, or a process of  reasoning about the intentions, thoughts, feel-
ings and beliefs of  another person.   389
Interestingly, when empathising with a person in pain, many of  the same parts of  the 
brain show activity as when we are in pain ourselves.  This is why it is difficult, 390
especially in person, to witness the distress of  another individual or even an ani-
mal. Often we find ourselves involuntarily turning away or feeling uncomfortable, 
not to mention the rising urge to help or allay their pain if  we can. However, when 
reasoning about a person in pain, taking their cognitive perspective as it were, dif-
ferent areas of  the brain light up.  
What this suggests is that there is a biological element to empathy, and that this is 
activated visually and automatically. Could it be possible, then, that in the case of  
fibromyalgia patients, the disconcerting (from the perspective of  the viewer) lack of  
 Based on this pain scale: https://lane.stanford.edu/portals/cvicu/HCP_Neu388 -
ro_Tab_4/0-10_Pain_Scale.pdf  archived on 19/07/17 at http://www.webcitation.org/
6s5GItL7Y; others are comparable.
 Hein, G. and Singer, T. ‘I feel how you feel but not always: the empathic brain and its 389
modulation’ in Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 2008, Vol. 18, pp. 153-158.
 Betti, V. and Aglioti, S. M. ‘Dynamic construction of  the neural networks underpin390 -
ning empathy for pain’ in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 2016, Vol. 63, pp. 191-206.
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visible anguish works against them in terms of  gaining sympathy?  - and that this 391
lack of  sympathy, or diminished empathy, detracts from the legitimacy of  their 
pain subconsciously? Fibromyalgia patients that I spoke to complained frequently 
that others did not see them on bad days, as during flare ups or other bad periods 
they did not leave the house, go to work or attend doctor’s appointments. More or-
dinarily, they try to hide what they are going through in order to make their lives 
easier. As one patient put it: 
 
‘You learn to wear a mask. When people are crossing the street and they say “oh 
good morning, how are you?”, the answer is “fine thank you, how are you?” and 
everyone goes their own way. Nobody actually wants to know the answer to their 
question. It’s a nicety’. 
 
Another sufferer had come to the conclusion that fibromyalgia is too complicated 
and confusing to explain every time they met someone new:  
 
‘I’ve given up trying to tell people what I have, I just say I’m fine. It’s difficult to 
explain how it’s had such an immense effect on my life and I don’t think anybody 
could understand that’. 
 
Is it possible that all these problems of  communication stem from the same place, I 
wonder? Is it that the pain felt by fibromyalgia patients is somehow different from 
 It has long been noted in disability studies that lay reactions to different disabilities rely 391
upon contextual and visual knowledge (i.e. how much the dysfunction ‘stands out’, the 
meanings surrounding it and how it is encountered). For examples, see Wright, B., ‘Atti-
tudes and the fundamental negative bias: Conditions and corrections’ in  Yuker, H. (ed.), 
Attitudes toward persons with disabilities, 1988, Springer, USA, pp. 2-21; Schmelkin, L. ‘Multi-
dimensional perspectives in the perception of  disabilities’ in Yuker, H. (ed.) Attitudes toward 
persons with disabilities, 1988, Springer, USA, pp. 127-137.
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‘ordinary’ pain and therefore necessarily divergent too in its interior presentation? 
Would this not make it both harder to express and less easy to recognise? Are there 
different types of  pain? 
 
Different types of  pain  
 
People without medical or scientific backgrounds tend to have a singular notion of  
pain: that it has many adjectives but belongs to just one category. Pain can be 
gnawing, biting, aching, shooting etc. but there is no Pain A and Pain B. Physiolog-
ically, this is incorrect. Pain experts have for some time distinguished between noci-
ceptive and neuropathic pain. The former is pain as a nervous response to injury, a 
message sent through the body as a result of  injury or inflammation; the latter 
emerges as part of  damage to the nervous system itself.  Where nociceptive pain 392
is usually time limited and easily alleviated, its neuropathic brother is less easily 
contained, often persisting over many years and proving resistant to treatment. 
Fibromyalgia patients do not show any measurable signs of  these types of  pain and 
as stated above, there are a distinct lack of  biomarkers in relation to their condi-
tion. And yet the patients are so clearly in pain. Davis and Vanderah have recently 
argued that the reason for this is because fibromyalgia patients do not suffer from 
either of  the two types of  pain detailed above.  Rather, they posit that traumatic 393
experiences, especially those that occur when we are young, can rewrite our ner-
vous systems and make us susceptible to exaggerated pain responses in later life 
without corresponding tissue damage. Furthermore, they hypothesise that clinical 
 Examples of  nociceptive pain: broken bones, sprains, burns, obstructions. Examples 392
of  neuropathic pain: post herpetic neuralgia, phantom limb pain, carpal tunnel syn-
drome, reflex sympathetic dystrophy.
 Davis, B. and Vanderah, T. W. ‘A new paradigm for pain’ in The Journal of  Family Prac393 -
tice, 2016, Vol. 65, No. 9, pp. 598-605; Davis is a doctor who specialises in pain medicine, 
Vanderah a neurologist.
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attitudes towards pain which view it as strictly nociceptive or neuropathic, actively 
harm the doctor patient relationship in instances such as fibromyalgia. I would ex-
tend this point to more general reactions to pain: pain without tissue damage, or-
gan dysfunction, inflammation or bruising is harder to understand and harder to 
believe.  
It is also harder to treat. A varied back-bar of  opioids, anti-depressants, anti-in-
flammatories, muscle relaxants and sleep medicines are prescribed to patients, 
normally on a tailored, trial-and-error basis. Of  the three drugs that are FDA ap-
proved, pregabalin (marketed as Lyrica), duloxetine (sold as Cymbalta) and mil-
nacipran (Ixel, Savella, Dalcipran, Toledomin), two are SNRIs also used to treat 
depression and similar disorders and one is an anti-epileptic drug.  None of  the 394
three has been found to treat patients with great consistency or efficacy, and many 
patients regularly take large doses of  each without witnessing a corresponding drop 
in symptom severity.  395
How this relates to the notion of  pain, or of  differentiating within pain, is down to 
the fact that individuals now have an expectation that medicine will be able to re-
duce suffering in almost all cases. As one patient said:    
 
‘My dad died of  a cancerous tumour and my aunt died of  bowel cancer and I re-
member being told that they would never have to be in pain. Nobody had to be in 
pain. So why is it I have to live in constant pain and nothing can stop that pain? I 
find that hard to get my head round’. 
 
 SNRI stands for ‘serotonin-norepinephrine repute inhibitors’. They are a class of  anti-394
depressant drugs commonly used to treat depression and similar conditions.
 They appear to work on a limited and piecemeal basis, proving marginally effective for 395
a minority of  patients: Theoharides, T. C., Tsilioni, I., Arbetman, L. et al 2015, pp. 
255-263.
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The fact that painkillers that work so well for other instances of  pain fail to have a 
similar effect on the symptoms of  fibromyalgia patients serves to increase the feel-
ing of  isolation and alienation on their behalf  in regard to their bodies, the simple 
question being that if  this were normal pain, then surely it would be subject to the 
same physiological laws and treatable by the same drugs?  
To collect the pieces thrown out so far in this section and begin to assemble them, 
it seems we can say the following. Fibromyalgia patients have problems in the lin-
guistic communication of  their pain, but these problems are not any more severe 
than some other conditions. It may be that physical presentation is an issue, that 
fibromyalgia patients don’t look like they are ill, or like they are in as much pain as 
they say they are. This is compounded by what could be called their invisibility, the 
fact that many of  them do not seek company or leave the house on their ‘bad’ 
days, and by the biological evidence that visual cues are necessary for deep empa-
thy. Furthermore, this might be in part elucidated by the strangeness of  the pain felt, 
suggesting a wholly different bodily process. However, there is a further avenue to 
be explored, that of  explanation. The pain that fibromyalgia patients feel exists in 
an explanatory vacuum. I believe it to be true that, however rudimentary and un-
scientific, other people require some coherent account of  the pain in order to 
recognise it as legitimate.  
I use the word ‘recognise’ here quite deliberately. When we see someone we know 
in a crowded place, we do not necessarily think of  where we know them from, but 
we are certain that we have met or seen them before. This is how it often feels in 
relation to contested illnesses, but inverted: they are in a familiar crowd but we do 
not recognise them, we have not seen them before, they do not fit the category of  
faces that we have crossed paths with previously. Encountering the pain of  a fi-
bromyalgia patient is like meeting someone you think you might know from some-
where but don’t; you ask them if  they went to this school or used to drink in that 
pub, and when the answers come back negative you conclude that in fact you do 
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not know this person. We ask: is it something to do with your muscles then? - did 
they find a problem with your spine? - do you need an operation? and when the 
answers come back we find ourselves looking at something unknown and therefore 
fill in the explanatory void with other inferences.  
The sort of  reasoning the fills this gap will be explored in greater detail later on in 
this chapter as it intersects with ideas about work and welfare but it is worth con-
sidering quickly. Given the difference between automatic empathy and cognitive 
perspective taking, is it not reasonable for individuals considering the fibromyalgia 
patient, on the basis of  their presentation, to downplay their symptoms for good 
reasons?  In that, having put themselves ‘in the shoes’ of  a fibromyalgia patient, 396
they have concluded that on the balance of  evidence that it is more likely that pa-
tients are not in fact feeling pain at all? Certainly some individuals do feel like this, 
and patients spoke frequently about coming up against the attitude that what they 
were relaying about their subjective state was subservient to the lack of  ‘objective’ 
markers of  debilitation.  
Although this section is beginning to get conceptually crowded I would like to raise 
another point, or rather ask another question: is it possible that some of  us believe 
that fibromyalgia patients are in pain, but we disbelieve the pain itself ? To put this 
another way, is it that we understand and appreciate that a fibromyalgia patient 
feels pain, but the lack of  physiological basis for that pain leads us to think that ei-
ther that pain is not worthy of  the same sympathy as other instances of  discomfort 
or that somehow that pain is ‘not real’?  
This is a moral standpoint that, if  not necessarily explicitly and consciously taken, 
is definitely felt to be taken by many in the eyes of  fibromyalgia patients. The 
dreaded sentence ‘it’s all in your head’ was repeated frequently by the individuals I 
spoke with: the implication being of  course that though they may well be feeling 
pain, that pain was self-generated, an internal creation rather than an external 
 See p. 167396
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threat and, most of  all, controllable.  In other words, because of  the lack of  an 397
explanatory framework, their pain was not as worthy as other forms of  pain:  
 
‘My neurosurgeon, who did my spinal surgeries, when I was still having so much 
pain after the last surgery, he was basically telling me it was all in my head and that 
the x-ray and MRI look like they should and so I’m basically just imagining it and 
remembering the pain I was in’.  
 
‘Some of  them don’t believe that it actually exists. One of  the consultants, he told 
me it was all in my head. It’s very, very difficult. It feels like you’re trying to con-
vince them you’re ill’.  
 
Pain here takes on the quality of  being genuine in these scenarios then not because 
it is felt, but because of  its origins. Legitimacy is given not in the case of  pain being 
reported, but in the context of  how that pain came about and in what ways we can 
view it. Of  course, different people have different reactions to the pain of  a fi-
bromyalgia patient, and I am only analysing here a few responses. But there are 
patterns, certainly, and, however impressionistically, I have touched upon a few 
above. 
There is one further point I would like to make about pain. In Wittgenstein’s much 
repeated and discussed private language argument, he uses pain as a prime exam-
 Incidentally, this phrase was used as the title of  Suzanne O’Sullivan’s Wellcome Book 397
Prize winning work, bizarrely later published as ‘Is it all in your head?’ (my emphasis). 
The subtitle - ‘True stories of  imaginary illness’ - remained the same between editions. 
The pronounced difference between these two titles does not obscure the central point: 
diseases can be ‘all in your head’, your head in this case being a metaphorical repository 
for unhappiness and, subsequently, a subconscious puppeteer of  your body. See: O’Sulli-
van, S. It’s All in Your Head: True Stories of  Imaginary Illness, 2015, Chatto and Windus, UK.
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ple.  He states that there is little difference between saying ‘I know I am in pain’ 398
and saying ‘I am in pain’, because it is incoherent to talk about knowledge of  inte-
rior sensations in the same way they we deal with exterior facts (i.e. investigation, 
verification, justification, truth etc.). As Schrag puts it, ‘knowing that one has a 
pain in his foot is assuredly quite different from knowing that a fifth of  Beefeaters 
gin is in the liquor cabinet’.   399
However, I do not believe it to be an outrageous stretch of  the imagination to con-
sider the idea that for fibromyalgia patients, the statements ‘I know I am in pain’ 
and ‘I am in pain’ are not straightforwardly identical, and in fact might not be held 
to be true simultaneously or at least clash in some previously unforeseen way.  
Wittgenstein does not think that we can talk about pain in terms of  knowing be-
cause it is an internal, subjective phenomenon that we simply feel: we are either in 
pain or we are not, and we cannot submit it to the same analysis that we can other 
pieces of  knowledge about the world. This argument is, of  course, grammatical 
rather than metaphysical: it is about how we use language. I do not intend to chal-
lenge this view.  
Instead, I intend merely to use his arguments about ‘knowing’ pain as a way of  il-
lustrating the doubt felt by patients, who themselves are not outside of  the explana-
tory void viewpoint I suggested above might account for a portion of  the scepti-
cism afforded to their symptoms. Certainly, the indication that several patients gave 
me was that the lack of  positive biomarkers, the inability of  others to recognise 
their pain, the attitudes they came up against, led them in some way to doubt that 
they were feeling pain at all. This is because they treated ‘pain’ as an object of  
knowledge in precisely the way which Wittgenstein said it would be nonsensical to 
do so, as something to be weighed against the evidence, a framework in which sub-
jective feelings could be overruled, as if  it were an external artefact rather than 
 Wittgenstein, L. 2009, pp. 95-111.398
 Schrag, C. O. 1982, p. 111.399
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something intangibly personal and interior:  
 
‘I doubted myself, that’s exactly what happened. They had me thinking is it really 
in my head? Have I really got it? I was doubting myself  at one point because no-
one was listening to me and I was thinking oh surely, they’re professionals, they 
know what they’re doing’. 
 
‘I’ve been to the doctor and said “am I making this up? Why aren’t these 
painkillers working? Is this just all in my head?”’.  
 
This doubt leads a patient to think that what they have isn’t pain, and thus they 
might say ‘I am in pain’ because our language does not provide them with an al-
ternative and appropriate way of  expressing their interior sensations - i.e. some-
thing that resembles pain enough to be considered but fails to meet some external 
criteria - whilst simultaneously and, sincerely, stating that ‘I know I am not in pain’.  
Goldberg makes a similar point to this, though he argues that what is occurring is 
not the simultaneous in pain/not in pain dichotomy that I have drawn above but 
rather a question of  denying the legitimacy of  real, irrepressible sensations:  
 
‘By visually representing the pathologies inside the human body, the truth of  the 
phenomenon in question can be discerned. But note that it is not merely the physi-
cian qua investigator who uses images of  the anatomised body to verify the truth 
of  the matter. The pain sufferer himself/herself/themselves also draw on the epis-
temic power of  the correlative pathological object inside the human body. While 
pain sufferers do not have the luxury of  denying the reality of  their pain, they can 
and do deny its legitimacy, thereby internalising the stigma so frequently directed 
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at people in pain’.  400
 
This discussion rests heavily on the thought that pain has become an object which 
is visible in a shared sense, and that which cannot be seen or leaves no physiologi-
cal trace must be something else, something not-pain. We are getting close to the 
point of  saying here that science has allowed us to look at each other’s beetles, and 
that is partly what I am saying. An analogy would be to say that though we all con-
tinue carry around boxes with a thing we call a ‘beetle’ in it, we also do so in a so-
ciety with rudimentary x-ray technology (technology that also carries a lot of  pres-
tige) which allows us to view blurry scans of  other people’s beetles. Most correlate 
roughly with each other, but some seem incongruous, despite their owner’s insis-
tence that what is in their box is a beetle like all others. It is these people we begin 
to distrust, suspecting that they are not in possession of  a beetle as we understand 
it, despite having limited knowledge ourselves. This view roughly correlates to the 
situation fibromyalgia patients find themselves in, where modern medical appara-
tus allows us to view the footprints of  pain but theirs leaves little trace.  
Pain is not the only symptom of  fibromyalgia, however. Patients also report cogni-




 Goldberg, D. S., ‘Pain, objectivity and history: understanding pain stigma’ in Medical 400
Humanities, 2017, Vol. 0, pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1136/medhum2016-011133; this statement is 
supported by research he draws upon by Rhodes: Rhodes, L. A., McPhillips-Tangum C. 
A., Markham, C. et al ‘The power of  the visible: the meaning of  diagnostic tests in chron-
ic back pain’ in Social Science and Medicine, 1998, Vol. 48, pp. 1189-1203.
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One of  the strangest symptoms of  fibromyalgia has been termed fibro fog:  401
‘What I’d call ‘fogginess’, lack of  clarity of  thought. I’ll go to do something and 
forget what I was going to do in the first place and end up doing something com-
pletely different. For example, I thought I’d emailed you but I hadn’t. It’s frustrat-
ing’. 
 
‘Sometimes when I’m cooking, something is in a different pan or in the top oven 
and I forget about it so it just gets left, or it burns, or we just don’t eat it because I 
forget. So we have two thirds of  the meal rather than the whole meal…we had a 
house fire a couple of  years ago because I left something on the cooker and went 
out’. 
 
‘My memory is horrendous. I sometimes can’t remember something that hap-
pened thirty seconds ago. I can’t remember the names of  people that I’ve known 
for twenty years. I look at them and think, I know you, but I can’t come up with 
their name’.  
 
This may well read like the ordinary consequences of  ageing and perhaps, given a 
certain angle, evidence of  the confirmation bias present in a condition like fi-
bromyalgia. Those of  the social construction/medicalisation/iatrogenic school of  
thought would certainly be tempted to argue that the above is evidence of  what 
they already know: people with fibromyalgia become ultra-sensitive to what are 
simply the normal biological effects of  time passing. Healthy people forget things, 
 For a clinical overview, see: Kravitz, H. M. and Katz, R. S. ‘Fibrofog and fibromyalgia: 401
a narrative review and implications’ in Rheumatology International, 2015, Vol. 35, pp. 
1115-1125; Ambrose, K. R., Gracely, R. H. and Glass, J. M. ‘Fibromyalgia dyscognition: 
concepts and issues’ in Reumatismo, 2012, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 206-215.
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just like healthy people feel tired and healthy people ache. The hypersensitivity to 
symptoms which lie on a normal spectrum of  distress is precisely what is causing 
the problem in this view: and a tendency to search symptoms online rather than 
engage with traditional constraints against illness behaviour (such as close family 
members) serves to exaggerate the meaning of  these symptoms further until they 
metastasise into a full blown ‘illness career’.  Barksy and Borus, in line with this 402
perspective, argue that ‘the suffering of  these patients is exacerbated by a self-per-
petuating, self-validating cycle in which common, endemic, somatic symptoms are 
incorrectly attributed to serious abnormality, reinforcing the patient’s belief  that he 
or she has a serious disease’.   403
In thinking about this view I am reminded of  the episode of  Hancock’s Half  Hour 
where Tony Hancock appears in a state of  histrionic convalescence, sitting at his 
kitchen table inhaling Vicks vapour whilst surrounding by a variety of  bottled 
remedies. Appealing for compassion from his friend Sidney, his concerns are given 
short shrift:  
 
Sidney: ‘What's the matter, you’ve got a cold? You want sympathy? Everybody gets 
colds’.  
Tony: ‘Not like I get them’.  
Sidney: ‘Of  course they do’. 
 See the section on Shorter in Chapter III.402
 Barsky, A. J. and Borus, J. F. ‘Functional Somatic Syndromes’ in Annals of  Internal Medi403 -
cine, 1999, Vol. 130, p. 910.
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Tony: ‘No they don’t. Samples, that’s all they get. Me, I get the full output of  the 
entire germ kingdom’.  
 
Besides being perhaps the first recorded instance of  ‘man-flu’, this exchange is il-
lustrative of  the attitudes that fibromyalgia patients sometimes face: that there is 
nothing especially unique about their symptoms and that what they were feeling 
was the ‘ordinary’ aches and pains of  life. The implication here is that they, like 
Tony Hancock, are not truly or at least seriously ill but merely being melodramat-
ic. As one patient told me:   
 
‘It’s very difficult because if  somebody asks what’s wrong with you, to try and ex-
plain what fibromyalgia is you’ll be there forever and people don’t want to be lec-
tured. So if  you say to somebody “I’ve got chronic fatigue” their usual reaction is 
well I get very tired as well and it’s frustrating because you need to explain to them 
that chronic fatigue is not the same as just being tired. Sitting down and having a 
cup of  tea will not fix it’.  
 
Fibromyalgia does not only affect the elderly, but also can be found in young and 
middle aged individuals who we would not expect to have pain or memory symp-
toms at all. The fact that these patients feel they have the same complaints as older 
sufferers casts doubt on the idea that fibromyalgia is simply hypervigilance to the 
creaky facts of  ageing. For example, a woman in her early twenties told me about 
her cognitive problems, not ordinarily associated with people her age:  
 
‘I get fibro fog, that is awful. It’s almost the worst part. You literally become unin-
telligent, you can’t focus on anything long enough to do anything and you just 
can’t get your brain going’.  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These issues - fibro fog or ‘dyscognition’ - have attracted increased clinical atten-
tion recently, but that is not what I would like to focus on. Instead, I’d like to make 
the point that cognitive problems, alongside the gamut of  other symptoms fi-
bromyalgia patients experience, alienate patients from other people’s expectations 
of  a diseased body. Using the terminology I introduced above, fibro fog and other 
symptoms, of  which there are an incredible multitude, make fibromyalgia patients 
harder to ‘recognise’.  
The reason for this again comes down to expectations. When we encounter illness, 
we (the lay population) expect it to manifest consistently (to our expectations of  
consistency as it relates to disease). If  you have X, we reason from experience, then 
that means you will get symptoms Y and Z. One fibromyalgia patient, on the other 
hand, might present with symptoms Y, G and B, whereas a different patient shows 
symptoms Z, D and K. The relationship between the symptoms themselves are 
important too: through the lay knowledge of  medicine we pick up over the years, 
certain complaints cluster together. A pain in the gut and constipation for instance, 
or yellow eyes and jaundice, or fever and a runny nose. Less common combina-
tions involving, say, muscle pain, forgetfulness and fluctuating numbness in your 
right hand, are harder for people to place, harder to recognise, and without a co-
gent explanation (which with fibromyalgia is rarely forthcoming), harder to believe. 
This is made all the more difficult when you consider that another fibromyalgia 
patient might experience different symptoms - what is an observer to make of  all 
this? 
Think back to my examples at the beginning of  this chapter. A large portion of  
Samuel’s complaints regarded seizures, something that none of  the other patients I 
interviewed reported. One patient described violent shaking, another talked about 
problems with sweating. A female patient I spoke to even said that pain was not her 
main complaint. This inconsistency of  presentation goes directly against what we 
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would normally expect to see in a disease.  404
I seem to be making the case, as others have, that fibromyalgia is a hopelessly 
vague diagnosis, accommodating a large number of  individuals with different 
complaints. But this reasoning itself  speaks to our implicit idea of  disease. That is 
to say, as obvious as it is to point out, our entire causal conception of  illness is one 
which privileges consistent outcomes, regardless of  whether the explanatory weight 
is put on mechanistic or probabilistic footing in any particular instance. This makes 
sense, but it is not a model that fits fibromyalgia patients - or, to strip away their 
label, this symptomatic population. Because here’s the crux: take away their diagnosis 
and these patients would still feel ill, would still appear in doctors’ clinics, would 
still have trouble functioning on a day-to-day basis.  They do have many of  the 405
same problems, in a broad sense, and what matters here is that they are treated by 
others on the basis of  possessing something unitary, irrelevant of  how fluid that thing 
is.  
There is a final layer of  inconsistency to be addressed. Frank, as discussed at vari-
 I am not saying that all diseases are symptomatically consistent: this is patently false. I 404
am talking in terms of  expectations - the subtle, subterranean rudders that guide our 
gaze. In ‘recognised’ conditions with variant symptoms there are two factors which ex-
plain our ‘lack of  surprise’, or in other words two factors that account for divergent com-
plaints not serving to delegitimise a condition. Firstly, though different symptoms may ap-
pear in different individuals, these patterns are normally mapped and so a symptom, 
though not necessary, will be regarded as sufficient for that condition and not unusual. 
That is to say, though patients may experience any one of  a number of  complaints, these 
symptoms will not display the same chaotic randomness that they appear to in fibromyal-
gia patients. Secondly, an explanatory framework will normally exist which can provide 
causal links between symptoms and disease in a way that is not possible, or not currently 
possible, with fibromyalgia.
 There are no doubt many people who would disagree with this point (some of  whom 405
were discussed earlier in this chapter) and contend that if  you took away the diagnosis 
then there would be no disease and patients would be more likely to recover. The basis on 
which I dismiss this iatrogenic model is simple: talk to patients and more often than not 
you will find that symptoms persisted for years before a diagnosis was arrived at. And even 
the possession of  a diagnosis such as fibromyalgia is, I believe, an underdetermined factor 
in the generation and maintenance of  symptoms as many sufferers recognise its vagueness 
and imprecision. It is a loose net, for sure, but the fish it trawls were already in the water. 
!248
ous points above, details the ways in which sick people think about their illnesses 
narratively.  He states that generally speaking we in the West are preoccupied 406
with restitution narratives, those which tell of  healthy people struck down by dis-
ease but on the road to recovery - a road which is linear and straightforward. Less 
thought is given, he says, to chaos narratives: stories of  illness with no endpoint 
and little internal consistency. There is no happy ending with a chaos illness narra-
tive because more often than not there is no ending at all.  
Quotes like the following illuminate the trouble that patients have making narrative 
sense of  their disease and its symptoms:  
‘They say “we’ll just up your morphine, that’ll get rid of  some of  your pain” and it 
will but it just goes round and round. I just think why can’t you treat the cause. 
They don’t seem to know anything about the cause. I feel like they can’t do any-
thing apart from up my medication and I don’t want to have it up because then it 
makes me more tired and sleepy. Is this my life? I’m going to constantly climb up 
on this painkiller regime until…until what? They can’t give me any more? And 
then I just live in pain or…I don’t understand it. I’m not sure where it’s going’. 
 
This sense of  unstructured, open-endedness speaks to the experience of  fibromyal-
gia patients and though many individuals find ways of  living with their symptoms 
and redesigning their lives in a way that allows them to function better, the restitu-
tion of  the body to previous levels of  health is rare. But more than this aspect of  
their condition is chaotic: their symptoms, varied as they are in form as detailed 
 Frank, A. 2013; the illness narrative literature that Frank contributes to is rich and var406 -
ied, see Kleinman, Charmaz and Charon for seminal texts: Kleinman, A. The Illness Nar-
ratives: Suffering, Health and the Human Condition, 1988, Basic Books, USA; Charmaz, K 
1993; Charon, R. Narrative Medicine: Honouring the Stories of  Illness, 2008, Oxford University 
Press, UK; see Bury for a good overview of  the literature: Bury, M. ‘Illness narratives: fact 
or fiction?’ in Sociology of  Health and Illness, 2001, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 263-285.
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above, vary also in severity. This is bewildering for patients; for those around them 
it jars with what they believe disease to be. We believe that symptoms do not sim-
ply flit about the body like a child walking at random between rooms of  a house, 
and neither do they appear, disappear and then reappear without any apparent (or, 
at least, proportional) corresponding reason.  So when we see a person who, one 407
day to the next, appears to oscillate between physical destitution and well-enough 
seeming periods of  energy and health, we find it difficult to assimilate this informa-
tion into the biomedical matrix that informs our understanding of  disease. It 
doesn’t fit.  
Some of  the patients I spoke to recognised that this was a factor in their condition 
not seeming valid:  
‘It changes so much, one minute I’m lying dead on the couch the next minute I’m 
like let’s go cook dinner. I think that’s got to be hard for them [her family] to deal 
with’. 
This issue - the inconsistency of  symptoms - and the way it is handled by doctors, 
patients and the people around them, will emerge in different forms as we go 
through this chapter. Along with the other items discussed above with regard to 
pain, explanation and belief, it can be a key reason why fibromyalgia patients feel 
delegitimised, their symptoms not as valid as other ill people’s. In the next section, 
I will look at what relationships can tell us about our collective conception of  dis-
ease and make the case that for many patients the interactions they have with their 
family, friends and colleagues in relation to their condition are more important in 
determining their wellbeing than the medical care they receive, something which 
 For instance, one patient told me: ‘some days it might just be one bit, or start in one bit 407
and go round the rest of  the body, or I’ve had days where it’s been full on, everywhere, 
stabbing pains all over’.
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has been neglected in previous philosophical treatments of  disease, which tend to 




A large portion of  the philosophy of  medicine literature focuses on how we should 
define certain concepts - health and disease being the main players. Implicit (and 
occasionally explicit) in these discussions is the salience of  deferring to medical def-
initions and usages of  terms. On the one hand this is intuitive: most of  what we 
know about disease, biologically, comes from medical science and discussing illness 
without talking about healthcare or ‘medicine’ seems deficient. But on the other 
hand, as I discovered throughout my conversations with patients, though medical 
definitions are extremely important and interactions with healthcare providers 
laced with meaning, doctors are not the only ones who define disease, and whose 
definitions have an impact on patients.  
I am not here talking about the web of  interests that often encircles a disease - the 
pharmaceutical influences, patient advocacy groups, public funding bodies etc. - 
but the regular, very ordinary way in which non-medically involved persons make 
decisions regarding the sick people around them. It struck me that when patients 
were talking to me about disbelief, invalidation, malingering and all the rest of  it, 
what they were commonly referring to was the disbelief  of  their neighbours, their 
children and their friends. This scepticism, the scepticism of  the ‘man in the 
street’, has not been discussed much within philosophical circles. Perhaps this is 
because it is so messy, so fraught with caveats, so difficult to pin down. Perhaps also 
because it is considered metaphysically unsophisticated and consequentially unim-
portant. Or maybe because philosophers consider this to be sociological or an-
 Some phenomenology of  illness notwithstanding (see p. 89).408
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thropological terrain.  
My position, as I have already begun to develop in this chapter, is different. The 
views of  non-medical individuals are of  great importance in relation to contested 
diseases, and these views are informed by philosophical standpoints about causali-
ty, disease and the body, no matter how unconscious or hidden they may be. It is 
these standpoints I would like to unearth and hold up as important factors in the 
happiness and coping ability of  those of  us who suffer from what I have termed 
contested diseases. 
Being seriously ill with almost any sickness compromises you in a multitude of  
ways: you cannot do some of  the things you used to be able to, or you have to do 
them in a modified way; your symptoms squeeze and constrict what you are able to 
focus on, minute by minute; the financial costs of  healthcare, special arrangements 
and income lost by jobs you are no longer able to do adds up and constrains the 
material aspects of  your life…the place you live in becomes ‘a world of  negotia-
tion, of  helplessness, of  avoidance’.  But it also compromises your person.  409 410
Chronic illness transforms an individual’s self-concept, their idea of  who they are 
and why they are, and the reactions of  others in their immediate social environ-
ment are important shaping factors in this process. Carel writes: 
‘Because it alters one’s relation to the world, illness can expose not only the limits 
of  human experience but also the biases of  an environment. The moment a par-
 Carel, H. 2016b, p. 77409
 Many studies have argued that an individuals sense of  self  is severely altered by chron410 -
ic, contested illness. For instance, Whitehead’s work showed that patients with chronic fa-
tigue syndrome found their identities completely reconstituted and Clarke and James ar-
gued that patients expressed a severe loss of  self-esteem as a result of  their illness: White-
head, L. ‘Quest, chaos and restitution: Living with chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic en-
cephalomyelitis’ in Social Science and Medicine, 2006, Vol. 62, pp. 2236-2245; Clarke, J. N. 
and James, S. ‘The radicalized self: the impact on the self  of  the contest nature of  the di-
agnosis of  chronic fatigue syndrome’ in Social Science and Medicine, 2003, Vol. 57, pp. 1387-
1395.
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ticular environment ceases to be familiar and becomes hostile, one is required to 
reflect on that environment’.  411
 
Here she is talking about a person’s physical surroundings - the way in which stairs 
become truly visible only once we struggle to ascend them - but it is just as apt a 
description the permanently altered social relations that come with being ill. Like-
wise, once this change occurs, it becomes easier to see the biases of  this particular 
environment, in this case not uneven surfaces or previously unacknowledged dis-
tances but the unconscious systems of  appraisal used to weigh up the validity of  
another’s experience as related by them to you. Or, to put it another way, the struc-
tures by which we - ordinary, non-medical individuals - establish epistemic credibil-
ity in relation to illness become most clear once tested by an unusual, borderline 
phenomenon. Fibromyalgia is one such case.  
 
Strangers, acquaintances, friends, family 
 
The first thing to say is that, fairly self-evidently, responses to contested illness vary 
between individuals. There is no one, universal reaction. There are, however, cer-
tain themes that emerge and certain features of  a fibromyalgia patient that seem to 
provoke. These are, as might be expected from the above discussion, the inconsis-
tency and strangeness of  symptoms, the distance between what is being said by a 
patient and what they look like, the lack of  a plausible-sounding and medically en-
dorsed aetiological explanation and, in light of  this, the growth of  scepticism and 
suspicion of  malingering, no doubt exaggerated by the ongoing and pejorative 
public discourse around welfare payments.  
It is perhaps not surprising that patients reported that strangers were the most like-
 Carel, H. 2013, p. 350.411
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ly to regard their condition as illegitimate. Confrontations were common in rela-
tion to fibromyalgia patients exercising their rights as disabled individuals:  
 
‘I’ve had stand up rows in carparks before. People go you can’t park here and I say 
why not and they go you’re not old enough to have a blue badge or you can’t have 
a sports car and a blue badge. And it’s like really, what does disabled look like? 
They just have a picture in their heads and it’s not me’. 
 
This ‘picture in their heads’ of  illness is something I developed above as ‘recogni-
tion’ and was commented on by many of  my respondents. For example, one told 
me:  
 
‘I’ve got a disabled parking badge and I’ve been told ‘why are you using your 
mother’s parking badge or your grandmother’s parking badge?’ I tell them it’s 
mine and they say “well you don’t look sick”’. 
Often, patients believed the problem not just to be that they did not look ‘ill’ 
enough to meet other people’s criteria, but that these people only saw part of  their 
story. They saw them on a good day, or a good part of  a day. They were not wit-
ness to when they got home and crashed: 
‘If  someone sees you getting out of  the car and you’ve parked in a disabled space 
and they look at you because you’re walking and they have this idea that you have 
to be about ninety and in a wheelchair. Society judges you because what they don’t 
see is that if  I’ve gone into town and had a little wander around the shops, I’m 
struggling to get back to the car because I’m absolutely worn out’.  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These comments get to the heart of  what I am trying to say in this piece about ex-
pectation and recognition and all the coded ways we appraise those around us, and 
how this intersects with other conceptions about fairness. We are happy to give ex-
tra rights, such as a blue badge, to those who we believe deserve it and what’s 
more, look as though they deserve it. The old, the frail, the wheelchair-bound. 
Something in the minds of  a lot of  people pricks up at the sight of  a young, 
healthy looking person parking in a disabled space. We do not associate what we 
are seeing with potential ill health and instead reach for another explanation: that 
this person is trying to game the system, that they are unfairly benefiting from the 
generosity and kindness of  others. 
It is not just complete strangers who hold these views. Given more information, the 
name of  the diagnosis, more regular encounters with the patient, we might expect 
to see a change in perception. But for some people this change does not occur and 
they remain suspicious of  the motivations of  fibromyalgia patients. For instance, 
one sufferer relayed the annoyance she felt that she her neighbours talked about 
how she ‘claimed’ to have fibromyalgia, but was in fact ‘just lazy’. Some spoke 
about the period following their diagnosis, when acquaintances seemed to recede 
into the background and lengthy friendships faltered. One patient said ‘I did lose 
most of  the friends that I had’. Another told me ‘I’ve known people for more than 
30 years and as soon as I became ill they all disappeared’.  
It would be wrong to ascribe this shrinking of  a patient’s world entirely to preju-
dice. Fibromyalgia, like most chronic illness, restricts an individual’s ability to par-
ticipate as fully in most activities as they did before, and friendships often require 
effort to maintain. Thus it may be as an unfortunate side-effect of  their condition, 
rather than solely on the basis of  stigma, that patients find their social lives dramat-
ically transformed by illness. As the following story demonstrates, balancing ordi-
nary seeming occurrences such as a night out with taking care of  your body can be 
fraught with difficulty:  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‘I’m meant to be going out with a girlfriend tonight, out into town, you know danc-
ing and all the rest of  it, and I absolutely love dancing. Now the worst flare-up I 
ever had was after a hen do, and as you do we stayed out until 5am and I was 
wearing big heels and I was in pain so I was actually drinking while taking tra-
madol which I probably shouldn’t have but I did. And so I was fine. But I was sore 
the next day and it got worse and worse and in the end I was in bed for four days. 
So now I’m actually scared, I don’t want to go out tonight and I’ve put it on hold, 
I’ve just said I don’t know if  I can, it’s hard to say to her that I’m scared of  going 
out dancing because I don’t want to be in bed for days. I think if  I were to say I’m 
going to have a month where I just recoup and all the rest of  it then I’m sure I’d 
never go out again. It’s like a vicious circle. If  you give up then you will just end up 
staying in all the time’. 
This story neatly and sadly summarises the dilemma that patients find themselves 
in: go out and suffer heavily for it or turn down the invitations until eventually they 
stop being issued. For some, it is just too costly for them to go at all:  
‘Friends want to go out for birthday parties and stuff, but I don’t go any more be-
cause I don’t know what I’m going to be like. I’ve been to places and fallen over 
while I’ve been there and then can’t get up. Life is very limited’. 
 
So it would seem that in most cases, the reduction of  a patient’s social activity is a 
mix of  both people who were previously friends dissipating and the unfortunate 
realities of  the illness itself.  Some groups are better able to make allowances 412
 The difficulties of  maintaining a social life whilst suffering from fibromyalgia are dis412 -
cussed here: Arnold, L. M. et al ‘Patient Perspectives on the Impact of  Fibromyalgia’ in 
Patient Education and Counselling, 2008, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 114-120.
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than others. For instance, one patient spoke with me about their experiences with 
motorsport:  
 
‘It was part of  my life before. After I discovered I had fibromyalgia, the rest of  my 
friends that weren’t in motorsport walked away, apart from one person. Motor-
sport accepted me. It was a case of, I’m too poorly to be allowed trackside, but 
there were other roles that I could do’. 
 
This respondent now works as an environmental scrutineer who monitors track 
noise, and thinks she is a good example of  how both sides of  a post-fibromyalgia 
relationship can make allowances in order to maintain and build social interac-
tions. 
In some cases, however, the situation is not so ambiguous as it may be with friends 
and strangers. With those closest to us, most often our families, the chance to skirt 
around issues of  belief, to avoid telling a patient ‘what you really think’, is not 
there. Most of  us live lives in close quarters, with little room to hide our opinion 
about certain circumstances. In other words, within a household it is a lot harder to 
conceal or disguise your feelings, and sometimes this comes to the fore in hard to 
handle ways. Relationship breakdown and familial estrangement are common fall-
outs from fibromyalgia. Trying to tease apart the relative weight that beliefs about 
the illness, the strain of  living and looking after a sick person, the financial and so-
cial impoverishment that illness can bring and the ‘ordinary’ collapse of  partner-
ships that can occur in any relationship is a difficult analysis to undertake. It would 
certainly appear, however, that in many cases the lack of  sincere confidence in a 
fibromyalgia patient’s symptoms and motivations leads directly to the fragmenta-
tion of  previously solid networks. At the extreme end, you find situations like that 
experienced by this patient: 
!257
 ‘I suffered domestic abuse at the hands of  my daughter. She didn’t believe I had 
fibromyalgia. She didn’t understand that it was a condition that varies. She really 
did not grasp that my condition can fluctuate. She would tell me, in her words, that 
I was “scamming off  the government”. She would pin me in the corner of  my 
kitchen, hurling verbal abuse over at me, that I was lying, that it was all in my 
head, that I was sick in the head and needed to be locked away from normal peo-
ple’.  
 
In other cases it was their parents who disbelieved them, or their partners, but the 
central points expressed remained the same: doubt that fibromyalgia patients were 
telling the truth, the sense that they had some degree of  control over their health 
situation and general embarrassment at their condition. For instance, one patient’s 
mother refused to hold her walking stick for her because she was concerned about 
what others would think while another’s daughter said she didn’t think her mum 
was a good role model because she was ‘a cripple’. A patient described to me how 
she hid aspects of  her condition from her parents because she was afraid of  what 
they would think: 
 
‘They know about the fibro but they won’t know I spent a day in bed yesterday, 
they just don’t get it. They don’t know about all the Tramadol. We just don’t really 
talk about it. Partially it’s because they think I’m being a hypochondriac and I 
made it up’.  
 
The pressure placed on a household by something like fibromyalgia can be im-
mense. Partners and children become de facto carers, and the lack of  recognition 
that fibromyalgia has in broader bureaucratic systems means that support from lo-
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cal authorities is often lacking. For example, one teenage daughter who found her-
self  in the position of  caring for her mum was offered much and given little:  
 
‘We had a child support officer come round and they promised her youth clubs 
and they said they’d buy her a laptop and take her on trips and things but we never 
heard from them again. There’s meant to be support in place but it didn’t happen. 
They did nothing for her’. 
 
Some families, it must be said, manage to cope admirably. Many partners, parents 
and children are compassionate and helpful, and a lot of  the patients I spoke with 
were filled with gratitude for their assistance, both practically and psychologically. 
In a few cases, individuals met and built relationships with partners following their 
diagnosis. One husband was described as ‘so immensely supportive it’s unbeliev-
able. He really is fantastic’, and this was not exceptionally uncommon.  413
 
Patterns of  mistrust  
 
The questions to raise philosophically at this point are manifold. Is it possible to 
say with any certainty, given the varied and complex axes on which these systems 
of  understanding each other turn, that we are witnessing a pattern here, and a 
meaningful metaphysical one at that? What makes some people, for want of  a bet-
ter description, ‘believe’ the fibromyalgia patient in their lives where others are 
filled with distrust? Furthermore, isn’t an important question not just what how 
 Both the transformative nature of  contested illness on the family unit and the diverse 413
responses family members have to sickness are covered in the following papers: Donalek, 
J. G. ‘When a parent is chronically ill: chronic fatigue syndrome’, in The Journal of  Nursing 
Research, 2009, Vol. 58, No. 5, pp. 332-339; Jackson, E. L. ‘The effects on siblings in fami-
lies with a child with chronic fatigue syndrome’ in The Journal of  Child Health Care, 1999, 
Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 27-32.
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others react to fibromyalgia but what effect this reaction has on the patients them-
selves?  
One approach to these questions is to examine what was said to me in the inter-
views carefully and try to apply some common-sense reasoning. All patients re-
ported to me some form of  alienation and disaffection from others following their 
development of  fibromyalgia, and the cause of  these dissolutions appeared re-
markably consistent. They were, as I have already outlined, for the most part based 
on a foundational epistemic diminishing of  the patient’s explanation for their situa-
tion, exasperated by the additional effort maintaining social relations now re-
quired. It is hard to retain cordial relations with someone who you believe has 
brought their condition upon themselves or, worse, is fabricating illness in return 
for material gain, especially if  doing so requires more effort on your part to ac-
commodate the new needs of  the relationship. This viewpoint, that nearly every 
fibromyalgia patient faces a necessary adjustment to their social world not just be-
cause of  the limitations their illness imposes on them but because of  the meaning 
that the illness holds for others, is also supported by any perusal of  online forums 
and internet groups related to fibromyalgia. So to deny that there is any pattern at 
all is, I believe, severely misguided.  
A slightly archaic and little recognised linguistic distinction may come in useful 
here. In everyday use, there is no difference between ‘mistrust’ and ‘distrust’. That 
is to say, they are synonyms. However, there is a subtle dictionary distinction be-
tween them: to distrust is to be wary on the basis of  experience or reasoning, 
whereas to mistrust is to be generally uneasy on an intuitive basis. We distrust spe-
cific people who have a history of  lying to us; we mistrust every estate agent even if  
they personally have given us no reason to (perhaps due to several untrustworthy 
estate agents in our pasts).  
The purpose of  drawing a line between these two words is to then use them specif-
ically in relation to fibromyalgia and my task here. I would say that in general when 
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people encounter individuals with contested illnesses they mistrust them, and if  
they are closer to the situation then this mistrust may evolve into the more active 
distrust or transform into support and solidarity. Of  course what must be kept in 
mind is that this transition from mistrust to something else is not conducted in a 
vacuum: what individuals are faced with is not some purely theoretical entity, ‘fi-
bromyalgia’, but rather the living, breathing flesh of  the thing inside the body of  a 
person they may already have reason to dislike or inclination to disbelieve. What is 
more interesting for me is pursuing the source of  the initial mistrust, because it 
suggests that the metaphysical dice are loaded in a particular way.  
In order to talk about the effect of  this mistrust, I first need to talk about patients 
and their complicated relationship with the organic or nonorganic nature of  their 
symptoms. Often, when in conversation with me, they seemed to not be discussing 
concepts at face value, but rather talking in proxies. So, when others, whether doc-
tors or people around them, questioned the source of  their pain, they took this to 
mean that they were suggesting it was psychological in origin. This, then, became a 
proxy for two tightly woven strands of  resentment: that this meant that their pain 
was self-inflicted and that they had control over their symptoms. Furthermore, this 
also implies a strong degree of  agency: that if  they so wanted then patients could 
stop being ill by force of  will or by changing something about their person. The 
overall impression was consistent with Sontag’s observation that illness is often 
strongly associated with psychological and temperamental inadequacy, particularly 
in cases where scientific knowledge is limited or ambiguous.  Comments from 414
patients like the following that support this view were common: 
‘We don’t choose to have this illness, we don’t want to be like this, you know we’d 
do anything really to get better. People spend ridiculous amounts of  money just 
trying to get better, so desperate to be free from the pain’. 
 Sontag, S. Illness as metaphor, 1978, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, USA.414
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Nestled in this and similar reactions by patients is the process I outlined immedi-
ately above; the implication of  choice and the suggestion of  a willingness to be ill 
greeted by patients highlighting the lengths undertaken to be relieved of  symptoms 
as evidence of  the absolute and unalterable captivity of  their condition.  
Analytically, it seems unproblematic to suggest that pain may be emotional in ori-
gin but still subconscious and therefore fundamentally out of  a person’s control. 
Indeed, this is many a sympathetic doctor’s position. The pain is very much real, 
they say, and there is no doubt that you are feeling the way you say you are, it just 
happens that in the absence of  physical signs we believe the cause to lie elsewhere.  
In practice however, the majority of  patients I spoke with, though willing to coun-
tenance traumatic experiences as a trigger event and accept stress as a major ag-
gravating factor, maintained the almost unbreakable link between, for want of  a 
better term, psychological origin and being in control of  and therefore responsible 
for your symptoms. I say ‘for want of  a better term’ here because it does seem as 
though there should be a distinction drawn between the type of  ‘psychological ori-
gin’ patients reject. Surveys show that patients are as likely to cite emotionally 
painful events in their lives (abuse, breakups, etc.) as they are external physiological 
causes (viruses for example), but this acceptance of  causality is distinct from believ-
ing that they are in pain because they are depressed, or because they are suffering 
ongoing emotional problems.  The point of  conception, so to speak, must remain 415
external and in the past even if  psychological. A good example of  this is the follow-
 van Wilgen, C. P., van Ittersum, M. W., Kaptein, A. A. and van Wijhe, M. ‘Illness Per415 -
ceptions in Patients With Fibromyalgia and Their Relationship to Quality of  Life and 
Catastrophizing’ in Arthritis and Rheumatism, 2008, Vol. 58, No. 11, pp. 3618-3626; Neer-
inckx, E., van Houdenhove, B., Lysens, R., Vertommen, H. and Onghena, P. ‘Attributions 
in chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia syndrome in tertiary care’ in The Journal of  
Rheumatology, 2000, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 1051-1055; Häuser, W., Wilhelm, R., Klein, W. 
and Zimmer, C. ‘Causal illness attributions and healthcare utilization in fibromyalgia syn-
drome’ in Der Schmerz, 2006, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 119-127. 
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ing patient, who agreed with her doctors that overwhelmingly negative psychologi-
cal incidents in her past had led to her fibromyalgia, but that this previous emo-
tional experience did not mean that her current symptoms were psychological. 
‘Something happens that just rewires your body’, she told me, ‘my body’s just 
wired wrongly now’.  
It is worth noting that one patient I spoke with did agree with the proposition that 
her symptoms had an entirely emotional base and that there was little physiologi-
cally amiss in her body. My discussion with her illustrated the bind of  such patients 
perfectly, because being apparently cognisant of  this aetiology of  fibromyalgia does 
little to change your experience of  the disease As she put it in relation to doing an 
activity, she felt she knew she could participate but this knowledge itself  would not 
prevent the pain she felt during or reduce the soreness and fatigue she suffered af-
terwards. It is not difficult to see why this kind of  epistemic framework is unappeal-
ing to most patients. 
This problem of  distinguishing ‘psychological’ from physiological is compounded 
by the phenomenology of  the symptoms themselves, which appear to patients to 
be overwhelmingly biological. A lot of  the issues that fibromyalgia patients have 
are too weird, too disconnected from their brain, too much of  a physical hindrance 
to appear as though they could be psychological to the patients. They often seem 
independent of  mood and more affected by biological events, i.e. the pain and 
flare-ups that patients report after any period of  exercise or following a viral infec-
tion. It seems greatly incongruous to individuals that their symptoms are entirely 
psychological when they live rich emotional lives alongside varying degrees of  pain 
and other problems. Put simply, if  your condition is said to be caused by depres-
sion or other emotional dysfunction, then how is it possible to have a ‘good’ week, 
where you are productive and happy but still suffer from fibromyalgia? For some, 
trying to untangle this causal mess starts to feel futile as time wears on. As a patient 
told me:  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‘I am now at the stage where I’m not actually all that interested in what caused it, I 
would just like to know what ‘it’ is and how I can get better. I am open to the idea 
that it may be caused by emotional factors but the very real physical symptoms 
seem inexplicable, unpredictable and totally random’.  
 
I think that the strangeness and physicality of  the symptoms described above sug-
gests on an intuitive level to patients that what they are feeling in their bodies is 
separate to their mind, even if  it may have been caused as some point in the past 
by emotional dysfunction. This process also serves to remind us of  the casual pre-
sumptions we make about disease. As one patient said:  
 
‘I can remember working with people that said they had fibromyalgia and I was 
thinking to myself, yes, well, what emotional problems do you have? Until it hap-
pened to me. I think there is definitely an emotional aspect to it but that’s definitely 
not…when my legs cramped up I knew, this is not emotional’.  
 
It has been noted for some time that fibromyalgia patients rate their quality of  life 
as lower than healthy controls, individuals with much more ‘serious’ conditions 
and doctors’ appraisals of  their situation based upon clinical evidence.  Depend416 -
 This appears to be consistent over time and across cultures: Burckhardt, C. S., Clark, 416
S. R. and Bennett, R. M. ‘Fibromyalgia and quality of  life: a comparative analysis’ in The 
Journal of  Rheumatology, 1993, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 475-479; Kaplan, R. M., Schmidt, S. M. 
and Cronan, T. A. ‘Quality of  well being in patients with fibromyalgia’ in The Journal of  
Rheumatology, 2000, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 785-789; Hoffman, D. L. and Dukes, E. M. ‘The 
health status burden of  people with fibromyalgia: a review of  studies that assessed health 
status with the SF-36 or the SF-12 in The International Journal of  Clinical Practice, 2008, Vol. 
62, No. 1, pp. 115-126; Lee, J. W. et al ‘Determinants of  quality of  life in patients with fi-
bromyalgia: A structural equation modelling approach’, in PLoS ONE, Vol. 12, No. 2, 
e0171186. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171186.
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ing on your perspective, this might suggest a few different things. Firstly, that fi-
bromyalgia patients are depressed exaggerators who have lost touch with the reali-
ty of  their condition and do not have an appreciation of  true hardship within ill-
ness. That is to say, they are not happy because they are not happy, which is also caus-
ing their symptoms. Or, it may point towards an under-appreciation and misun-
derstanding on the part of  doctors and lay individuals as to the restrictive and dev-
astatingly painful core of  the disease. Or, to offer one more viewpoint, it may be 
that the social situation that patients find themselves in restricts their ability to de-
velop ‘wellbeing within illness’.  In other words, they are unable to adjust to the 417
world around them because it refuses to adjust to them. This might also explain 
the ‘exaggeration’ of  symptoms: when we are not heard, we shout. I do not know 
why fibromyalgia patients appear less capable of  achieving mental peace within 
their condition than others with chronic illness, but I suspect that the last point 
raised above plays a role. The psychological burden of  being, to put it lightly, mis-
understood, and the way in which this specific type of  miscommunication (both 
between yourself  and others - the inability to express your pain - and between your 
own body and your conceptualisations of  it) stalks your interactions with the world 




Two main things struck me when talking to patients about the relationship be-
tween organicity and legitimacy.  The first is the abject poverty of  the dualism as it 
 ‘Wellbeing within illness’ is a phrase used to describe the idea that though serious sick417 -
ness is no doubt a difficult experience, it does not necessarily lead to a major reduction in 
‘wellbeing’, or quality of  life. That it does in the case of  fibromyalgia contrasts with most 
other chronic illnesses and traumatic events, where an unpredicted and consistent level of  
happiness is often self-reported following the initial effects of  a negative transformative 
experience. It is posited that in these cases we overestimate how damaging to our happi-
ness illness will be and underestimate our personal ability to adapt. For a discussion of  
this concept see Carel, H. 2016b, pp. 130-149. 
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is understood implicitly by most patients at providing a framework for the messages 
they receive from their body. This is a banal point, and one much explored else-
where over a number of  years in relation to patient experience in medicine gener-
ally and in reference to fibromyalgia specifically.   418
The second is that I was witnessing the frequently observed ‘stubbornness’ of  pa-
tients in relation to aetiology and organic symptoms, which has often been regard-
ed as an impediment to recovery.  The argument goes that in clinging to strictly 419
biological explanations and refusing to consider alternate causal possibilities, pa-
tients are harming their chances of  getting better because they are not addressing 
what some see as the ‘real’ cause of  their pain: a deep underlying unhappiness. 
Furthermore, in pursuing treatment plans based upon false premises, they actively 
harm their bodies through over-medication and other attempts to alleviate their 
symptoms such as resting for long periods or turning to untested medicines ob-
tained outside of  mainstream medical systems. Over time, this adherence to physi-
cal aetiology hardens, becoming part of  a fibromyalgia patient’s identity, the illness 
itself  becoming a ‘way of  life’.  420
Kroll-Smith and Floyd have written about this process of  seeking biomedical ex-
 For two seminal papers on the role of  dualism in medicine, see Sullivan, M. ‘In what 418
sense is contemporary medicine dualistic?’ in Culture, Medicine and Psychology, 1986, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, pp. 331-350 and Engel, G. L. 1977, pp. 129-136; Demitrack, for instance, writes 
about chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia that: ‘These characteristics of  the two 
illnesses, namely, profound somatic distress in the absence of  any grossly evident biologi-
cal dysfunction, and their apparent close association with physical and emotional stressors 
has confounded the traditional, dualistic Western medical model in its attempt to concep-
tualize them. In a broad sense, these problems serve to frame the basic dilemma for these 
two conditions: What is their proper place in modern medical thought? Contemporary 
medical and psychiatric nosologies are most comfortable with unitary illness classifications 
that demand that an illness be seen fundamentally as either physical or psychological in 
nature’. See Demitrack, M. A. ‘Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Fibromyalgia: Dilemmas 
in Diagnosis and Clinical Management’ in Psychiatric Clinics of  North America, 1998, Vol. 21, 
No. 3, p. 671.
 Edward Shorter writes extensively about his view of  this process in Shorter, E. 1993.419
 Ford, C. V. 1997, p. 7.420
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planations above all else in relation to multiple chemical sensitivity.  They label it 421
a ‘practical epistemology’ whereby patients reconfigure biomedical logic and utilise 
scientific rhetoric to render their condition comprehensible to themselves and oth-
ers.  They argue that these patients sit at the intersection of  modernity and post-422
modernity, neither giving themselves wholly to a medical system which cannot ex-
plain their symptoms physiologically nor privileging their subjective experiences 
above all else. Propelling this process is an understandable pragmatic desire on the 
part of  patients to make sense of  their illnesses through the available and socially 
powerful tools they find around them. 
What is interesting to me is how this pragmatism of  identity-building in relation to 
contested illness is shaped by non-medical factors. The attribution of  symptoms to 
physiological dysfunction despite a lack of  substantial evidence is frequently ex-
plained in terms of  stigma, responsibility, legitimacy and delusion, and it is the ex-
act interactions in which these concepts crystallise that I would like to focus on.  
It certainly appeared to me that in reading the literature about fixed illness beliefs 
and considering Hacking’s looping theory that the points of  contact that were por-
trayed as most important in establishing this belief  system were between institution 
(or institutional representative) and subject, doctor and patient, the diagnosis and 
the diagnosed.  
In fact, as we shall see in the remainder of  this chapter, the situation for a number 
 Kroll-Smith, S. and Floyd, H. Bodies in Protest: Environmental Illness and the Struggle over 421
Medical Knowledge, New York University Press, USA, 1997.
 An example of  this in practice would be the importance placed on scientific ‘sounding’ 422
diagnoses. See Jason, L. A. and Taylor, R. R. et al ‘Evaluating Attributions for an Illness 
Based Upon the Name: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Myalgic Encephalopathy and Flo-
rence Nightingale Disease’ in The American Journal of  Community Psychology, 2002, Vol. 30, 
No. 1, pp. 133-148 for a discussion of  the implications of  different semantic choices in 
relation to disease names and chronic fatigue syndrome. The following paper also covers 
some of  the same ground: Huibers, M. J. H. and Wessely, S. ‘The act of  diagnosis: pros 
and cons of  labelling chronic fatigue syndrome’ in Psychological Medicine, 2006, Vol. 36, No. 
7, pp. 895-900.
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of  patients is more complicated than this. The classic Hacking loop does exist to a 
degree, insofar as we can trace the development of  the fibromyalgia concept 
through its different diagnostic criteria (i.e. the ACR 1990 criteria followed by the 
2010 update), the growth of  patient organisations and condition-specific dialect 
(fibro fog and flare-up), the ‘accepted’ aetiological model and so on. Indeed, it is 
certainly true that you can be a ‘fibromyalgia patient’ in a way you couldn’t half  a 
century ago.  
But what is interesting to me is the manner in which it appears that this ‘identity’ is 
stable but also exists alongside more fractured, antagonistic conflicts over the 
meaning of  fibromyalgia. Conflicts not with doctors or medical classifications, but 
with people encountered on a day to day, person to person basis. The basic 
premise of  this idea is as follows. In 2017, a fibromyalgia patient may well have a 
doctor who they are happy with, who is sympathetic, willing to help and genuinely 
believes they are ill and in need of  medical care. They may subscribe to a concep-
tualisation of  their illness such as that promoted by Yunus, which affords them an 
adequate explanation of  what they are feeling in somatic terms. It may be also that 
they have friends in the patient community with whom they share their experi-
ences and whose companionship allows them to feel comfortable and legitimised in 
their symptoms. Now, in this scenario, the relationship between patient and catego-
ry is static and benign. The real friction between categorisation and self-concept 
occurs outside of  these institutional frameworks. It happens in car parks and 
kitchens. 
Because if  patients are prone to taking ‘psychological origin’ as a proxy for a wide 
range of  other, negative inferences, even if  this is not what is meant by the doctor 
who suggests it, then this chain of  reasoning could be expected to be prevalent 
across the population.  Which means that in terms of  categorical negotiation, 423
 Survey data on lay perception of  fibromyalgia is lacking, but qualitative reports from 423
patients about their interactions with others in this research and elsewhere would seem to 
support this statement.
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fibromyalgia patients find themselves grouped not necessarily by their actual diag-
nosis, but by where that diagnosis leads: so they are categorised as individuals in 
control of  their symptoms, as malingerers, as emotional unstable and so on. To re-
act to this by doubling-down on a categorical definition that centres around physio-
logical dysfunction makes perfect sense, as the inferences from this are the exact 
opposite: no control of  symptoms, understandably emotionally distressed as a re-
sult, entitled to both social and financial benefits.  
The vital loops then are not between individuals and institutions but between peo-
ple outside of  such structures entirely. To simplify this, it is not just that fibromyal-
gia patients tend to prefer biological explanations in the clinic, it is that to exist in a 
society that so quickly makes the leap from ‘psychological’ to ‘accountable’ as 
someone with fibromyalgia becomes unacceptable to our sense of  self  if  we do not 
postulate an understanding of  the disease and of  ourselves which promotes an or-
ganic base or physiological process over and upon emotional factors. This then, is 
the fallout from the mistrust of  which I outlined above: the feeling that others 
around you encounter your disease in a certain way and the ultimate necessity of  
proving them wrong so that you can continue to be an individual who has been 
struck down by circumstance and not by a malignant force of  their own making.  
Is this process dynamic? A central tenet of  Hacking’s distinction between interac-
tive kinds and indifferent ones is that the former not only get changed by their cat-
egorisation but that this then leads to a change in the way they are categorised. In 
this way, the category ‘wanders’. With fibromyalgia and the interpersonal (rather 
than institutional) loop I have described above, I would argue that dynamism is in 
evidence. The attitudes of  non-medical persons that patients face, as described in 
this chapter, pressure them subconsciously towards particular explanations of  their 
condition and to act in certain ways as a result (whether it be ‘wearing a mask’ be-
cause you don’t think other will understand or pestering the doctor for more tests). 
They also lead the patient to conceptualise not only their condition in a particular 
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way that diminishes stigmatising inferences but also to reconfigure their entire life 
history.  
In turn, the solidifying of  illness belief  and the alienation felt by patients fuels 
community action and ‘oppositional consciousness’, leading to public information 
campaigns and fundraising activity.  One aim of  this politicisation of  the disease 424
is to increase biomedical research, but another key objective is to affect attitudes, to 
change the perceptions of  those who fibromyalgia patients encountered pejorative-
ly at the beginning of  this process.  425
Thinking back to the last chapter, I believe that it is by the examination of  these 
interactions that we can make the most sense of  Tekin’s pursuit of  mechanism 
within Hacking. That is to say, she poses questions about the nature of  the selves 
who are being ‘made up’, and here I reply that in the case of  fibromyalgia a major 
factor in a patient’s ‘loop’ is the extent to which they can balance their self-concept 
 I have borrowed this term from feminist studies but I believe it is applicable here (and 424
it is often used in relation to health movements): ‘before members of  oppressed groups 
can act collectively, they usually must develop an oppositional consciousness. That is, they 
must come to see themselves as members of  a group, regard their life situations as unjust, 
find a common interest with other members of  the group in opposing that injustice, con-
sider the injustice due to structural inequalities, and believe the injustice can be dimin-
ished or ended through their collective actions’. See: Groch, S. ‘Free Spaces: Creating 
Oppositional Consciousness in the Disability Rights Movement’ in Mansbridge, J. and 
Morris, A. Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of  Social Protest, 2001, The Universi-
ty of  Chicago Press, USA, p. 65.
 This attempt to ‘change minds’ occurs across plenty of  other controversial, mostly 425
mental, conditions and is supported by the fact that in some cases legitimising conceptions 
of  illnesses without overwhelming scientific support have ‘caught hold’ of  the public mind 
(for example the transformation of  depression from personal failing into physiochemical 
imbalance). This is supported by survey data, for example: Furnham, A. and Telford, K. 
‘Public Attitudes, Lay Theories and Mental Health Literacy: The Understanding of  
Mental Health’ in L’Abate, L. (ed.) Mental Illnesses - Understanding, Prediction and Control, 
2012, InTech, doi: 10.5772/29413. Though some, such as David Healy, would argue that 
this process is driven largely by pharmaceutical manipulation and agitation, I would sug-
gest that in contested illnesses (such as the ones discussed in this thesis) this occurs in tan-
dem with patient movements rather than as a dominating factor. Both groups want 
roughly the same thing - a responsibility absolving, stigma reducing, biomedical explana-
tory model of  disease - though for admittedly very different reasons.
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against the various pressures exerted upon it by their surrounding social environ-
ment. Some do this by accepting their (and other’s) conceptual ignorance of  fi-
bromyalgia, but many are unable to do so, or feel that doing so would delegitimise 
their pain and leave them at a disadvantage not just in terms of  personal validation 
but also in relation to obtaining the sick role and its attendant benefits.  
I asked then (in Chapter III) ‘how much does the immediate social environment of  
an individual alter their self-concept?’ and I am now in a position to say that this 
does not lead to glib and obvious truisms, (because I am not framing it in general 
terms but rather Hacking’s parameters); it is instead a question that provokes fruit-
ful results upon contemplation. Illness belief  is inherently social, and though its ne-
gotiation may begin in a medical setting it does not end there. Whatever the trials 
and tribulations patients that I spoke to had with doctors, these were underlined 
and in some cases caused by belief  systems about illness reinforced constantly by 
those around them. The recalibration of  the self  within illness that fibromyalgia 
forced upon patients was coordinated in light of  their overall social situation, of  
which medical encounters played a relatively small part.  
A site where this adjustment plays out most dramatically is often in the workplace 
where, as we will see in the next section, work, willingness to work and access to 
social security act as proxies again for these issues of  self. The message is the same 
as here though, that it is the non-medical encounter that shapes an individual’s 
categorical identity as much as any interactions with medical structures and their 




One strong theme of  my conversations with patients was a willingness, desire and 
ability to work that had been curtailed by their illness and compounded by inflexi-
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ble workplaces and the impression they received from others that they were re-
garded as work-shy or trying to game the system. This process often took place in 
the shadow of  struggles against clunky and rigid bureaucracy to be awarded social 
security payments on the basis of  long term sickness. Despite these issues, many of  
those I spoke to continued to work in some capacity. Often, it was the attitudes of  
others that formed the greater part of  a patient’s resentment in relation to work 
and statements like the following, where much is implied, were commonplace:  
 
‘It wouldn’t occur to me not to work. I’m not sponging off  the government getting 
benefits, I just need a bit of  help. I paid into it for twenty years, it’s not like I’ve 
never done anything’. 
 
‘There is no way I would have given up my salary by choice and given up a job I 
enjoyed doing and everything else, you don’t just do that’. 
 
‘I don’t want to stay at home and watch daytime television, I want to work’.  
 
Time and time again the point was made by patients that they had always worked, 
had often held multiple jobs at once, that they were not ‘the sort’ to try and get 
something for nothing. Employment brings with it multiple social benefits - regular 
interactions with others, raised self-esteem, intellectual challenges, status - and 
many patients regarded it as fundamental to their identity.  It also undoubtably 426
(and perhaps for some most importantly) serves a fiscal purpose. Without work, or 
 Other studies support the idea that work is central to many fibromyalgia patient’s self-426
concept: Henriksson, C. M., Liedberg, G. M. and Gerdle, B. ‘Women with FM: Work and 
rehabilitation’ in Disability and Rehabilitation, 2005, Vol. 27, No. 12, pp. 685-695; Löfgren, 
M., Ekholm, J. and Öhman, A. ‘“A constant struggle”: successful strategies of  women in 
work despite FM’ in Disability and Rehabilitation, 2006, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 447-455.
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with reduced working hours, patients with fibromyalgia find their lives are more 
restricted financially and their reliance on others greater. Particularly bristling for 
some is the idea that they should be grateful they no longer have to work, or that 
they can now work part time:  
 
‘I get remarks like “oh you’re so lucky working part time” and I think well I used to 
bring home two and a half  grand a month and now I bring home eight hundred 
pounds. That’s not lucky, that’s not good. I’m doing a job I don’t even want to do 
because it’s the only thing I can get with those hours’. 
 
‘I can’t tell you how badly I would love to be working outside of  the home but it’s 
just not physically possible…not only do you miss the money that you would be 
making but you miss the social interactions of  speaking with other adults and you 
know, being out of  the four walls of  your home. People don’t look at it that way, 
they say “oh she’s lucky, she doesn’t have to work, she gets to sit at home on her 
butt”. I don’t want to sit at home on my butt!’ 
 
Work is symbolic for a lot of  the patients I spoke with. It stands for their lives pre-
illness, but also for evidence of  their truthfulness and sincerity. They use their CVs 
as bulwarks against insinuations and accusations of  laziness and scrounging. If  they 
were indeed trying to use sickness as a way of  evading employment, then why have 
they got no history of  such evasion? Why, in fact, are their lives often evidence of  
the opposite: hard work over a number of  years, frequently in more than one job 
at once? Why would they, as many do, have sought flexible working arrangements 
or work on a part time basis in response to the needs of  their condition if  their 
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only aim was to avoid work?   427
Beneath the (understandable) bitterness and anger of  these questions lie key as-
pects of  illness and work in western society that fibromyalgia patients collide with: 
justice and fairness. What frustrates sufferers is the fact that they are not afforded 
the same allowances as other sick individuals, despite feeling strongly that they are 
just as ill, and that they have contributed the requisite amount to have earned 
reparations.  This brings to mind the Parsonian sick role touched upon in Chap428 -
ter I, that of  an acceptable forfeiting of  social responsibilities in case of  illness in 
return for certain actions on the part of  the sick individual themselves (i.e. follow-
ing doctor’s orders, trying to get better etc.).  
As Steward and Sullivan have argued, the sick role is idealised theoretically around 
acute conditions which are characterised by ‘by definitional and [patient/doctor] 
role clarity, consensus and harmony'.  In chronic conditions like fibromyalgia 429
where the disease is ill-defined and the symptoms inconsistent, the likelihood of  
recovering quickly and returning to fulfilling their functional role in society is re-
duced and thus key components of  the sick role is compromised.  It has also been 430
argued that the temporal structure of  conditions like fibromyalgia (i.e. long-term) 
 These questions touch upon another, older stereotype of  patients with conditions such 427
as fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, that they are workaholics who have run 
themselves into the ground. As one patient told me: ‘a lot of  us have personalities where 
we are really hard workers and are always busy, you just don’t stop’.
 I will not have space to discuss here is the way in which fibromyalgia patients felt that 428
welfare support is a ‘earned right’ that they deserved as a result of  their active citizenship, 
but it was a theme. For examples, one patient told me they were particularly disappointed 
in the way they had been treated, considering that they had ‘paid in tax, my parents paid 
in tax, my grandparents paid in tax…’ 
 Stewart, D. C., and Sullivan, T. J. ‘Illness behaviour and the sick role in chronic dis429 -
ease: The case of  multiple sclerosis’ in Social Science and Medicine, 1982, Vol. 16, No. 15, p. 
1397.
 This is a longstanding criticism of  Parsons’ theory. See: Segall, A. ‘The sick role con430 -
cept: Understanding illness behavior’ in The Journal of  Health and Social Behavior, 1976, Vol. 
17, No. 2, pp. 162-169.
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undermines the exemption from certain social responsibilities that the sick role 
provides because this exemption is predicated on a temporary suspension of  ordi-
nary duties rather than one conducted on a permanent or semi-permanent 
basis.   431
The difficulty of  accommodating their experiences into the confines of  the tradi-
tional steps of  the sick role does not, however, prevent patients from attempting to 
do so and from feeling frustrated when they find they are unable. It has been sug-
gested that this is ordinary illness behaviour, as the sick role narrative of  restitution 
is the dominant reaction to disease and few other options are presented to patients 
as viable or natural responses to falling ill.  Therefore, regardless of  its applicabil432 -
ity to their condition, individuals with fibromyalgia will pursue this course of  ac-
tion. 
This is evident in the long search for a diagnosis that was undertaken by many (ex-
panded upon in the next section) and in the understanding patients had that recov-
ery was expected of  them. Unfortunately, this clashed with the knowledge most 
patients felt that they had or had gained, which is that they were unlikely to ever 
make a full recovery from fibromyalgia. The ambiguity of  their disease and the 
impotence of  treatment programmes also contributed to the difficulty patients had 
being afforded the social gains of  sickness they felt were rightfully theirs. 
In regard to the patients I spoke with, the real tension seemed not to be that they 
had failed to fulfil their end of  the bargain (as it were), but rather that they were 
attempting to benefit from the sick role without being regarded by many as ill at 
 Radley, A. Making Sense of  Illness: the Social Psychology of  Health and Disease, 1994, Sage, 431
UK; it might also be worth noting that ongoing changes in patient behaviour, the eco-
nomics of  health and wider society has cast doubt on the continued application of  sick 
role theory to acute illness: Bury, M. Health and Illness in a Changing Society, 1997, Sage, UK, 
p. 106; for a more extensive discussion of  these trends, see Burnham, J. C. ‘The Death of  
the Sick Role’ in Social History of  Medicine, 2012, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 761-776.
 Robinson, I. ‘Personal narratives, social careers and medical courses: Analysing life 432
trajectories in autobiographies of  people with multiple sclerosis’ in Social Science and Medi-
cine, 1990, Vol. 30, No. 11, pp. 1173-1186
!275
all, or ill in the right way. The fact of  the matter is they had all received, however 
belatedly and reluctantly, a diagnosis from a medical professional, traditionally the 
key to unlocking the sick role, and yet many still struggled to access its benefits. 
Clearly, it is not true in any straightforward sense that doctors are the only gate-
keepers of  the privileges of  illness - other factors are in play too.  
Partly this can be explained by the favouring of  physical symptoms within the sick 
role, and the sense that only biological dysfunctional or traumatic (in the original 
sense of  the word) injuries are sufficiently amoral to be granted special status.  433
Psychological conditions raise the spectre of  personal responsibility and, as we 
have seen, fibromyalgia sits uncomfortably athwart these two porous categories. 
Research such as Glenton’s has shown that the presumed clear distinction between 
physical and mental disease has particularly deleterious consequences for individu-
als trying to access the sick role whilst suffering from conditions that do not align 
neatly with either grouping.  The words she writes about back pain could be easi434 -
ly adapted to the case of  fibromyalgia:  
 
‘While the expectations of  the sick role are particularly inappropriate for the back 
pain sufferer, these expectations are still very much present among back pain suf-
ferers and their surroundings. Rather than challenge those concepts about sickness 
and suffering that appear to be tied to the delegitimisation of  their experiences, the 
back pain sufferers…try to fit into the system by striving to live up to the expecta-
 Grey areas exist (e.g. hangovers) but these are mostly uncontroversial.433
 The visibility and consistency of  symptoms are also posited as factors unconducive to 434
success in obtaining sick role status in chronic back pain (Glenton’s case study): Glenton, 
C. ‘Chronic back pain sufferers - striving for the sick role’ in Social Science and Medicine, 
2003, Vol. 57, pp. 2243-2252; it is worth noting alongside this Goffman’s description of  
the stigma of  ‘character blemishes’ - weakness of  will, deception, dishonesty etc. - is ap-
plicable here. Patients who find the sick role withheld from them are often motivated fur-
ther in their pursuit by fear of  being falsely categorised and finding themselves on the re-
ceiving end of  such stigma. See: Goffman, E. Stigma: Notes on the management of  spoiled identi-
ty, 1968, Penguin, UK.
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tions of  the sick role’.  435
 
A further aspect to this problem is the simple observation that diagnoses are not a 
monolithic entities: they come in many shades and whilst medical legitimacy may 
inform social legitimacy, it does not do so in a blanket fashion. Stigmatised, under-
determined diagnoses like fibromyalgia lack the credibility of  other medical labels. 
As one patient told me: ‘fibromyalgia itself  as a name has developed quite a stigma 
because of  so many years of  being considered a, quote unquote, “trash can diag-
nosis”’. For conditions like fibromyalgia, the centrality of  the doctor/patient rela-
tionship to the enactment of  legitimisation in the sick role is called into question 
because being given a stamp of  approval (of  sorts) by a medical professional is not 
enough. 
 
Beyond the diagnosis  
 
A diagnosis offered by a doctor is just one node in a larger network of  acceptance. 
I am talking of  the broad bureaucratic structures that surround a patient - their 
workplace’s attitude to illness, the decisions made by social security services and, if  
under a system like that in the US, the judgement of  health insurance companies. 
All of  these are interrelated to some degree, and all work to different parameters 
of  disease. So it may well be the case that even though their symptoms are verified 
by a physician and a diagnosis is proffered, the patient is unable to take time off  
work because their employers do not recognise their condition or they find them-
 Glenton, C. 2003, p. 2249; I find that arguments like these convincing enough to justi435 -
fy my use of  the sick role in relation to fibromyalgia, even in light of  the numerous cri-
tiques that have been put forward against it.
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selves without care because their insurance does not cover them.  436
The patients I spoke to had mixed experiences. Some, like Samuel (who I de-
scribed in the first section of  this chapter), felt that they had been forced out of  
their jobs. They found themselves caught in a bind: their condition made work 
harder for them and made them less appealing to their employers and so reduced 
their workplace capital significantly, often to the point of  being made redundant or 
being removed in some other way (Samuel for instance was forced to leave his job 
on a technicality after his driving licence was revoked due to his seizures), but their 
sickness was not taken seriously enough for them to achieve the concessions we 
might associate with other diseases. Thus their ability to renegotiate their work-
place position was severely limited. The protection of  human rights legislation 
from dismissal or discrimination on the basis of  disability was not utilised by any of  
the respondents I spoke to, possibly because of  ignorance or the lengthy and costly 
procedures involved, although one was able to retain her position after union in-
volvement and a tribunal.  437
Some patients secured favourable adjustments in their terms of  employment, ei-
ther by going part-time or reducing their workload. Those that were able to do this 
in my sample tended to be the ones who had been working at the same place for a 
significant amount of  time:  
‘Work are very lenient with me and they have supported me all the way through, 
but they have seen me from start to finish. They’ve seen that I have gone from 
someone who’s been healthy, active, jolly, the lot, to someone who sits at her desk 
 Dumit, J. ‘Illnesses you have to fight to get: facts as forces in uncertain, emergent ill436 -
nesses’ in Social Science and Medicine, 2006, Vol. 62, pp. 577-590.
 These are common barriers to individuals acting upon their rights in a western disabil437 -
ity/workplace setting: Tompa, E., Scott, H., Trevithick, S. and Bhattacharyya, S. ‘Precar-
ious Employment and People with Disabilities’ in Vosko, L. F. Precarious Employment: Under-
standing Market Insecurity in Canada, 2006, McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 90-114.
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now, does as much work as I can before I know I’m going to fall asleep or start lag-
ging or not be able to get done what I need to get done, having regular rest breaks 
and things like that. So they’ve seen the transition’. 
 
The point could be made that it is the case with nearly all workplace disputes that 
longevity plays an important role, but what I’m interested in is the specific view of  
disease presented to employers in the quote above. The patient feels that the salient 
point here is that her colleagues were witnesses to her transition from health to ill-
ness, and that they have therefore alternative evidence to the myriad ambiguities 
present in fibromyalgia with which to arrive at a judgement. Their sympathy and 
accommodation is enacted on the basis of  the patient’s visible transition from one 
state to another.  
These allowances are not afforded to fibromyalgia patients trying to find new em-
ployment; without a view of  their previous self  in the collective minds of  their 
coworkers, they are much more likely to be regarded with suspicion. Observing a 
patient ‘from the beginning’ provides those around them with a counterfactual to 
their illness: it prevents the explanatory void surrounding their symptoms leading 
necessarily to distrust. In short, seeing a patient transition from one type of  person 
to another, one full of  energy to one who is lethargic, provides another form of  ev-
idence. Their symptoms may be inconsistent and vague now, but they still repre-
sent something significantly removed from how that person was before. 
Outside of  work, patients reported to me that they struggled accessing welfare 
payments.  Many, as previous earners and breadwinners, found the process hu438 -
miliating. A common complaint was that the way in which incapacity is ‘tested’, i.e. 
established as legitimate, did not align well with the way that fibromyalgia is. Per-
sonal assessments based upon ability to do simple tasks and verbal reasoning, as 
 This is not unusual for patients with fibromyalgia and similar conditions: Dumit, J. 438
2006.
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well as unconscious (or perhaps conscious) bias due to the appearance of  the pa-
tient, do not take into account the inconsistency of  fibromyalgia symptoms or the 
effect exertion has on patients in the medium term:   439
 
‘Because of  the way they word the forms it’s very difficult to explain to them that it 
is not always about what we can do at the time, but how it affects us afterwards. If  
we were to go and do an eight hour day when we’re on our feet all day, next day 
we’re not going to be able to move. They don’t allow for that kind of  disability. In 
their eyes a disability can be seen and it’s immediate and if  you take painkillers 
that should be the answer to everything’. 
 
What emerged during my conversations with sufferers about social security was the 
strong impression that disease and its debilitating features are defined both func-
tionally and cynically by government organisations, at least in the eyes of  patients. 
They felt strongly that the inconsistency of  their symptoms and the lack of  bio-
markers devalued their diagnosis and gave an inch of  disbelief  to individuals look-
ing to take a mile:  440
 
‘When I went for a medical, the person that I saw said that I made “adequate eye-
contact”. This person in actual fact did not look at me once during the entire 
 The wholly functional assessment procedure (divorced from actual condition and fo439 -
cused entirely on its effects) employed by government contractors has been criticised on 
this basis and others: McCartney, M. ‘Medicine and the Media: Atos and changes to dis-
abled people’s benefits’ in The British Medical Journal, 2012, Vol. 344, No. 7844, p. 30.
 This is echoed by other studies: ‘When the etiology of  disease is controversial…or 440
when the existence of  a disease is questioned by the medical establishment, as in the case 
of…fibromyalgia…it becomes difficult to access economic support from workers’ com-
pensation systems in the event of  disability’, from Lippel, K. ‘Workers’ Compensation and 
Controversial Illnesses’ in Moss, P. and Teghtsoonian, K. (eds.) Contesting Illness: Process and 
Practices, 2008, University of  Toronto Press, p. 47.
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meeting, and I was deemed fit for work’.  
‘We don’t often get the benefits because they don’t believe anything’s wrong. 
Claiming benefits is an absolute minefield with conditions like this and a lot of  
people struggle’.  
 
‘You are made to feel guilty by the way they do things and they seem to think if  
they see you walking about outside then you’re fine, but they don’t see when you 
get into the house again and collapse into a heap from just walking up the road 
and back. It’s really, really difficult and it is an attitude that they need to change’. 
 
These complaints again orbit around ideas of  justice and fairness, which is demon-
strated not only by patient’s frustration at not receiving some form of  compensa-
tion (and what might also be termed symbolic acknowledgement) for their condi-
tion, but by their anger at others who they believe to unjustly collect state support:  
‘We’ve got a girl next door who is twenty-five years old, the government pays for 
her house because she’s got a five year old child. She does nothing but lay around 
the place, sunbathe in the garden and talk on her phone and it’s like why do I have 
to go and work and you don’t? You know what I mean? It’s madness how someone 
that’s healthy can get that but not someone like me’. 
 
Some patients echoed these sentiments in a more reflective way, acknowledging the 
difficulty that fibromyalgia poses to what is a primarily bureaucratic, not medical, 
framework of  administration. They considered that the acts of  true malingerers 
had diminished the credibility of  subjective reporting of  illness, created a more 




‘I think that people who have cheated the system, have claimed when they 
shouldn’t, they’ve made it harder for the rest of  us who are genuinely poorly. I 
don’t know how the system can be changed to make it fairer. Especially as you 
could be having a particularly bad day, you could be having a middling day, you 
could be having a good day. That’s never taken into account. They just judge you 
on what they see that day’. 
Fibromyalgia patients are of  course not alone in these frustrations: from the very 
introduction of  social security provision for the sick (whether from the state or 
through mutual organisations), arguments about legitimate eligibility for assistance 
have formed the centrepiece of  most debates around the just administration of  the 
system and the larger part of  most complaints against it, both in North America 
and the UK.  In fact, the risk of  malingering was highlighted as one of  the three 441
main potential pitfalls of  introducing National Health Insurance (a forerunner to 
the NHS) in the first place.  Under the current system, recent changes have seen 442
the introduction of  the Personal Independence Payment, designed to replace the 
Employment and Support Allowance and provide individuals with extra financial 
support to cover the cost of  long-term health conditions. It is not linked to the abil-
ity to work or the condition itself  but rather the practical effects of  a disease or dis-
ability on an individual’s functional capacity.  
The epistemic tension at the heart of  these policies is clear: who’s assessment of  
 Prince, M. J. ‘Claiming a Disability Benefit as Contesting Social Citizenship’ in Moss, 441
P. and Teghtsoonian, K. (eds.) Contesting Illness: Process and Practices, 2008, University of  
Toronto Press, p. 31; Macnicol, J. ‘The history of  work-disability in the UK, from the 
1880s to the 1950s’ in Social Policy Association Conference, 2011, 4-6th July, University of  Lincoln.
 Ibid.442
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incapacity is to be given the most weight? Or, in other words, whose definition is 
the most legitimate? For fibromyalgia patients who may have struggled against 
what they see as the undermining and dismissive attitudes of  doctors, the preju-
diced and hurtful views of  friends and family and potentially financially incapaci-
tating issues with employment, having their disease, or the effects of  their disease, 
questioned on a similar but different basis in the welfare system may well con-
tribute further to the process of  solidification of  illness belief  I have described 
above.   443
Patients are reacting in this case against rigid and false categorisation: the view that 
if, as some people around them believe, they have agency and control over their 
condition, then the seeking of  welfare payments is a logical step on the path of  ma-
lingering. In this scenario sufferers therefore have another incentive to emphasise 
the biomedical aspects of  their functional impairment, because it is these compo-
nents that provide best ‘evidence’ of  their inability to complete tasks and detract 
from the idea that it is simply one person’s word against another. So, in short, al-
though social security benefits are in theory assessed functionally in the UK, this 
translates into more hardening of  illness belief  on behalf  of  patients, who feel that 
an inability to prove the legitimacy of  their disability behind its functional effects 
automatically places them in a highly stigmatised category, that of  the benefits 
‘scrounger’ or ‘cheat’.  444
 This brings to mind Hall and Hall’s ‘unique set of  stressors’ in relation to compensa443 -
tion, discussed in Chapter I (p. 50).
 This backdrop of  pejorative attitudes is longstanding but has been argued to have 444
worsened in recent years. It is particularly related to those who are seen to be unfairly 
benefiting from the system, e.g. individuals with subjective, unprovable health complaints 
like fibromyalgia: Baumberg, B., Bell, K. and Gaffney, D. Benefits stigma in Britain, project 
report for Elizabeth Finn Care, 2012: https://www.turn2us.org.uk/About-Us/Research-
and-Insights/Benefits-Stigma-in-Britain accessed 4/3/17; Jensen, T. and Tyler, I. ‘“Bene-
fits broods”: The cultural and political crafting of  anti-welfare commonsense’ in Critical 
Social Policy, 2015, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 470-491.
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It also leads in some cases to a false projection of  their illness which more accords 
with what they believe welfare officers are looking for. An example from one of  the 
patients I spoke to is illustrative here:  
 
‘My partner and his son walked up Ben Nevis a few weeks before I met him and I 
thought that, that for me was a pipe dream to even consider doing that. I printed 
out a picture of  the walk that they did and wrote on it “you can do this”…Well, in 
July, we went to Scotland, we went to Ben Nevis and I got a third of  the way up. 
For me this was a phenomenal achievement, something I am immensely proud of. 
What’s really sad from my point of  view is that I could not post my pictures on 
Facebook and say I did this, I got a third of  the way up Ben Nevis, I couldn’t…I 
wanted to shout it from the rooftops but I didn’t dare because I didn’t want to 
jeopardise my benefits, I didn’t want people to judge me differently’. 
 
Encapsulated in this story are many of  the elements I have been discussing. By hid-
ing her achievements within illness - her capacity to work around functional diffi-
culties - this individual is demonstrating the pressure faced by people with fi-
bromyalgia to present their illness in a way which accords with society’s expecta-
tions of  a truly ill person. That is, someone whose symptoms remain consistent in 
their ability to incapacitate; someone who does not have fun and climb mountains 
but rather stays in bed and tries to get better; someone who is entitled to state aid 
because they are desperately, visibly sick, not because they are tired and achey.  
What is interesting is the way ‘fibromyalgia’ is framed differently by patient in dif-
ferent situations: to their doctors, to their friends, to the state and to themselves, 
and though it may change shape at different sites the intention beneath the fram-
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ing remains the same.  What I mean by this is that though the precise definitions 445
and explanations offered might vary from situation to situation, the underlying 
emphasis is unchanged: patients wish to be absolved of  responsibility for their 
symptoms and recognition for their distress that aligns with their preexisting no-
tions of  sickness and justice. That the presentation of  their disease does change 
from clinic to bedroom illustrates, I think, how individuals frame the messages 
their body sends them in order to achieve subconscious goals but also allows us to 
see the degree of  ‘acceptability’ parts of  their condition have in different contexts.  
This may well appear to be stating the obvious, but what I am trying to convey 
here is a sense of  convergence. That is to say, when we ask questions about a pa-
tient’s epistemic stance on their illness, it is impossible to reach an answer without 
considering the many different sites at which that stance is challenged and renego-
tiated.  What is salient here is that a patient is not afforded a binary relationship 446
with the meaning of  their illness: it is constantly in need of  justification and expla-
nation. The continued clashing of  one person’s epistemology against another - the 
totality of  encounters and the problem of  recognition, leave a patient with a conception 
of  their disease defined by what it is not. This process gestates in an individual a 
stronger sense of  what they are going through than any conceptualisation provided 
by medicine and, to bring it back to Hacking’s loop, makes them up to a greater de-
 For example, at a the work assessment fibromyalgia might be defined by its functional 445
features, in the clinic by its latest symptoms, to friends often by some heuristic or other 
and to the individual themselves by wholesale changes to their life and their person.
 The use of  ‘epistemic’ and ‘epistemology’ in this context simply refers to knowledge-446
generation and its outcomes: what does a patient come to know about their condition and 
how is that knowledge arrived at. What weight is given to equally underdetermined ex-
planations? Which sources of  knowledge are privileged? Specifically, why do patients of-
ten end up epistemically understanding their condition in biomedical terms, despite evi-
dence to suggest other conceptualisations are more supported? Does this decision say 
something about the way that the condition is experienced or does it say something about 
the smithy in which such beliefs are forged? I believe the answer to this last set of  ques-
tions is yes on both counts.
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gree than their relationship with the knowledge produced about them at an institu-
tional level.  
Care 
 
There are two aspects of  a patient’s care I would like to focus on in this final sec-
tion, to avoid covering the same ground as above. These are the role and relative 
importance of  the medical encounter and the steps sufferers take to care for them-
selves, in particular their relation to patient-run support groups.  
The first of  these has been covered much elsewhere, and it is a feature of  this thesis 
that I have tried to focus on and emphasise the importance that non-medical fac-
tors have in determining the experiences of  fibromyalgia patients in relation to 
their conceptualisation of  their illness.  This is not to say that interactions with 447
doctors are unimportant.  
Of  particular interest to me is the journey towards a diagnosis that patients go on, 
and how it is they come to see themselves as fibromyalgia patients. Although my 
sample size was very small, none of  the patients I spoke to appeared to conform to 
Shorter and Showalter’s ideas about ‘fashionable’ diagnoses and cultural transmis-
 For a range of  perspectives over time on the doctor-patient relationship in relation to 447
fibromyalgia, see Hanh, S. R. et al ‘The difficult doctor-patient relationship: Somatization, 
personality and psychopathology’ in Journal of  Clinical Epidemiology, 1994, Vol. 47, No. 6, 
pp. 647-657; Åsbring, P. and Närvänen, A. L. ‘Women’s Experiences of  Stigma in Rela-
tion to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Fibromyalgia’ in Qualitative Health Research, 2002, 
Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 148-160; Werner, A. and Malterud, K. ‘It is hard work behaving as a 
credible patient: encounters between women with chronic pain and their doctors’ in Social 
Science and Medicine, 2003, Vol. 57, pp. 1409-1419; Dobkin, P. L. et al ‘Patient-physician 
discordance in fibromyalgia’ in The Journal of  Rheumatology, 2003, Vol. 30, pp. 1326-1334; 
Wasan, A. D. et al ‘Dealing with difficult patients in your pain practice’ in Regional Anesthe-
sia and Pain Medicine 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 184-192; Hayes, S. M. et al 2010, pp. 
385-391; Clark, P., Paiva, E. S., Ginovker, A. and Salomón, P. A. ‘A patient and physician 
survey of  fibromyalgia across Latin America and Europe’ in BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders, 
2013, Vol. 14, No. 188, doi: 10.1186/1471-2474-14-188.
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sion (i.e. self-diagnosis after media exposure): they often experienced symptoms for 
many years before being told, in many cases reluctantly and with caveats, that they 
probably have fibromyalgia, a name quite a few of  them had never heard before.  
Commonly, the diagnostic process went as follows: a patient starts suffering fatigue 
and joint pain, sometimes in a specific place such as the lower back or shoulder. 
These symptoms continue and do not respond to painkillers whilst a multitude of  
tests are conducted on the patients and a variety of  specialists employed to rule out 
other, more easily established conditions. Eventually, usually following a referral to 
a neurologist, physiotherapist or rheumatologist, a diagnosis of  fibromyalgia is of-
fered. 
A patient told me, for instance: ‘originally we were concerned about MS, did the 
tests for that, couldn’t find anything. Did the tests for everything else, couldn’t find 
anything so we ended up at fibromyalgia’. Others were explicitly aware that theirs 
was a diagnosis of  exclusion:  
 
‘Some didn’t believe it, said it’s all in your head. The rheumatologist I saw just said 
he didn’t think it was a real disease and so what did we expect him to do about it? 
It isn’t anything else that you’ve got so we might as well call it that but there’s noth-
ing I can do’.  
 
Some were diagnosed by non-medical professionals to begin with: 
‘As bad as it sounds, my hairdresser actually identified it. And said I really think 
you might have fibromyalgia and I went to the GP and discussed it. So she sent me 
to the neurologist and she said, “oh, I agree. What do you want me to do about 
it?” Literally in those words. And that was it. But at least I’ve got a name now and 
I can understand it a bit better and find more out about it. So even though I did 
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feel as though I’d been treated very flippantly by the neurologist, they did help me 
put a name to my illness’.  
 
These quotes speak volumes about the fibromyalgia patient experience in relation 
to diagnosis. Often arrived at tangentially and without firm conviction, it none-
theless does offer to many patients a small degree of  hope and a semblance of  clar-
ity. They have a label and a way of  understanding and explaining their symptoms. 
However problematic this may be, it is for most patients a step up from the uncer-
tainty and alienation of  having no name at all for their distress. 
Some patients do dispute their diagnosis, conscious of  the methodological prob-
lems in identifying fibromyalgia. Most of  all, they are not satisfied that everything 
that could have been done had been to locate some other, more biomedical but 
also, crucially, more curable condition. One patient in particular was wedded to the 
idea that she had been denied access to potential alternative diagnoses because of  
cost factors and thought that as she was not viewed as a legal threat to the doctors 
involved they were withholding treatment:   448
‘It’s almost like it’s convenient for them to diagnose it as there’s no legal comeback, 
because I can’t sue them, they don’t care…You rely on family and friends and your 
own private money on tests with the hope that something might come up, that they 
might find something they haven’t tested for, that they might have the cure. What 
if  I haven’t got fibromyalgia? What if  it’s something else? I don’t know, another 
rare disease that may be curable or treatable? The best hope for me is that it’s not 
fibromyalgia. But they’re not giving me the option because they’re not doing 
enough tests. It’s the tests that are bothering me the most, the money and the tests’. 
 It should be noted that this patient was somewhat of  an anomaly amongst the individ448 -
uals I interviewed: none of  the others shared her extreme antagonism towards the health 
service or her impression that fibromyalgia patients are treated badly by doctors primarily 
on the basis of  cost.
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What is interesting about this patient’s views is how it illustrates the consumer 
model of  patient/doctor interactions in a novel way: here the patient is acting like 
a consumer, rejecting the judgment of  the doctor and demanding a different 
course of  action, but their ‘rights’ as they see them (to undergo more tests) are be-
ing undermined by doctors who still weald the power supposedly stripped from 
them by precisely this kind of  ‘consumer’ behaviour.  
Other patients more faithfully enacted the ‘doctor shopper’ model, switching be-
tween professionals until they found one who they were happy with.  Unlike the 449
sufferer described immediately above, however, the issues patients had with ‘bad’ 
doctors largely revolved around the manner of  the professional, rather than the 
substance of  what they had to say. Patients sought a doctor who they felt believed 
them and was willing to try different therapies, even if  they were ignorant or ac-
knowledged themselves that medicine could not offer a cogent explanation or 
treatment plan. For example, let us look at the experience of  the following patient:  
 
‘I have no fear of  changing doctors if  I have one that I don’t feel is making sense 
or listening. I’ve had orthopaedic doctors that don’t even listen, they talk over me 
and wanted to ignore the pain I’m feeling and pretend its not there instead of  ac-
tually looking into it. I’ve had one that has left me in tears because he was so rude. 
I was standing there in massive amounts of  pain, my shoulder’s hurting and yet 
he’s grabbing it and twisting it in all directions, making me scream and telling me 
there’s nothing wrong with it. Obviously I didn’t return to him’. 
 
 It should be noted that the concept of  ‘doctor shopping’ can be defined in numerous 449
ways and there is no, one universally agreed upon description: Sansone, R. A. and San-
sone, L. A. ‘Doctor Shopping: A Phenomenon of  Many Themes’ in Innovations in Clinical 
Neuroscience, 2012, Vol. 9, No. 11-12, pp. 42-46.
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What is important to her relationship with her doctor is the respect with which her 
and her symptoms are treated. Being talked over and having her pain ignored or 
minimised does more to sour her relationship with a doctor than the ambiguities 
present in her condition. This is an example of  epistemic injustice, as discussed at 
the beginning of  this chapter: the epistemic status of  the patient has been min-
imised and as a result she has been made to feel as if  her testimony is ignored be-
cause other epistemic sources are given more credence.  
A few more such instances were reported to me by patients, such as one where a 
patient was referred:  
 
‘They sent me to another doctor and used the term ‘women like me’ or something. 
It was a very derogatory statement they had made implying it was all in my mind, 
kinda hypochondria’.  
 
Other patients also complained that doctors were quick to reach for a purely psy-
chological explanation which, for reasons described above, did not sit well with 
them. Though several told me that they fully accepted the psychological origin of  
their symptoms, this was separate from believing the symptoms themselves to be 
psychological. It was particularly frustrating for patients who were told that any 
mood problems they were experiencing was at the root of  their pain. For them, the 
pain had caused their mood issues: 
 
‘I know I’m not depressed but when I get an attack of  all sorts of  different types of  
pain, when I get an attack of  one of  those, it sends me into, well, I want to die, I 
feel suicidal, there’s no point in living, I can’t go on like this but then I would wake 
up in the morning and feel better and ready to get on with my day again. So it 
causes depression…I think my depression was caused by the pain’. 
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‘I was talking to my friend who is a physiotherapist, a recently qualified physio-
therapist and he said to me “don’t let them tell you you’ve got fibromyalgia, that’s 
just what they tell depressed people and give you tablets for”. I just thought I’m not 
imagining how I feel I know I’m not imagining how I feel, I’m not that sort of  per-
son, I never have been who goes off  sick or who goes to bed if  they’ve got a cold, I 
would always keep going and they think it is in people’s heads’. 
Overall though, I was surprised, given the long history of  antagonism between 
doctors and patients presented both in the literature and online, at the number of  
individuals I spoke with who had positive relationships with their doctors.  Many 450
had formed relationships with them that were trusting, palliative and just about as 
good as could be expected given the circumstances. Partly this was as a result of  
being able to exercise choice within the healthcare system, but often a change of  
doctor was not necessary. Comments like the following were fairly common:  
 
‘My GP is brilliant. I don’t go in thinking what can she do for me, I go in thinking 
what can we do for me. In other words, we will be a partnership. Together we do’. 
 Some examples of  studies which highlight the problems that patients have with their 450
healthcare professionals (and vice versa): Åsbring, P. and Närvänen, A. L. 2002, pp. 
148-160; Werner, A. and Malterud, K. 2003, pp. 1409–1419; Bieber, C., Muller, K. G., 
Blumenstiel, K. et al ‘Long-term effects of  a shared decision-making intervention on 
physician-patient interaction and outcome in fibromyalgia: A qualitative and quantitative 
1 year follow-up of  a randomized controlled trial’ in Patient Education and Counselling, 2006, 
Vol. 63, pp. 357–366; Matthias, M. S. and Bair, M. J. ‘The Patient-Provider Relationship 
in Chronic Pain Management: Where Do We Go From Here?’ in Pain Medicine, 2010, Vol. 
11, No. 12, pp. 1747-1749; Briones-Vozmediano, E., Vives-Cases, C., Ronda-Pérez, E. 
and Gil-González, D. ‘Patients’ and professionals’ views on managing fibromyalgia’ in 
Pain Research and Management, 2013, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 19-24.
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‘I’ve started with a new doctor. They will do home visits and so far they’ve been 
very good. If  I make suggestions then usually they are willing to listen. I don’t 
know if  it’s my background with the nursing or not but they seem to be quite oblig-
ing in that way. But it’s really difficult to treat this illness’.  
 
And, perhaps most tellingly:  
 
‘I’m very lucky, I have a family doctor who does believe in fibromyalgia’. 
 
The majority of  the patients I spoke with, then, accepted their diagnosis and it 
formed the basis of  their ongoing interactions with their doctors and other special-
ists. However, the uncertainties and amorphous definitions that permeate other as-
pects of  fibromyalgia were just as present in the clinic. Being diagnosed, for the pa-
tients I interviewed, was just one step of  many towards constructing a meaningful 
definition of  their condition and assimilating it into their present and past experi-
ences. Even a doctor who listens to and trusts the patient may not be able to offer 
them much in terms of  understanding what fibromyalgia ‘is’:  
 
‘It is a relief  [to be diagnosed], but unfortunately you sit down and go, well I’ve 
been diagnosed, now what? They don’t actually tell you anything when you are di-
agnosed, they’re not helpful at all’.  
‘The rheumatologist did all the tests for arthritis and stuff  and then said, I don’t 
like giving this diagnosis, it makes me anxious in case I’ve missed something but I 
think it’s fibromyalgia. And he didn’t know anything about it. He kinda said there’s 
not much to tell, there’s not much I can do about it and that was it’. 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The lack of  information provided to patients, underlined it must be said by gen-
uine clinical uncertainty, makes narrative construction more difficult. Patients look 
elsewhere to construct their meaning of  fibromyalgia, since that offered by health-
care professionals is so devoid of  detail. This, combined with the impotence of  the 
treatment plans, drive individuals to learn more about their condition from a wide 
range of  sources. Filtering of  information is necessary to avoid absorbing false in-
formation or being exploited but often patients feel like they have nothing to lose 
by trying something new: 
‘You do tend to go online because you’re just desperate to find out things. I’m very 
aware that there’s a lot online, particularly from America, where people will offer a 
cure for it, they write books called ‘A Cure for Fibromyalgia’…well of  course 
there’s no cure at the moment. You’ve got to sift it in your own mind and take out 
the relevant bits’.  
 
‘When you’re diagnosed with something and the doctor can’t help you, you do get 
a little desperate looking for things, and when you see what people are offering in 
the way of  pills and potions and this cream and that cream and all the rest of  it, 
and the prices they are charging, and they’re not necessarily going to do anything 
anyway. But of  course people do get very desperate when they’re in pain and fa-
tigue and all the rest of  it. You do tend to go for things’.  
 
The bottom line is, I think, that many patients would agree with one individual I 
spoke with, who told me that when she was diagnosed: ‘I didn’t have a clue what it 
was’. Now, again, my sample size is small, but the patients I spoke to who were in-
volved in community support groups indicated to me that it was common for a suf-
ferer to know next to nothing about their condition when they were diagnosed. 
What they learnt about it they discovered through their own research and their in-
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teractions with other patients, which aligns with my argument that key to the con-
struction of  meaning in this situation is the non-medical world of  the patient, or 
perhaps more accurately their non-medically mediated world.  
In my search for a mechanism behind the cultural transmission of  symptoms high-
lighted by Shorter and Showalter I could find little to support their arguments. 
These patients were ill long before they were diagnosed and constructed most of  
what they came to know about their condition following a long period of  uncer-
tainty. No doubt framing of  symptoms in light of  information later learned occurs, 
but to say that these problems are shaped entirely and always by culture is not 
borne out by my research.   451
The centrality of  the doctor-patient relationship to the production of  specific 
symptom types, for as described by Shorter, is not evident in the patients I spoke 
with and neither is media exposure (at least on the face of  it) or shifting medical 
paradigms major factors. The symptoms experienced by patients in all cases ap-
peared to predate their meaningful assimilation of  them into any kind of  concep-
tual framework by quite a long time, decades in some instances and doctors, as dis-
cussed above, were often able to offer patients little in the way of  explanation or 
information about fibromyalgia, which suggests a diminished element of  iatro-
genicity, if  there is any there at all.  
What deserves further investigation is whether or not patient groups contribute to 




Showalter, as explained in Chapter III, argues for intertextuality as a means of  un-
 That is to say, there seems to be a thick heart to fibromyalgia which is independent of  451
or extremely obscurely related to the culture of  the patient. Tracing lines between the in-
dividual, their symptoms and the culture they are part of  was of  great difficulty. 
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derstanding how similar symptoms appear to clot around a particular psychoso-
matic disease. The sum total of  reporting and consumption of  media surrounding 
a condition creates for troubled individuals ways in which to be ill - it gives them 
stories with which to understand what is happening to them and this subconscious 
interpretation causes symptoms to crystallise in a particular way. This then feeds 
back into the narrative: if  another person feels exactly like this, then there must be 
some common, base cause.  
In the patients I spoke to, I did not see evidence of  this. Although their complaints 
were often similar, each had their own individual way of  talking about their condi-
tion and none mentioned news reports, television shows or other media. I think 
this is significant. If  the intense intertextuality and profound media influence sug-
gested by Shorter and Showalter exists, then in the case of  my patients its reach 
was hidden from me. As stated above, most of  those I spoke with lived a life in 
limbo with regard to what they thought they had before they were given a diagno-
sis. Many spoke of  the ambiguity of  information available and the sense of  living 
in a vacuum of  information. What is more likely to have had an impact on their 
ideas about their condition was their interactions with other patients following di-
agnosis.  452
I have included patient support groups in this section, entitled ‘Care’, instead of  
the section called ‘Relationships’ because as I spoke to respondents I began to see 
more and more that the patient ‘community’ was not so much something an indi-
vidual with fibromyalgia automatically joins, but rather a loose network that could 
be utilised or rejected as they saw fit.  In other words, it is more piecemeal than 453
 And by implication, following Shorter and Showalter, their symptoms (though the re452 -
lationship between the level of  meaning and bodily feeling is never satisfactorily elucidat-
ed).
 By ‘patient community’ I mean: large organisations like Fibromyalgia Action UK, lo453 -
cal support groups, online groups such as patient forums and pages on social media and 
helplines for those with the disease.
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unitary. Most of  the patients I spoke with encountered others with their condition 
following their diagnosis, and responses to the usefulness of  doing so were varied. 
Some emphasised the amount of  common feeling that support groups afforded 
and the sense of  relief  isolated patients got from talking to others in the same situa-
tion as themselves. Another comment that was often repeated amongst my sample, 
however, was the perceived negativity and defeatist attitudes prevalent throughout 
the community.  454
Beginning with the first of  these, some of  those I spoke with demonstrated to me 
the beneficial aspects of  support groups and the sharing of  companionship and 
information therein. It was suggested to me that these groups - who meet locally 
and organise events across the country and are largely self-organised - play a par-
ticularly important role when a patient has just received their diagnosis and is un-
certain about how to proceed. One patient, who runs a support group herself, told 
me that:  
 
‘It is about giving people the support, including myself  really, that you won’t get 
from anywhere else, because only people with the condition can understand how 
somebody feels. So especially for people when they’re newly diagnosed and they’re 
really confused and there’s nobody else to turn to and they don’t understand it, 
their families certainly don’t understand it, at that point it’s nice to be able to talk 
about it and learn a bit more about it with people who really know’.  
Another said:  
‘Every new person that comes, they all say they’re still alone and no-one believes 
them, and that no-one else understands how they feel and they feel like they’re the 
 This raised questions in my mind as to the representativeness of  my sample. See 454
Methodology, Appendix I.
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only ones and they don’t know how to explain it to their family. That’s the general 
pattern of  things when new people arrive’. 
These quotes touch upon a point that a number of  patients made to me, which is 
that no matter the level of  support and sympathy they received from those around 
them, it was a relief  to talk to others with fibromyalgia for the simple reason that 
they could truly understand what they were going through. This brings to mind the 
discussion earlier in this chapter about empathising with another’s pain and would 
seem to suggest that fibromyalgia patients themselves think that there is something 
unique, something other about the symptoms they experience. What is uncertain is 
whether this is an intrinsic ‘fact’ of  the condition or whether they arrive at this 
opinion following repeated interactions with others who never seem to understand 
the way that they feel inside of  themselves.  
Some of  the patients I spoke to found that using support groups, in real life or on-
line, calmed their anxieties about particular symptoms, especially those on the 
stranger side. In this immensely connected world, it is not that difficult to find an-
other person who has had or is claiming to have had similar experiences to you, 
and that can come as a relief:  
‘I had this weird episode where I, this sounds really bizarre, if  I tasted any food or 
drink my tastebuds, saliva glands or whatever, would just go berserk and so I was 
on the forum saying I know this is bizarre but has anyone experienced this and 
someone had and they didn’t know what it was was. And so to go on there and get 
reassurance that you’re not the only one to have these weird and wonderful symp-
toms, that’s reassuring’. 
 
‘So many of  the things that people talk about I go oh my God me too, it’s not just 
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me! So I feel an acceptance and an understanding in those groups that I don’t have 
a lot of  in my real life’. 
 
A question that these comments raised in my head was: do the negative outcomes 
of  this process outweigh the positives for patients? That is to say, yes patients are 
able to find others who feel the same as them and feel less alienated as a result, but 
would they have been better off  if  they had tried to ignore the symptoms entirely 
rather than fixating (in a loose sense) upon them, putting them into words, talking 
to others about them etc.? Certainly, strange symptoms become a lot easier to as-
similate into ‘the disease’ once it becomes evident that other people with fi-
bromyalgia also have the same complaints. And once odd experiences become 
normalised as symptoms, would it not be understandable if  patients began to un-
derstand every out-of-the-ordinary experience they had as a fibromyalgia symp-
tom?  
Or, to take another tack: do these quotes provide a counterbalance to ideas about 
intertextuality? Patients in the situations above clearly had no precedent for their 
experiences - no prototype, no story - and it was only through talking with others 
that they realised they were not the only ones who felt this way. Evidence like this 
appears to me to make the case that these patients are undergoing something fun-
damentally similar, even if  bizarre.  
By asking these questions we can appreciate the complicated ways that communi-
cation between patients might interact with their experiences of  their body and in 
turn, through some obscure, little understood mechanism, actually change those ex-
periences. 
One further function of  the fibromyalgia community that patients found helpful to 
them was the sharing of  ideas in relation to treatment. A lot of  individuals were 
adverse to the drug-heavy regimes suggested by their doctors and preferred to dis-
cuss with other patients what it was that had worked for them, whether that in-
!298
volved a change in diet, a particular type of  exercise or even meditation. Pooling 
ideas and success stories locally and online allowed patients to feel as though they 
were in a reciprocal relationship with each other, working together to better man-
age their symptoms. 
Something that came as a surprise to me during my interviews, however, was the 
amount of  negativity displayed towards the patient community by a number of  my 
respondents. Many of  those I spoke with felt that, though they had their place, on-
line forums and local support groups could leave them feeling worse than before:  
‘One girl I know went to a group but she came out of  there feeling so depressed, it 
was so miserable, not uplifting in any form and she won’t be going back. That’s 
what you don’t need’. 
‘There’s a lot of  doom and gloom on there [the forums] and I think, oh I can’t be 
dealing with this today and I don’t log on’. 
Some patients felt that the outcome of  these attitudes, which revolved around dis-
cussions of  symptoms, experiences with doctors and general tales of  problems 
faced, was a worsening state of  health. For them, the mental attitude you took as a 
sufferer towards your illness was critical:  
 
‘I joined different things. It was negative, negative, negative. To the point where I 
was thinking good God, do something about it! Don’t just sit there and whine that 
you’re in bed. To be in bed all day is not an option. To me, if  you lay in bed all day 
you’re making it worse because you’re not moving’.  
‘People with fibro need to be more proactive. They need to get out of  their house. 
I’m not saying they have to go to support groups, I just sense that their whole social 
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life is a little screen and a keyboard. That’s not good. It’s not good for them men-
tally, not good for them physically and possibly not good for them fiscally either’.  
 
Attitudes like this confirmed for me more than anything the idea that beneath all 
the symbolic explanations and oblique theories of  medico-cultural interplay, there 
is a strong element of  fibromyalgia and similar conditions that simply is. Some of  
the patients who I spoke to, like those quoted above, had no knowledge about fi-
bromyalgia before their diagnosis and remained open-minded following it. They 
tried to exercise and eat well, and above all attempted to maintain a healthy and 
positive mental attitude. Their experiences with doctors, whilst not without acri-
mony, often led to a mutual and beneficial relationship. They went online and to 
other patients in search of  information and treatment ideas, but did so with a scep-
tical mind. In other words, as far as I could see, they displayed little of  the charac-
teristic stubbornness or unreasonable behaviour that one might expect to see hav-
ing read portions of  the literature.  And through it all they continued to be in 455
pain. 
What my conversations with patients regarding other patients revealed as well was 
the degree of  diverse opinions within the community. It seemed to me that some 
sufferers were defining themselves not just against the impressions of  others, be it 
doctors, family or whomever, but also against what they perceived as the ‘wrong’ 
attitude towards having fibromyalgia. They did not want to give in to invalidism 
and they were frustrated by those who they thought of  as doing so. As one patient 
said:  
 
 For an overview of  some of  the typical ways in which patients are characterised by 455
physicians, see Åsbring, P. and Närvänen, A. ‘Ideal versus reality: physicians perspectives 
on patients with chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and fibromyalgia’ in Social Science and 
Medicine, 2003, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 711-720. This accords with much that can be found in 
more informal sources such as internet forums.
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 ‘I know that some in my group are perceived as not trying. They think ‘oh I can’t 
do that so I won’t work, I can’t do that so I won’t do anything. And it’s like, you 
know, you could do a little bit, I’m sure a call centre or something. You could an-
swer the phone. And some will say no I can’t do it, I can’t do anything. You have 
got to try, you have got to push a little bit’. 
 
Another respondent who encountered other fibromyalgia patients as part of  their 
job said:  
‘I take a lot of  occupation therapy referrals with people with fibro. So obviously I 
cringe and keep my mouth shut because they’re asking for grab rails and things for 
the loo and I think for God’s sake come on, you’re not 70, you’re not 80, you’re 40 
or 50 odd’. 
 
This diversity of  response and opinion led me to consider once more the pure 
complexity of  the issue at hand here: the sheer number of  variables and inputs 
that present themselves as patterns but may well say nothing about the experience 
of  any one individual. In other words, the age-old problem of  conducting qualita-
tive research. Could it be the case that some of  the ideas discussed in this thesis 
apply to some patients but not others, even though they have the same diagnosis? 
Of  course. No doubt there is more than one way to skin a cat, just as there is more 
than one way to become a fibromyalgia patient and more than one way to act like 
one. This does not mean, however, that the words I have presented above are 
meaningless. On the contrary, they are infused with meaning, and in considering 
not just what patients say but how they say it, who they appear to be addressing, 
which themes they return to and the like, I think we can come to serious conclu-
sions about not only their experience as patients but the societies which created 
and shaped their patienthood. 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Conclusion and further questions  
 
I have covered a lot of  ground in this thesis, dipping my toe as I went in various 
bodies of  literature from a range of  fields. My hope is that the result has been a 
holistic examination rather than a superficial and slipshod treatment and that the 
material utilised was relevant. The intent was certainly to provide illumination 
rather than obfuscation.  
At the beginning of  this work, I stated that my aim was to ‘to look in detail at the 
philosophical context that frames the way contested, chronic illnesses are experi-
enced and understood by patients in the early 21st century…The focus of  this re-
search is therefore to trace with greater accuracy, and more importantly greater 
reference to lived experience, the contours of  belief  and assumption which provide 
us with our collective map of  disease’. I believe that I have succeeded in this aim. 
Throughout the foregoing chapters I have introduced and discussed a number of  
ideas which I believe help us to understand the way in which fibromyalgia patients 
relate to their condition and, furthermore, elucidate a general sense of  our collec-
tive idea of  disease, as nebulous as that may be. I have also identified and analysed 
those ideas which I believe to be unhelpful or distracting. Ideas such as the notion 
that philosophers of  medicine should focus on the definition of  disease problem. 
Though I offered arguments against this in Chapter II, let us briefly consider them 
again in light of  this chapter.  
What, for instance, can the definition of  disease literature tell us about fibromyal-
gia? That it either is or is not a disease, depending on whose schema you 
employ.  This does not resolve any controversies or offer any insight into the ex456 -
periences patients have. It remains, in my view, a conceptual distraction. I think 
that what we can see from this final chapter is that in relation to disease we have 
 Naturalists would probably conclude that it is not, normativists that it is. Neither dis456 -
cuss such cases specifically.
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very often been asking the wrong questions.  
Instead of  asking what, we should be asking who, how, why and at what location? Dis-
eases are ‘defined’ constantly, most often by individuals whose definitions carry 
with them more consequences than those of  philosophers. Truly descriptive studies 
of  disease definition will have to give up on the false promise of  universality, aban-
doning this edifice for work which is specific and grounded in examples. We should 
therefore be looking at how diseases are defined, not disease.  
Clearly there is a huge medical component to the focus of  this work, but what I 
have emphasised in this thesis is the extent to which non-medical factors come to 
bear upon patients. This is true too in relation to disease definition, for much of  
the literature takes it for granted that in most cases an adequate characterisation of  
a condition can be found (these form most of  the counterexamples) without ques-
tioning either the epistemic authority on which that definition is based or asking 
about the diversity of  opinion that may exist among the ‘definers’. Disease defini-
tion is taken to be a straightforward process enacted by a homogenous group, the 
philosopher’s job being to create a category which captures all of  this group’s out-
puts. I hope that in this thesis I have shown this method to based on false premises.  
Throughout this work I have also tried to demonstrate the usefulness of  collapsing 
the categories of  ‘disease’, ‘illness’ and ‘sickness’. The epistemic privileging of  ‘dis-
ease’ within this schema, despite its original aims at liberation, compound issues 
that patients face.  Treating them as one and the same allows us too to switch 457
more easily between the medical and non-medical encounter, examining all aspects 
of  the way the disease operates (to borrow a phrase from Chapter I) rather than 
trying to delineate different sections of  it for piecemeal analysis. We can thus talk 
about fibromyalgia in terms of  pain receptors and welfare payments and self-doubt 
because they are all bees of  the same hive.  
 A position I share with Annemarie Mol: Mol, A. 2003457
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At present the overt link between ‘disease’ and biomedical signifiers leaves patients 
shut out of  the category and placed in another. Sociologically we would say that 
fibromyalgia sufferers have ‘illness’ but not ‘disease’; for the patients themselves this 
distinction means they are caught in a netherworld where they feel diseased but are 
treated as if  they are not. A continued recognition and focus on the fact that dis-
tinguishing between disease as biomedically defined and sickness as experienced 
creates a whole category of  discontented and dysfunctional patients with little to 
guide their experience is necessary to understand the problems of  these individuals 
and to make their lives easier.  
This work has also, I believe, demonstrated the truth behind the idea that illness 
presents a unique opportunity to think about our world, our beliefs and ourselves. 
In other words, disease is ideal philosophical fodder. The breadth and range of  
topics touched upon in the above discussion pay testament to this notion, and I 
remain convinced that there are few other topics which so aggressively force the 
intersection of  thoughts about embodiment, mortality, causality, communication 
and biology. Such cases as I have discussed remain fundamentally unsolved and 
obscure but they are also insightful and revealing. They make us look twice, they 
make us consider alternatives. They make philosophers of  us all.  
So what is my conclusion? That it is important to think about illness from all an-
gles, not just medical ones. That the prevailing notion of  disease held loosely across 
the population is reductionist, mechanistic, specific; concerned with restitution; hi-
erarchical and deferential to medical expertise in its classification; suspicious of  in-
tent and subjectivity; constructed around consistent and visual symptoms, both in 
the everyday and clinical senses. Individuals encountering disease have a set of  
preconceptions about it, and as I have detailed, a set of  causal expectations. When 
these expectations are not met, when we do not recognise disease in an individual, 
then other inferences start to occupy the territory ordinarily reserved for sympathy 
and assistance. This mode of  thinking is reflected not only in the attitudes of  lay 
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people but also in how patients experience, rationalise and narrativise their condi-
tion. At different sites it is refracted to accommodate various aims, whether in rela-
tion to a productive, efficient workforce or a welfare system geared towards saving 
costs, but retains the same central features. Belief  and empathy are fickle and rely 
upon the support of  a casual matrix; simply communicating distress, against the 
backdrop of  an explanatory void, is not enough to entitle the patient to what they 
feel as though they deserve. My conclusion is that the strictures of  biomedical 
thinking are precisely that - a narrowing of  vision, a tightening of  the imagination. 
Much in the same way as blinkers prevent horses from being spooked or distracted, 
our modes of  thinking about illness bring clear benefits, but they also act as re-
straints on the types of  information to be considered and the credence we give to 
it. It becomes incredibly difficult to look at something from a different angle once 
you have become accustomed to seeing it in a certain way, because such a recali-
bration comes to require a wholesale adjustment of  your viewpoint.  
Leriche said that health is life lived in the silence of  the organs. Fibromyalgia pa-
tients find their bodies speaking at a frequency we cannot hear. Others mistake this 
for silence, and therein lies the problem.  
- - - 
 
There are several questions that I did not address in this work but that as a reader 
you may feel have been begged. Where for example, do these prevailing notions of  
disease that I have sketched originate from? I covered this topic briefly in my dis-
cussion of  biomedicine and with fleeting references to both a dualism and a mech-
anistic causality that lie beneath the surface of  our worldview but truly this is a 
project of  its own. I have only been able to outline the surface manifestations of  
what is an entire metaphysical edifice, no doubt with deep historical roots. My 
work here has shown the importance of  underlying beliefs about causality, mecha-
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nism, dualism and much else besides in understanding the experience of  patients, 
but I have not had the space to uncover the origins or transmission of  these ideas. 
Another question that is implicitly raised by my work but not addressed is the role 
that mass communication plays in some of  the processes I have described. Does 
the internet and social media represent a significant sea-change in the way that pa-
tients talk to each other and relate to their conditions? Or is it just an exaggeration 
of  previously existing structures?  I would have very much liked to approach 458
these questions in this thesis but, the more I investigated and pondered the role of  
the internet and the forms of  communication it facilitated, the more I was pushed 
towards the conclusion that it required extensive research in its own right and a 
reframing of  this work’s key questions. I was most interested in how a patient’s 
condition was reflected back to them by the world they encountered outside of  
their condition, rather than their interactions with others in their position. I think 
that the extent to which patient’s experience was shaped by factors unrelated to the 
internet justify my bracketing of  it in this instance. 
The role of  gender has been raised by many individuals I have spoken to about my 
research and is clearly relevant to this topic. Why is it that so many fibromyalgia 
patients are female?  How is the patient experience of  contested illnesses affected 459
by gender? I suspect a convergence of  biological and cultural factors would go 
some way to answering these questions, as well as institutional biases which lead to 
more women being diagnosed with contested diseases than men.  The reason I 460
refrained from including this discussion in my thesis is because I felt as though it 
 That is to say, there were plenty of  patient movements and groups before the internet, 458
so are we just seeing an extension of  this?
 Shorter has suggested that though there is probably a biological component, one un459 -
der appreciated factor may be that women’s lives are, on average, more likely to be stress-
ful, unfulfilling and create the psychological tension that seems so often to lead to condi-
tions such as fibromyalgia: Shorter, E.1994, pp. 87-88.
 Not of  course across all such conditions. Gulf  war syndrome for instance is predomi460 -
nate among males, for obvious reasons.
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would shift the perspective of  the entire work. It is not that I do not think ap-
proaching this from a feminist viewpoint would be fruitful, but rather that I did 
not, when undertaking this project, have the theoretical background necessary to 
pursue that line of  enquiry with confidence. This is another thesis for another 
scholar.  
A fourth question might be reasonably asked. Throughout this work I have drawn 
upon those instances of  disease that sit astride the border of  legitimacy, either right 
on the borders of  biomedical structures or else shut out but trying to get it. As 
such, the vocabulary I have employed around expectations and recognition is 
geared towards the uncanny edges of  illness, those conditions that don’t quite fit.  461
The usefulness of  this exercise is, I hope, clear but it does raise the question: what 
of  non-controversial diseases? I have written at great length about the ways in 
which we don’t recognise or struggle to recognise illness and about the damage 
which is done when a disease does not meet our expectations, but what about when 
it does? That is to say, instead of  trying to tease out prevailing notions of  disease in 
a negative manner as I have done here, could we not take a condition that we do 
recognise and ask: what it is about this thing that seems so familiar? These are cer-
tainly interesting questions, and I would be intrigued to know how much of  my 
analysis of  contested illnesses applies to less ambiguous cases. It might be assumed 
that in such instances the interplay between the individual and the institution 
would be greater, given the more concrete aspects of  the knowledge being pro-
duced about a given disease category. Whether or not this diminishes the aspects 
of  a patient’s identity constructed outside of  medical interactions remains to be 
seen.  
But these are questions for another time. 





Appendix I - Methodology  
 
Study design 
In order to collect the original data for this thesis I conducted semi-structured, 
recorded telephone interviews with twenty-two fibromyalgia patients, lasting be-
tween 30-60 minutes each. Twenty of  these patients were from the UK and living 
here, one was living in the US and one was an American living in the UK. Twen-
ty-one were female and one was male (and from the UK). They were between the 
ages of  eighteen and sixty-five, inclusive. I tried throughout the process of  recruit-
ment and interviewing to be as sensitive as possible to the needs of  the patients, in 
order that they would feel comfortable sharing details of  their condition with me 
and so that my study would interject minimally into their lives.  
My recruitment technique was as follows. All participants but one were self-select-
ed: I wrote to the spokespeople for major fibromyalgia organisations within the 
UK such as FMA UK, discussed my project with them and asked that they kindly 
distribute details of  my study to the support groups they worked with.  After that, 462
patients were free to get in touch with me if  they were interested in taking part. I 
received over one hundred responses, which I took on a first-come first-serve basis, 
only making one exception in which I invited a male to take part as he was the 
only man who responded to me. Patients who expressed interested were provided 
with a study outline and ethics sheet (see Appendix 2), and I answered any ques-
tions they had about me, my work or the project. Providing that they consented to 
taking part, I then arranged a time that would be convenient for them to talk with 
me on the phone. 
 The exception to this was a prominent fibromyalgia blogger, whose online presence and pro462 -
motion of  disease awareness led me to believe they were comfortable discussing their condition 
and might have articulate and informed insights to share with me.
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During our phone interview, after going through my ethical requirements and re-
sponsibilities and describing the process to them, I led the discussion with open-
ended questions about their condition, the symptoms they experienced, how their 
care had been, how their family had reacted and what their work situation was. 
Each patient was asked, broadly, questions on the same topics. They were free to 
stop the interview at any time. If  at any point a promising tangent developed then 
I allowed the participant to speak freely and let the conversation head in that direc-
tion. Towards the end of  the interviews, I asked each participant if  there was any-
thing further they would like to discuss, anything they thought I should cover or 
whether there was something about their experience of  fibromyalgia they felt de-
served attention. In general I was surprised and pleased by the apparently candid 
nature of  these talks, and of  the way that patients appeared comfortable sharing 
sometimes intimate details of  their condition.  
After the interviews concluded, I sent each participant a recording of  their inter-
view, then saved and encrypted the files on my personal computer. I gave each par-
ticipant the opportunity to expand upon, clarify or retract anything they had said 
in the interview, and several utilised this option to send me further useful details 
they had forgotten to mention when we spoke.  
I then converted each interview to a transcript and worked from this to produce 
Chapter IV. Before writing this section of  the thesis I re-listened to each interview 
and went through each transcript. It was as a result of  this that I arrived at the four 
categories used - Pain, Relationships, Work and Welfare, Care - as these seemed to 
be the most salient concerns to my argument and a layered but pleasingly encom-
passing set of  categories by which to organise my data and direct my discussion. In 
order to protect the confidentiality of  the participants, I changed or removed all 
names from my work as well as potentially identifying features such as location. 
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When a draft of  this chapter was finished, I distributed it among those I had spo-
ken to and allowed two months for any comments, retractions or clarifications.  463
Discussion 
Many potential weak points of  my study methodology will appear immediately 
obvious. The first is size. Twenty-two individuals is hardly likely to be representa-
tive of  a large patient community. However, to contact more patients would have 
led, I feel, to shorter, less expansive interviews. I made a choice, therefore, to bal-
ance the need for in-depth responses with practical concerns of  time consuming 
transcribing and organising of  the data that resulted. Furthermore, on some 
points, I began to notice that similar themes were being brought up and that there 
were not wildly divergent responses to a lot of  my questions. This convinced me, if  
not completely then sufficiently, that the number of  patients I had interviewed was 
adequate to pass comment upon. 
Sampling presents a bigger issue, I think. My aim in approaching patients through 
community leaders and allowing for self-selection was to avoid any chance of  in-
conveniencing people who might be vulnerable. By simply disseminating the in-
formation and allowing patients to opt-in to the study, I think I did minimise the 
risk of  inadvertently causing distress. However, this created other difficulties, chief  
among them that I was unable in any meaningful way to manipulate my partici-
pant population to make it more representative of  the patient community as a 
whole (though mapping the demographics of  this is a task in itself). I was also in 
the dark as to what sort of  person would put themselves forward for a study like 
this, what axes they might have to grind or, indeed, whether there was a consisten-
cy to my respondents and their reasons for participating at all. The lack of  infor-
mation I held on the patients involved - beyond the basic inclusion criteria - caused 
 None of  the participants wished to change their interview comments or withdraw from the 463
study following the distribution of  this draft.
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me a significant amount of  worry: how skewed would their responses be and in 
what direction? My worry was amplified slightly by the number of  patients who 
expressed disappointment or contempt for the patient community itself. I began to 
wonder if  I had inadvertently collected a sample of  atypical patients who wanted 
to use the opportunity to make a point about support groups and the like.  
This fear was somewhat allayed by not only the regularity of  some of  the respons-
es, as detailed in Chapter IV, but also by the way in which a large portion of  the 
rest of  the data generated accorded neatly with my general sense of  the disease 
and others like it, gleaned from my master’s degree research on morgellons, exten-
sive perusal of  patient forums, online support groups and blogs, conversations with 
other academics at conferences and of  course the medical literature itself. That I 
was not often completely surprised by what I heard I took to indicate a certain lev-
el of  commonality to patient experiences, one which I do not wish to overstate but 
nonetheless one which made me more confident in the usefulness of  my theorising 
from such a sample.  
Not just the people who I interviewed but the way that I did so should be brought 
into question. Again my interest was to reduce the amount of  stress and discomfort 
felt by those I was interviewing: speaking on the telephone is a less confrontational 
and requires less effort than face-to-face conversation, and it also grants the speak-
er more power to terminate the process if  they so wish. As well as this, I was aware 
that individuals might be self-conscious about their physical condition and appear-
ance, as well as their home, something which could distract them or put them off  
talking with me at all. Finally, there are practical costs involved in travelling around 
the country, so telephone interviews allowed me to avoid discriminating on the ba-
sis of  distance, which I may have been forced to if  I had chosen to conduct them 
in person.  
Telephone interviewing also creates its own problems, however. Non-verbal com-
munication is expressive and important and, on another note, can be vital in gain-
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ing the trust of  another person in an interview setting. I will never know how much 
I missed by choosing to conduct my interviews in the manner that I did, but as far 
as can be judged, I feel confident that the patients I spoke with were open and 
honest with me, discussing sensitive, sad and embarrassing moments in their lives. 
Certainly, if  there was one thing which surprised me about those I spoke with, it 
was the even-handedness and self-awareness with which they treated their condi-
tion. This seemed to me evidence enough of  sincerity. 
In terms of  theory, I can see room for critique of  my study. I did not hang my in-
terview structure or questions on a particular theoretical framework. However, 
there was present a predisposition towards certain viewpoints and my interests had 
congealed around particular points of  discussion before I interviewed my first pa-
tient, so I think it would be incorrect to characterise my methodology as grounded 
theory. In other words I knew what I was looking for and I found it, the many 
permutations of  what I found making up the bulk of  the analysis presented above. 
So is this ethnography then? I am instantly wary of  terming my work ethnograph-
ic, because it can mean many things to many people. This work is though, in a 
sense. My research is ethnographic in the way that Herbert Gans describes when 
he says ‘it means being with and talking to people, especially those whose activities 
are not newsworthy, asking them thoughtful and empathic questions, and analysing 
the resulting data’.  I take this, and my, sort of  ethnography to be of  the common 464
sense variety: not overly theory-laden, willing to be proved wrong, tentative and 
specific where possible. But yes, it is explanations of  culture - in this case the way 
that culture moulds our philosophical reaction to illness - that I am chasing after, 
and I am willing to use all and any of  the tools that I find ready to hand, whether it 
be literature, patient forums, interviews or conversations in the pub.  
This is all very well, but is it not the case that these kind of  methods and intentions 
 Gans, H. in Wolfe, A. (ed.) America at Century’s End, 1991, University of  California Press, USA, 464
p. xi.  
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are the preserve of  sociologists rather than philosophers? It could certainly be ar-
gued that much of  what I have present above would neatly assimilate into various 
parts of  sociology of  health and illness with no need to talk of  metaphysics. So is it 
just sociology? Do I have a philosophical position? If  so, why does it appear so ob-
scured? My response to this is to say that, though I have sympathy with this line of  
thought, it strikes me that what I have largely attempted to do in this thesis is to 
contemplate philosophical questions in a broader, less abstracted context: what is a 
disease and what is not? - how do our deep-seated conceptualisations of  the world 
affect how we experience illness in ourselves and in others? - how do historical cur-
rents, cultural deposits, relations with others, institutional categories interact and 
develop in us - somewhere deep and intangible - a strong sense of  one thing rather 
than the other? These are, I believe, philosophical questions. They may seem gen-
eral but really they are about the individual. It’s just that this individual is not an 
idealised type, or me, or a hypothetical figure representing a viewpoint, they are 
the non-philosophically self-conscious among us. That is to say, they are most of  
us. 
Still, though, I feel that something nags. I have established no particular ontologi-
cal standpoint. I belong to no school. I have not engaged with my data or the liter-
ature as a phenomenologist, or a Foucauldian, or from a mechanistic causality per-
spective, or whatever. This is due, I think, to a combination of  theoretical sloppi-
ness and a scholarly and genuine desire to be as heterogeneous in my approach to 
source materials as possible. I did not take a stated position and hoped that one 
would emerge organically as I read and talked and listened, and this is roughly 
what happened. But the nebulous nature of  this process and its product puts me in 
the difficult position of  admitting that, though this work is many things, it does not 
benefit from the consistency, comparability and cohesiveness of  a work steered 
more confidently by a predetermined intellectual rudder. All I can say it that I do 
not think it is in my nature to have done it any other way. 
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